
CHRISTIANITY WORLD • POLITICS

JOURNAL OF THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

The Institute of Political Science
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

Scientific Advisory Board:

Professor Jane Adolphe, Ph.D. (Ave Maria School of Law - Florida USA)
Professor Chantal Delsol, Ph.D. (Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée)
Professor Aniela Dylus, Ph.D.
Professor Ingeborg Gabriel, Ph.D. (Universität Wien)
Professor Jan Grosfeld, Ph.D.
Professor Milan Katuninec, Ph.D. (Trnavská Univerzita v Trnave)
Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz Ph.D. (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw)
Professor Vittorio Possenti, Ph.D. (Università Cà Foscari di Venezia)

Editorial Board:

Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D. – Editor-in-Chief
Professor Michał Gierycz, Ph.D. – Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Rev. Piotr Burgoński, Ph.D.
Professor Ligia Castaldi, Ph.D. (Ave Maria School of Law - Florida USA)
Grégor Puppinck, Ph.D. (European Centre for Law and Justice - Strasbourg)
Mariusz Sulkowski, Ph.D. - Secretary

Subject editors: Professor Michał Gierycz, Ph.D., Mariusz Sulkowski, Ph.D.

Polish-Language Copyeditor: Paweł Gabryś-Kurowski

English-Language Copyeditor: Małgorzata Wójcik

Reviewers:

Professor Jane Adolphe, Ph.D.	Professor Ryszard Michalak, Ph.D.
Professor Janusz Balicki, Ph.D.	Professor Łukasz Młyńczyk, Ph.D.
Professor Ligia Castaldi, Ph.D.	Sergei A. Mudrov, Ph.D.
Professor Aniela Dylus, Ph.D.	Rafał Proszak, Ph.D.
Professor Michał Gierycz, Ph.D.	Professor Paweł Skrzydlewski, Ph.D.
Professor Wojciech Gizicki, Ph.D.	Sławomir Sowiński, Ph.D.
Professor Jan Grosfeld, Ph.D.	Professor Maria Sroczyńska, Ph.D.
Professor Wojciech Jakubowski, Ph.D.	Professor Zbigniew Stawrowski, Ph.D.
Professor Paweł Kaczorowski, Ph.D.	Rev. Professor Arkadiusz Wuwer, Ph.D.
Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.	

Publisher:

Chair of the Political Theory and Political Thought
The Institute of Political Science Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw
ul. Wóycickiego 1/3, 01-938 Warszawa, b. 23, p. 414
e-mail: ip@uksw.edu.pl, www.chsp.waw.pl

Graphics and cover design:

Mediakoncept

Desktop Publishing:

Studio EDO – Jakub Łoś

Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka – English-language version.
The original version of the Journal is the English-language printed version.

ISSN 1896-9038

© Copyright 2019 by Chair of the Political Theory and Political Thought.
The Institute of Political Science Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

From Editors

Despite the secularization of the Western world, religion is becoming increasingly present in political analyses. This is closely related to the growing impact of religious motivation on national (at the level of national states) and international politics. The phenomenon is not a new one if we take into account the role of religion in the so-called third wave of democratization, for example; nevertheless, acknowledgement of the religious factor has not always gone anywhere beyond simple information. For some time now, particularly in view of the role of the religious factor in conflicts in the Middle East or Africa, religiously motivated terrorism, or the so-called Arab Spring, religious topics have come to stay in the discourse of political science for good. Moreover, a new sub-discipline has emerged in the form of a political science of religion.

The main topic of this issue is a methodological question: How should religion be studied by political science? Articles on this subject have been contributed by Michał Gierycz, Krzysztof Gładkowski, Tadeusz Jarosz SDS, and Rev. Piotr Mazurkiewicz. They discuss fundamental issues, namely how should a political scientist know what religion is, or even whether the term should be used in the singular or plural? Where should he turn to for knowledge about religion? What does neutrality of worldview and religion consist in, a must in empirical sciences? Can the interdisciplinary approach in contemporary sciences be overcome? They also reflect on the difference between neutrality of worldview and religion in science and methodological atheism. Is a thesis about the methodological atheism of political science true? Does this atheism have any negative impact on the knowledge and understanding of political phenomena, and if so, can it be overcome? Can only a functional definition of religion be used in the context

of political science, or are there appropriate methodological methods in place to enable the introduction of some elements of the substantial approach as well? Thence the questions featured in the titles of these articles (even if not always followed by a question mark): *Can Interdisciplinarity Be Overcome in the Political Science of Religion?*; *Overcoming Reductionism. On "In-depth" Systems Analysis in the Political Science of Religion.* *Ecclesial Politology: in Search of an Adequate Perspective of Viewing the Church in Political Studies.*

Other aspects of the main topic appear in the miscellanea. Rev. Adam Romejko applies René Girard's theory of mimetic mechanism to the analysis of political discourse in Germany concerning its neighboring countries. He argues that it reflects a quasi-religious sense of the Germans' political affiliation with the "civilized" Western-European order, which legitimates their "educational mission" to societies which choose to organize their political sphere differently.

Chantal Delsol analyses the influence of Judaism and Christianity on the perception of historical time. The shift from a cyclical concept of time to a linear one results in "opening up" time and introducing hope into the history of mankind, including political history. The Enlightenment, by secularizing the hope of salvation, transformed it into a belief in progress, promising fulfillment within the confines of this world. Messianic promises could not be fulfilled in the temporal dimension, however, through a simple accumulation of goods. Such an approach results in disillusionment and attempts at finding consolation in instant gratification. Consequently, the society – also in the political sense – becomes short-sighted.

Fred Lazin analyses the evolution in the status of Jews in the United States from the 1930s onwards. In particular, he focuses on the US migration policy towards Jews, the approach of the American society and political authorities, and the influence of Jewish organizations on US politics.

The next article by Joachim v. Wedel analyses the political idealism which tries to place the last things (salvation) in history. By referring to the thought of Saint Augustine, Luther and Paul Althaus, theologians representing three different historical periods, the author argues that Christian theology has always spoken up against an immanentisation of the idea of salvation.

In the next article, Marguerite A. Peeters comments on the international policy of promoting reproductive health in the African context. Under the banner of

improved safety, sustainable development, or freedom, solutions are proposed aimed at promoting abortion, contraception, in-vitro procedures, sterilization or a new kind of sexual education. This leads the author to ask whether developed countries are not trying to impose a demographic policy on poor countries in contravention of the fundamental ethical principles and human rights?

Equally interesting is the last chapter which presents accounts of conferences and reviews. On the 25th anniversary of *The Politics and Religion Journal (PRJ)*, Miroljub Jevtić looks back at the history of this sub-discipline in the Serbian context. The very first lectures on the political science of religion were delivered at the University of Belgrade's Department of Political Science in the academic year 1993/1994. Since then, a number of students and postgraduates have received formation in this area. Many years of consistent efforts have resulted in the publication of a magazine in the English language which enjoys much recognition today in the academic circles.

The collection also includes a report by Jolanta Kulska on the international conference on *Socio-Political and Religious Ideas and Movements in the 20th-21st Centuries* (Riga, October 4-5, 2018), and a review of Chantal Delson's important book *Les pierres d'angle* by Michał Kmiec.

It is our hope that articles published in this issue of our magazine will help readers answer the fundamental question about whether political science is/must indeed be "atheistic in the proper sense".

Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.
Editor-in-Chief

Table of Contents

The Metodology of Political Science of Religion

Rev. Piotr Mazurkiewicz

What Should a Political Scientist Know About Religion? 11

Krzysztof Gładkowski

Can Interdisciplinarity Be Overcome in the Political Science of Religion? 31

Michał Gierycz

Overcoming Reductionism. On “In-depth” Systems Analysis in the Political Science of Religion 41

Tadeusz Jarosz SDS

Ecclesial Politology: in Search of an Adequate Perspective of Viewing the Church in Political Studies 66

Miscellanea

Marguerite A. Peeters

The 2016-2063 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Reproductive Rights Neo-Colonizing Plan for Africa 85

Chantal Delsol

O nadziei (On Hope) 101

Joachim von Wedel

Der theologische Antichiliasmus (The theological antichiliasm) 108

Fred Lazin

The changing context of Jews in American Politics – 1930s to the Trump Era 122

Rev. Adam Romejko

*René Girarda teoria mimetyczna. Między religią a polityką
(René Girard's mimetic theory. Between religion and politics)* 134

Discussions, Conference Reports, Reviews**Miroljub Jevtić**

25 Years of Politology of Religion 151

Joanna Kulska

*Sprawozdanie z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej,
Ryga 4-5 października 2018
(Report on the international scientific conference, Riga 4-5 October 2018)* 159

Michał Kmieć

*Paradoksy współczesnych Europejczyków
Recenzja książki Chantal Delsol
pt. Kamienie węgielne. Na czym nam zależy?
(Paradoxes of modern Europeans Book review of Chantal Delsol
Les pierres d'angle: À quoi tenons-nous?)* 164

Biographical note 169

The Methodology of Political Science of Religion

Rev. Piotr Mazurkiewicz

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland

What Should a Political Scientist Know About Religion?

Abstract: A political scientist will not see any reasons for becoming seriously interested in the phenomenon of religion unless he finds religion to be a lasting phenomenon in the history of civilization. The first question that needs to be answered in order to talk reasonably about the borderland between religion and politics is the issue of what religion is, and how historical religions essentially differ from one another. One may then study, for example, the political effectiveness of religious motivation. The other question is whether a functional approach to religion in the context of political science is sufficient. The author suggests that it should be replaced with a semi-substantial approach. It requires from a political scientist to understand the essence of a particular religion and the extent to which certain social consequences of religious beliefs (e.g. polygamy, religiously motivated violence, separation between religion and politics) are related to its essence, and to what extent such relationship is merely accidental.

The article also analyzes traditional areas of a political scientist's interest in religion, i.e. the relationship between the state and religious communities, religiously defined and motivated interests, and the state's policy towards religious institutions. In addition, new areas of interest are discussed, such as confessional politics in the EU, or forgiveness as a political category of current relevance and a strictly Christian origin.

Key words: religion, reconciliation, Christianity, Islam, political science

Abstrakt: Powody do poważnego zainteresowania zjawiskiem religii ze strony politologia pojawiają się dopiero w momencie uznania przez niego religii za trwałe zjawisko w dziejach cywilizacji. Pierwszym pytaniem na jakie trzeba odpowiedzieć, aby sensownie mówić o styku religii i polityki, jest kwestia tego, czym w ogóle jest religia i co odróżnia w sposób istotny poszczególne historyczne religie. W dalszej kolejności możemy badać np. faktyczną polityczną efektywność religijnych motywacji. Powstaje także pytanie, czy funkcjonalne podejście do religii na gruncie nauk o polityce jest wystarczające. Autor proponuje zastąpienie

go podejściem semi-substancjalnym. Wymaga ono od politologa zaznajomienia się z treścią danej religii i próby zrozumienia na ile pewne społeczne konsekwencje konkretnej wiary religijnej (np. poligamia, przemoc motywowana religijnie, separacja religii i polityki) związane są z jej istotą, a na ile są one powiązane jedynie akcydentalnie.

W tekście podjęta jest także analiza tradycyjnych obszarów zainteresowania religią ze strony politologa, tzn. relacje państwo a wspólnoty religijne, religijnie definiowane i motywowane interesy oraz polityka państwa wobec instytucji religijnych. Ponadto poruszone są nowe obszary takiego zainteresowania, jak np. polityka wyznaniowa UE, zmiana struktury demograficznej poszczególnych religii w Europie czy wreszcie przebaczenie jako istotna współcześnie kategoria politologiczna o proveniencji ściśle chrześcijańskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: religia, pojednanie, chrześcijaństwo, islam, politologia

The title question of this article is based on the assumption that a political scientist should know something about religion in the first place. This assumption seems reasonable, and rather obvious, only if we recognize that religion affects political attitudes and choices made by citizens, and that it has any future at all, i.e. that religious traditions and communities are not merely an archaic relic of premodern societies transferred into contemporary times. Once we assume that the phenomenon of religion is on the decline, and that religious people will sooner or later become extinct, just like so many other endangered species, the political scientist no longer needs to be bothered with such problems too much. He may simply limit his expert opinion to a postulate that a kind of preserves or heritage parks be established so that such groups can die and rest in peace. Jurgen Habermas once wrote:

“As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious communities are, as it were, archaic relics of premodern societies persisting into the present, they can understand freedom of religion only as the cultural equivalent of the conservation of species threatened with extinction. (...) Even the principle of the separation of church and state can have for them only the laicist meaning of benign indifference” [Habermas 2012: 139].

Assertions based on the assumption that the nature of all religion is not only ephemeral, but also alienating, i.e. harmful, are part of one of the main social philosophies of the Enlightenment, that is Marxism. It considers the thesis about the extinction of religion to be a scientific standpoint, while the opposite view

is seen as a superstition. “The above claim has been proclaimed and postulated most emphatically, even ‘required’ in relevant circles, as a synonym of the only scientific method and, moreover, of the ‘scientific worldview’. Today, such claims are no longer made with a similarly unqualified finality”, John Paul II said at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1987 [John Paul II 1998: 424]. The demise of the Marxist paradigm and the role played by religion in the entire process should make scholars a little more cautious in their postulates about the social “death of God”.

The failure of communism is not the only argument demonstrating the scientific error of atheism. Religion perceived from a purely sociological perspective in the global dimension is well and thriving as well. The number of persons who declare a religious affiliation both in absolute and relative terms keeps growing year to year, and forecasts for the future are – as far as people of faith are concerned – rather optimistic [Pew Research Center 2016]. Europeans find it hard to realize, though, as processes occurring on the Old Continent represent an exception on a global scale and have the opposite dynamic PB: [Inglehart, Norris 2006: 322-323].

Another important reason for political scientists to become interested in religion is the actual political effect of religious motivation. Let us call to mind two events in which religion has played an essential role: the third wave of democratization [cf. Huntington 1993], and the so-called Arab Spring. In my numerous contacts with high EU officials, I looked in disbelief at their collective identification of these two phenomena. I have often heard assertions, made with much confidence, that secular authoritarian regimes in the North Africa and the Middle East are falling before our very eyes, and will most certainly be replaced with liberal democracies. A similar optimism characterized American politicians commenting on the future of Iraq shortly before the invasion of coalition forces. In both cases, that of the bankruptcy of communism and of the Arab Spring, religion was an essential factor. Different religions have different consequences in social and political life, however. It is not enough, therefore, to acknowledge that religion matters. One must know something about what effects are brought about by different religions¹. Political scientists (and politicians) who display misconceptions in their political thoughts and actions about the significance of religion, or who are ignorant of the content and historical traditions of different religions, may not only be wrong in their expectations about developments in the political situation, but may actually

¹ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart conclude that it is impossible to compare different religions, as each of them is *sui generis*; nevertheless, the significance of certain elements of different religions in different cultures does yield to comparison [Inglehart, Norris 2006: 302].

be politically dangerous. This awareness may have been the reason for establishing a 'pôle religions' at Quai d'Orsay in 2009 (Service-Public) for the purpose of analyzing religions for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first thesis, therefore, which a political scientist should consider is the lasting character of the phenomenon of religion. Man is a *homo religiosus*, he is "incurably religious". And the other is that religion influences social and political life, and that the consequences of this influence depend on the religion. Attempts at eliminating religion from social life are doomed to failure, though in the meantime they may contribute to increasing the number of martyrs in churches and religious communities. On the other hand, there is a dispute going on in societies about the quality of the sacrum that is influencing social life.

What Is Religion, Anyway?

This question seems banal enough. Not only has this term been around in our civilization for centuries, after all, but we encounter it in the media all the time on a daily basis. The difficulty, which we are not always aware of, is that our associations with this concept have developed – irrespectively of our personal attitude to religious faith – in a strictly Christian context. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, for example, considers Christianity to be the only absolute religion [Hegel 2007: vol. 2, 198]. In his comments on this view, Remi Brague says that according to Hegel, Christianity is the only religion which is nothing else but religion; or which is "pure" religion, we might say. All other religions have an admixture of something "foreign", which is not religion. There is some additional element thrown in together with the religious one. Judaism is a religion and a people, or – if you will – a religion and a morality. Islam is a religion and a legal system. Buddhism – if it is a religion at all – is also a doctrine of wisdom [Brague 2018: 40]. One may theorize, however, that Hegel, precisely in the light of his Christian experiences, defined religion so that it could only be fully satisfied by Christianity. Continuing along these lines, one might say that the definition of religion we use in Western social sciences is highly European-centered. Should a political scientist realize this, and should he understand why the word European-centered when referred to religion means something different than when it is used in the context of law or culture, for instance? Should he – if we agree with Brague's comments – know what is of a strictly religious nature in other beliefs and what is not, being merely an additional element, a "contamination" of sorts? In the former case, the imposition by the state of any restriction on religious practices could – in view of the Western definition of religion – be considered a restriction

of the right to religious freedom; in the latter, this would no longer be the case. It seems that knowing the answer to these question matters, for example, in the context of the dispute going on in Europe about the right to wear “ostentatious” religious symbols, such as e.g. a burqa, a chador, or a hijab. While such disputes may be approached on the grounds of functionalism, i.e. by looking for a solution which leads to ensuring social peace without going into the essence of the dispute, the question is whether such peace would last, and whether we are not dealing with apparent functionalism in a case like this, i.e. a substantial approach which has not been explicitly articulated. A political scientist always has some concept of religion in the back of his head, possibly without even realizing where this concept came from, taking it for granted as the only possible and obvious one.

A good illustration of the paradox of functionalism when applied to religion is the example provided by Robert Spaemann. He notes that the state’s positive attitude to religion often depends on the extent to which it helps the state achieve certain important non-religious objectives. Religion is therefore allowed to exist in the public sphere, only to the extent, however, that it properly fulfills the secular function it is assigned. It is for this reason that even secular France has not abandoned the idea of military chaplains, or of inviting bishops or imams to marches against violence organized after terrorist attacks. The point is often simply about charitable or educational goals, however. As an example of the functional approach, Spaemann describes the reaction to the claim that zen meditation is important, because policemen who practice it are better snipers. This claim may be true, yet the question is open as to how this would be relevant to an individual who were to engage in certain religious practices in order to improve their “efficiency” at work. Should police officers be ordered to “convert” to zen and practice meditation? If we perceive religion and religious communities in terms of the functions they perform, we risk not only running into a host of misunderstandings, but also popularizing an instrumental approach to these religions and communities. Functionalism treats the society as a black box into which certain inputs are introduced, to be then processed in accordance with an algorithm known to the operators, in order to receive a desired output. No one is interested in what actually is inside the black box. An algorithm which does not take into account the nature of the religious factor and the essential differences between various religions may be dangerously unreliable, however. Moreover, a purely functional approach could be perceived by the religious communities concerned as disrespectful, if not – to use religious terminology – blasphemous. Let us recall the dispute going on in Brussels over what the

“specific contribution” means in Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. I will leave the question open whether politicians (political scientists) should be allowed to approach the religious feelings of citizens in a disdainful manner, even if inadvertently or due to ignorance. The point is not so much to provide a particular answer here, but to pose a particular question.

What can be proposed instead of functionalism? Reflecting on the possibility of an inter-religious dialogue between Christianity and Islam, Marcelo Pera points out that strictly speaking such a dialogue is impossible. Both religions have their holy scriptures which they believe to have been revealed by God, and any attempt at “negotiating” or “adjusting” their content to account for that of another religion would presume relativism. Each of these religions, as has already been mentioned, causes different cultural effects, however, and a dispute over which of them are more or less desirable in view of the common good does not have to refer to which of them is considered “true” or “false” at all. In this context, Pera introduces the concept of “empirical patrimony”, which in Europe is strictly Christian in character, and asks whether “the cultural consequences of Islam are compatible with the moral patrimony of humankind? With democracy? With the Charter of Human Rights?” [Pera 2008: 132-133]. In other words, he suggests a discussion concerning the extent to which polygamy, violence, lack of separation between religion and politics, etc., are essentially related to Islam as a religion, and to what extent their relationship is accidental. This approach may be described as semi-substantial. In the context discussed here, it means that a politician who takes decisions (or a political scientist who offers his suggestions) should be aware of the course of such debates, and – if they are conclusive – of their results. In fact, it appears that we actually follow just such or similar guidelines; in other words, we do not appoint religious philistines as diplomats, and we do not rely in foreign policy on experts who are dilettantes as regards the religious context of decisions to be taken. The point is, to a large extent, that this should be done in an informed way. Especially that – as Samuel Huntington as well as others have pointed out – religion represents the foundations of every civilization, even though differences between civilizations cannot be reduced to those due to religion [cf. Huntington 1996].

What is religion, then? When looking at the Latin etymology of the term “religion”, we will notice that there are two aspects to it. Cicero derives the word *religio* from *relegare*, which means: to regather, to reconsider, to reread, to repeat, to rerun. Consequently, *religiosi* are people who try to carefully observe and repeat

all that is related to gods². Understood this way, religion is first of all a collection of beliefs and practices related to gods, peculiar to a particular nation and passed on by tradition. Re-reading involves the use of reason, whence *religio* may also be considered as the opposite of *superstitio* - superstition³. The religious need inherent to human nature means, as has been pointed out by Alasdair MacIntyre, that man always – even if he considers himself to be an agnostic or an atheist – professes some religion or superstition. Consequently – as should be emphasized – the emancipatory power of religion with respect to superstition is always liberating⁴. What should be stressed in the very definition of religion is its relation to reason. Whether we are in fact dealing with a mere *superstitio* or with religion depends on whether it is a faith which tries to understand, or a faith which is merely fideistic. Religion, therefore – considered in the European context – is not afraid of properly used reason; quite on the contrary, it opens reason to the fullness of truth about reality, it expands its cognitive horizon. If religion were banned from the university, or if questions about the relationship between a particular religion and violence were to be prohibited, as Benedict XVI emphasized at the University of Regensburg, reason, and consequently political science, would become helpless in the face of attempts at abusing religion [Benedict XVI 2017: 27-53].

Early Christianity related the word “religion” more often to *re-ligare*, to re-connect, meaning, firstly, the relationship between man and God (rather than tradition), and, secondly, the relationship between believers⁵. Religion, therefore, is based on

² “Such as heedfully repeated and, as it were, “regathered” (*relegerent*) everything that formed a part of divine worship, were named *religiosus* from *relegere*. (...) In this way (...) the word religious (...) became the designation of (...) an excellence”. [Cicero, II,28].

³ Cicero links *superstitio* to an „inane fear of gods” (*timor inanis deorum*) [Cicero, I, 117]. Over time, the word began to mean rites hostile to Rome, such as, for example, Gallic rites. Also Christianity was initially referred to by this word. In 379, heretic Christian dogmas were called *perversa superstitio*. Summing up the evolution of conceptual frameworks which survived the demise of the Western Empire, Bruno Dumézil says that *religions* were most often defined as the whole of cults allowed by civil law. They were divided into two groups: *religio par excellence* present in the state’s institutions, and *religiones licitae*, meaning cults which, while permitted, did not enjoy a legal status equal to that of the state religion. *Superstitio*, on the other hand, began to mean all beliefs prohibited by law [Dumézil 2008: 49-60].

⁴ “Part of the gift of Christian faith is to enable us to identify accurately where the line between faith and reason is to be drawn, something that cannot be done from the standpoint of reason, but only from that of faith. Reason therefore needs Christian faith, if it is to do its own work well. Reason without Christian faith is always reason informed by some other faith, characteristically an unacknowledged faith, one that renders its adherents liable to error” [MacIntyre 2013: 211].

⁵ “Man is bound to God by the ties of piety, whence religion itself receives its name”. Lactantius, *Epitome of the divine institutes*, LXIX, in: Fletcher W. (ed.), *The works of Lactantius*, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, vol. II, p. 157.

a personal relationship between man and God which is realized in the community of the Church. The risen Christ is the only Mediator between the Father and people. At the same time, he breaks down the wall of hostility that kept mankind apart, making two kinds of people into one [cf. Ephesians 2:14]. There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female [cf. Galatians 3:28]. All of these features become insignificant compared to the fact God has adopted man and made him his foster child. This way of substantiating the oneness of humankind is specific to Christianity. Thus, religion has two dimensions: the vertical and the horizontal one. It is fulfilled through the implementation of two commandments of love – of God and of one’s neighbors. As a consequence of this approach, Christianity claims that religion is not merely a private matter, reducible to acts of cult performed within the four walls of one’s home. Religion – according to Christians – is a public matter, and any attempts at denying or restricting the right to confess and practice one’s faith in the public sphere are always felt as a violation of the right to religious freedom, which political scientists must never forget. Religion cannot be reduced, therefore, to the experience of some form of spirituality.

Traditional Areas of Political Interest in Religion

Petr Fiala offers a rather apt summary of the three traditional areas where religion and politics come into contact. Firstly, there is the relationship between the state and religious communities (*polity*). Secondly, there are religiously defined and motivated interests (*politics*). And thirdly, there is the religious *policy* of the state [Fiala 2016: 133-137]. The claim he makes, however, that the force of the public influence of religious institutions, including the Catholic Church, and of Christian political parties has declined so much that disputes in these areas no longer matter, is arguable. It seems that literature on the subject, particularly on the model of the relationship between the state and the Church in the Western world, is abundant enough, and there is no need to dwell upon this issue here. Nevertheless, even recently we have witnessed significant developments, e.g. in Norway, Sweden, Italy, Spain or Malta, not to mention Central and Eastern Europe, where legal regulations in this area have changed. Admittedly, these changes fit within the three models mentioned above, and in this sense the saying *nihil novi sub sole* is true. As regards the second area, it should be said that the situation is very dynamic. A debate has swept through Europe recently about what the “C” means in the name of Christian democracy, and what it changes in its politics. Let us call to mind that Christian democracy in Italy has fallen apart, and at the same time the “C” has returned to the official name of the European People’s Party.

Do “C” parties really represent any interests of the Church? This question entails the implicit view that the Church is, in fact, simply one of many interest groups, and consequently its treatment as a large lobby organization is quite reasonable. What interests would this be about? Material? Ideological ones? A striving for political power in disguise, or an ideological fight for the souls?

There are parties in Europe, however, which – while not representing the Church – make explicit references to Christianity in their very names. Their policies, as has been mentioned, have inspired a discussion over the meaning of the “C” in the names of political parties. One of the theses proposed in this context was that a majority of the most problematic regulations concerning the protection of life, marriage and family would probably never have been approved in Europe, if Christian democrats had not adopted a strategy of “lesser evil”. The main example, as has been stressed by Vladimir Palko, is the Italian Act No. 194 concerning abortion, which is the only pro-abortion law in the world signed exclusively by Catholic politicians (Giulio Andreotti, Tina Anselmi, Francesco Bonifacio, Tommaso Morlino, Filippo Pandolfi) [Palko 2010; [Lohmann 2011: 161-171]. Twenty five years later, Giulio Andreotti said: “Today, I would rather resign than sign that Act” (Palko). Unfortunately, those C-parties which are large enough to aspire to seizing power, still employ the same strategy. The problem is not a new one. Max Weber once wrote: “Some parties, and notably those in America since the disappearance of the old conflicts about the interpretation of the constitution, have become simply parties of position-seekers [*Stellenjägerparteien*] which change their substantive programme according to the chances of winning votes” [cf. Weber 1994: 321]. On the one hand, contemporary C-parties prefer to avoid axiological disputes rather than risk internal conflicts which could result in a break-up of the party itself⁶. On the other hand, when judging their politics by the fruit, one has the impression that some of them are infiltrated by political opponents. Petr Fiala says that due to “an erosion of the Christian political subculture, major Christian parties have gradually (...) transformed into conservative-liberal or conservative-social ones. Some have adopted the model of ‘catch-all parties’, others have become oriented towards certain social groups, or particular regions” [Fiala 2016: 135].

⁶ Current axiological disputes stem from different anthropological visions. One can say that there exists an anthropological dispute between, on the one hand, Christian vision of a man and, on the other, a vision developed in the Enlightenment; between – to recall typology proposed by Michał Gierycz – „constrained” and „unconstrained” anthropology [Gierycz 2017]. Anthropological distinction should not be identified with political fractions. Also among members of, so called, „C-parties” there are proponents of those both antithetical pre-judgements about a dignity of a man.

The question is whether Christians still need nominal C-parties? If so, how can they make the “C” mean more than an aesthetic embellishment? One of the measures that have been proposed is to create small Christian groups within large political parties. This could help their members overcome a sense of isolation, introduce Christian reflection into the main stream of the political debate, and ensure that the Christian viewpoint is presented explicitly. Certainly, there are still enough committed Christians within these parties to make such minority groups possible; it would be a major overstatement, however, to say that C-parties exist today to defend some interests of the Church.

The third area certainly includes the debates going on in the West, already mentioned above, as well as the accompanying legal measures prohibiting the wearing in public places, or only inside public buildings, of religious headwear or clothing (chadors, niqabs, burqas, burqinis, or turbans), or – more broadly – “ostentatious religious symbols”. I believe this area also includes the French discussion initiated by President Sarkozy concerning *laïcité positive*. It is also worth calling to mind that we are witnessing major discrepancies in the approach of political culture to the presence of religion in the public sphere. I do not only mean the difference between European confessional states, religiously neutral states, and secular France. In the dispute over the presence of a cross in an Italian school initiated by a citizen of Finland living in Italy, which was finally resolved in the second instance by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg, the case, as it turned out, was merely about legally defending Italian cultural tradition [European Court of Human Rights 2011]. And so, the cross remained because such is the law of the country. In a somewhat similar dispute over the cross on the John Paul II monument in Ploermel, France, the court ordered that the cross be removed from public space, and the citizens of the town complied by moving the monument a dozen or so meters over to a private plot of land.

***Res novae* in Religion and Politics**

Res novae have certainly appeared in the activities of international organizations, such as the United Nations and similar regional organizations, as well as the European Union. In the former case, there have been repeated attempts at denying the Holy See the status of a member or permanent observer, and replacing it with the status of a large non-governmental organization.

In the latter case, the situation is more complicated, as this international organization seems to have a specific confessional agenda, which touches, be it in a new

form, upon the third area mentioned by Fiala. We have witnessed animated discussions about references to Christianity in the preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the EU Constitutional Treaty. We have a number of EU directives and regulations which directly or indirectly affect the functioning of churches and religious organizations, including their legal status in the Member States [Mazurkiewicz, Ptaszek, Młyńczyk 2019]. Finally, there is Article 17 TFEU which makes it mandatory for EU institutions to dialogue with churches and religious organizations. The density of mutual relationships between EU institutions and churches and religious organizations keeps increasing, but at the same time a tendency is becoming more and more visible in EU politics to change these religions through efforts from the inside. To illustrate this issue, let us call to mind Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council]. While Article 91(1) allows churches and religious organizations to maintain their autonomous system of personal data protection, it does so at the cost of transferring into the system of canon law the model of protection provided for in EU regulations. This way, politicians define the standards of data protection in churches. There is an analogy here also with the debate concerning sexual abuse in churches. Under the influence of political and media pressure, churches often assume not only the sensitivity, but also the terminology and standards for protecting persons, particularly minors. And this is not a criticism of such practices, but merely a statement of their existence.

In order to show another innovative element in the relationship between religion and politics in Europe, we will make a small thought experiment. Let us take a photograph taken in Germany in May 2018. It presents the inside of a Roman basilica built under Emperor Constantine, currently used by the Protestant church. In the center of the photograph there is an altar with the words: „1818-2018. Karl Marx - Trier”⁷. Behind the altar, instead of a pastor who usually stands there while celebrating liturgy, we can see Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, addressing the audience. A number of naïve questions come to

⁷ In a speech in honor of Marx, Juncker said: „Karl Marx was a philosopher, whose thought into the future had creative aspirations. (...) Today he stands for things which he is not responsible for and which he didn't cause, because many of the things he wrote down were redrafted into the opposite. (...) He is the main founder of Marxism, the founder of Marxist political parties and the creator of international communism, and the greatest thinker of modern times” [Churm 2018]; Complete recording of the President's speech: J.-C. Juncker, 2018.

mind: Why is the meeting being held in a church? Is this a service, or a political meeting? Has Juncker changed his confession and become a Protestant pastor? Or the other way round, perhaps, has a pastor become the head of the European Commission? Has the Church changed its approach to communism and no longer treats it as a synonym of godlessness? Is the European People's Party a continuator of the Communist International, and the European Union a successor of the Soviet Union? I am not sure if these questions are serious or not, but the picture certainly represents a meeting point of two worlds: that of religion and politics, where the former hospitably offers its space, and the latter takes over the teaching mission.

Another area in which political decisions very clearly influence the phenomenon of religion in Europe is the migration policy, both at the level of national states and that of the Union. Since for some time now the inflow of immigrants to Europe has been clearly dominated by the confessors of a single, non-European religion, decisions about the preferred directions from which Europe will receive immigrants and about the number of immigrants to be received represent a major factor influencing the religious demographics of the Old Continent. We may say that it is politicians who largely determine future disproportions between various confessions and religions in Europe. This is very much unlike the confessional policy employed in the past by communist countries; it seems, however, that calling it a confessional policy is most reasonable. In both cases, knowledge about religions and their specific contribution – to cite TFEU – to social and political life is a must for a political scientist, including the ability to distinguish between the consequences of this contribution depending on whether the skyline is dominated by the steeples of Gothic cathedrals or by minarets.

When talking about *new things*, one cannot fail to mention the Western discussion about religion and violence. The fundamental question in the face of the fear of terrorism spreading in Western civilizations is whether resorting to violence is an integral part of a particular religion, or whether it is only accidental, meaning that terrorists are acting on their own account, without having the religious legitimation of their community? From time to time, Islam is placed in the center of the public controversy. This was the case after the address of Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg in 2006. Few people seem to have registered the fact that it was entitled: “Faith, Reason and the University” [Benedict XVI 2006]. It was not the Pope's intention to cause a dispute with Muslims, but to propose a critique of modern reason from within. It was not an attempt – as the Pope made clear – to turn our clocks back to pre-Enlightenment time, but a moment of necessary

reflection on modern reason so that it is not entirely defenseless in the face of contemporary challenges. As Lee Harris points out in his comments on the Pope's address, when speaking at the University hall, Benedict XVII was not lecturing from the position of the Head of the Church who "knows all the answers", but from that of a sage who – like Socrates – "knows all the questions" [Harris 2006]. According to Harris, the Pope believes that the concept of rationality characteristic of the Western world is being attacked nowadays from two different sides: that of Islamic fundamentalism, and that of contemporary Western intellectuals who, reducing rationality to that which can be measured using the methods of empirical sciences, a mixture of mathematics and empiricism, narrow it down considerably compared to the Greek concept. Modern reason, the Pope argues, by excluding the issues of religion and ethics from the scope of its research interests, and transferring them to the area of choices which are entirely private, subjective and "irrational" – from the point of view of this narrowed-down concept of rationality – is unable to pass any value-judgments on different religions even as regards their attitude to violence. Consequently, it cannot participate in a discussion about which of the two religions: Christianity or Islam, is more rational and whether, for example, the thirst for human blood is a reflection or the opposite of divine nature. The very survival of reason depends on its ability to answer these questions. It may only function within a community of rational people, within a culture whose members agree that violence is not a legitimate method of influencing human minds. If reason has nothing to say about pathologies of religion, it may perhaps still remain modern reason, but it is far from certain whether it will be able to survive outside of the "culture of reason" (Johann Herder) at all. Consequently, it seems justified that two postulates be addressed to modern reason: an ethical and a religious one. The ethical postulate is: "Do whatever is possible to create a community of reasonable men who abstain from violence, and who prefer to use reason" [Harris 2006: 81]. In our native tradition, this postulate used to be expressed in its Latin version as *plus ratio quam vis*. And the religious postulate is: "If you are given a choice between religions, always prefer the religion that is most conducive to creating a community of reasonable men, even if you don't believe in it yourself" [ibid.]. It appears that these two conclusions of the Pope's address in Regensburg, so loudly protested against in the Muslim world, should not outrage people of science, in particular political scientists, in our secularized Western world.

Religion and European Demographics

For the past several decades, Europe has been experiencing a demographic crisis. It is not often acknowledged that this crisis also has a religious dimension. In

2015, Muslims were the youngest religious group in Europe (with the average age of 33 years, compared to 43 years among Christians). In 2010-2015, in none of the European countries the number of deaths among Muslims exceeded the number of births, which was the case in 24 out of the 42 countries among Christians. In result, the birthrate among Muslims in Europe was 2 290 000 persons, compared to a negative birthrate of -5 640 000 among Christians. The respective forecasts for 2055-2060 are 1 480 000 persons for Muslims and -12 320 000 persons for Christians. This is also related to a religiously differentiated fertility rate. On the global scale, it is decidedly higher in the case of women who are believers than in the case of women who do not declare any religious affiliation (2.5 and 1.6, respectively), which has been pointed out already by Ronald Inglehart [cf. Inglehart, Norris 2011]. The situation in Europe is similar, even though the respective fertility rates and differences between religions are markedly smaller (1.7 and 1.5, respectively)⁸. On the global scale, the total fertility rate is 3.2 among Muslim women, 2.7 among Christian women, and 1.7 among women who do not declare any religious affiliation⁹. According to Eurostat, the total fertility rate for the entire EU in 2017 was 1.59 [Eurostat 2018].

Next to fertility rates, the second major factor affecting the confessional demographics of Europe is migration, already mentioned above. According to Pew Research Center data, it is expected that the Muslim community will reach 8.45% of the total population of Europe without migration, and 10.2% including migration. The expected influence of migration on the confessional structure is higher in Europe than in the case of other continents. In result, it may be expected that such European countries as Great Britain, France, the Republic of Macedonia, Bosna and Herzegovina, or Holland, where Christians represent more than half of the population today, will no longer be countries dominated by Christians. In the case of Great Britain, Christians will still remain the largest religious group, representing 45.5% of the society. In the case of Bosna and Herzegovina, the largest group will be Muslims (56.2% and 49.4%, respectively). And in the case of France and Holland, the largest group will be those who do not declare any religious affiliation (44.1% and 49.1%, respectively). We may thus expect a “victory” of Islam in the Balkan states, of atheism in France and Holland, and of Christianity in Central Europe. Actual changes in the religious demographic structure of Europe will depend on the decisions made by politicians, however. For example, Pew Research

⁸ Forecasts for the years 2015–2020.

⁹ Data for the years 2010–2015.

Centre has prepared three different scenarios of future developments depending on the migration policy adopted in Europe [Pew Research Center 2017]. And it is worth noting that in addition to making decisions about the desired scenario, politicians and political scientists will also be faced with the necessity to take into account the sense of “ontological threat” and the social feelings accompanying this phenomenon¹⁰. Its literary expressions, such as those by Michel Houellebecq, are not merely an effect of artistic imagination [Houellebecq 2015].

Secularization and Short-Sightedness

In a travesty of a saying by Winston Churchill, Rémi Brague says that democracy is the best regime from the standpoint of those who represent a democratic community at the moment. If it stays for good, however, in the long run it will lead to the extinction of mankind [Brague 2014: 304]. Brague is referring here to Alexis de Tocqueville who believed that religion instills in man a general habit of thinking about distant future (*longanimitas*) with the awareness that one day man will have to stand naked before the Judge, “out of [where] two roads lead: one to the islands of the blest and the other to Tartarus” [Plato 1994: 116]. “But in proportion as the light of faith grows dim”, writes Tocqueville, “the range of man’s sight is circumscribed, as if the end and aim of human actions appeared every day to be more within his reach. When men have once allowed themselves to think no more of what is to befall them after life, they readily lapse into that complete and brutal indifference to futurity, which is but too conformable to some propensities of mankind. As soon as they have lost the habit of placing their chief hopes upon remote events, they naturally seek to gratify without delay their smallest desires; and no sooner do they despair of living forever, than they are disposed to act as if they were to exist but for a single day.” [Tocqueville 2002: 617]. Short-sightedness is, so to say, inherent to the nature of a secular democratic state. The community of those living at present is not naturally interested in making laws beneficial to those who have not come into this world yet. Man forgets the observation, made already by Aristotle, that “statesmanship does not create human beings but having received them from nature makes use of them” [Aristotle: 1258a]. In other words, children are not born spontaneously. If we are not consciously committed to giving life to a new generation, children will simply not be born in numbers sufficient to prolong the existence of a democratic community. The contraceptive pill – in this perspective – may prove to be a greater threat to democracy than the atomic bomb [Brague 2014: 299].

¹⁰ The debate on this subject has been aptly summarized by Ivan Krastev [Krastev 2017] or Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz [Bartoszewicz 2018].

Instead of being properly concerned about those who are, as yet, “absent”, we are witnessing a waning sense of intergenerational solidarity, and an increasing popularity of various versions of neo-Malthusianism. The dramatic decline in birth rates in Europe was pointed out by John Paul II, who linked it closely to secularization and the disappearance of hope (“extinguishing hope”) in the Old Continent [John Paul II 2003: 7-10, 12-16]. Similar comments, though, naturally, not in the context of a possible “demographic death of Europe”, were made by Immanuel Kant: “Hence then also morality is not actually the doctrine of how we make ourselves happy, but rather of how we make ourselves worthy of happiness. Only then, upon the advent of religion, does the hope arise of someday participating in happiness in that measure as we were considered to be not unworthy of it. (...) [O]nly with religion does the hope for happiness first arise” [Kant 2012: 167-168].

It seems that the knowledge about where societies are to find the hope they need to survive in the historical dimension may also be useful from the standpoint of a political scientist.

Religion and Forgiveness

The only way to establishing peace in a secularized world is forgiveness – John Paul II wrote soon after the attack on the World Trade Center [John Paul II 2001: 4, 63]. Forgiveness as an absolute moral obligation resulting from the commandment to love enemies is not a secular “good”, however, but is a *novum* brought into the history of civilization by Christianity¹¹. The possibility of establishing peace in a secularized world depends, therefore, on the ability to forgive whose source is a very concrete religion. In other words, neither Paul VI in the ecumenical context, nor the Polish bishops in their letter to German bishops, would have used the Horatian formula, changing its original sense entirely, if it had not been for their faith in and knowledge of the Gospel¹².

John Paul II was aware of the novelty which Christian forgiveness had brought into the history of humankind.

Forgiveness given and received enables a new kind of relationship among people, breaking the spiral of hatred and revenge and shattering the chains of evil which bind the hearts of those in conflict with

¹¹ More on forgiveness: see Mazurkiewicz 2007; Mazurkiewicz 2006; Mazurkiewicz 2016.

¹² It referred initially to the diversity of literary genres [Mazurkiewicz 2001: 306-307].

one another. (...) In proclaiming forgiveness and love of enemies, the Church is aware of adding to the spiritual heritage of all humanity a new mode of human relationships; an arduous mode, to be sure, but one that is also rich in hope. [John Paul II 2001: 4, 63].

The obligation to forgive is related directly to the evangelical commandment of the love of enemies: „But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous” [Mt 5,44-45]. When commenting on this text, Saint Augustine says that to fulfill this commandment, one must desire to make enemies into one’s friends, which is possible through forgiveness¹³.

“An inner conversion is required if this step is to be taken”, John Paul II writes, “the courage to be humbly obedient to Jesus’ command is needed. His word leaves no doubt: not only those who provoke hostility but also those who are its victim must seek reconciliation [cf. Mt 5:23-24]. Christians must make peace even when they feel that they are victims of those who have struck and hurt them unjustly. This was how the Lord himself acted. [John Paul II, 2001: 4, 63].

In today’s world, the moral commandment to forgive and strive towards reconciliation also has an institutional dimension, for example in the actions of international institutions. World peace will not be the work of any bureaucracy, even the most efficient one, however. “[T]he fate of peace depends first of all on finding a solidarity of hearts. And this requires (...) the courage to forgive” [John Paul II 1994: 5, 13-14]. „Only to the degree that an ethics and a culture of forgiveness prevail can we hope for a “politics” of forgiveness, expressed in society’s attitudes and laws, so that through them justice takes on a more human character” [John Paul II 2002: 8]. In other words, just as forgiveness precedes the establishment of true peace, so ethics and culture, and religion above all, precede politics. The history of mankind depends on the contribution made by religion, culture and ethics into social life. An awareness of these relationships may be useful also to those involved in political studies.

¹³ „Love your enemies, desiring them for brothers; love your enemies, calling them into your fellowship. For so loved he who as he hung upon the Cross said, ‘Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do’ [Luke 23:43]” [Augustine 1955: 266].

* * *

I have taken the liberty to sketch out just a few aspects of the relationship between religion and politics, a few pictures which – or so I believe – a political scientist should take into account in political analyses, without becoming in the least a theologian, and with the awareness that his studies belong to the domain of political science rather than theology. Can political studies be carried out today without this knowledge? They certainly can, since many authors do just that; at least some of their studies are not thorough enough, however, to be not only intellectually interesting, but also safe for the societies they refer to.

Bibliography

- Aristotle, *Politics*, <https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/aristotle-the-politics-vol-1--5/simple>.
- Augustin, Saint (1955), *Augustine: Later Works*, Westminster Press, Philadelphia.
- Bartoszewicz M.G. (2018), *Festung Europa*, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Kraków.
- Benedict XVI (2006), *Faith, Reason and the University. Memories and Reflections, Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg*, 12.09.2006, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html.
- Benedict XVI (2017), *Poznanie prawdy. Wykłady papieskie*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków.
- Brague R. (2014), *Modérément moderne*, Flammarion, Paris.
- Brague R. (2018), *Sur la religion*, Flammarion, Paris.
- Churm P.A. (2018), *Juncker opens exhibition to Karl Marx*, <http://www.euronews.com/2018/05/04/juncker-opens-exhibition-to-karl-marx>.
- Cicero, *De natura deorum*, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/nd1.shtml#117>.
- Dumézil B. (2008), *Chrześcijańskie korzenie Europy*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty.
- European Court of Human Rights (2011), *Arrêt de Grande Chambre Lautsi et autres c. Italie 18.03.2011*, [https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre-press#{«fulltext»:«\[lautsi\]»}](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre-press#{«fulltext»:«[lautsi]»}).
- Eurostat (2018), *Total fertility rate*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00199>.
- Fiala P. (2016), *Laboratorium sekularyzacji. Kościół i religia w społeczeństwie niereligijnym*, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Kraków.
- Gierycz M. (2017), *Europejski spór o człowieka. Studium z antropologii politycznej*, Wyd. Naukowe UKSW, Warszawa.
- Habermas J. (2008), *Between Naturalism and Religion*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Harris L. (2006), *Socrates or Muhammad? Joseph Ratzinger on the destiny of reason*, 10/02/2006, Volume 012, Issue 03, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/736fyrpi.asp>.

- Hegel G.W.F. (2007), *Wykłady z filozofii religii*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa
- Houellebecq M. (2015), *Submission*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.
- Huntington S.P. (1993), *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.
- Huntington S.P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York.
- Inglehart R., Norris P. (2011), *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Kłoczowski J.A. (2004), *Religia*, in: B. Szlachta (ed.), *Słownik społeczny*, Wydawnictwo WAM.
- John Paul II (1988), *Wiara i kultura*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Rzym – Lublin.
- John Paul II (1994), *Do prezydenta Republiki Bośni i Hercegowiny*, *L'Osservatore Romano* Polish edition, 11(167).
- John Paul II (2001), *Message for Lent*, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/lent/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20010206_lent-2001.html (17.06.2019).
- John Paul II (2002), *No Peace Without Justice, No Justice Without Forgiveness. Message For the Celebration of the World Day of Peace*, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20011211_xxxv-world-day-for-peace.html (17.06.2019).
- John Paul II (2003), *Ecclesia in Europa*, Wydawnictwo M, Kraków.
- Juncker J.-C. (2018), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00199> (17.06.2019).
- Kant I. (2012), *The Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Philip McPherson Rudisill <https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracticalReason.pdf> (17.06.2019).
- Krastev I. (2017), *After Europe*, University Pennsylvania Press.
- Lactantius, *Epitome of the divine institutes*, LXIX, in: Fletcher W. (ed.), *The works of Lactantius*, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, vol. II, p. 157, <https://archive.org/details/theworksoflactan00lactuoft/page/n9> (24.05.2019).
- Lohmann M. (2011), *Gdzie jest „C” w CDU?*, *Z Martinem Lohmannem rozmawia Stefan Sękowski*, *Fronda* 58.
- MacIntyre A. (2011), *God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Maryland.
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2001), *Przemoc w polityce*, Ossolineum, Wrocław.
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2006), *Przebaczenie i pojednanie*, *Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka. Zeszyty Społecznej Myśli Kościoła* 1 (1) 2006, s. 7-32.
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2007), *Vergebung und Gerechtigkeit als Stützpfiler des Friedens*, *Christentum – Welt – Politik. Hefte zum Gesellschaftlichen Nachdenken aus Christlicher Verantwortung* 1/ (1) 2007, s. 7-26.
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2016), *Przebaczenie czy miłosierdzie? Wokół potrzeby pojednania w polityce*, *Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne*, XXIX/3/2016, s. 119-131.
- Mazurkiewicz P., Ptaszek R.T., Młyńczyk Ł. (2019), *Polityka wyznaniowa. Perspektywa Unii Europejskiej*, Pracownia Badań nad Mniejszościami Narodowymi i Etnicznymi - Instytut Politologii – Uniwersytet Zielonogórski, Zielona Góra.
- Palko V. (2010), *Chore hviezdy kresťansko-demokraticke*, *Impulz* 1, <http://www.impulzrevue.sk/article.php?531>.

- Pera M. (2008), *Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani. Il liberalismo, l'Europa, l'etica*, Mondadori, Milano.
- Pew Research Center (2016), *The future of world religions*, <http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org>.
- Pew Research Center (2017), *Europe's Growing Muslim Population*, <https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/>.
- Plato (1994), *Gorgias*, Agora Publications, Millis.
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679>.
- Service-Public (2019), https://lannuaire.service-public.fr/gouvernement/administration-centrale-ou-ministere_185251.
- Spaemann R. (2015), "The Undying Rumor: The God Question and the Modern Delusion" in: *A Robert Spaemann Reader: Philosophical Essays on Nature, God & the Human Person*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Tocqueville A. de (2002), *Democracy in America*, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania.
- Weber M. (1994), "The Profession and Vocation of Politics", in: *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Krzysztof Gładkowski

The University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland

Can Interdisciplinarity Be Overcome in the Political Science of Religion?

Abstract: The article presents the problem of interdisciplinarity as a crisis of modern science. As a solution, it is proposed that a common methodological basis should be developed for science in general, which should begin with defining man as a spiritual and corporeal being. This basis makes it possible to develop an integrated model of science in general. This issue is of great importance for religious studies, including the political science of religion.

Keywords: interdisciplinarity, crisis of science, political science of religion

Abstrakt: W artykule ukazano problem interdyscyplinarności jako kryzys współczesnej nauki. Jako rozwiązanie podano konieczność wypracowania wspólnej podstawy metodologicznej dla nauki w ogóle, którą jest w punkcie wyjścia zdefiniowanie człowieka jako istoty duchowo-cieleśnej. Ta podstawa umożliwi wypracowanie integralnego modelu nauki w ogóle. Kwestia ta ma istotne znaczenie dla badań religii w tym politologii religii.

Słowa kluczowe: interdyscyplinarność, kryzys nauki, politologia religii

Interdisciplinarity is the most emphatically highlighted value in contemporary science. One of its varieties is the equally often emphasized transdisciplinarity. Since the beginning of its existence as a research practice, interdisciplinarity has given rise a number of doubts, however. There are three – largely independent, if not mutually contradictory – sources of resistance to the category of interdisciplinarity: a) opposition to the “noticeable practice of financing research”; 2) if “interdisciplinarity is considered an answer to the idea of closed disciplines of science, with their separate objects and methods of study”, it is criticized for unjustified violation of borderlines between individual disciplines; 3) “when a complete redefinition of the borderlines between individual sciences, or even their abolition,

is postulated, interdisciplinarity is considered to be an incomplete proposal which does not overcome problems resulting from the traditional understanding of disciplines as isolated and autonomous” [Tabaszewska 2013: 114-115].

A brief definition of interdisciplinarity says it is “an individually performed confrontation of one’s own discipline with another (or others)” [Hejmej 2008: 87; as quoted in *ibid.*: 115]. The goal of such a confrontation is to get a better understanding of the studied phenomenon. It is pointed out that “understood in such terms, interdisciplinarity does not contravene the conviction about the existence of relatively separate disciplines and the need to appreciate their respective methodologies” [Tabaszewska 2013: 116]. In this approach, every scholar representing a particular discipline of science draws upon another, less important one. This flaw in the understanding of interdisciplinarity was to be overcome by multidisciplinary, transdisciplinarity, and finally by adisciplinarity.

Transdisciplinarity was supposed to overcome the apparent opening of scientific disciplines as a radicalized version of the interdisciplinarity project. In this approach, theories kept expanding, while applications of theoretical discourse became more and more dispersed. Researchers were supposed to aim at a utopian, integrated description of their study object. The interdisciplinary approach failed to provide a perspective broadening the field of study. Instead, this goal was to be achieved by transdisciplinary studies. They were supposed to enable going beyond individual disciplines and challenging traditional divisions. Transdisciplinarity, unlike interdisciplinarity, deals with those areas “whose assignment to a particular discipline is not clear-cut, or which do not yield to the accepted divisions between individual disciplines” [*ibid.*: 118]. Thus, the difference between transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity consists first of all in a different approach to the existing borders between disciplines. Interdisciplinarity “examines the borderlands between disciplines, drawing on non-contradictory methodologies” [*ibid.*: 117]. The concept of transdisciplinary research is supposed to enable “studying those phenomena which are located in between individual disciplines of science, and which cannot be assigned to any of them, or to any one discipline existing as an inalienable part of more than one of them”. Concepts relevant for more than one discipline, but not functioning in them in the same way, have been investigated by Mieke Bal [Bal 2002], who used the example of traveling concepts situated in the borderland between discourses, while remaining ever beyond their field of interest. It should be recognized, however, that by applying the phenomenological method it could be

demonstrated that travelling concepts are not necessarily situated in the borderland between discourses, and much less beyond their field of interest. Mieke Bal claims that concepts perform the function of mini-theories.

It could be argued that the progressive specialization and departmentalization of sciences has pushed scientific research in the direction of interdisciplinarity, which ultimately resulted in even greater fragmentation. We are now facing huge numbers of papers and theories marked with the label of interdisciplinarity. And the word itself works like a magic charm which is supposed to legitimize any activity aspiring to scientificity. The label of interdisciplinarity is now replacing the notion of science.

Difficulties with inter-, multi-, or trans-disciplinarity show that these fashionable terms are functioning in relation to the crisis of science and the excessive fragmentation of scientific disciplines within particular areas of knowledge. This crisis has been brought about by a crisis of the philosophy of science, which provided the basic categories necessary to define the foundations of scientificity.

The Humanistic Breakthrough

To provide an example, let us limit ourselves to the significant – in our opinion – moment when the distinction between natural sciences and humanities was first pointed out. This took place during the anti-positivist breakthrough at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Wilhelm Dilthey was the first to discuss the problem of the foundations of humanistic studies. He pointed out the distinct nature of natural sciences and the humanities in 1883 [Dilthey 1922]. His most important work on the subject is *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* [Dilthey 1910]. Their distinctiveness was also emphasized by neo-Kantians of the Baden School - Wilhelm Windelband and his student Heinrich Rickert. Dilthey claimed that unlike in the positivist ideal of science which included only natural sciences, humanities were real sciences which differed from natural sciences. He saw this difference in their respective objects of study. The object of natural sciences is nature, while the object of humanistic sciences is the historical and social reality. Humanities are concerned with individuals, people, nations, social systems, the artefacts of culture.

Windelband, on the other hand, stressed the distinction between humanities and natural sciences resulting from their respective methodologies. He asserted that natural sciences established laws, while humanistic sciences established facts. The

former were general in nature, the latter – idiographic. Rickert situated humanities among other sciences based both on their separate methodologies and their respective objects. This way, the division of sciences into natural and cultural ones was established.

Today, we would say that the humanistic turn had been brought about by the crisis of science at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. The separation of humanities from natural sciences in view of their different objects of study was at that point a creative solution to the crisis of the then contemporary science.

Nowadays, attempts at emerging from the crisis of science arise from the fact that the far-reaching specialization and the unprecedented advance of knowledge within particular sciences hinder their mutual communication, while the expanding scopes of individual sciences lead to solutions referred to as inter-, multi-, trans-disciplinarity, etc. We believe that such attempts result from a failure to realize that the source of this excessive fragmentation of science is the lack of consent about the definition of man.

As an example, let us look at cognitive sciences which, aside from the senses, also study the brain and the mind. Cognitivists deal with language, perception, thinking, awareness, decision-making, and intelligence. Cognitive sciences are referred to as interdisciplinary studies, situated on the borderlands of many disciplines, including linguistics, cognitive psychology, neurobiology, philosophy of the mind, logics, artificial intelligence, and physics [cf. Duch 1998; Bremer 2016: 7]. Can this multidisciplinaryity be overcome? We believe it can, once we agree that man is a complex being, and that one of the essential elements of the human nature is the integral unity of body and spirit. Man is a corporeal and spiritual (psychosomatic) being. What consequences result from this definition for the theory and methodology of scientific research?

Looking for solutions to the unforeseen difficulties encountered in her attempts at a new inter-discipline which she calls “cultural analysis” [Bal 2002: 4], as a remedy Mieke Bal suggests that we need a fundamental change in the way we think about methodology within individual disciplines. She writes: “it is possible to overcome the three major – indeed, potentially dangerous – drawbacks of cultural studies [...] Within an interdisciplinary setting, coverage – of the classics, of all periods or ‘centuries,’ of all major theories used within a field – is no longer an option. Nor is ‘sloppy scholarship.’ If a different alternative can be articulated, the divide,

which is the second drawback, can be lessened. The creation of a methodological common ground [...] is the only unified answer” [ibid.: 8]. This search for “a methodological common ground” should begin with defining the essence of man. A corporeal and spiritual being cannot be studied as though he was made up of two autonomous and independent parts. On the one hand, the human body is studied by biological studies; on the other, the spirit is studied by the humanities and social studies. This fragmentation and reduction of the human being to one of these inseparable parts results in reductionist scientific theories suffering from a drawback which results, if not from erroneous assumptions, than at least from a reductionist concept of the essence of man. An awareness of the insufficiency of studies within such frameworks in individual sciences has led to inter-, multi-, trans-, or a-disciplinary models. We believe that in order to overcome these attempts at emerging from the crisis of science, we must assume that man is, in essence, a spiritual and corporeal being, and can only be studied as such. This applies equally to all of man-created reality.

The difficulty that arises here, however, is well-known to science, namely: how can the subject be simultaneously the object of study? An answer to this question is sought both by philosophy and by cognitive sciences. We will not dwell on this problem of the theory of cognition here, however. We are interested in a model of science in general; not a model of any of the particular sciences, but a model which needs to be developed for science as such, when we consider man as an integral corporeal and spiritual being.

We believe this approach to be of great significance, as studies on man defined in this way also have considerable practical consequences. Such studies will have a revolutionary impact on the whole of both the individual and the collective life of man. Already the Greeks realized this fact when they emphasized the integral development of the human body and spirit, and we are just as aware of it today. This is demonstrated by such concepts as psychosomatics [Gapik 2013], or psychodermatology [Makowska, Gmitrowicz 2014], etc. Publications which provide reasons for recognizing the need to build a theory of science founded on the definition of man as a psychosomatic whole are many. By accepting an anthropology based on such a definition of man, we can found science on new assumptions and ensure unity between sciences. I believe we are closer to this ideal than we think. Interdisciplinary approaches have contributed to the achievements of many sciences whose development had been inhibited by boundaries and methods. Interdisciplinarity has been an attempt at remedying

this standstill, which has brought considerable achievements, but failed to resolve the crisis; for this, we need an in-depth reflection on what the crisis actually consists in. The above definition of man opens up new opportunities for research. They will be fruitful to the extent that they are preceded by an effort to build a theory which provides a basis for developing appropriate methods of studying man as an integral being, and of his products as those of a corporeal and spiritual whole. We can see entirely new possibilities of research here, which may bring sciences together. And not only sciences in the area of humanities and social sciences, but also both of these areas and that of biological or theological studies.

To conclude this part of our reflection, let us refer to Thomas Aquinas for whom man was a unity of body and soul [Krapiec 1979; id. 1991: Chapter XII; id. 2009]. Personalism focuses on man as a person and warns against any reductionism or dualism in understanding man: “When talking about an integral view of man in personalism, one must take into account all that constitutes man as a human being, avoiding the traps of both reductionism and dualism. If this can be achieved, we may say that we are dealing with the human person, with a real man. Man conceived in a reductionist or dualist way is neither a person nor a man” [Daszkiewicz 2010].

A New Approach to the Study of Religion

This new approach is also a rational way of overcoming reductionism and the problematic interdisciplinarity in the study of religion. Man understood as a spiritual and corporeal unity no longer needs, as a religious being (*homo religiosus*), to be the object of studies reserved solely for representatives of such sciences as theology, the history of religion, or religious studies [Bronk 2009: 35, 159 *passim*]. Man as a corporeal and spiritual being is, by definition, a religious being even when he tries to assert his identity in opposition to religion.

It may legitimately be asked on what grounds it is claimed that man as an integrated corporeal and spiritual being is religious? An answer to this question may be provided by referring to the findings of Mircea Eliade.

Let us quote one of the experts on his work: „One of Eliade’s main ideas is the belief that man’s religiousness is ultimately not historically conditioned, and does not consist solely in that without religion man is unable to solve any of his fundamental existential problems. Eliade makes a more radical claim, namely that being

religious is inherent to man's nature (*conditio Humana*), and that a non-religious man would simply not be a man (which in Eliade's anthropology is an unthinkable situation). The term "religious man" is, in a way, a pleonasm: the essence of what differs man from all other living creatures is the religious dimension. (Religious) man is the only creature capable of a non-rational (intuitive) understanding of that dimension of reality which is entirely different from the temporal world, and of consciously participating in this dimension. As can be seen, Eliade is radically normative here; he is not satisfied with revealing the fundamentally religious structure of man, but wants to show practically how man should live so that his life may be meaningful and fearless.

Understood this way, the history of religion is not only a historiography, and a historian of religion is not simply a historian. He deals not so much with man's religious behaviours (the study of which he leaves to others), as with the traces and manifestations of the sacrum, irrespective of their cultural setting. Eliade charges contemporary historians of religion with being interested more in the history of religion than in **religion itself** [emphasis added by K.G.]. Similarly, he believes, ethnologists have wasted too much time on reconstructing the history of the cultures of archaic people instead of trying to understand them.

An important characteristic of Eliade's method is his opposition (expressed, among others, in his flagship article *History of Religion and New Humanism*) **to reductionism in the study of religion, i.e. the reduction of religious to non-religious meanings: economic, sociological, cultural, psychological, political, or other** [emphasis added by K.G.]. He saw an example of the reductionist approach in Nietzsche's deception of the European intelligentsia with his idea of God's death; in Marks's subordination of the spirit to the laws of economy; and in Freud's reduction of the great variety of ways in which man exists to sexual behaviours. The task of the history of religion is to say something about religion in a non-reductionist way, to show that it is a **religious fact** [emphasis added by K.G.], and not merely a historical, psychological, social, ethnic, philosophical, or theological one. To this end, a scientist of religion (*a learned generalist*) must have as much general knowledge as possible, while at the same time being a specialist in a particular religion" [Bronk 1998: 264-265].

The study of religion confronts us with the significant challenge of trying to understand the meaning assigned to various aspects of reality in different cultures, in which religion is the key to understanding their history. Christopher Dawson wrote:

„Religion is the key of history. We cannot understand the inner form of a society unless we understand its religion. We cannot understand its cultural achievements unless we understand the religious beliefs that lie behind them. In all ages the first creative works of a culture are due to a religious inspiration and dedicated to a religious end. The temples of the gods are the most enduring works of man. Religion stands at the threshold of all the great literatures of the world. Philosophy is its offspring and is a child which constantly returns to its parent” [Dawson 2013: 37-38; cf. Werner 1999: 69]. This causes considerable methodological problems both in the context of general methodology and of detailed research into particular aspects, such as, for example, the understanding of time in and outside of religion, sacred and secular time. An example of a major misunderstanding in this area are the works of Mircea Eliade, who has been wrongly classified as a phenomenologist of religion, and his approach described as ahistorical. If we consider the phenomenological approach to be a method of studying religion, i.e. say that phenomenology is one of the methods of studying religion, it will become obvious that Eliade called himself a historian of religion, and his approach cannot be called either ahistorical or anti-historical [Topolski 1972: 112 f.]. It is in religion, therefore, that the peculiarity of the approach resides, in this case to time, which – as in the case of linear time – has a different meaning as sacred to a religious person, and a different one as secular in popular usage [Eliade 1993: 114]. Eliade directs our attention to the fact that time is understood differently in different cultures, pointing to the different meaning they attribute to reality [Werner 1999: 74].

In the discipline I represent myself (cultural anthropology), we have realized for a long time now that our attempts at understanding people of different cultures have failed. [This seems to have been fully understood by C. G. Jung, who claimed that a Christian of the Western culture can never become a Buddhist, for example, due to his having been influenced by a different religious tradition, or a different culture.] Consequently, not only ethnocentrism is an obstacle on the road to a proper description and understanding of a different culture or religion. Eliade claimed that the religious man should be understood in the categories of his religion and in accordance with criteria proper to his culture. For Eliade, the evolutionist approach in the study of religion was unacceptable, since the basic concepts of evolutionism – development and genesis subordinated to the idea of progress – were not appropriate in studying the history of religion. According to Eliade: “There is no such thing as a ‘pure’ religious datum, outside of history, for there is no such thing as a human datum that is not at the same time a historical datum. Every religious experience is expressed and transmitted in a particular historical contest.

But admitting the historicity of religious experiences does not imply that they are reducible to non-religious forms of behavior” [Eliade 1984: 7]. In Eliade, recognition of the historicity of religious experience results from the distinction between the object of this experience, referred to as a (non-historical) *sacrum*, and the historicity (secularity) defined culturally in terms of time and space. Scholars emphasize the value of this concept of situating religion in time, because it is an important attempt at solving the problem of the “conceptual incompatibility of different cultures” which “resumes the search for [...] a model of global history” [Werner 1999: 78].

We believe that the crisis of contemporary science related to the attempts referred to as inter-, trans-, or by any other name which may be coined in the future in relation to disciplinarity, may be overcome if we agree that the subject and object of our knowledge is an integrally corporeal and spiritual being.

We realize that our reflections may appear subjective and are open to discussion. We strongly believe, however, that interdisciplinarity can be overcome with a properly identified and defined object of study. In the classical methodology of sciences, a theory was built and an appropriate methodology was selected based on a well-defined object of study. We are of the opinion that there is no escaping the same also in the case of a discipline as young as the political science of religion.

Is the study of religion in political science characterized by any particular features other than the fact that literature on the relationship between politics and religion and vice versa is so extensive that it needs a special discipline to be encompassed?

In our opinion, religion is a peculiar object of research, dealt with by religious studies. One of these studies is the political science of religion. This statement merely asserts the fact, however, that such a science exists and, being a discipline of social sciences, belongs to religious sciences, in accordance with one of the proposed definitions of the term “religiology” [Bronk 2011: 39-49].

Bibliography

- Bal M. (2002), *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities. A Rough Guide*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London.
- Bremer J. (2016), Wprowadzenie, in: *Przewodnik po kognitywistyce*, ed. J. Bremer., Kraków: 7-36.
- Bronk A. (1998), *Zrozumieć świat współczesny*, Lublin.
- Bronk A. (2009), *Podstawy nauk o religii*, 3rd ed., Lublin.
- Bronk A. (2011), *Czym jest religiologia?*, "Nauka" 2: 39-49.
- Daszkiewicz W. (2010), *Rozumienie człowieka a problem cywilizacji – na podstawie poglądów Feliksa Konecznego*, w: *Kultura i oświata w europejskim międzywojniu*, ed. R. Bryzek, J. Urban, Siedlce: 17–28; access: <http://sapiencjokracja.pl/rozumienie-czlowieka-a-problem-cywilizacji-na-podstawie-pogladow-feliksa-konecznego/>
- Dilthey W. (1910), *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, Leipzig.
- Dilthey W. (1922) *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Versuch einer Grundlagen für Studium der Gesellschaft und die Geschichte*, w: *Gesamelte Schriften*, Bd. 1. Stuttgart.
- Dawson C. (2013), *Religion and Culture*, Catholic University of America Press.
- Duch W. (1998), *Czym jest kognitywistyka?*, "Kognitywistyka i Media w Edukacji" 1: 9-50.
- Eliade M. (1993), *Mit, sacrum, historia*, translated by Anna Tatarkiewicz, Warszawa.
- Eliade M. (1984), *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Gapik L. (2013), *Choroba i lęk. Zależności psychosomatyczne*, "Przegląd Terapeutyczny" 9-10: 1-10.
- Hejmej A. (2008), *Muzyka w literaturze. Perspektywy komparatystyki interdyscyplinarnej*, Kraków.
- Krapiec M. A. (1979), *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, Lublin.
- Krapiec M. A. (1991), *Ja – człowiek* w: *Dzieła*, Vol. 9, Lublin.
- Krapiec M. A. (2009), *Człowiek jako osoba*, Lublin.
- Makowska I., Gmitrowicz A. (2014), *Psychodermatologia – pogranicze dermatologii, psychiatrii i psychologii*, "Psychiatria i Psychologia kliniczna" 14(2): 100-105.
- Tabaszewska J. (2013), "Wędrujące pojęcia". *Koncepcja Mieke Bal – Przykład Inter – czy transdyscyplinarności?*, "Studia Europea Gnesnensia", 8: 113-130.
- Topolski J. (1972), *Świat bez historii*, Warszawa.
- Werner W. (1999), *Religia w czasie czy poza nim? Jeden z metodologicznych problemów historii religii*, "Historyka" XXIX: 69-78.

Michał Gierycz

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland

Overcoming Reductionism. On “In-depth” Systems Analysis in the Political Science of Religion

Abstract: The starting point of the article is the observation made by Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, according to which political science perceives itself as an “atheistic science in its proper sense” and documents problematic consequences of this paradigm on the grounds of “political science of religion” (such as, for example, reducing religion to ideology and Churches to groups of interests). In this context the author poses a question whether the theory and the instrumentarium of the political science creates possibilities of non-reduction approach to religion. The article provides an answer to this question. In the first part, outlining changes in the understanding of political science, the author proves that political science, in its theoretical and methodological body leaves some space for what we currently define as “political science of religion”, as well as reveals the sources of special importance of the system paradigm for political research. The second part brings the analysis of the current interpretation of this paradigm and shows their role in consolidating the “religious cataract” of political science. In the third part, referring to Easton’s writing, the author presents the theoretical possibilities of “deepening” the system analysis as well as examples of research techniques and approaches, allowing us to analyze the role of religion in political processes in a non-reduction way. The article proves therefore that it is possible to analyze religion as a social phenomenon differing from politics not only from the theoretical, but also from methodological perspective (the so-called in-depth system analysis).

Keywords: political science of religion, systems analysis, paradigm, atheism, scientific character

Abstrakt: Punktem wyjścia artykułu jest spostrzeżenie Ernsta Wolfganga Böckenförde, zgodnie z którym nauki polityczne pojmują siebie jako naukę „ateistyczną we właściwym znaczeniu” i dokumentuje problematyczne konsekwencje tego paradygmatu na gruncie „politologii religii” (jak np. redukcję religii do ideologii, a Kościołów do grup interesu). W tym kontekście autor stawia pytanie, czy teoria i instrumentarium nauk o polityce stwarzają możliwości

nie-redukcyjnego podejścia do religii. Od powiedzi na to pytanie poświęcony jest niniejszy artykuł. W pierwszej części, szkicując przemiany w pojmowaniu politologii, autor dowodzi, że politologia w swym teoretyczno-metodologicznym korpusie zostawia miejsce na coś, co określamy wspólnie mianem „politologii religii”, jak również odsłania źródła szczególnego znaczenia paradygmatu systemowego dla badań politologicznych. W drugiej części rozważone zostały współczesne interpretacje tego paradygmatu i ukazana ich rola w ugruntowywaniu „religijnej katarakty” politologii. W trzeciej, w nawiązaniu do pism Eastona, autor ukazuje teoretyczne możliwości „pogłębienia” analizy systemowej, jak również przykładowe techniki i podejścia badawcze, umożliwiające badania roli religii w procesach politycznych w sposób nieredukcyjny. Artykuł dowodzi zatem, że nie tylko z perspektywy teoretycznej, ale również metodologicznej, możliwe jest badanie religii właśnie jako fenomenu społecznego różnego od polityki (tzw. głęboka analiza systemowa).

Słowa kluczowe: politologia religii, analiza systemowa, paradygmat, ateizm, naukowość

In his well-known article, Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde points out that even though for thousands of years the thinking and theories of political order in the society were related to religious imagery, and in the times of Christianity – also to theological ones, political science considers itself to be a science that is “atheist in the proper sense of the word” [cf. Boeckenfoerde 2005:301]. This issue becomes particularly significant in the context of the intense development, also in Poland, of the so-called “political science of religion” [cf. Haynes 2009, Marczevska-Rytko 2010, Dylus 2016, Michalak 2016, Burgoński, Gierycz 2014], which studies the relationship between religion and politics from the perspective of political science. When reviewing literature on the subject, one cannot help but notice that most politological analyses have a predominantly descriptive value, while their theoretical value is fairly limited. Moreover, attempts made by political science at explaining the significance of the religious factor leave much to be desired in terms of their merits content-wise. As pointed out by Timothy Longman [2001], they seem to reflect three approaches to religion. Scholars who focus on social conflicts usually see religion as an aspect of identity which defines individual members as part of a social group, and thus acts as an intermediary in their relationships with other social groups and the state. For example, in literature on genocide, religion is treated as a tool used to define members of certain groups as being “the other” in social terms, and thus as a substantiation of their social exclusion. In another popular approach to religion in political science, religious

groups are seen as interest groups, just like trade unions, women's federations, or non-governmental organizations which bring together like-minded people to consolidate their political power. Longman, however, postulates that the Church should be treated as an inherently political institution. He claims that the classical definition of politics suggested by Harold Lasswell (1936), who describes it as a struggle over "who gets what, when, and how", leads to the conclusion that churches are clearly political institutions, as they play an important role in the distribution of resources. Ultimately, then, theoretical perspectives of viewing the Church and religion in mainstream political science are limited to understanding religious communities as: (1) a source of conflict-generating nationalism; (2) interest groups; and finally as (3) political institutions *sensu stricte*, with the result of viewing religion as an ideology.

The problem with this approach, represented in many works of political science, is self-evident. It is not a consequence of the fact that these three perspectives are entirely wrong. It is quite obvious that religion plays an important role in building national identities, that religious institutions may operate just like interest groups (see for example the activity of COMECE in Brussels [Gierycz 2008]), or that they may evoke certain political goals [Dylus 2014], and religion may be reduced to the level of ideology [Sulkowski 2018]. The problem, and a serious one at that, of the predominant way of looking at the relationship between religion and politics in political science is its reductionism, i.e. peremptory reduction of religion to ideological and political phenomena. If, however, capturing the Church, for example, precisely as the Church is beyond the cognitive abilities of a political scientist, then consequently the proper understanding of religion, Catholicism and the Church in the area of politics will be just as much beyond his cognitive abilities as well. We may add that this type of an essentially atheistic approach ultimately leads to annihilation of the object of study. If, as suggested by Longman, we consider religious communities as "inherently political institutions", we are in fact removing any distinction between religion and politics, consequently doing away also with the point of examining the particular contribution made by religion to political processes.

In this context, we must ask whether the theory and the inventory of political science allow for taking any approach to religion which is not *a priori* reductionist in nature. What I mean is an approach which recognizes that religion as a phenomenon based on the relationship between man and a transcendent reality (the Absolute, *sacrum*) is not an "add-on" to man's life, but is that which determines his individual identity (and group identities as well) at its

very foundations, and may not be reduced to mere “opinions”; that religion as a doctrine referring to eschatological issues and placing its greatest hopes there is clearly not the same as ideology, whose goals belong to the temporal order; and, finally, that religion as the foundation of a community (religious organization) has a place in the public sphere that is not reducible to that of any other bodies or NGOs. In short, in this article I would like first of all to look into the possibility of viewing the phenomenon of religion in political studies in the entirety of its otherness from all that political science has become used to and has learned to study. Only if this “otherness” is recognized of the phenomenon of religion, and its political meaning is acknowledged precisely due to this otherness, can any new contribution be made to political studies by the political science of religion.

In view of the above research objective, this article has been divided into three parts. In the first part, by briefly outlining developments in the understanding of political science I argue that in its main theoretical and methodological body political science leaves room for what is today called a “political science of religion”. I also reveal sources of the special significance of the systems paradigm for political studies. In the second part, I consider some contemporary interpretations of this paradigm, presenting their role in consolidating the “religious cataract” of political science. In the third part, referring to the work of Easton, I present some theoretical possibilities of adding depth to systems analysis, and discuss sample research techniques and approaches which support a non-reductive study of the meaning of religion for politics within the systems paradigm. This allows me to demonstrate that not only from the theoretical, but also from the methodological perspective it is possible to study religion as a social phenomenon that is “different” from politics (in the so-called on-depth systems analysis).

There are two reservations that needs to be made here. First, the problem I have set out to analyze can only be taken up if we assume that the understanding of scientificity prevailing at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, which claimed that political and social sciences should only rely on rational, empirically verifiable statements, and on this basis study and explain social phenomena and manifestations of order [cf. Boeckenoerde 2005:301-302], is a historical one. And consequently that, just like due to its genesis political science put the question of God “in parentheses”, becoming an “atheist science in the proper sense of the word”, so it may, in the course of its development, take the question of God “out of parentheses”. Ultimately, even remaining on the grounds of scientific achievements (in

the sense of natural sciences), it must be admitted that “the issue of God remains an open question”.

Secondly, even though in the title I refer to religion as such, and generally the comments below are universally applicable, in a more detailed way my reflections should be read from the perspective of religions characteristic for the Western hemisphere, which means broadly understood Christianity. Even though there are many issues over which various Christian denominations are divided, they have much more in common, particularly compared to other great religious traditions, such as Islam or Buddhism. One of the specifically Christian elements of key importance for my reflections here is the assumed autonomy of “temporal realities” (nonexistent for example in Islam), which has allowed for the development in Europe of an understanding of politics and science which is characteristic for the Old Continent. Consequently, my assertions presented here should be treated as middle-range claims, which would need to be adequately adapted if they were to be referred to other great religious traditions.

1. Methodological currents in political studies and the possibility of a „political science of religion”

As pointed out by Andrzej Antoszewski, political science „has not developed its own proper research method” [Antoszewski 2004:328]. On the contrary, it features a “pluralism of the objects of study, methods and techniques of research” [Woleński 1974:34]. It does not mean a methodological chaos, however. Its methods form clearly identifiable groups, developing in each subsequent period of the history of political science. For the sake of order in our narration, let us briefly take a look at the main methodological currents from the theoretical and historical perspective.

Political science, developing in the context of science of the state, initially remained under the influence of the normative and institutional approach, as well as the historical perspective. „The historical emphasis produced detailed descriptions of the developments leading to political events and practices. Legalism, in contrast, involved the study of constitutions and legal codes. And the concentration on institutions included studies of the powers and functions of political institutions such as legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts” [Johnson, Reynolds, Mycoff 2012:62]. Consequently, traditional political science was focused on formal governments and their legally defined powers, and – as claimed by its critics – not only failed to take into account informal political

processes, but was essentially descriptive. In addition to the above initial features of political science, it remained a normatively-oriented one. If – as was claimed by Christian Schwaabe – Aristotle should be considered the author of political science [Schwaabe 2010], it becomes apparent that at the outset it developed normative theories regarding the essence of politics and the goals and optimum form of government.

Does political science understood this way have any specific research instruments at its disposal? As has been euphemistically remarked by Marek Sobolewski, as regards the relationship between political science and history, attempts made by political scientists at using a different workshop to write about history have had “very mixed results” [Sobolewski 1975:242]. If we look for a contribution made by political science to the study of recent history, and to the history of ideas, we will not find it essentially in the field of developing its own instruments, but rather in pointing to issues which had been marginalized in traditional historiography. They include for example “study of the social make-up of representative bodies, particularly the parliament, study of the content of magazines and the political role played by newspapers, study of the development of the organizations of “interest”, and study of the genesis of political parties” [Sobolewski 1975:243]. When studying the genesis of political institutions or ideologies, or when looking for an empirical basis for the generalization and verification of scientific laws, political science is “doomed” to methods and techniques typical of historical sciences. An analogous situation occurs in the relationship between political science and legal science and philosophy. Normative analysis, exegesis, and hermeneutic tools are now adapted to political science from the inventory employed in the latter sciences.

The traditional approach to political studies has been increasingly challenged since the 1950s. The main charge against them was the lack of any empirical verification of “verbal theories”, which – particularly in view of the development of sociology and cultural anthropology – resulted in a sense of political science being “methodologically backward”. In the United States at the beginning of the 1960s, the so-called “behavioral revolution” began, consisting – to put it briefly – in “shifting the emphasis from how political phenomena, processes, or activities should proceed, to the actual course of political phenomena and processes and the actual behavior of individuals in political situations” [Sztompka 1975:80-81]. In terms of the methodological paradigm, it was, therefore, a kind of an empirical or positivist revolution in political science.

The beginning of behaviorism in political science was marked by the well-known study by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet entitled *The People Choice* [Ryszka 1984:354]. Its goal was to examine the relationship between voting decisions and the education, social and economic status, age and sex of the voters. Even though reception of this approach was not immediate, over the following decades the role of political studies focused on political behavior radically increased. They relied mostly on statistics and methods of social studies characteristic for sociology, and partially also for cultural anthropology. Consequently, the empirical method began to delineate the main (and still prevailing) research current in political science, with its multiple applications: starting from statistical analyses of “political activity, aimed at detecting patterns in voting behavior or relationships between such behavior and social background”, through survey studies and opinion polls aimed at “identifying political views and standpoints”, to laboratory experiments “which consist in simulating certain types of political relations, with the widest range of applications in the study of international relations” [Dubrzyńska 1998:19].

Almost from the very beginning, the empirical movement has been criticized as well, however. The triteness of its “allegedly scientific” conclusions was emphasized¹, as well as ignorance of vital social problems and overlooking “in the effort to be scientific and precise (...) moral and policy issues that make the discipline relevant to the real world”; finally, the fact that “many explanations and predictions in political science are weak or even false” [Johnson, Reynolds, Mycoff 2012:59,42]. In opposition to the empirical standpoint, a constructionist paradigm has emerged and grown in significance since the end of the 1970s. Its advocates claim that “humans do not simply discover knowledge of the real world through neutral processes, such as experimentation or unbiased observation; rather, they create the reality they analyze. In other words (...) what people often assume to be pure facts are conditioned by the observers’ perceptions, experiences, opinions, and similar mental states” [Johnson, Reynolds, Mycoff 2012:57]. Consequently, scientific research (if this concept is still adequate, anyway²) carried out within this current is focused around the problem of inter-

¹ See e.g. the “spatial” theory of voting proposed by James Enelow and Melvin Hinch [1984], asserting that people support those parties and candidates who are closest to them; or the – otherwise valuable – work by Jurg Steiner [1997] who demonstrates that politicians sometimes follow their conscience in making political decisions. It appears that empirical studies often lead to a scientific “discovery” of obviousness.

² Ultimately, constructionism seems to challenge the idea of objective epistemology or theory of knowledge [cf. Brzezińska, Gierycz, Burgoński 2018].

pretation, restoring normative reflection as an essential element in the study of politics. Methods derived from linguistic studies, such as critical analysis of discourse or interpretative analysis, have also been adapted, therefore, for use in political studies [cf. e.g. Yanow 1999].

Considering the fact that none of the traditions of viewing political studies briefly discussed above has been ultimately refuted by any other, it is important that we realize the accumulation of research methods employed in political science. And it should be stressed that these methods are derived from essentially disparate ways of understanding the goal of science itself. While the normative approach refers to classical reflection on politics related to philosophy, the empirical approach strives at providing political science with a scientific model characteristic of exact sciences [Cribb 1991:18].

This methodological heterogeneity of political science reveals a heterogeneity of all political knowledge. Henryk Przybylski suggests that in this context we should talk of source based and non-source based political knowledge. While the former “comes from a source, a reliable document, direct observation of a phenomenon, material trace of an activity, etc. which can be described as concrete and verifiable”, the latter represents “an interiorized knowledge which ... by merging into all layers of our personality, speaks in us as ‘the voice of conscience’ when we evaluate a particular fact” [Przybylski 2004:19-20]. In other words, the empiricism and nomology of political science are not necessarily directly related. The identification of patterns and formulation of general laws about the political reality is not related in political science only to empirically investigated processes (even though – naturally – empirical observation always plays an essential role), but also to the operation of ideas, values, worldviews, and the entire “soft” sphere of our reflection on social life. This means that in the methodological specificity of political science there is, potentially, room for a political science of religion, since a political scientist must necessarily go beyond the instrumentation characteristic of the empiricism of social science³.

³ As a side remark, it is worth noting that this issue deserves some broader consideration in the context of the classification of political science in Poland as a discipline which belongs to social science. Taking into account the field of study proper to political science, its classification as social science seems to ignore its peculiar identity; it is an amputation of an essential part of its field of study. It would be much more legitimate to situate political science on the borderline between social science and the humanities.

Considering the multiplicity of methods, corresponding to the multiplicity of issues related to the problems of government, political science runs the immanent risk of disciplinary decompression, so to say, or of remaining a collection of various scientific sub-disciplines “dealing with the investigation of political phenomena and processes by employing their own peculiar views and methods” [Kantyka 1999:199]. This threat is not purely theoretical. As David Easton has pointed out, in the 1950s in the United States it was difficult to justify the existence of a theory of politics as part of political science at all [Easton 1953:IX]. He indicated that the fact that “we can try to understand political life by viewing each of its aspects piecemeal” [Easton 1957:562] is methodologically problematic. Naturally, “we can examine the operation of such institutions as political parties, interest groups, government, and voting; we can study the nature and consequences of such political practices as manipulation, propaganda, and violence; we can seek to reveal the structure within which these practices occur. By combining the results we can obtain a rough picture of what happens in any self-contained political unit” [Easton 1957: 383]. Nevertheless, we cannot capture the whole this way, and “in combining these results ... there is already implicit the notion that each part of the larger political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part” [Easton 1957: 383].

If Easton actually wanted to “help in some small way to win back for theory its proper and necessary place” [Easton 1953:IX], he achieved much more. By suggesting that political life should be viewed as a system of interrelated activities, thus opening political analysis to the systemic paradigm (pluralist orientation), he in fact paved the way for an operationalization of the field of research in political science (pluralistic orientation), and ultimately its conversion into politology (monistic orientation). Consequently, systems analysis still remains “one of the most influential theoretical and methodological orientations in political analysis” [Chodubski 1999:28], making it possible to interpret not only various spheres of political life as “internally integrated wholes which are distinct from their environment and follow their proper rules”, but also the relationship between political processes and other (cultural, economic, or social) phenomena.

When looking for a methodological approach, therefore, which would allow us to take religion into account when studying political phenomena, it seems necessary to begin by referring to this paradigm. For if we want to understand the influence of religion on the political process on many levels, and, for example, take into account the role of social awareness and common “pre-judgments” in

the framework conditions of the political process, to understand the influence of religious institutions on the course of the political process, or the way religion is used by political actors, viewing politics as a process which occurs within a system appears to be very helpful.

2. Around the System Approach

It seems to be of key importance for us to understand the essence of a system approach. In political studies, it is sometimes treated as a theory, and at other times as a research technique. It does not appear to be either of the two, however.

As pointed out by Franciszek Ryszka, systems analysis is more a “methodological proposal rather than a complete theory” [Ryszka 1984:360]. The system here is a model or scheme which provides “a conceptual frame of reference within which the theory itself is to be built” [Krauz-Mozer 2005:58]. Therefore, as Barbara Krauz-Mozer suggests, „conceptual models represent a useful tool of research created at an initial stage in developing a theory, but may not be identified with it” [Krauz-Mozer 2005:58]. The employment of a systems perspective does not determine the form of the theory, therefore, but enables – by taking into account all essential elements and their interrelations – its construction. It delineates the area of legitimate searches and hypotheses.

The system approach is not a research method in the narrow sense of the word either. It should be considered as a methodological proposal in a broad sense: as a perspective highlighting elements of a system and the existence of relationships between them, which helps us observe a certain phenomenon. It does not, in itself, offer tools for investigating it, however. From this perspective, the methodological eclecticism of political science proves to be an advantage. From its diversified arsenal of research instruments, mostly borrowed from other humanistic and social studies, it may choose those techniques which are most useful in the investigation of an element or relationship perceived thanks to the systems perspective.

2.1. An Outline of the Concept of David Easton

The essence of the system approach – in Easton’s view – is looking at political life as a system of interrelated activities, which determines the way they can be analyzed. Firstly, “the very idea of a system suggests that we can separate political life from the rest of social activity, at least for analytical purposes, and examine it as though for the moment it were a self-contained entity surrounded by, but clearly distinguishable from, the environment or setting in which it operates” [Easton

1957:384]. The boundaries of this system are those activities which are directly related to the making of authoritative decisions, and the way in which it works is in part “a function of its response to the total social, biological, and physical environment” [Easton 1957:385].

Secondly, “if we hold the system of political actions as a unit before our mind’s eye, as it were, we can see that what keeps the system going are inputs of various kinds. These inputs are converted by the processes of the system into outputs and these, in turn, have consequences both for the system and for the environment in which the system exists” [Easton 1957:384]. The outputs of the system are decisions made by the government, and the inputs are demands which require an organized effort on the part of the society, and support.

Both forms of inputs (demands and support) are of two different kinds. Demands may be external or internal. They may come from the environment (i.e. other systems: the economic, cultural, social, or demographic one), or from the inside. Internally inspired outputs, according to Easton, have more direct consequences than those coming from the outside⁴. Support, on the other hand, may consist either of actions “promoting the goals, interests, and actions of another person”, or it may “involve not external observable acts, but those internal forms of behavior we call orientations or states of mind” [Easton 1957: 390]⁵. In each case, support refers to one of three objects: the political community, the regime, or the government.

Support is generated by inputs of the system (political decisions) which he believes to constitute “a body of specific inducements for the members of a system to support that system” [Easton 1957: 395], which are also of two kinds: positive and negative inducements, or rewards (satisfying some demands of its members), and sanctions⁶. In this sense, there is feedback between the inputs and the outputs of a system which ensures its balance, thus being a “vital mechanism in the life of a political system” [Easton 1957: 397]. Easton’s formula is thus expressed in a model shown diagrammatically in the figure below:

⁴ As an example of such demands, Easton mentions “changes in the process of recruitment of formal political leaders, or modifications of the way in which constitutions are amended”. [Easton 1975: 388-389]

⁵ Easton emphasizes here that “supportive states of mind are vital inputs for the operation and maintenance of a political system”.

⁶ Easton also mentions a reserve of support, which is the support resulting from the conviction (mental state) that the government is generally favorable to the interests of its supporters, which allows it not to meet all of their demands.




Fig. 2. David Easton's Model of a Political System

Source: Easton D., 1957, *An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems*, in: *World Politics*, vol. 9, No.3, pp. 383-400.

2.2. Contemporary Understanding of the System Approach in Political Science

The diagram presenting a systems analysis, even though created by David Easton himself, is imperfect as it does not take into account all internal demands (all seem to be inspired by the environment), and in fact it underestimates the process of politicization as a source of the system's stability, being an equivalent of the process of socialization in sociological analysis [Easton 1957: 574-575]. Moreover, it appears as though all support and demands were empirically measurable, while even the dual nature of the former makes it clear that they are not simply "observable". In this sense, the superficially model nature of the above diagram, suggestive of a positivist paradigm of scientificity, is somewhat misleading. To paraphrase Pierre Manent's opinion about Machiavelli, one might say, however, that in the case of an author of Easton's standing, it may be worthwhile taking a look at this superficiality, as it has influenced and is still influencing human minds.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that the understanding of systems analysis which results from the above diagram corresponds to the typical way in which it is viewed in political studies. It is assumed that "system inputs are supports originating in the environment (e.g. the payment of taxes, compliance) and demands (e.g. reduction of unemployment)" [Żebrowski 2012:30], and thus internal and external elements are integrated as system inputs. For example, in studies on the European Parliament, presented as an exemplary application of the system model in a major

publication on the methodology of research in European studies, system inputs include “the measures available to Polish Members of the Parliament”, while bodies of the Parliament, the procedures and mechanism they employ were treated as the inside of the system [Szymański 2010:176]. This way Members of the Parliament – who are undoubtedly part of the system of the European Parliament – were placed outside of it, as carriers of “inputs” into the system.

The above approach is justified to the extent that – as Anatol Rapoport pointed out – the system approach makes no restrictions as to the type of units which may represent ‘elements’ of a system. Neither does it make any restrictions as to the type of relationships which may exist between them. The only limitation is the requirement that both the elements and their relationships are unequivocally distinguishable [cf. Rapoport 1996:129]. Consequently, mezzo- and micro-level system analyses prevailing in political studies view the political system as the environment of the sub-system under investigation. This way, however, the research field of political science becomes narrowed down to its core. All that which is its actual environment, and which is therefore qualitatively different from the system itself, is no longer included in the researcher’s perspective. This political reduction results in an explicitly behavioral orientation of systems analysis. In contemporary political science, it is viewed as an approach which may be adequately “applied to the knowledge of so-called hard problems: institutions, social organization or structure, but is not convincing when applied to the study of “soft” problems: the system of beliefs, meanings, norms and rules, forms of discourse, collective mentality, etc.” [Chodubski 1999:28].

2.3. Consequences of a Reductionist Understanding of Systems Analysis in Studying the Relationship Between Religion and Politics

The understanding of the systems perspective briefly discussed above has significant consequences for the analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary political studies. Firstly, it results in religion being easily overlooked by political scientists. A small, but symptomatic example of this problem is provided by the way in which sources of the 1989/91 breakthrough and systemic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe were analyzed in political studies in Poland. Referring to the most important factors determining the genesis and development of the transformation in CEE, they list (even fifteen years after the transformation) various, certainly important, factors, such as: transformations in the USSR, the crisis of Eastern European economy, divisions within the Communist Party, the significance of non-confrontational groups within

the opposition [Wonicki 2002], reforms carried out too late by the communists [Wiatr 2006], etc. What these analyses have in common is that they do not, in fact, consider religion worthy of note. In Polish literature on political studies, a thesis about the key role of religion in the processes of transformation was first defended by Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński in articles published in the „Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka” journal in 2007 [Wnuk-Lipiński 2007].

The narrowing down of the research field to a political sub-system in systems analysis also results in viewing religion solely as an institution (the Church, churches) so that it is impossible to distinguish it from other subjects of broadly understood political life. In consequence of this approach, the specific role of religion and religious institutions is negated. A good example of this process is the attitude to the role of churches in politics, visible in literature. Claims that from the theoretical perspective of the relationship between religion and politics, “it would be best if the Church actually functioned as one of the many institutions of the civic society, not having any privileged status compared to other (...) organizations” [Gdula 2010:73] are not isolated. On the other hand, there are also expectations that the Church should give up offering “certain content”, for example about morality, and should concern itself instead “with particular forms and procedures of communal life and joint decision-making by the citizens” [Radwan 2015]. It seems that all such proposals result directly from narrowing down the analytic perspective to a political sub-system, and consequently from a reductionist approach to religion and religious institutions. From this point of view, as Bryan Wilson points out, there are ultimately no Churches, as the term should legitimately be used only in relation to “a monopoly of spiritual power on the coercive power of the political authority” [Wilson 2016:203].

The point is, however, that in fact Churches do exist, and their identity is not related to having at their disposal the coercive measures employed by political power. Moreover, their role in politics cannot be reduced to struggle for power (and much less to attending to their “own interests”, which is characteristic of interest groups [Mazurkiewicz 2012:5-20]), and may therefore be completely unintelligible from the perspective of typical political analysis. If we look at the approach of John Paul II to the Eastern Bloc, we will notice that it begins with putting the classic view of politics, in this case international politics, “in parentheses”. In his activities, almost from the very beginning of his pontificate, John Paul II challenged the foundations of the most reasonable – from the point of view of

political calculations – *Ostpolitik* of Cardinal Casaroli [Weigel 1995:129-133]. He did not acknowledge geopolitical necessities, so to say; instead, he took “seriously” the framework of doing politics in Poland, whose identity had been related from the very beginning to Catholicism. Consequently, he in fact negated the idea of the Eastern politics of “small steps”⁷. The papal mission almost at the very start put politics “in parentheses”, while at the same time leading the framework in which it was done out of the shadows. The Pope’s offensive, so to say, was evangelical: it was based on proclaiming the truth about God and man inherent to the Christian message, together with the historical truth about Poland whose past was inseparably related to Christianity. Its addressees were not states or institutions, but individuals and societies. It was them the Pope addressed as their pastor, often ignoring the accepted political custom. And it was this non-political involvement that was of fundamental political significance, and not the political negotiations with Wojciech Jaruzelski, or the exchange of views with Henryk Jabłoński.

Summing up, the empirical and functional approach to the systems method prevailing in political science, while being legitimate, does not capture the complexity of political processes, particularly with regard to the role played in these processes by religion. This is due to the fact that it always remains, so to say, on the “surface” of the observed phenomena. In this context, Robert Esposito points to the deficit of depth and substance in the language of political science [Esposito 2015:67]. It hinders a proper understanding of the observed phenomena, particularly in the case of the role of the religious factor we are interested in here⁸. A political system is more than just the issue of *ad hoc* majority and its demands or support. Both the form of the system and its inputs and outputs are much more deeply rooted in the ways of thinking and understanding the world prevailing in a given culture, including the key aspect of “pre-judgments” about what is right and what is wrong; about the ultimate goal and meaning of life; and, finally, about whether God exists or not.

3. Towards a „In-depth Systems Analysis”

The question is whether we are doomed to such a model of understanding systems analysis. It might appear that the empirical and functional understanding of the

⁷ Whose acceptance may be linked to taking the edge off the Church’s criticism of communism during the pontificates of John XXIII and Paul VI [cf. Weigel 1995: 132-133].

⁸ Simone Weil actually claimed that we can take almost every expression or term in our political dictionary, and when we look inside, we will find that it is empty [cf. Weil 2004: 424].

systemic method is fully compatible with the methodological orientation of David Easton himself, who may be considered a representative of the empirical revolution in political science. Nevertheless, the situation is not as obvious as it might appear. It is true that – from the vantage point of Eastonian research – a broadly understood behavioral perspective is fully substantiated. Still, Easton’s theory also has a great potential – which seems to have not been fully taken advantage of – of carrying out an in-depth analysis of politics, which I suggest we call in-depth systems analysis.

3.1. Religion and Culture in Systems Analysis

In the above context, we may want to consider the approach to culture and religion in the area of politics presented by David Easton. He pointed out that “the members of every society act within the framework of an ongoing culture that shapes their general goals, specific objectives, and the procedures that the members feel ought to be used” [Easton 1957:390]. He emphasized that „the typical demands that will find their way into the political process will concern the matters in conflict that are labeled important by the culture. For this reason we cannot hope to understand the nature of the demands presenting themselves for political settlement unless we are ready to explore systematically and intensively their connection with the culture” [Easton 1957: 567]. This reflection points to not only the possibility, but in fact to the indispensability of an in-depth analysis if the system model is to be applied properly. Furthermore, analyzing the process of politicization – not represented in the above diagram – as an important factor consolidating the political system, the author of *The Political System* underlined the fact that “the various political myths, doctrines, and philosophies transmit to each generation a particular interpretation of the goals and norms” [Easton 1957: 399], creating the foundations determining the proper or expected behavior in specific political situations.

The above observation – let us make it clear – is not some kind of a research directive detached from the systems approach, and added for no apparent reason to reflections on the political system. On the contrary, it is consistent with the entire logic of systemic thinking in social science, which assumes that “the regularity or patterning of interaction becomes possible through the existence of norms which control the behavior of the actors. (...) Indeed, a stabilized social system is one in which behavior is regulated in this way and, as such, is a major point of reference for the sociological analysis of the dynamics of social systems” [Lockwood, 1956:135]. Social order is possible thanks to a normative order, which – even

recognizing the legitimacy of Lockwood's criticism of Parsons⁹ – unless it is the only variable, represents, together with the social stratum, one of the two key ones. Easton was fully aware of this. He emphasized that „it is essential for the viability of an orderly political system that the members of the system have some common basic expectations with regard to the standards that are to be used in making political evaluations, to the way people will feel about various political matters, and to the way members of the system will perceive and interpret political phenomena” [Easton 1957: 398].

Once we realize the meaning of normative standards, we are able to ask the questions we are interested in concerning the political science of religion. The accepted norms, among which “the most important are moral standards” [Lockwood 1956:135], ultimately lead to taking the significance of religion, together with its related anthropological or eschatological beliefs, for the political process into account in political analysis. In this sense, systems analysis requires depth – to uncover the sources and possible trajectories of political thought and action, the framework conditions of such action, so to say, thus outlining the space for a political science of religion.

At the same time, one must admit that in Easton's model itself the issue of taking normative standards into account has not been operationalized, and remains more a theoretical directive than an instrument of research praxis. In other words, while the systemic model theoretically makes it possible to take the theoretically recognized role of religion, and the culture for which it provides foundations, seriously as an environment exerting fundamental influence on the functioning of the system, and thus appears to be a useful paradigm for a non-reductionist political science of religion; in the practice of political studies – as has been demonstrated above – the environment and its role are considerably restricted by a “politological reduction”: focusing on intra-systemic inputs, or applying the systems model to micro- and mezzo-level systems analyses, where the problem under investigation is but a fragment of a broader political system, thus becoming the environment for the studied political sub-system.

Not aspiring to solve the problem of adding depth to the systems method in a brief article, I would like to point to some clues which may be useful in this context,

⁹ Talcott Parsons distinguished between three subsystems of the environment, resulting from the functional approach: the economic and technological one (the function of adaptation); the family one (the function of upholding models); culture, religion, art (the function of integration) [Sztompka 1975:96].

however. These clues, let me add, refer to the issue which political science – or so it seems to me – has had the most trouble with, namely that of taking religion seriously as an essential element exerting influence on the framework conditions of a political process. Naturally, these remarks also pave the way for developing an appropriate approach to institutional religious actors, even though – due to the already excessive length of this article – I will not discuss this issue here.

3.2. The Environment and the System – “Time Difference”

The above-mentioned “politological reduction” of the role of the environment (including religion) which does not fully yield to social studies comes as no surprise. The problem with the operationalization of taking the significance of religion as the context in which politics happens into account within the framework of systems analysis seems to arise from the temporal incompatibility of the cultural and political context. In relation to the theoretical work of Fernand Braudel, we may notice that there are „at least three planes. One, which we may call A, is that of traditional history, habitual narrative, hurrying from one event to the next like a chronicler of old or a reporter of today (...). A second plane – B – is that of episodes, each taken as a whole: Romanticism, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution (...). They can be regarded as events of long duration, stripped of superfluous detail. A third plane – C – transcends these events: it considers only phenomena that can be measured over a century or more. (...) On this last level (...) civilizations (...) reveal their longevity, their permanent features, their structures – their almost abstract but yet essential diagrammatic form” [Braudel 1995:68]. The model of systems analysis prevailing in political science is concerned with the short-term: that of political processes happening “right now”, the so-called events history. The cultural context of key importance – according to Easton himself – for understanding these processes is the dimension of long-term, even great-term duration, revealing fundamental structures and thinking patterns delineating its trajectories in the short time.

As we perceive this “time difference”, we discover a research directive of essential importance for analyzing religion and politics. Namely, in-depth systems analysis should strive towards uncovering the relationship between two levels of time: political events studied in the short-time perspective, and transformations in ideas and ways of thinking which determine the standards of value-judgments and norms defining the structures of institutional operation. In this perspective, analysis of political processes should take into account the fact that „the conscious policies of men and governments are (...) deductions from our most basic ideas of

human destiny, and they have a great, though not unobstructed, power to determine our course” [Weaver 1984:3].

A research tradition which seems to be useful in this process is hermeneutics, or, to be more precise, the hermeneutically-oriented phenomenology¹⁰. Hermeneutics, as has been pointed out by Wilhelm Dilthey, is a theory of the art of understanding manifestations of life as they are recorded in writing. This knowledge is achieved through construction, i.e. interpretation [Gadacz 2009:130]. This is a manifest expression of the aftermath of the exegetic tradition. Since “life is a text” which is open to interpretation [Bollnow 1994:17], the starting point here is the specific political phenomenon which – in accordance with the logic of the hermeneutic circle – is subject to ever deepening analysis in the context of the entire cultural tradition. This way, thanks to the hermeneutic circle, “the time distance from the cultural achievements of the past is no longer an obstacle to understanding” [portal 2017]. On the contrary, it allows for placing the observed phenomena against a broader cultural context.

A good exemplification of such hermeneutics may be the perception of the phenomenon of limited power, essential for modern democracies, in the specific context of the Western culture. As has been pointed out by Leszek Kołakowski, the Promethean paradigm of revolution rejects “the idea of original sin understood so that it requires an external redemptive intervention” [Kołakowski 2006:311]. By contrast, the ultimate reason for institutional limitation of power, e.g. in the form of a tripartite separation, is anthropological in nature. What does it mean, however? As has been stressed by many scholars [cf. eg. Delsol 2016, Mazurkiewicz 2017, Gierycz 2017], a realistic anthropology makes it mandatory to respect the equal and inviolable dignity of every person, the natural human inclination towards good, and the universal tendency to choose evil. When trying to understand these claims, it is necessary to discover their theological sources. The first element is related to the Biblical belief in the creation of man “in the image and likeness” of God, which makes man the subject of certain inherent and inviolable rights. The two latter – to belief in the original sin which has “damaged”, but not entirely destroyed the orientation of human nature towards good.

¹⁰ To cite Helmuth Plessner, we may say that this is – generally speaking – about understanding seen as insight into objects which, expressing themselves, give witness about themselves; understanding which begins with the sensual and visual layer and penetrates down to the essential core, being at every stage a unity of direct witness and intellection [cf. Plessner 2018:37].

3.3. Inputs and the Inside of the System – „Transmission Channels” and „Borrowings”

Another path, different from the hermeneutic tradition, to uncovering the significance of religion for the framework conditions of a political process is a method developed, for example, by Ernst Kantorowicz and Carl Schmitt.

In his well-known treatise, Ernst Kantorowicz discusses the formula of “the king’s two bodies” which had been upheld in England for many long centuries. It played a considerable role in the history of England during the trial of Charles Stuart, when “only” his natural body was executed “without affecting seriously or doing irreparable harm to the King’s body politic” [Kantorowicz 1997:23]. How could the king be executed without his body being destroyed? English lawyers of the 16th century claimed that “the King has in him two bodies, *viz.*, a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident (...). But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the direction of the people, and the Management of the public weal, and this Body is utterly void of (...) natural Defects and Imbecilities” [Kantorowicz 1997:7]. Without going into the detailed definitions of the King’s two bodies, which the English doctrine had done an admirable job in developing¹¹, Kantorowicz points out that the speculations of English jurists concerning fundamental political institutions are crypto-theological. He asserts that “we need only replace the strange image of the Two Bodies by the more customary theological term of the Two Natures in order to make it poignantly felt that the speech of the Elizabethan lawyers derived its tenor in the last analysis from theological diction (...) [transferring the theological doctrine] to the sphere of the state the head of which is the king” [Kantorowicz 1997:16].

A strikingly similar observation has been made by Carl Schmitt about the national state. In his *Political Theology* he argues that „all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” [Schmitt 1985:37]. The way he understood it, conceptual analogy meant that meanings assigned to a particular legal concept in the political community reflect a corresponding theological concept in their structure and content. Schmitt demonstrates this using the example of the idea of state. He proves that the concept of state

¹¹ At one point in his reflections, Kantorowicz examines the „Creed of Royalty” in the context of its „orthodoxy”. The doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies passes the test with flying colors, the only possible danger being that of Monotheletism. Cf. Kantorowicz 1997: 17-18.

secularizes the idea of almighty God, reflecting his omnipotence, omnipresence, his unity of nature in the multiplicity of persons, and even his mercy. He points out that „the state intervenes everywhere. At times it does so as a *deus ex machina*, to decide according to positive statute a controversy [...]; at other times it does so as the graceful and merciful lord who proves by pardons and amnesties his supremacy over his own laws. There always exists the same inexplicable identity: lawgiver, executive power, police, pardoner, welfare institution” [Schmitt 1985:38]. Consequently, the meanings contained in the concept of God and the very structure of this concept have evident analogies in the concept of state [Schmitt 1985:40]. Schmitt, like Kantorowicz, notes the crypto-theological language of the science of the state. In addition, by pointing out conceptual analogies, he claims that concepts of key importance for the political construct have been borrowed from the sphere of religion.

It should be added that neither Kantorowicz nor Schmitt limit their analyses of borrowings to diagnosing an analogy between concepts or their contents. Both of them look for possible channels of transmission; neither accepts any oversimplified solutions in this matter. For example, while Kantorowicz asserts that “the crypto-theological idiom was not the personal spleen of any single one among the Tudor lawyers, nor was it restricted to a small coterie of judges” [Kantorowicz 1997:19], and that quite on the contrary, it was a common and widespread phenomenon, he also stresses that one should not conclude that “the lawyers consciously borrowed from the acts of the early Councils” [Kantorowicz 1997:18]. Similarly, while Schmitt notices the above-mentioned analogy between concepts, he emphasizes that it is not a matter of simple reproduction. At one point, he explicitly writes that he does not believe it to be a good example of political theology to argue that „the monarchy of the seventeenth century is characterized as the real that is ‘mirrored’ in the Cartesian concept of God” [Schmitt 1985:45].

Schmitt suggests another explanation of the borrowing. He agrees that „the historical-political status of the monarchy (...) is shown to correspond to the general state of consciousness that was characteristic of western Europeans at that time” [Schmitt 1985:45-46], and that the legal form of this historical and political reality was expressed in a concept whose structure coincided with the structure of metaphysical concepts. He believes, therefore, that religious concepts appear in the legal system of a state indirectly through the political concepts of its community. Theological analogies appear due to the fact that political concepts are founded on a particular religious awareness – being the most profound basis for

the structure of political concepts as they are being developed. Religious content is therefore not used directly, but indirectly. Secularization of religious concepts is related to their content being expressed in political categories, which results from a particular shape of social awareness. For Schmitt, who asserts that the state emerges as a result of religious wars, i.e. in the moment when the supreme ideas forming the social perception of the world are of a religious nature, this explanation exhausted the matter.

The analyses performed by Kantorowicz, who clearly does not contradict Schmitt's belief in the indirectness of the borrowing process, draws our attention to yet another element in the process of transmitting concepts and meanings from religion to politics. Kantorowicz emphasizes, in the context of the problem he analyzes, that one cannot "preclude the possibility that corporational and other concepts defining the papal power were directly transferred and purposely introduced into Tudor England to bolster the royal power" [Kantorowicz 1997:19]. This way Kantorowicz points out that the transmission of religious concepts may proceed almost "directly". Not in the sense that a particular concept is transferred directly from theology; what he means is rather that this may be the case of politics using concepts which have become secularized, or partially secularized, within the Church itself. Kantorowicz describes this process in detail using the example of the concept of *corpus mysticum* which, as we will recall, English jurists had borrowed to describe the royal body¹². In the process of borrowing, an important role is thus played both by religious and by political actors.

The above analyses show that political science is capable of calibrating its research tools, both at the level of paradigms (the systems perspective), and specific techniques (analysis of borrowings, hermeneutics), so that a non-reductive approach can be developed to the phenomenon of religion and its role in the political process. Objectively speaking, it is not necessary, therefore, to force political

¹² Kantorowicz points out that the concept of *corpus mysticum*, initially meaning the Eucharist – the consecrated Host – became gradually transposed to the community of the Church, and subsequently – always within the Church itself – turned into a "legal abstract", a "mystical person", a concept which is similar, if not synonymous, to that of "fictitious person" which the jurists introduced into the legal thought, and which can be found in the foundations of many political theories of the Middle Ages. The observation made by Kantorowicz reveals, therefore, that also the Church may make an essential contribution to the process of borrowing concepts. Not so much in the sense of creating them (which, naturally, is also the case), but of their initial secularization which facilitates their "interception" by the secular sphere.

studies of religion into a rigid methodological straightjacket tailored in the spirit of Vilfredo Pareto, or to adopt an approach which negates the specific nature of religion compared to other phenomena in broadly understood political life. At times, as in the case of systems analysis, it is enough to take full advantage of the potential inherent to the concept of political science. In this sense, the road of a political science of religion seems possible, and may be an essential contribution to the identity of politology. The only problem is that – as is otherwise seen in positive terms – “tradition obliges”. In this case, the atheistic tradition of political science mentioned by Boeckenfoerde needs some controversy in order to leave the question about God open, and thus take answers to this question seriously.

Bibliography

- Antoszewski A. (1975), *Politologia*, in: A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut [ed.], *Leksykon politologii*, atla 2, Wrocław 2004.
- Böckenförde E. W. (2005), *Teoria polityki a teologia polityczna. Uwagi na temat ich wzajemnego stosunku*, “Teologia polityczna” No. 3.
- Bollnow O. F. (1994), *Wilhelm Dilthey jako twórca filozofii hermeneutycznej*, trans. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, “Studia z Filozofii Niemieckiej” vol. 1, p. 17; as quoted in: T. Gadacz, *Historia filozofii...*
- Braudel F. (1995), *A History of Civilisations*, Penguin Books, New York.
- Brzezińska M., Gierycz M., Burgoński P. (2018), *Analiza dyskursu politycznego. Teoria, zastosowanie, granice naukowości*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UKSW, Warszawa.
- Burgoński P., Gierycz M. (2014), *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*, Elipsa, Warszawa.
- Chodubski A. (1999), *Analiza polityczna*, in: W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki [ed.], *Encyklopedia politologii*, vol. 1: *Teorie polityki*, Zakamycze, Kraków.
- Cribb A. (1991), *Values and Comparative Politics. An introduction to the philosophy of political science*, Avebury, Adershot.
- Delsol Ch. (2017), *Nienawiść do świata. Ponowoczesność i totalitaryzmy*, PAX, Warszawa
- Dubrzyńska H. (1998), *Elementy teorii polityki*, Uniwersytet Gdański, Gdańsk.
- Dylus A. (2014), “Krytyka ‘zabójczej’ gospodarki. Ujęcia *Evangelii Gaudium*”, *Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka* No. 15/16.
- Dylus A. (2016), *Polityka w perspektywie etycznej i religijnej*, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa.
- Easton D. (1953), *The Political System. An Inquiry Into A State Of The Political Science*, H. Wolff, New York.
- Easton D. (1957), *An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems*, in: *World Politics*, vol. 9, No.3, pp. 383-400.
- Enelow J., Hinch M. (1984), *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

- Esposito R. (2015), *Pojęcia polityczne. Wspólnota, Immunizacja, Biopolityka*, trans. Katarzyna Burzyk et al., Universitas, Kraków.
- Gadacz T. (2009), *Historia filozofii XX wieku. Nurty*, vol. 1, Znak, Kraków.
- Gdula M. (2010), *Kohabitacja i sojusz. Polityka i Kościół w Polsce 1945 – 2009*, in: *Kościół, państwo i polityka płci*, H. Boell Stiftung, Warszawa.
- Gierycz M. (2008), *Chrześcijaństwo i Unia Europejska. Rola religii w procesie integracji europejskiej*, WAM, Instytut Politologii UKSW, Kraków – Warszawa.
- Gierycz M. (2017), *Europejski spór o człowieka. Studium z antropologii politycznej*, Wyd. Naukowe UKSW, Warszawa.
- Haynes J. (2009), *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Routledge, London & New York.
- Johnson J. B., Reynolds H. T., Mycoff J. D. (2012), *Political Science Research Methods*, CQ Press, Thousand Oaks, California.
- Kantorowicz E. (1997), *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Kantyka Z. (1999), "Nauki polityczne", in: W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki [ed.], *Encyklopedia politologii*, vol.1: *Teorie polityki*, Zakamycze, Kraków.
- Kołakowski L. (2006), "O duchu rewolucyjnym", in: Tenże, *Czy diabeł może być zbawiony i 27 innych kazań*, Znak, Kraków.
- Koło hermeneutyczne*, paneef2.republika.pl/hasla/h/hermeneutyczne.html.
- Krauz-Mozer B. (2005), *Teorie polityki*, PWN, Warszawa.
- Lockwood, D. (1956), "Some Remarks on The Social System", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 7 (2).
- Longman T. (2001), "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 31, Fasc. 2, *Religion and War in the 1990s*.
- Marczewska-Rytko M. (2010), *Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie*, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin.
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2012), *Niepolityczna polityczność Kościoła*, „Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka” No 13 (1).
- Mazurkiewicz P. (2017), *Europa jako kinderniespodzianka*, OMP, Kraków.
- Michalak R. (2016), *Implementacja zasad religijnych w sferze politycznej*, Morpho, Zielona Góra.
- Plessner H. (2018), *Political Anthropology. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois.
- Przybylski H. (2004), *Politologia. Zarys problematyki*, Wyd. Naukowe Śląsk, Katowice – Warszawa.
- Radwan A. (2015), *Kościole, proszę nie milcz!*, „Rzeczpospolita”, <http://www.rp.pl/Publicystyka/312309838-Kosciele-prosze-nie-milcz.html#ap-1>.
- Rapoport A. (1966), *Some System Approaches to Political Theory*, in: D. Easton [ed.], *Varieties of Political Theory*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
- Ryszka F. (1984), *Nauka o polityce. Rozważania metodologiczne*, Warszawa.
- Schmitt C. (1985), *Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Schwaabe Ch. (2010), *Politische Theorie I. Von Platon bis Locke*, 2., durchgesehene Auflage, Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn.

- Sobolewski M. (1975), *Historyczne ujęcie zjawisk politycznych*, in: K. Opałek [ed.], *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych*, PWN, Warszawa.
- Steiner J. (1997), *Sumienie w polityce. Empiryczne badania przypadków trafności decyzji politycznych w Szwajcarii*, trans. J. Sowa, JanSowa, Wyd WSP, Rzeszów.
- Sulkowski M. (2018), "Ideologia Państwa Islamskiego", *Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka* No.22.
- Sztompka P. (1975), "Analiza systemowa w naukach politycznych. Próba rekonstrukcji", in: Kazimierz Opałek [ed.], *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych*, PWN, Warszawa.
- Szymański A. (2010), "Systemowe podejście w badaniach europejskich", in: W. Jakubowski, K. A. Wojtaszczyk [ed.], *Studia europejskie. Zagadnienia metodologiczne*, WAIp, Warszawa.
- Weaver R. M. (1984), *Ideas Have Consequences*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
- Weigel G. (1995), *Ostateczna rewolucja. Kościół sprzeciwu a upadek komunizmu*, W drodze, Poznań.
- Weil S. (2004), "Nie rozpoczynajmy znowu wojny trojańskiej", in: id., *Dzieła*, trans. M. Frankiewicz, Brama. Książnica Włoczęgów i Uczonych, Poznań.
- Wiatr J.J. (2006), *Europa pokomunistyczna*, Scholar, Warszawa.
- Wilson B.R. (2016), *Religion in Secular Society: Fifty Years On*, Oxford University Press
- Wnuk-Lipiński E. (2007), "Meandry kształtowania się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej", *Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka* 2007 No.2 (1).
- Woleński J., "Spór o status metodologiczny nauk o polityce", in: K. Opałek [ed.], *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych*, PWN, Warszawa.
- Wonicki J. (2002), *Trudna droga do demokracji. Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia po 1989 roku*, Warszawa.
- Yanow D. (1999), *Conducting interpretive policy analysis*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Dehli.
- Żebrowski W. (2012), *Badanie polityki. Ogniwa procesu badawczego na studiach politologicznych*, INP UWM, Olsztyn.

Tadeusz Jarosz SDS

Jordan University College, Tanzania

Ecclesial Politology: in Search of an Adequate Perspective of Viewing the Church in Political Studies

Abstract: Transformations in the theoretical and methodological inventory of political science define the framework of reflections on the present state of studies on the institutionality of the Church. Analyses revealing the insufficiency of approaches proposed so far confirm the need for a more adequate perspective of research into its individual aspects. This perspective is created by the normative theological and philosophical content which defines the extent component of the concept of Church. Empirically derived descriptions of the individual elements making up this concept, on the other hand, performed within the domain of social sciences, add precision to its definition content-wise. A skillful combination of the two aspects of the concept of Church offers a more in-depth insight into the functioning of ecclesial institutions by emphasizing the supernatural element as a component of the social and political process.

Key words: ecclesial politology, Catholic Church, political science of religion, non-economic pressure group, political process

Abstrakt: Przeobrażenia teoretyczno-metodologicznego zaplecza nauki o polityce wyznaczają ramy refleksji nad stanem badań instytucjonalności Kościoła. Analizy niewystarczalności dotychczasowych ujęć potwierdzają konieczność wypracowania bardziej adekwatnej perspektywy badań jej poszczególnych aspektów. Perspektywę tę tworzą normatywne treści teologiczno-filozoficzne, definiujące zakresowy komponent pojęcia Kościoła. Z kolei empirycznie pogłębione opisy pojedynczych elementów tego pojęcia, dokonane w domenie nauk społecznych, doprecyzowują jego treściowy komponent. Umiejętne połączenie obydwu aspektów pojęcia omawianej instytucji umożliwia uzyskanie dogłębniejszego wglądu w funkcjonowanie instytucji eklezjalnych, dzięki uwydatnieniu pierwiastka nadprzyrodzonego jako składowej procesy społeczno-politycznego.

Słowa kluczowe: politologia eklezjalna, Kościół katolicki, politologia religii, nieekonomiczna grupa nacisku, proces polityczny

At the beginning of this century, the process of incorporating religious problems into politological studies has been considerably accelerated. Its growing pace should be understood not only as an expression of increased demand for a quantitative description of the phenomenon of religiousness, but also for an explanation of the increasing influence of religion on its neighboring segments of the society. The slow, albeit consistent shifting of religious problems from the peripheries of the research interests of political scientists towards their very center has been accompanied by a growing awareness of the need to enhance the theoretical and methodological resources of political science, so that exploration of the religious element as a component of the political process may become more reliable and scientifically accurate both in the cognitive and the pragmatic aspect.

This self-awareness is reflected in a cautious approach, currently coming to the foreground in scientific discourse, to the potential of scientific and positivistic epistemology of developing new theories.¹ It has determined both the genesis of the discipline of political science, and the trends in its subsequent development. This has been felt most fully under the influence of the theories of secularization developed since the sixth decade of the last century. They have contributed to popularizing a belief about the insignificance of the religious factor, whose role in inspiring culture was waning as it clashed with subsequent phases of the industrial society. And since this belief was also shared among political scientists, religious problems within this discipline became marginalized [cf. Bronk 2003: 215].

The process of restoring the significance of studies on the phenomenon of religion in political science should not be motivated by a way of thinking and valuating as simplistic as the one which has led to its becoming forsaken. It is therefore necessary to strive towards introducing religious problems into the very core of the theoretical and methodological reflection typical of this discipline. So that the emerging political science of religion may be an inherently consistent domain of research, transparent with respect to the findings of its related disciplines.

¹ While the religious element is now starting to be seen as an essential element of the political process, many scholars fail to see the inadequacy of the theoretical base which has been employed so far. Consequently, new narrations do not, in fact, depart from those prevailing when religion was considered a non-essential factor. For lack of space, only one reference can be provided here: cf. Ch. Z. Mooney, *The Public Clash of Private Values*, in: *id.* (ed.), *The Public Clash of Private Values: The Politics of Moral Policy*, Chatham House Publishers, New York, London, 2001, 3-18.

Consequently, the starting point of this study is the *status quo* of knowledge about religious problems in political science. Dynamic changes occurring within the theory of politics which determine the development of its individual sub-disciplines provides the proper background against which to place religious problems in the broader context of its theoretical and methodological base. Within this sub-discipline, a tendency has been observed not so much to consolidate the theory and unify its methodological profile, but rather to enhance its explanatory potential. This requires a synthesis, redefining the existing paradigms, of diverse conceptualizations which, while divided by their “genetic” diversity, are brought together by common points of interest in research. One of their integral parts is the process of defining interdisciplinary perspectives in studies [Jakubowski, Zamecki 2013: 119-122].

Further on in this study we will develop an adequate perspective of viewing the Church as a protagonist of the public scene. We will look at the specific nature of its social status, and its influence on the remaining actors. To this end, the Church needs to be depicted as an institution determined both by the transcendental dimension of religion and by the dimension limited to the horizon of the human nature of the persons who make it up.

The last part of this study will begin with analyses typical of the „traditional” research approach of political science which narrows down the essence of the institutional nature of the Church. We will then discuss selected issues in ecclesial theology. They will pave the way for a reinterpretation of the excessively reduced image of Church institutions in political studies. Finally, an attempt will be made at defining the concept of ecclesial politology as a tool for exploring the religious element in political studies.

1. Transformations of the Theoretical Framework and Methodological Perspectives in Political Science in the Aspect of Religious Problems

With a view to restoring religious problems to the main current of political studies, it is necessary to verify the existing paradigms of research into the phenomenon of religion (the meta-theoretical sphere); the descriptive and normative statements derived from these paradigms which provide the foundations for individual theories (the theoretical sphere); and the very structure of the research process, the sequence of steps in the procedure, and the employed instruments (the methodological sphere).

The above tasks involve an intra-disciplinary reflection on the theoretical and methodological *status quo* of political science. The pluralism of epistemological, theoretical and methodological views and orientations, inherent to its genesis and history, keeps deepening. Established traditions are being joined by new approaches. Often the objective difficulty becomes manifest of assigning individual perspectives to particular sub-disciplines of political or related sciences. This results from a relative freedom in combining theoretical content with the formal rules of various disciplines of science. And the study subject defined within the respective frameworks of each of these approaches goes beyond the traditional division of the field of study. This way, political science becomes an area of peculiar transformations. The growing distancing from theories and methodologies modelled on the ideals of natural sciences – the behavioral or the functional and systemic one – is accompanied by a belief in the need for research inspired by the achievements of humanistic and social sciences.

Among standpoints challenging the advisability of upholding an excessively idealized model of political science, with its inherent narrowing down of the object of study, there are representatives of historical institutionalism (1); cultural theories (2); the analytical theory (3); as well as critical and normative theories (4). According to critics, the process of defining the object of study in political science should be considerably expanded. Each of the perspectives listed above approaches this task in a different way.

In the case of (1), the subjective aspects of actors on the political stage are moved to the foreground. Satisfactory insight into their activities can only be achieved when they are studied jointly as a component of a broader historical and social process. The postulated way of viewing the studied phenomenon in the context of its direct and indirect environment enables capturing interactions between participants of the social exchange in the perspective of the influence of values and norms on the course of events under investigation. An additional benefit of the contextual approach is due appreciation of the contingent factor, which sometimes becomes the causal factor of the examined phenomenon. It does not always correspond to the linear model of development, however, which makes it more difficult to anticipate results in the field of influence due to factors which are otherwise considered as causative.

In the light of the perspective proper to (2), the significance of procedures reflecting the subjective specificity of participants in the studied social and

political process becomes more manifest. This becomes possible as the cultural context is taken into account, particularly its normative and axiological layer. It determines various (political/religious) identities, and leaves its mark on particular contexts of the studied processes, for example socio-economic, or cultural and religious ones.

In approach (3), the complexity of politological problems requires the development of a conceptual framework adequate for the object of study. It should always be built relying on an interdisciplinary combination of perspectives. So that first a set of concepts is defined which pave the way for capturing and explaining the essence of the studied phenomenon. Particular attention is paid here to a critical analysis of individual concepts. Abstract meanings which add precision to selected aspects of the studied object may considerably expand the explanatory capacity of a particular research procedure. This is achieved mainly through analyses of the genesis of individual expressions, and the evolution of content which broadens or narrows down the meaning of a particular concept depending on the context in which it is used.

Finally, perspective (4) raises the awareness of those aspects of the examined reality which are important from the social point of view. It is postulated that concrete social problems should be taken into account in politological studies. This means it is necessary to shorten the distance between political science as a reflection on the condition of the society and the society itself. Its representatives should be able to benefit from the explanations offered by political scientists, thus enriching their knowledge and worldview. Another important postulate in this approach is that of combining the theoretical perspectives which are believed to be the most useful within the chronological and spatial boundaries of a particular study area. This applies also to the use of notions derived from mutually contradictory perspectives. This postulate reflects the belief that even contradictory standpoints may supplement one another, which can be achieved when elements of contrary notional apparatuses yield to reciprocal penetration [cf. Jabłoński 2015: 15-18].

Summing up: there is a broad range of coherence between views held by representatives of similar standpoints. In the light of a perspective encompassing the whole of the discourse summarized here, excessively idealized ideals of scientificity, referring to positivist empiricism and rationalism, definitely lose their power of persuasion. The theories, models and methods which they inspired have detached political science too much from the reality it purports to investigate. This happens

mostly due to the “purifying” selection of facts and values, which has considerably reduced the range of aspects of the studied object which are taken into account. Consequently, a very dangerous tendency has spread, visible in the area of studies on religious phenomena. Research projects have not so much been the result of an effort to describe and explain real problems, but a reflection of hypotheses – those which could be formulated within a particular theory – and the test causality of the corresponding research method [cf. Zenderowski: 2014: 1551].

The critical attitude to empiricism which is now becoming manifest does not mean a deprecation of the very point of carrying out empirical studies. On the contrary, the postulated changes of the theoretical and methodological status of the discipline discussed here should be understood as an expression of concern about adjusting empirical studies to the specific nature of the social and political segment. More precisely, to the relationship, defining this specific nature, between elements of the factual and axionormative layer. The introduction of a valuating element into the theoretical framework of the research procedure weakens the predicative force of theories in political science, as it means giving up on attempts at explaining the studied phenomena by reference to the cause-and-effect relationships arranged along the line separating the independent from dependent variables. With an accurately captured hierarchy of relationships, transformations observed on the one side of the category of variables automatically cause corresponding changes on the other side, which can be reflected using statistical models. This unfortunate drawback of such a research approach is compensated, however, by the possibility of making an appropriately extensive and in-depth description of the study object. This possibility is expressed in the emphasis placed on the complexity of factors which together influence selected aspects of the studied reality, so that their description always situates the essence of the studied phenomenon in the broader context of the interdependencies and mutual influences which form its environment. In contrast to the criticized model of natural sciences, this new model is much more sophisticated. It appears, however, to be a better tool for the ultimate explanation of the examined phenomena, which often take the form of hierarchically ordered structures of an axiological and normative nature [Hajduk 2001: 220-222].

The above dynamics of transformations in the theory and practice of political studies undergo constant fluctuations. They are driven both by the increasing pace of changes within the social and political community, and by the permanent crisis of the scientific identity experienced by political scientists. This crisis is a result

of the alternating influences of paradigmatic models in the practice of science. It goes back to the beginnings of contemporary science, marked by the values of Enlightenment, and is expressed most fully in a commitment to keep improving the scientific repertory. The goal is to ensure that new embodiments of the general criteria of scientificity in concrete structures of research procedures enable a more in-depth analysis of the explored reality. In her criticism of certain aspects of this process, Barbara Krauz-Mozer, abstracting from strictly methodological problems, considers the theory of political science we are concerned with to be an insufficiently developed research tool, inadequate considering the fast transformation of the reality around us [Krauz-Mozer 2015: 5].

To endow this pessimistic assertion with an optimistic interpretation, it should be said that the theory discussed here, as Krauz-Mozer has admitted herself in fact, must not be understood as a set of solutions defined once and for all, in a “finished and closed form”. Rather, it is a collection of their constant redefinitions (modification of existing meanings, adaptation of novel ideas, development of pioneering perspectives, discovery of previously ignored aspects of the studied reality, creation of successively improved models). Such redefinition takes the form of a process described in source literature as continuous theorizing [ibid.].

The materialization of this process opens up a perspective of rethinking the issue of religious problems as the subject matter of studies in political science. Considering its subjective and objective determinants, as well as its characteristic complexity, it must be concluded that the empirical and rational model of science has proved to be an insufficient tool of research. Its characteristic conceptualization of religious problems has, as has already been mentioned, excessively reduced the meaning of the religious element as a component of social and political processes. This is due to the reduction, proper to the Enlightenment, of the phenomenon of religion to a strictly rational dimension. Another important limitation of the said paradigm is the consequence of applying the methodology – adequate to its requirements – of the research procedure. The essence of this approach is determined by the significance attached to empirical studies. They play the primary role first of all in the process of defining and setting the boundary conditions of a particular study object. Consequently, the development of political studies in the area of religious problems has been exposed to the limiting effect of excessive subordination to the rigors of natural sciences. This way, the research area has been systematically narrowed down to a set of empirically verifiable issues, theorems, normative directives and hypotheses.

The submission of religious problems to the requirements of this procedure has resulted in its secularization. It has become secularized in the sense that a relatively stable set of theories and methods, limited to those which could be empirically verified, has led to a distorted insight into the complexity of the phenomenon of religion. This distortion resulted from focusing on those aspects of the phenomenon which confirmed a previously assumed thesis; aspects which attested to the decline of the social significance of institutions representing religion and the real influence on the social and political process (in accordance with the paradigm of secularization). As a consequence, political scientists have been left helpless in confrontation with facts – the growing influence of the religious factor on the public forum which has been witnessed since the second half of the last century. It is described in source literature as a resurgence, and extends from the local dimension (Khomeini's revolution in Iran), through the regional one (the transformations initiated in Poland which ultimately led to the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe), to the global dimension (political Islam whose influence has been indisputable at least since the events of 9/11/01).

Summing up, it should be noted that in result of the community's self-reflection, the paradigmatic assumptions which are responsible for the marginalization of religious problems in political studies have been redefined. The new perspectives which are opening now make it possible to look at the phenomenon of religiousness in a broader context of multiple-layered factors influencing the political process. This expansion corresponds to a gradual departure from the scientific and positivistic ideals of science, whose application has led to an excessive formalization of its conceptual apparatus and research procedures. They have proved to be inadequate when applied to the subjective determinants of religious problems, and have led to an excessive reduction of the examined manifestations of religiousness; particularly to an excessive detachment of religious actors from the natural social context, failure to take into account elements which determine the nature of religious phenomena, underestimation of the influence of the transcendental element on the social and political process. These transformations of the theoretical and methodological status of political science bring political scientists closer to recovering the lost subjectivity of the religious element in their studies. One of the most important, due to its being the first, step which makes this possible is to redefine the subject matter of political studies. In the next part of this paper, an attempt will be made at suggesting relevant redefinitions, be it in a field narrowed down to the notion of the Church.

2. Creating a Perspective to Enable Defining the Church as the Study Object of Political Science

The basic difficulty in operationalizing the concept of the Church for use in political science is a resultant of general problems with capturing its essence in a definition. Even in the area of theological sciences, it is difficult to find someone who would dare present a definition of the Church in the form of a single, concise formula. It is even more difficult to find specialists who would accept such a formula as not falling into one-sidedness. So that it integrates all essentially relevant designates of the concept, i.e. denotations of its constitutive features. Consequently, theologians most often limit themselves to listing a set of descriptive and normative features. They emphasize only selected aspects of the multi-dimensional ecclesial reality, which derive their significance from the context delineated by the problems under investigation. A similar strategy was adopted during Vatican II. In order to eliminate the possibility of falling into the trap of oversimplification, for example by focusing excessively on one aspect at the cost of another, the idea of providing a single, conclusive definition at the starting point of ecclesiological documents was abandoned. Instead, a set of mutually complementary descriptions was used, borrowed from authors representing subsequent (Biblical, patristic, ecclesiological) stages in the development of the theological thought [Jarosz 2013: 29].

Since in the area of theological science, the way the concept of the Church is defined depends on the context of particular studies, it appears that an analogous approach should be adopted in political science. Thus, the definition of the concept of Church for use in political studies should be based on a skillful abstraction of its comprehensive reality from different aspects, always placed against the broader background of the Church's participation in the social and political process. This way of arriving at a definition capturing the object of study entails the need for generalizations. Which inevitably leads to reduction. Nevertheless, such generalizations are not the same as abstracting solely from empirically observable aspects of the ecclesial reality, along the line of attempts made during the rule of the empirical and scientific paradigm. Quite on the contrary, such efforts may also refer to elements of the supernatural stratum of the Church which are beyond sensory perception. Insight into this stratum becomes possible thanks to an analysis of the religious beliefs of the members of the ecclesial community included in a particular research procedure.

In view of the above, at the starting point the research procedure employed by political science should take into account the axiological and normative aspects

of the ecclesial reality. This applies to the ideological layer of the Church, its institutional and functional layer, as well as the broad range of social and cultural associations linking religion represented by the Church with the sphere of public and political life. It is therefore necessary to draw inspiration from the theological, philosophical, and humanistic reflection. This procedure cannot be identified, however, with mechanically transferring the conceptual apparatus of theology or its inherent methodological principles into the area of political science. It is necessary, therefore, to perform analyses aimed at transposing theological and philosophical meanings and senses so that the actual content of particular conceptualizations, e.g. theological ones, may find its equivalent in the content of the politological designates which denote them. Designates which satisfy the criterion of rationality proper to social sciences.

One advantage of such a starting point is precise determination of the extension of the concept of Church, i.e. the set of constitutive elements making up its structure. Its typical focus on the normative aspect prevents, however, the identification of features characteristic of the individual components of this structure. Consequently, in order to define the content of this concept it is necessary to provide another series of in-depth descriptions and explanations. As they refer to empirically observable properties of the individual parts of the structure, they may become the subject matter of descriptively-oriented studies. Wherefore the next phase of building a procedure of research into the complex ecclesial reality requires taking advantage of the potential of social sciences. Thanks to the instruments employed within their framework, it is possible to precisely determine the specific nature of a selected aspect of the Church structure, for example the institutional one. The insight thus arrived at into the multiple-layered reality of the concept of Church integrally combines elements of its supernatural superstructure with elements of its natural “base” [cf. Królikowska 2010: 65].

The primary feature of the Church as an object of politological studies is its teandric nature, i.e. the necessary and close relationship between its spiritual and temporal elements. The former expresses man’s vertical orientation towards transcendence and is understood by members of the community as man’s personal relationship with God. The latter fits within the horizon of interpersonal relationships; providing that such relationships are perceived by members of this community as indispensable for the formerly mentioned relationship between God and man to exist. A brief definition, which nevertheless captures the very essence of this relationship, may be formulated in reference to reflections

concerning the radically redefined moral authority of the Church. According to Johannes A. van der Ven, this redefinition has been accomplished in the early modern times under the influence of dramatic social and cultural transformations. In van der Ven's perspective, the Church is a human community which is becoming like other social institutions in the circumstances of the contemporary secularized – and, it should be added, globalizing – world. It is nevertheless distinguished from these institutions by its exceptional vision and mission [Ven 1997:18]. In other words, while the Church is a human community, it implements divine plans of salvation.

Summing up: the theological reflection referred to in the first part of this paragraph refers to the teandricity of the Church. It becomes manifest in the light of two perspectives. The first one refers to the concept of community, which means man's direct relationship with transcendence which may only exist within the community of the Church. The second one refers to the concept of community referring to the internal organization of ecclesial unification and its contacts with representatives of its environment [Baniak 2010: 7-8]. In accordance with the conclusions emerging from this juxtaposition, in order to define the Church as an object of political studies it is necessary to harmoniously combine its constitutive elements: the communal (supernatural) and social (natural) one. Therefore, processes employed to develop appropriate research procedures must include analyses of the normative aspects of the institutional nature of the Church. When they are taken into account, a point of reference is established for subsequent stages in the research procedure which, depending on the studied aspect of the ecclesial reality, are aimed at selecting the right set of instruments.

3. Substantive Implications of the Broadened Perspective in Defining the Concept of Church

The discussed perspective of viewing the Church as the subject matter of political studies has resulted from the conviction about the insufficiency of approaches employed so far. Due to their scientific and positivistic origins, they were not capable of providing comprehensive descriptions and explanations of the complex ecclesial reality. Consequently, the Church had been reduced to a pressure group. It became an actor single-mindedly committed to promoting certain rights and privileges; an exploiter of strategies and measures typically employed by similar organizations competing on the public forum. This picture oversimplifies the reality of the Church's involvement in the public sphere, however. First of all, it fails to take into account its many irreplaceable functions. Furthermore, one must

bear in mind that the praxeology of typically ecclesial activity is a much more sophisticated form of activity than the methods of social engineering employed by various pressure groups.

In order to confirm the legitimacy of the above arguments, a critical analysis will be carried out of Paul J. Fabrizio's study entitled: *Evolving Into Morality Politics: U. S. Catholic Bishops' Statements on U. S. Politics from 1792 to the Present* [id. 2001: 73 – 90]. The study is concerned with the evolution of the participation of Catholic bishops in the U.S.A. in influencing morality politics, and is based on an analysis of their pastoral letters. Its starting point is the conviction about the great power of ecclesial influence. It has been achieved through an evolutionary adaptation of the religious community headed by the bishops to the dynamics of change in its environment. In accordance with the thesis put forward in the study, Catholic bishops are a non-economic interest group. Due to their privileged position in the hierarchical structure of the Church, they have become part of the social and political establishment. They have achieved this status just like representatives of other pressure groups: the gradually increasing acceptance of their active presence on the public forum has contributed to an increase in the capital of social trust. This increase has subsequently been materialized by forming a system of political pressure.

The author of the study has adopted the method of historical analysis, focusing on the participation of the religious community headed by members of the American episcopate in the process of shaping moral politics. In accordance with this perspective, the management of influence exerted by the Church is a resultant of the evaluation of its social status earned by the bishops. Consequently, in the first phase of the institutionalization of the Catholic Church (about a hundred years after gaining independence), the bishops adopted the attitude of withdrawal and defense of their *status quo*. This was the consequence of a relatively low number of Catholics. Addressing the authorities and the society at large, the spiritual leaders of the Church tried to point out the role of Catholics in achieving prosperity. It was only in situations of locally demonstrated hostility, by referring to the religious roots of secular authority, that they called for respecting the freedom of practicing one's faith. A similarly defensive attitude was adopted with regard to the issue of property rights. The faithful were never addressed with appeals for active political participation.

The gradually growing social significance of Catholics which has become apparent since the beginning of the twentieth century began the second phase in the organization of the Church's morality politics. One of the major arguments for

legitimizing the increasing status of the local Church was its loyalty to the state, demonstrated during both World Wars. It was with a markedly increased assertiveness that the bishops began to influence morality politics, mainly by introducing references to Christian values and norms into the public debate. Nevertheless, lay Catholics were still not called upon to become politically engaged. General appeals were made instead, addressed to political decision-makers.

Finally, the third phase of full involvement in shaping morality politics was initiated with a negative reaction to the legalization of abortion. The immediate cause for the radical change in the bishops' participation in shaping morality politics was the Federal Supreme Court's ruling in *Roe v. Wade* (1973). It caused an unprecedented liberalization of anti-abortion regulations, which according to the Court's ruling had violated the right to privacy guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Since such a radical change in legal regulations dealt a blow at the foundations of Christian morality, the bishops entered into an open conflict aimed at delegitimizing abortion. A large-scale, long-term campaign was launched. This was possible by taking advantage of the high social status of the Church. Using the capital of social trust, the bishops initiated a complex pressure system. The key role was assigned to the lay faithful. They began directly lobbying political decision-makers, and indirectly influencing members of various social groups through media campaigns, charity initiatives, and in particular by assistance provided to high-risk women. This phase culminated in the American episcopate transforming into a non-economic pressure group.

Summing up, it must be admitted that while similar analyses substantiate the thesis proposed in the discussed study, the picture of the Church community and of the bishops who lead it is essentially similar to that of communities and leaders of other social institutions, particularly organizations of the third sector. Therefore, the task taken up in the next part of this paper will be to expand this insight in order to recover the lost elements of the religious nature of the institution of the Church itself, and of its episcopate.

A particularly delicate issue is that of the nature of the ministry performed by bishops. When approaching this issue, it should be noted that even the term "ministry" situates the leadership activities performed by bishops in a typically religious sphere. The sphere of sapiential rather than instrumental rationality. Consequently, the "work" of the bishop should be understood as the resultant of the commitment, proper to the Church, to a system of interpersonal links and

connections, always established within the ecclesial network of relationships and bonds which is supposed to enable and systematically enhance communication with transcendence. Just like all other members of the community, a bishop is a beneficiary of the vertical communication – occurring within the inner life of the ecclesial community – between man and God [Ratzinger 2004: 49n]. This was emphatically expressed by Saint Augustine when he said: “for you, I am a bishop, with you, I am a Christian” (Sermon 340). The essential equality of all members of the Church highlighted here does not correspond to a separation between bishops and the faithful. Their jurisdiction is limited in many aspects by mechanisms which serve to ensure the community is oriented towards transcendence².

From the point of view of morality politics, an area in which the bishops’ power is limited by restraints of particular significance is the Church’s moral teaching. In accordance with the dialectics of the above-mentioned study, the college of bishops, remaining in unity with the Pope, has almost unlimited power to determine the content and extent of the moral teaching of the Church. This state of affairs is confirmed by relevant canons of the Church law, to which the author of the study referred when defining the essence and scope of a bishop’s ministry. The introduction of canonical regulations into the ecclesiological perspective to provide their substantiation somewhat complicates the situation, however. The structure of teleological knowledge is not a static collection of moral obligations passed on by tradition, defined by duly authorized persons who rationalize the content of that tradition. On the contrary, both theology and morality are spheres of a continuous search for such an interpretation of this tradition as to make sure that the unchangeable and timeless transcendental values stored in its repository are properly communicated in the religious message. A message which is sufficiently adequate in particular social and cultural conditions to ensure that the Church can freely fulfill its mission. Such interpretation is not so much a rationalization, therefore, but rather a revelationalization, i.e. a set of acts which reveal, “in the context of revealed truths, the natural knowledge about man and his reference to the Absolute” [Hajduk 2001: 223].

The process of arriving at definitions capturing principles which are morally obligatory in a particular place and time is very complex. All members of the

² The history of the Church provides numerous examples of a dangerous discontinuation of mechanisms limiting the bishops’ power. In the period analyzed here, however, excessive clericalization of relationships within the Church are definitely being abandoned (particularly since Vatican II).

Church community participate in this process. Not by way of a democratic majority, but of an asymmetrically shared responsibility oriented towards transcendence. The most important part of this structure is made up by two communities directly responsible for interpreting the sources of revelation, namely the bishops, acting in unity with the Pope, and theologians. Both, enjoying their respective autonomy, interact with one another so that the normative aspects of the bishops' teaching, focused around the whole of the experience faith of members of the ecclesial community, remain in an interactive exchange with descriptively oriented contents of theological studies, aimed at systematically deepening the understanding of truths of the faith and morality. The axis of tensions accompanying interactions between members of these two communities is balanced by the influence of a third community, that of the faithful. More precisely, the *sensus fidei* they provide verifies the assertions made by the two institutions by continuously referring the regulations they develop to the existential experience, or, in other words, by implementing the obligatory content of individual regulations in individual and social life. This structure represents a transmission belt, so to say, of defining moral obligation. While bishops play a very important role within this framework, other members of the Church community do not remain on the margins of the process of looking for optimum forms of giving witness. The described structure of multi-lateral communicative references considerably diminishes the bishops' alleged arbitrariness in making decisions of key importance from the moral point of view. Thus, they cannot be said to be a privileged elite furthering their own interests above the heads of the faithful. Rather, they are mediators whose overriding goal is to uphold the transcendental element in the horizon of interpersonal communication, maintain the inner unity of the Church community, and socialize religious faith. An indispensable part of this last element is internalization of moral principles by both the faithful and members of the external environment of the Church.

At this point, some critical comments should be made concerning the concept of moral politics adopted in the discussed study. It has been narrowed down to the political play between the advocates of competing worldviews, in which the key role is played by political power, as it creates compromise-based legal regulations [Mooney 2001: 3-5]. In the perspective of the Church, however, morality politics is but a narrow section of the broader phenomenon of morality. Its dominant part is the essentially autonomous space of man's conscience, standing on the threshold of politics, being the immanent capacity of human beings to distinguish between that which is morally right from that which is morally wrong. It is this sphere

of the autonomy of the conscience which is the area of the Church's particular engagement. Therefore, the depiction of officials representing the Church as players on the field of morality politics without making any reference to the orientation of the community they represent towards the special activity within the meta-political sphere is unjustified. Formation of the conscience is the object of day-to-day concern and diligent effort of members of the Church community, including bishops. And direct interventions in the shape of morality politics are made in emergency situations, when fundamental principles of universal ethics are violated.

Summing up: the ecclesiological content introduced above has considerably expanded the perspective of studying the Church as a participant of morality politics, thus weakening arguments for viewing bishops and the Church community they represent as a non-economic pressure group. This has confirmed the need to explain the ecclesial reality in reference to the mutual interaction between the natural and the supernatural element.

Conclusion

Ecclesial politology is a perspective of studying the Church as a participant of the political process. It stems from the inner transformation of the theoretical and methodological *status quo* of political science. The goal of ecclesial politology is to remedy the excessive formalization of existing research procedures. This is accomplished by systematically adding to its conceptual apparatus, in order to enable capturing the religious and spiritual element which escapes direct observation. The need to take into account the transcendental element as a component of the social and political process results from the fact that by leaving its mark on the institutional nature of the Church, it determines the specificity of influences generated within the ecclesial community on its environment.

The ambivalence resulting from the unification of the supernatural and natural elements present in the Church influences the inner complexity of ecclesial politology as a research tool. On the one hand, it is determined by a layer extending beyond that which is temporal; on the other, by being immersed in the reality of a particular place and time. Insight into the former makes it possible to take advantage of the normative reflection proper to theological, philosophical and humanistic sciences; insight into the latter – that of empirical social sciences. The employment of both perspectives is expressed at the first stage in formulating an operative definition of the concept of Church, which is always developed

in the context of a particular research problem. In the next stage, it consists in supplementing this insight by employing an empirical research method which makes it possible to articulate the content-based component of this definition.

Bibliography

- Baniak J. (2010), *Wprowadzenie: Wizerunek własny Kościoła katolickiego i w wyobrażeniach katolików świeckich*, in: id. (ed.), *Laikat i duchowieństwo w Kościele katolickim w Polsce: Problemy dialogu i współistnienia*, WNNS UAM Poznań, 7 -16.
- Bronk A. (2003), *Podstawy nauk o religii*, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL Lublin.
- Fabrizio J. (2001), *Evolving into morality politics: U. S. catholic Bishops' statements on U. S. politics from 1792 to the present* in Mooney Ch. Z., (ed.), *The Public Clash of Private Values: The Politics of Moral Policy*, Chatham House Publishers New York London; 73 – 90.
- Hajduk Z. (2001), *Ogólna metodologia nauk*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL Lublin
- Hayens J. (2013), *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion*, 2 ed., Pearson, London.
- Jabłoński A. W., *Czym jest teoria w politologii? Teoria polityki: między nauka a interpretacją*, http://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/attachments/787_Prof.%20Jablonski%20-%20referat.pdf, accessed: 12.10. 2015, pp. 15-18.
- Jakubowski W., Zamęcki Ł. (2013), *Status teoretyczny nauk o polityce. Głos w dyskusji na marginesie II Ogólnopolskiego Kongresu Politologii*, Społeczeństwo i Polityka. Pismo edukacyjne 2(35)2013, 113 – 130.
- Jarosz T. (2013), *Public relations w dyplomacji Stolicy Apostolskiej*, Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW Warszawa.
- Krauz-Mozer B., *Czym jest teoria w politologii? Teoretyzowanie w politologii u progu XXI wieku*, http://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/attachments/787_Prof.%20Krauz-Mozer%20-%20referat.pdf, accessed: 12.10.2015.
- Królikowska A. (2010), *Jakie jest miejsce laikatu w Kościele katolickim?* in: J. Baniak (ed.) *Laikat i duchowieństwo w Kościele katolickim w Polsce: Problemy dialogu i współistnienia*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Nauk Społecznych UAM Poznań, 65 – 80.
- Marczewska-Rytko M. (2010), *Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie*, Wydawnictwo Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin.
- Mooney Ch. Z. (2001), *The Public Clash of Private Values*, in: id. (ed.) *The Public Clash of Private values: The Politics of Moral Policy*, Chatham House Publishers New York London, 3 -18.
- Ratzinger J. (2004), *Demokratyzacja Kościoła? w: tenże, H. Maier, Demokracja w Kościele: możliwości i ograniczenia*, tł. Magdalena Labiś, Wydawnictwo Salwator Kraków, 7 – 62.
- Ven van der J. A. (1996) *Ecclesiology in Context*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company Grand Rapids Cambridge.
- Zenderowski R. (2014), *Religia w teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*, in: P. Burgoński, M. Gierycz, (ed.) *Religia i polityka: zarys problematyki*, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa Warszawa, 546-574.

Miscellanea

Marguerite A. Peeters

Institute for Intercultural Dialogue Dynamics, Belgium

The 2016-2063 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Reproductive Rights Neo-Colonizing Plan for Africa

Abstrakt: Artykuł przedstawia argumenty wskazujące na prowadzenie wobec Afryki polityki zmierzającej do zmiany percepcji kwestii dotyczących etyki seksualnej. W imię umacniania bezpieczeństwa, zrównoważonego rozwoju czy wolności postulowane są rozwiązania zmierzające do popierania aborcji, stosowania środków antykoncepcyjnych zapłodnienia *in vitro*, sterylizacji czy edukacji seksualnej. Można sądzić, że kraje wysoko rozwinięte usiłują narzucić krajom ubogim politykę ludnościową, sprzeczną z zasadami etyki i prawami człowieka.

Słowa kluczowe: Afryka, ONZ, prawa reprodukcyjne, zdrowie reprodukcyjne

Abstract: The article presents the arguments demonstrating that Africa is subjected to the politics aimed at changing the perception of the issues concerning sexual ethics. In the name of improving security, sustainable development or freedom, some legal solutions are proposed, aimed at supporting abortion, using contraceptives, in vitro fertilization, sterilization or sexual education. One might think that developed countries are trying to impose on poor countries population politics which contradicts the principles of ethics and human rights.

Keywords: Africa, UN, reproductive rights, reproductive health

Introductory remarks

A silent drama keeps on unfolding and rapidly gaining momentum in developing countries, first and foremost in Africa, in the name of soft or human security, sustainable development, democratization, liberty, equality and human rights. Global governance is enforcing the agenda of the 1994 *Fourth World Conference on Population and Development*, the Cairo conference, in Africa more forcefully

than in any other continent: sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (SRH and RR).

SRH and RR, which have become, in 2015, the agenda of the *Sustainable Development Goals* - the “framework” of international cooperation until 2030, have been fully integrated in Panafrican development policy frameworks since the inception of the *African Union* in 2002, and until 2063.

SRH and RR activists are all the more determined to “join forces and redouble efforts” [Maputo Plan: 11] in Africa than the UN predicts that the African population will represent 40% of the global population by 2100 [WPP 2017]. These estimates take into account the drastic measures set in place and implemented by the population establishment to reduce African fertility rates: their own prediction is that by the end of the century, the African fertility rate will have dropped from its current rate of 4.7% to 2.1%.

Population concerns, when real, need to be addressed in respect for the family as the basic unit of society, and for the right and duty of a “responsible transmission of life” [Gaudium et spes: 51] which respects the biological processes. Governments must enact “laws which will assist families” and educate “the people wisely so that the moral law and the freedom of the citizens are both safeguarded” [Paul VI 1968: 23].

Africa is in a life and death combat. The sense of the family, motherhood, fatherhood, brotherhood, children, the sacredness of life defines the African soul. The strength of African cultures, however, contrasts with the weakness of African political institutions and their permeability to foreign, culturally and morally destructive, agendas. Dramatically enough, African institutionalization has been hijacked and does not go the way of representing the African peoples and cultures. But how could it? Representation has disappeared from the political vocabulary and practice of the West.

The 2017 UN population prospects: Africans to represent more than 40% of the world population by 2100

The 2017 report of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)’s Population Division, “World Population Prospects, the 2017 revision”¹, contends

¹ Having no means to verify the accuracy of DESA’s figures on the one hand, and keeping in mind the unchanged population control objectives of the UN since the 1960s on the other, we invite our readers to a certain prudence in the assessment of the demographic data and projections we present in this article.

that the 2017 population of Africa (1.256 billion) represents 17% of the world's current population (7.55 billion), almost twice that of Europe (742 million), and three and a half times that of North America (361 million). In 1950, by contrast, the African population (221 million) was about half the European population; it was then only slightly over the size of the North American population.

According to DESA's medium-variant demographic projection, the African population will have grown to 4.468 billion by the end of this century. In 2100, it will represent more than 40% of the world's projected 11.184 billion. It will then be almost seven times that of Europe (projection of 653 million in 2100) and nine times that of North America (499 million). In the meantime, the population of Asia (4.504 billion in 2017) will only have increased by less than 300 million (4.78 in 2100): Asian population is projected to start decreasing by mid-century. Hence "beyond 2050, Africa will be the main contributor to global population growth" [WPP 2017: 3].

"More than half of the anticipated growth in global population between now and 2050 is expected to occur in Africa" [WPP 2017: 3]. Among the ten countries accounting collectively for more than half the projected world population increase, six are African: Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Egypt. Over the same 2017-2050 period, "the population of 26 African countries are projected to reach at least double their current size. For six African countries, the populations are projected to increase by 2100 to more than five times their current size: Angola, Burundi, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia" [WPP 2017: 13].

The projected population growth of Africa in the 21st century is attributed to several factors. First, Africa currently "has the youngest age distribution of any region": "children under age 15 account for 41 per cent of the population in 2017"; "young persons aged 15 to 24 account for an additional 19 per cent" [WPP 2017: 10]. Africa, secondly, is the continent where fertility levels are highest. "Of the 22 countries with relatively high levels of fertility in the most recent period, 20 are found in Africa and 2 in Asia" [WPP 2017: 6]. What DESA calls "the adolescent birth rate" (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19) "in 2010-2015 was highest in Africa, at 99 per 1,000 women" [WPP 2017: 14]. Thirdly, of course, Africa's contraceptive prevalence rate² is the lowest among the regions of the world. According to the Maputo Plan of Action, the continental rate is currently 28%.

² WHO defines contraceptive prevalence as "the percentage of women who are currently using, or whose sexual partner is currently using, at least one method of contraception, regardless of the method used. It is usually reported for married or in-union women aged 15 to 49".

Africa more than ever a priority target for the population establishment

The DESA African population growth estimates just exposed above do take into account the projected results of the efforts of the population establishment to bring about “a substantial reduction of fertility levels in the near future” [WPP 2017: 4].

DESA projects, first, a significant fall of Africa’s population growth rates: in recent years, reads the report, the population of Africa has had “the fastest growth among all regions, increasing at a rate of 2.6 per cent annually in 2010-2015”. However, this rate “is beginning to fall and is projected to reach 1.8 in 2045-2050 and 0.66 in 2095-2100” [WPP 2017: 4].

DESA projects, secondly, a drastic fall of the continent’s fertility rates: Africa’s total fertility has already fallen “from 5.1 births per woman in 2000-2005 to 4.7 in 2010-2015” [WPP 2017: 12]. DESA’s medium-variant projection “assumes that fertility in Africa will fall from around 4.7 births per woman in 2010-2015 to 3.1 in 2045-2050, reaching a level slightly above 2.13 in 2095-2100” [WPP 2017: 4]. The dramatic projected decline of Africa’s fertility rate implies a dramatic and quick rise in Africa’s contraceptive prevalence rate over the next decades.

Following its own logic, DESA concludes that “to achieve the substantial reductions in fertility projected in the medium-variant, it will be essential to support continued improvements in access to reproductive health care services, including family planning, especially in the least developed countries” [WPP 2017: 6].

Since the invention of modern contraception at the end of the 1950s, the population establishment has been going all out to control African population growth through coercive and morally illicit means. The new strategy they adopted in 1994, at the Fourth World Conference on Population, better known as the Cairo Conference, ruthlessly implemented ever since, will not only have as an effect the fall of fertility rates: it will produce an irreversible corruption of youth morality and cultural decadence.

In later sections of this article, we will expose how African health ministers and African heads of state integrated the full-fledged agenda of the population establishment and the global sexual revolution activists as a priority and at the very heart of continental and therefore national health policies until 2063. They did

³ As a reminder to our readers, 2.1 is the replacement level fertility in developed countries.

it not out of their own will, but under the political and financial pressure of the globalist neo-colonizers.

In *Laudato Si*, Pope Francis reaffirms the view of the Church on population issues: “Yet ‘while it is true that an unequal distribution of the population and of available resources creates obstacles to development and a sustainable use of the environment, it must nonetheless be recognized that demographic growth is fully compatible with an integral and shared development.’ To blame population growth instead of extreme and selective consumerism on the part of some, is one way of refusing to face the issues” [Francis 2015: 50].

“Sexual and reproductive health” to potentially provoke full scale sexual revolution in Africa⁴

A reminder of the content of the Cairo agenda imposed on Africa - of SRH and RR, is in order here. In 1994, the Cairo conference provided the transnational agents of population control with an alleged global political consensus on a new demographic perspective called “sexual and reproductive health” and “reproductive rights”. The UN called it a “globally normative consensus”, a “framework”.

Under the leading impulse of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), Cairo operated a Copernican turn in global population policies: from the coercive, top-down demographic approach of the 60s, 70s and 80s focused on numbers to an approach deceptively qualified as “people-centred” and “focused on people’s needs and rights”.

The new perspective integrates population control goals but hides them within a broader agenda. Its moral, anthropological and cultural challenges are far more pernicious: the globalization of the western sexual revolution.

Incidentally, let us remark that some proliferators tend to equate sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights plainly with “abortion”. They need to be challenged to recognize that these euphemistic expressions in fact hide the whole spectrum of ingredients necessary to provoke a full-scale sexual revolution in developing countries. Let us spell these ingredients out:

⁴ This section draws on previous writings of the authors on sexual and reproductive health, inter alia on *The globalization of the western cultural revolution, key concepts, operational mechanisms*, chapter 3, and on *Twenty Years of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Africa*.

- 1) “universal access” to the “full range” of contraceptives (including so-called “emergency contraception”) [see: Suaudeau 2010] irrespective of age and marital status;
- 2) so-called “comprehensive sexual education”, purely technical, not only amoral but immoral in its content;
- 3) AIDs prevention through such “sexual education” and condoms;
- 4) voluntary sterilization;
- 5) *in vitro* fertilization;
- 6) so-called “safe abortion” where it is legal - the idea being that, in order to be safe, it has to be legal: hence the pressure SRHR agents exercise on African governments to legalize abortion;
- 7) “*sexual health*”, which is strategically fuzzy enough⁵ to open the door to the LGBT agenda.

By the early 1990s, population controllers and sexual revolution activists – chief among them the IPPF - had observed the undisputable efficiency of the western sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s in reducing fertility, hence demographic growth in the West, especially in Europe⁶: the revolution had provoked an unprecedented drop of the marriage rate and a massive breakdown of the family. The Cairo rationale was the following: provoking the sexual revolution in the developing world, particularly in Africa, would be far more efficient in terms of population control than the top-down institutional imposition of population policies practiced until then. By 1994, any open coercion, anything appearing “top-down” had become countercultural. The “freedom to choose” was the new paradigm.

Reproductive health is presented as “bottom-up”: going through people themselves to achieve the geopolitical goal of population stabilization. But people, let us remark, are rooted in cultures, and the African culture is deeply rooted itself in a sense of the family, life, motherhood. The war then becomes cultural. The objective is to

⁵ The author was a journalist in the 1990s and interviewed the head of the WHO delegation at the Beijing conference, Dr. Hammad, asking her WHO’s definition of “sexual rights”. Hammad stated that we should not define sexual rights “so as to leave room to all the possibilities that you need”. She also said that all the components of sexual rights, in all their dimensions, were in the Beijing document even if the expression “sexual rights” was not. See Peeters 1995.

⁶ The fact they will not recognize, however, is that the sexual revolution is the chief cause of Europe’s demographic winter, now compensated by massive immigration. The previously mentioned DESA report reads that “between 2015 and 2050, the excess of deaths over births in Europe is projected to total 57 million, whereas the net inflow of international migrants is expected to be around 32 million” [WPP 2017: 16].

change the mentality of girls and women, hence the content of education, cultures and, to the extent possible, also religions to align them along the “freedom to choose” mindset. When girls and women succumb to brain-washing and start claiming their “right to choose”, that is, their “right” to contraception, abortion, voluntary sterilization..., when young people start adopting “western sexual lifestyles”, culture shifts to the side of SRHR agents, who have then won the war. For this strategic reason, SRHR agents are adamant at establishing “comprehensive sexuality education” and so-called “rights education” in school curricula in Africa.

Quite a few myths about reproductive health need to be debunked. To the extent it imposes western lifestyles on non-western cultures, reproductive health is not focused on women’s needs and rights but on the demographic and economic interests, and cultural imperialism of a powerful clique of neo-colonizers. The allegedly non-coercive agenda is *imposed* through brainwashing and manipulation. The imposition is performed by the institutions of the population establishment: the agenda is not “people-centred”.

A “global framework” from 1994 to at least 2030: the source and powerhouse of pressures on Africa

Before exposing how SRH and RR integrated Panafrican development policies, let us recall that the international community has repeatedly imprisoned itself, in an unbroken continuum, in the 1994 Cairo “framework” until at least 2030. Indeed, Panafrican frameworks refer themselves to those of global governance.

In spite of its profoundly ideological and therefore divisive content, the alleged SRHR “global consensus” has remained integral and unbroken ever since Cairo: this is evidence of the power wielded by its advocates within global governance. In fact the Cairo “consensus” was reinforced each time global governance shifted to a new “global framework” of international cooperation: more and stronger political, operational and financial partners have jumped on its bandwagon, more countries and more institutions have, under the relentless pressure of its agents, aligned themselves on its agenda and implemented it. SRHR are more integrated than ever into development policies. Yet the radical agenda, hidden in Cairo, has largely been uncovered. Countries and institutions have been able to check its contents against the destructive anthropological and cultural reality it has already brought about.

In 2001, the UN *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs) became the new framework of international cooperation. Goal 5 included a target that read: “Achieve by

2015, universal access to reproductive health.” By 2015, SRHR agents estimated that the international community was far from having reached this goal.

The next “global development framework” for the 2016-2030 period, the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs), integrate not only “reproductive health” but “sexual and reproductive health” and “reproductive rights”: in other words, the full Cairo agenda; the SDGs go further than the MDGs. A target of SDG3, “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”, reads: “By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes”. And SDG5, “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”, contains a similar target that reads: “Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the *International Conference on Population and Development* and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences”.

The Global Strategy for Women’s, Adolescents and Children’s Health 2016-2030 – Survive, thrive, transform: operationalization strategy for SRHR

The UN and its multistakeholder partners have taken the lead to implement, and monitor the implementation of, UN “consensuses”, “global norms” and “development frameworks” ever since they were first adopted in the 1990s. This is only logical as they, not national governments, are in fact their true authors. Multistakeholder leadership proves truer in the global “enforcement” of SRHR than for any other UN “paradigm”.

To implement the UN health objectives - chief among them SRHR - the UN Secretary General took the initiative, in 2010, independently from governments, to launch both a global strategy for women’s and children’s health and a multi-stakeholder movement to put this strategy into action. The movement, called *Every Woman Every Child*, is powerfully supported by the *Global Financing Facility* and is, according to the UN SG, *in a momentum*.

The UN Secretariat issued a new version of its strategy when the *Sustainable Development Goals* were adopted: *The Global Strategy for Women’s, Adolescents and Children’s Health 2016-2030 – Survive, thrive, transform* [GS 2015]. It is noteworthy that the updated version includes *adolescents*: the primary target of the global sexual revolution activists.

The UN SG states that “we must build on what has worked in the past” and that the new strategy will “require new evidence-based approaches backed by innovative and sustainable financing mechanisms” [GS 2015: 5]. The very first example that the new strategy provides of “evidence-based” intervention packages for women is “sexual and reproductive health information and services”. “Safe abortion” is also mentioned in that same short list of examples [GS 2015: 17]. “Sexual and reproductive health information and services” are again given as an example of evidence-based interventions for adolescents. “Too few adolescents have access to SRH services” [GS 2015: 17], reads the document.

Modern contraception is the first example the document provides of high returns on investment in women’s and adolescents’ health. The document dogmatically affirms that 225 million women worldwide have “an unmet need for family planning”, and that 8% of maternal mortality is “attributable to unsafe abortion” [GS 2015: 25].

The global strategy advocates the promotion of laws, policies and social norms that advance SRHR and comprehensive sexuality education for adolescents and adults. This is all the more worrisome than the global strategy produces a comprehensive synthesis report annually.

The strategy incorporates the so-called “human rights-based approach to development cooperation” adopted by all UN agencies in 2003: “ensuring women and adolescent girls are aware of their rights” is fundamental [GS 2015: 38]. “Rights” in this context are obviously sexual and reproductive rights. The strategy also incorporates demographic objectives, linking them to economic and environmental factors: “Population stability would enhance economic sustainability and reduce the risks of climate change” [GS 2015: 19].

All major Panafrikan health policies henceforth refer to the *Global Strategy* as well as to the *Sustainable Development Goals*, reflecting their alignment on their perspective as “normative”, and their “fellow traveler” mindset: a tragic shame.

The systematic and successful integration of SRHR in all sectors of development and particularly in “universal health coverage” since Cairo is a matter of grave concern. The *Global Strategy* makes it plain that we are by now faced with a hermetic system, in which SRHR have become tightly connected to and inseparable from health financing, the training of health workforce, commodity

supply, human rights education, monitoring mechanisms, women's, children's and adolescents' overall health, gender equality policies, educational contents, demographic concerns, climate change: it is all bundled together. SRHR are *in all*.

As regards commodity supply, the *Global Strategy* integrates the ten recommendations made by the so-called *UN Commission on life-saving commodities* to improve the availability of and access to thirteen allegedly “underutilized, low-cost, high-impact” [GS 2015: 56]. commodities. Three among these are components of SRHR: female condoms, contraceptive implants and emergency contraception. Let us note the degree of moral decadence of the UN, which considers these “life-saving” commodities! According to the Commission, these commodities would supposedly avert almost 230,000 maternal deaths. Part of the UN strategy is to support African countries in their efforts to improve distribution systems and create demand for these three commodities.

Another very worrisome development is the intricate political mechanisms now firmly in place and still expanding to enforce SRHR and monitor their implementation. Every sector is involved; not even “faith-based groups” can escape the watchdogs exercising pressure on all actors to align themselves and comply. The *Global Strategy* is provided with an “accountability framework” that harmonizes national and global monitoring, regional peer review, health sector reviews, human rights monitoring, gender assessments, parliamentary committees, citizen hearings, performance audits. Score cards are issued [GS 2015: 72]. It is a “unified framework” [GS 2015: 73]: no diversity of views is allowed.

Panafrican policies and juridical instruments promoting SRHR adopted from 2002 to 2015

Sadly enough, the African Union, the Panafrican institution launched in 2002, succumbed, from its onset, to the pressures of the global sexual revolution activists. This means that the African Union has become their springboard to align all African countries on “global norms”.

Let us remind our readers the main policy and juridical instruments that were adopted since 2002 to implement the Cairo agenda on the African continent⁷.

⁷ The author exposed these in greater details in a booklet entitled “Twenty years of sexual and reproductive health and rights in Africa: Achievements of its transnational agents in African political institutions since Cairo, and their post-2015 strategy – Challenges for the Church”.

SRHR activists wasted no time in exerting their pressure first at the juridical level. The *Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*, adopted in 2003 and already signed by 49, and ratified by 39 of the 54 African nations includes an article (article 14) on reproductive rights. Article 14 includes the right to abortion. The Protocol is the only instrument of international law that includes the right to abortion. In 2014, the African Commission adopted General Comment No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa* in 2014 (African Commission) so as to put maximum pressure on all African governments to, *inter alia*⁸, legalize abortion. African governments should have no illusions about the pressure they will increasingly be under.

At the policy level, SRHR agents then managed to obtain the adoption of a *Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights*

⁸ According to *General Comment*, ratification of the *Protocol* would juridically commit state-parties to: Legalize or de-penalize medical abortion, or revisit restrictive laws to enlarge them; Provide “universal access” to the “whole range” of modern contraceptives (the observations make it clear that laws and policies “cannot restrict access to family planning/contraception on the basis of religious beliefs” (25) ; they also make clear that “the consent and involvement of third parties, including but not limited to, parents, guardians, spouses and partners, is not required when adult women and adolescent girls want to access family planning/contraception and safe abortion services in the cases provided for in the Protocol”) (43) ; Remove “discriminatory laws, policies, procedures, practices” so that “women can effectively claim their reproductive freedom and the rights thereof, and enjoy the same” (21) ; “Develop and implement national action plans in order to mitigate the prevalence of unintended pregnancies” (20) ; Grant women the right to make personal decisions irrespective of “beliefs, traditions, values and cultural or religious practices”, and “the right to question or ignore them” (24) ; “Remove impediments to the health services reserved for women [meaning, in the context of the *General Comment*, contraceptive and abortive “services”], including ideology or belief-based barriers. Administrative laws, policies and procedures of health systems and structures cannot restrict access to family planning/contraception on the basis of religious beliefs” (25) ; Train healthcare providers and educators in reproductive health matters (28) ; Ensure that “available, accessible, acceptable and reliable information on contraceptive methods is provided, in printed form or by other means, such as the Internet, radio and television, mobile phone applications, and other telephone assistance service” (28) ; “Develop a national public health plan with comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services, protocols, guidelines and standards that are consistent with current evidence-based standards established by WHO and the committees responsible for ensuring compliance, by States” (30); Sensitize and educate communities, religious leaders, traditional chiefs and political leaders on women’s sexual and reproductive rights (44) ; Guarantee the provision of “comprehensive information and education” on contraception, “safe abortion”, “reproductive rights” for adolescents girls and young people (51) ; Integrate reproductive health in school programs (52), and sexual and reproductive rights in civic education programs (60) ; “Allocate adequate financial resources” for reproductive health (62), etc.

(2007-2010). African ministers of health adopted it at the 2nd *African Union Conference of Health Ministers* held in Gaborone, Botswana in October 2005. The “framework” was endorsed by African heads of states and governments in 2006. This alleged framework remains in vigor and the reference used in African health policies. At a special session of the *African Union* in Maputo in 2006, African Ministers of Health then adopted the *Maputo Plan of Action on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights*⁹ to implement the “framework”.

The Maputo Protocol and its General Comment N°2, the Continental Policy Framework and the Maputo Plan of Action are unforgiving. Unless there is a rapid and strong moral awakening of African leaders and peoples, one does not see how Africa will resist the imposition of the neo-colonizers, their ready-made agenda enforced through the seduction of their “technical expertise” and powerful financial means.

The 2015-2063 SRHR African agenda: Maputo Plan of Action 2016-2030, Agenda 2063, and the Africa Health Strategy

Three key strategic documents of the African Union address SRHR on the continent for the coming years and decades. The first is *The Maputo Plan of Action 2016-2030 for the Operationalization of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health*, subtitled “Universal Access to Comprehensive Sexual and Reproductive Health Services in Africa”: it is an updated version of the 2006 Maputo Plan of Action. The second is *Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want*, adopted by the *African Union Commission* in 2015 and defined as “a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years” and “a global strategy to optimize the use of Africa’s resources for the benefit of all Africans”. The third is *The Africa Health Strategy*.

The first document deals exclusively with SRHR, as its full title suggests. It is the driving strategy of SRHR agents operating in Africa, which basically equates with that of the International Planned Parenthood Federation and Cairo. The two other documents integrate the vision of the Maputo Plan. This imbrication shows the extent to which SRHR have successfully been integrated in mainstream development policies on the African continent.

The Maputo Plan of Action 2016-2030. The *Maputo Plan of Action* bases itself on an ideological dogma: “Health, especially sexual and reproductive health

⁹ The proposed budget for this plan of action was 16 Billion dollars.

and reproductive rights is a precondition for and an outcome indicator of all aspects of sustainable development” [Maputo Plan: 10]. Hence it aims at prioritizing reproductive health “into continental, regional and national development plans” [Maputo Plan: 11]. The Plan recognizes the “relevance” of the continental policy framework adopted in 2005, which had established ten strategic interventions, among which: increasing resources to SRHR programmes; translating Cairo into national legislations and policies; expanding contraceptive use; reducing levels of unsafe abortion (understand: try and legalize abortion); ensuring access of adolescents and youth to SRHR. The revised Maputo Plan of Action builds on ten action areas among which: political commitment; health legislation; “investing in SRH needs of adolescents, youth and other vulnerable population”; “monitoring, reporting and accountability”. The strategy insists on the necessity to build SRH and RR “into and on an effective health system”. It sets “indicators for monitoring progress” [Maputo Plan: 8-9]. The conclusion of the Maputo Plan reads: “African leaders have a civic obligation to respond to the SRH needs and RR of their people” [Maputo Plan: 25].

Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want. The document starts by a “We the people of Africa” declaration. It presents its underlying vision as rooted in “Pan Africanism” and “African Renaissance”: *Agenda 2063* is supposed to represent the voices of the African people, African aspirations, African identity, cultures and traditions. It spells out seven African aspirations, among which one reads: “Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics”. Another aspiration is “An Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by people” [Agenda 2063: 2]. What would make *Agenda 2063* different from other continental policy document is that it would not be “the work of bureaucrats, but rather an Agenda driven by the voices of the African people indicating the Africa They Want” [Agenda 2063: note 1].

How shocking then to discover the inclusion and centrality, in this allegedly purely “African” strategic development framework, of reproductive health and rights! The expression is mentioned seven times. A central health objective of *Agenda 2063* is the following: “By 2063, every citizen will have full access to affordable and quality health care services, universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights information, and these services will be available to all women, including young women, adolescents, women with disability, those living with AIDS and all

vulnerable groups”¹⁰. Let us note that this “full access” to SRHR is to be granted to every *citizen*, not matter the age and marital status: a forecast of the Panafrican sexual revolution.

The Africa Health Strategy. After the adoption of Agenda 2063 and based on it, the African Union Commission produced a continental health policy framework, the Africa Health Strategy 2016-2030 [AHS], supposed to provide “strategic direction to Africa’s Member States in their efforts in creating better performing health sectors, recognizes existing continental commitments and addresses key challenges facing efforts to reduce the continent’s burden of disease mainly by drawing on lessons learned and taking advantage of the existing opportunities” [AHS: 9].

The health policy is also based on the SDGs, the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Continental Policy Framework and its extended Maputo Plan of Action (2016-2030), the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA), the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescent Health 2016 – 2030. It is no surprise that the priority of its strategic objective # 2 reads as follows: “ending preventable maternal, new born and child deaths and ensure equitable access to comprehensive, integrated sexual, reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child and adolescent services, including voluntary family planning” [AHS: 22].

¹⁰ Other mentions are: “No woman shall die in pregnancy. There shall be full access to integrated sexual and reproductive health care and institutional delivery for all women of reproductive age”. “The commitments to integrate sexual and reproductive health and rights, family planning and HIV/AIDS services through reinforcing action on earlier commitments to enhance maternal, newborn and child health status, ensuring the integration necessary to facilitate synergies Health Policy Measures”. “Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health rights, including to reduce maternal mortality rates and end preventable maternal morbidities, and to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS”. “The number of girls out of school has dropped significant from 24 million in 2000 to 9 million in 2013. Furthermore, nearly half of the African countries have attained gender parity in primary school enrolment in 2012. However, these gains have not yet fully impacted on reducing inequalities between men and women, especially with respect to access and control of economic resources, as well as in terms of labour market participation or reproductive rights (maternal mortality and fertility).” Or “The continent cannot meet its ambitious goals under Agenda 2063 while it limits a dynamic segment of its society, which women represent, from realizing its full potential. Investing in women and girls and their integration into the labour market, alongside delayed marriage and child bearing and expanded access to education for girls, family planning and sexual and reproductive health rights, has been attributed as the driving forces behind the economic successes of the “Asian tigers”.”

Conclusion

Africa stands at a kairos. UN statistics reveal that the lifestyles and behaviors of African women and youth are changing and aligning themselves on the norms of the western sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s. Panafrican policy documents, in particular in the areas of gender, health and education, manifest African political alignment along the ideological perspective of global governance. It is not out of “free choice” that Africa is going down that cultural and political route, but under the relentless pressure of the transnational sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights lobby.

Yet is submission to this pressure a fatality? A fundamental mindset change amongst Africans and their political leaders seems to be in order. To the extent they behave as servile followers of global governance (out of naïveté, out of ignorance, out of corruption, whatever the reason...), they must decide to love themselves enough to check the neo-colonialist agenda against who they are and want to be as Africans. They must learn to govern themselves according to their own, family-centred values. This implies being more prudent before jumping on the bandwagon of alleged global “consensuses” and “partnerships”. Incidentally, the power wielded by global governance also challenges any Northern government supportive of the family and life to encourage Africa to remain itself and self-govern.

A pressing policy priority for the continent is education. The IPPF-inspired “comprehensive sexuality education” programmes now imposed on African ministries of education, schools and youth groups promises to produce in Africa the same results as in the West. The choices made by today’s generation of young Africans with regards to sexuality, marriage, family, life and morality will determine the future of the continent: Africa either remains itself, or loses itself. Just as one single generation produced the critical mass necessary for overturning an entire civilization in the West (the May 68 generation), so is this very generation of African children and young people absolutely critical.

Greater African self-knowledge and self-love, combined with a rigorous human and moral education, should be integrated in school curriculum. Africans must awake to who they are, to their responsibility as individuals and peoples in the world today. They alone can decide for integral human development, the only alternative to the moral decadence of the continent of life and the family. Genuine solidarity can take place once they themselves make that decision.

Bibliography

Agenda 2063, African Union.

AHS, African Union Department of Social Affairs. Africa Health Strategy 2016-2030.

Francis Pope (2015), *Laudatio Si'*. Encyclical Letter *Laudato Si'* on Care for our Common Home.

Gaudium et spes (1965), Vatican II. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*.

GS (2015), *Every Woman Every Child*. The Global Strategy for Women's, Children's and Adolescents' Health (2016-2030). Sustainable Development Goals.

Maputo Plan of Action 2016-2030 for the Operationalization of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights. Universal Access to Comprehensive Sexual and Reproductive Health Services in Africa.

Paul VI Pope (1968), *Humanae Vitae*, Encyclical Letter *Humanae Vitae* on the Regulation of Birth.

Peeters Marguerite A. (1995), IIS 7. October 13.

Peeters Marguerite A. (2012), *Dialogue Dynamics*. The globalization of the western cultural revolution. Key concepts, operational mechanisms.

Peeters Marguerite A., *Dialogue Dynamics*. Twenty years of "sexual and reproductive health and rights" in Africa. Achievements of its transnational agents in African political institutions since Cairo, and their post-2015 strategy. Challenges for the Church.

Suaudeau J., (2010), *The contraception-abortion nexus*, *Dialogue Dynamics*, <http://dialoguedynamics.com/content/forum-d-apprentissage/interviews-and-articles/article/mons-jacques-suaudeau-on-the>

WPP 2017, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division. World Population Prospects. The 2017 Revision. Key Findings and Advance Tables. UN NY 2017.

Chantal Delsol

Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée, France

O nadziei

On Hope

Abstract: Despite the differences in the explanation of mythical origins of the world, in all cultures up to Judaism and Christianity, the same circular concept of time was inbuilt. Judaism, and Christianity after it, replace it with a linear vision. The future, therefore, is not just a repetition of the past, but a promise of fulfillment. Enlightenment, secularizing the hope of salvation, transforms hope into faith in progress and fulfillment within this world. However, the Messianic promises could not be fulfilled in the dimension of temporality due to the mere accumulation of the produced goods. This approach results therefore in disappointment and in an attempt to find consolation in the enjoyment of the present moment, which should free man from the risk and uncertainty. The opposite of hope is not despair but certainty. True hope demands anthropology of risk and finitude. Only “crazy expectations” (Kierkegaard) and the belief that in the situation of disappointment can come unexpected answers, give life a taste of adventure and a sense of happiness “despite everything”.

Keywords: hope, culture, Christianity

Abstrakt: Mimo różnic w tłumaczeniu mitycznych początków świata, we wszystkich kulturach aż do judaizmu i chrześcijaństwa przyjmowano taką samą kolistą koncepcję czasu. Judaizm, a za nim chrześcijaństwo, zastępują ją wizją linearną. Przyszłość zatem nie jest jedynie powtórzeniem przeszłości, ale obietnicą spełnienia. Oświecenie, sekularyzując nadzieję na zbawienie, przemienia ją w wiarę w postęp, w spełnienie w ramach tego świata. Mesjanistyczne obietnice nie mogły jednak być spełnione w wymiarze doczesności, za sprawą zwykłej akumulacji wytwarzanych dóbr. Efektem tego podejścia jest zatem rozczarowanie i próba znalezienia pociechy w czerpaniu przyjemności z bieżącej chwili, uwalniającej człowieka od ryzyka i niepewności. Przeciwnością nadziei nie jest rozpacz, ale pewność. Prawdziwa nadzieja domaga się antropologii ryzyka i skończoności. Tylko „szalone nadzieje” (Kierkegaard) i przekonanie, że w sytuacji rozpaczki mogą nadejść nieoczekiwane odpowiedzi, nadają życiu smak przygody i poczucie szczęścia „pomimo wszystko”.

Słowa kluczowe: nadzieja, kultura, chrześcijaństwo

Każda kultura zawiera kosmogoniczne mity, tłumaczące genezę i sens wszechświata. Wszystkie jednak kultury, także zachodnia, aż do momentu pojawienia się judaizmu i chrześcijaństwa, nadają czasowi formę cykliczną. Żydowski monoteizm ugruntował w cywilizacji europejskiej linearną wizję czasu. Jahwe, jedyny i wszechmocny, kieruje historią ludzi i prowadzi ją do chwalebego wypełnienia. Chrześcijaństwo wzmacnia to przekonanie. Śmierć i zmartwychwstanie Chrystusa otwierają historię. Pojawienie się Boga w czasie łączy czas z wiecznością, przełamując jego cykliczność. Chrystus, jak mówi św. Augustyn, umarł i zmartwychwstał tylko raz. To leżące u podstaw chrześcijańskiej wiary wydarzenie kończy przymus powtarzania.

Czas linearny zakłada możliwość poprawy ludzkiego świata wraz z upływającą historią. Sugeruje, że istnieje nadzieja, czy też nadzieje. Wywołuje pojawienie się wiary w postęp. W tym sensie jest głównym bodźcem intensywnego rozwoju Zachodu. Pojawienie się czasu linearnego prowadzi do ukształtowania się społeczeństw, które trwają w oczekiwaniu na coś nowego. Czas przed nimi jest pełen obietnicy. Obietnice te różnią się w przypadku konkretnych społeczeństw. Czas linearny pozwala bowiem na wiele typów oczekiwań oraz kroków zmierzających ku osiągnięciu tego, co lepsze. W artykule tym pokażemy jak każdy z nich ulega obecnie wyczerpaniu, a jego znaczenie zniszczeniu.

Nowoczesny postęp

W epoce oświecenia oczekiwanie zbawienia zostaje poddane sekularyzacji i przekształcone w wizję postępu. Linearny czas idzie tym samym śladem, ale od teraz, pod nieobecność pierwiastka transcendentnego, przypisuje swoje cele immanentnemu światu. Wierzy się w materialny i moralny postęp. Oczekuje szczęścia, a nawet szczęścia absolutnego na ziemi (Condorcet).

Ideologia postępu nie jest wynalazkiem nowoczesności, ale substytutem utraczonego chrześcijańskiego ubogacenia, „zamiennikiem” ratującym czas linearny. Zostaje on jednak przekształcony, zarówno dlatego iż osadzony jest wyłącznie na immanencji, jak i dlatego, że naznaczony jest niecierpliwością – obietnice doczesne nie mogą przyjmować zbyt długiego okresu realizacji (te dwie cechy są ze sobą powiązane).

Teorie postępu są dobrze znane. Od siedemnastego do początków dwudziestego wieku piszą o nich niezliczeni autorzy. Potężny przypływ nadziei ożywia zachodni świat. Wszędzie, ze świętą gorliwością, czegoś się oczekuje. Udoskonalenia mogą lub nie pojawiać się za sprawą wybuchu zwanego rewolucją, które to określenie zostało pozbawione swojego pierwotnego sensu oznaczającego ruch po kole, i zaczęło oznaczać gwałtowny skok naprzód.

Rozczarowanie nowoczesnym postępem

Idea linearnego czasu zawsze opierała się na wierze i nadziei. Po usunięciu monoteistycznej wiary, nowoczesny postęp początkowo wiązano z rozwojem techniki. W efekcie sekularyzacji, poprawa świata rozumiana jest w kategoriach ilościowych: akumulacji towarów służących zapewnieniu komfortu i dobrego samopoczucia, wzrostu równości, czy wreszcie akumulacji szczęścia. Doczesna idea postępu domaga się zaprowadzania coraz większej równości, coraz większej indywidualnej wolności oraz znoszenia coraz większej ilości zakazów. Podczas, gdy w wizji transcendentnej oczekiwano na owoce będące efektem jakiegoś sposobu ludzkiego postępowania (jakiejś postawy), tutaj postęp wiąże się jedynie z akumulacją wytworów działania, które same traktowane są jako wartości.

Dość szybko okazuje się, że cele, które ma się osiągnąć za sprawą postępu (równość, wolność) nie mogą wzrastać w nieskończoność. Bądź też, jeśli kto woli, że szczęście nie wynika z akumulacji, ale z osiągniętej równowagi.

Charakterystyczny dla współczesnych czasów brak nadziei oznacza pustkę w podwójnym znaczeniu. Nadzieja zanika niejako na obu „końcach” przemijającej chwili. Zarzuciwszy mesjanistyczne oczekiwania, charakterystyczna dla oświecenia wiara w nieskończony postęp, blaknie.

Brak nadziei

Kult przyszłości wielkie chwile ma już za sobą. Ogromne rozczarowanie jakie pozostało po nim pozbawia nas nadziei: „Mówisz: Chodźmy! A ja ci odpowiadam: Nie ma dokąd iść...” Zamknięte drzwi nadziei nie otwierają się na hasło projektów, które od długiego czasu sobie przyswajaliśmy. Walka na przekonania została zastąpiona przez spór odnośnie do tożsamości indywidualnej czy grupowej. Oznacza to zasadniczą zmianę perspektywy. Wzrok, wcześniej zakorzeniony w przeszłości i spoglądający w przyszłość, dzisiaj skierowany jest do wewnątrz jednostki czy grupy. Obietnic nie dotrzymano, gdyż były niemożliwe do spełnienia.

Stąd stwierdzenie, że jedynie mądrość może poradzić sobie ze światem nadziei. Współczesny renesans myśli zbliżonych do stoicyzmu pokazuje, że doświadczamy niepokoju, który jednak towarzyszył człowiekowi także w innych okresach historii.

Kwestia nadziei jest podstawowym węzłem europejskiej kultury. Podsumowuje czas arogancji, postępu, nieskończonego odkrywania tajemnicy istnienia. Introwersja, skierowanie spojrzenia ku sobie, dopatrywanie się w sobie samym źródła, jest dla tej kultury zabójcze. Jednak zaburzenia umysłu, nawet jeśli czynią przyszłość absurdalną, nie przeszkadzają zaistnieć przyszłości. Świat nadal się obraca, tyle, że kręci się wokół własnej osi. Czas linearny, wypełniony obietnicami, ustępuje miejsca niekończącym się powtórkom ubóstwa, wojen i ucisku. I tak bez końca.

Czas cykliczny a ciężar terażniejszości

Niezadowolenie z czasu linearnego przenosi nas z powrotem ku wizji czasu cyklicznego, charakterystycznego dla przedchrześcijańskiego okresu, jak również dla wielu współczesnych kultur. „Pomyśl, dla własnej nauki – pisze Marek Aureliusz - o czasach Wespazjana, a zobaczysz, że ludzie żenili się, wychowywali dzieci, chorowali, umierali, walczyli z sobą, urządzali uroczystości, handlowali, uprawiali rolę, schlebiali, byli zarozumiali, podejrzewali, knuli spiski, niektórzy błagali o śmierć, narzekali z powodu losu, kochali się, zbierali skarby, pożydali konsulatów i tronu. Owo to ich życie już nigdzie nie istnieje. Znowu przejdź do czasów Trajana. I tam to samo, i owo życie znikło. Tak samo popatrz na inne nagrobki wszystkich czasów i ludów i zobacz, ilu to zmarłych w krótkim czasie upadło i rozłożyło się w pierwiastki” (*Rozmyślenia*, IV, 32). Widząc to, co dzieje się teraz, widzimy wszystko, co się wydarzyło od początku czasu, wszystko, co wydarzy się aż po kres czasów; ponieważ wszystko jest takie samo, w ogólności i w szczególe. Jak można nie widzieć tutaj analogii do współczesnego dyskursu, tkwiącego w powtarzalności obaw i nieszczęść?

Idea przeznaczenia zastępuje ideę zbawienia

Mędrzec musi uwolnić się od nostalgii za przeszłością i od obaw przed przyszłością, gdyż pobawione są one fundamentu w rzeczywistości. Mędrzec jest w pełni zaangażowany w bieżące działanie. Stąd porównanie człowieka do aktora odgrywającego rolę w teatrze: gorliwie angażującego się w realizację aktualnego zadania, bez myślenia o przeszłości i bez troski o przyszłość; jak gdyby obecny akt był jedyną rzeczywistością godną jego uwagi. Człowiek taki nie ma nadziei na nic. Ma tylko swoją mądrość i swoje pogodzenie się ze światem. Tak rozumiane życie mędrca, zanurzone w terażniejszości, jest poniekąd odwrotnością życia chrześcijanina, wypełnionego

tragicznym poczuciem istnienia; życia, dla którego liczy się tylko ów dramat istnienia.

Nawoływania stoickiego mędrca, by szukać szczęścia w dowartościowaniu chwili obecnej, a za iluzję uznać pragnienie trwałości czy wręcz wieczności, znajduje ogromny rezonans wśród wielu współczesnych moralistów „po pierwszym łyku piwa”. Przykładem takiej postawy jest potrzeba znalezienia natychmiastowego uznania, błyszczenia w mediach. Ale także skłonność naszych rządów (które nigdy nie odzwierciedlają poglądów ludzi) do konsumowania z wyprzedzeniem owoców przyszłości (poprzez nadmierne zadłużenie, repartycyjne systemy emerytalne, finansowe banki).

Perspektywa długiego trwania, obecnie całkowicie lekceważona, przypomina nam, że jesteśmy śmiertelni. Dzisiaj zaś nie mamy żadnej odpowiedzi na niepokój związany z tym faktem. Sprowadzenie szczęścia do poczucia satysfakcji z bieżącej chwili stanowi radykalne wyzwanie dla zachodniego prometeizmu. Nieświadomie porzucamy tysiącletnią wizję czasu ponadczasowego, aby powrócić do czasu cyklicznego, który cechuje wszystkie cywilizacje.

Stąd nadzieja jako pytanie

Nadzieja jest systematycznie odrzucana (w obecnym stanie rzeczy jest ona tchórzostwem, jak pisze Anders). Nie ma nadziei, bo nie ma przyszłości. Zamiast tego pojawia się czas spodziewania się różnych drobnych rzeczy. Brak nadziei, tzn. rozpacz, to powszechny sposób istnienia. Wielkie opowieści oparte na spodziewaniu się zostały zastąpione przez opowieść o końcu świata wraz z jego „heurystyką strachu” (H. Jonas).

Współczesną pokusą jest mądrość. Można ją znaleźć wszędzie: od prac wybitnych filozofów (A. Comte-Sponville, J.-L. Nancy) po artykuły w mediach (Paulo Coelho, Marc Levy), jednym słowem wszędzie. Moim zdaniem mądrość to rodzaj psychologicznego więzienia. Religia była krytykowana jako opium dla mas. Mądrość jest takim opium, pocieszeniem dla tego, kto szuka szczęścia, a nie prawdy. Chrześcijaństwo szuka prawdy wbrew wszystkiemu. Głupotą jest, jak mówił św. Paweł, przeciwstawianie szaleństwa Krzyża mądrości stoików. Mądrość jest dzisiaj jednym ze sposobów na porzucenie nadziei. Strzeżmy się współczesnej mądrości.

Jak znaleźć nadzieję? Myślę, że nie powinniśmy próbować odnawiać nadziei związanej z ideą postępu. Idea postępu zastąpiła wiarę w zbawienie, ale to nie jest nadzieja. Idea postępu to myśl o banku przechowującym nasze oszczędności

(C. Peguy), obraz ze świata burżuazji, w którym wszystko jest liczone, mierzone i ważne. Postęp nie odbywa się całkiem bezinteresownie, ale jest on ważny tylko wówczas, gdy jest wpisany w nadzieję na wieczne zbawienie. W przeciwnym razie jest kurczakiem biegającym bez głowy. Chodzi mi o to, że nadzieja może być tylko duchowa, zaś poza oczekiwaniem na duchowe zbawienie nie ma żadnej nadziei (większość ludzi radzi sobie bez niej, za sprawą mądrości).

Nie chodzi jednak o to, by powiedzieć: wierz w Boga albo pograżaj się w rozpacz! Nadzieja tworzy się w pewnej atmosferze, w ukrytym świecie stanowiącym swoisty krajobraz wiary. I to chciałabym tutaj opisać.

Nadzieja oznacza wiarę w ludzkie możliwości. Ale także wiarę w możliwości nieskończoności. We „Fragmentach raj”, Giono napisał: „Nie wierzę, że radości tego świata są wszystkie oznaczone w katalogu, do którego przywykliśmy się zwracać w każdym przypadku”. Postęp jest starym gratem, nadzieja jest wiecznie młoda, zawsze pojawia się o świecie. (Czas linearny narodził się z religijnej wiary i nadziei na raj. Wiara i nadzieja, obydwie nie dają się udowodnić. Ponieważ czas linearny obecnie nie odwołuje się już do religijnej wiary, lecz do oczekiwania konkretnego jutra w ramach tego świata, stał się zakładnikiem zdolności świata do samo-tworzenia, do demonstrowania swojego istnienia).

Immanentny czas nie przetrwał kataklizmów dwóch wojen światowych, upadku realnego socjalizmu i „wspaniałego trzydziestolecia”. Wiążąc nadzieję ze spełnieniem poprzez produkcję, został zniszczony. Nie tylko dlatego, że świat, jaki próbowano „wyprodukować” stał się niemożliwy do ogarnięcia. Stało się tak ponieważ nadzieja żywi się impetem, niedokończeniem. Musi być w świecie pewna doza nieracjonalności, nawet jeśli nie chce się mówić wprost o pierwiastku duchowym w szerokim znaczeniu.

Nadzieja jest częścią antropologii ryzyka i skończoności. W świecie, gdzie ludzie starają się przewidzieć wszystko, nie istnieje nadzieja, a jedynie kalkulacja. Przeciwnością nadziei nie jest rozpacz, lecz pewność. Postmodernistyczny człowiek nie pragnie nadziei, lecz pewności. Nie akceptuje niepewności. I dzieje się tak we wszystkich obszarach życia: panika towarzysząca ryzyku codziennego życia, medycyna... W kwestii ostatecznego celu, człowiek także chce poczucia pewności. Dlatego woli afirmować pustkę, dającą pewien rodzaj gwarancji po zaniżonej cenie.

Postmodernistyczny człowiek nie pragnie możliwego, on tego się obawia

Peguy mówi, że ogrom pamięci i przyzwyczajień sprawia, że nadzieja staje się niemożliwa. Opisuje „nieprzepuszczalną” duszę (*Note conjointe sur M. Decartes*), duszę, która jest kompletna. Jak może ona widzieć i kochać „to co będzie”, skoro jest pełna tego, co jest? Owa kompletność, oznacza śmierć duszy, ponieważ nie jest ona w stanie powitać niczego nowego. Odrzuca odnowę, gdyż jest „duszą wypełnioną po brzegi”. Nadzieja, natomiast, przedstawiana przez Peguy jako dziecko jest przeciwieństwem przyzwyczajenia, przeciwieństwem śmierci, gdyż „to nadzieja sprawia, że wszystko może się jeszcze raz rozpocząć”. W gruncie rzeczy, to nadzieja gwarantuje wieczną młodość świata: jest przeciwieństwem wiecznego powrotu tego samego. Dziedzicznym Heraklitem. Rzykiem. Czekaniem na to, czego nie znamy, przyznaniem, że nie opanowaliśmy jeszcze wszystkiego: tym jest nadzieja.

Dusza jest powiązana zarówno z nadzieją jak i z niepokojem. W „My” Zamiatina jesteśmy świadkami pracy nad formacją duszy głównej postaci, gdyż dusza traktowana jest jak choroba, którą trzeba zwalczyć. Dusza powiązana jest z zachowaniem śladów, wyobraźnią, niepokojem, samoświadomością. Dusza boli, a szczęście polega na braku cierpienia.

Nadzieja odnosi się do celów leżących gdzieś dalej, gdyż człowiek nie może być usatysfakcjonowany jedynie komfortem doczesnego życia. Ale dotyczy także, w samym sercu immanentnego świata, tego szalonego oczekiwania (musimy posłużyć się terminem Kierkegarda), czy też, posługując się bardziej zobiektywizowanym językiem, przekonania, że istnieje nieoczekiwane wyjście z każdej rozpaczliwej sytuacji, ścieżka w każdej ciemności, rozwiązania aporii, których świat nie pozwala dostrzec. Nadzieja polega na przedkładaniu przygody związanej z poszukiwaniem sensu ponad zwykłe szczęście. To wybór. Nadzieja oznacza „pomimo wszystko”.

Joachim von Wedel

Jacob of Paradies University, Poland

New Georgian University, Georgia

Der theologische Antichiasmus

Abstract: The motive for writing the article is the perception, on the ground of Christian theology, of the challenge of chiliasm trying to embed eternal things (salvation) in history, especially when it is hidden in the programs of socio-political movements. The aim of the article is to show that Christian theology has always been against chiliasm. This goal was achieved by referring to the thoughts of St. Augustine, Luther and Paul Althaus - theologians representing three different historical periods. The arguments against chiliasm taken from these theologians are of anthropological nature (the implementation of the Kingdom of God exceeds the human capacity) and indicate the importance of structures (state, church) in ensuring stability and durability on earth.

Keywords: antichiliasm, chiliasm, Kingdom of God, heresies, state, Church

Abstrakt: Przesłanką do powstania artykułu jest dostrzeżenie na gruncie teologii chrześcijańskiej wyzwania, jakie stanowi chiliazm próbujący rzeczy ostateczne (zbawienie) osadzić w historii, zwłaszcza, gdy jest on ukryty w programach ruchów społeczno-politycznych. Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że teologia chrześcijańska przez cały czas opowiadała się przeciwko chiliazmowi. Cel ten został zrealizowany poprzez odwołanie się do myśli św. Augustyna, Lutra oraz Paula Althausa czyli teologów reprezentujących trzy różne okresy historyczne. Zaczerpnięte od tych teologów argumenty przeciwko chiliazmowi mają charakter antropologiczny (realizacja Królestwa Bożego przekracza możliwości człowieka) oraz wskazują na znaczenie struktur (państwa, kościoła) w zapewnieniu stabilności i trwałości na ziemi.

Słowa kluczowe: antychiliazm, chiliazm, Królestwo Boże, herezje, państwo, Kościół

Die christliche Theologie vermittelt in Hinblick auf den Chiliasmus bis in die jüngste Vergangenheit den Eindruck großer Einheitlichkeit: sie will von einem innerweltlichen Endreich nichts wissen und schließt insofern an den Satz Jesu an: „Mein Reich ist nicht von dieser Welt“ (Joh 18, 36). Diese theologische

Positionierung ist in ihrer konfessionsübergreifenden Übereinstimmung umso bemerkenswerter, als sich der Chiliasmus seit dem späten Mittelalter und insbesondere seit der Reformation völlig gewandelt hat: er ist vom theoretisch-expliziten zum praktisch-impliziten Chiliasmus geworden, hat sich von der Geschichtstheorie zur politisch-sozialen Praxis¹ umgeformt. Diese zweite, moderne Version des Chiliasmus hat sich bis in die jüngste Vergangenheit als große Herausforderung für die Theologie erwiesen.

Im folgenden soll gezeigt werden, daß die Theologie ihre antichiliasmische Argumentation nicht nur, wie allgemein bekannt, anthropologisch begründet hat, sondern zusätzlich institutionell: mit der Abstützung auf Kirche und Staat. Diese zweisäulige Argumentation soll anhand dreier Theologen rekonstruiert werden, die die Positionierung der Theologie an drei großen historischen Schwellen verkörpern: Augustin mit der Etablierung der Staatskirche, Luther in der Reformation und Althaus im Übergang zur Liberaldemokratie.

I. Tragende Säule des theologischen Antichiliasmus ist die These, daß das Gottesreich nicht in der Welt liegt, sondern jenseits der Welt. Diese Behauptung steht in den Stellungnahmen von Augustin, Luther und Althaus übereinstimmend jeweils an zentraler Stelle. Bei Luther etwa heißt es lapidar, das Reich könne in der Welt keine Gestalt gewinnen². Ihm entspreche keine irdisch-äußerliche Wirklichkeit: es ist „nit irdnisch noch in irdenischen, sondern in geistlichen Gütern“ [VDFEC 319]: Wir tragen es in uns [VDBG 272], es besteht in „Wahrheit,

¹ die Zusammenfassung beider Sachverhalte unter den Chiliasmusbegriff ist nicht unumstritten, vgl. List 1973, Dietze 1963. Problematisch ist neben der Vielgestaltigkeit der frühneuzeitlichen und erst recht der späteren Strömungen insbesondere der dort fast allgemeine Verzicht auf den Chiliasmusbegriff. Eine begriffliche Zusammenfassung mit dem antiken Chiliasmus erfolgt hier deshalb, weil beide kirchengeschichtlichen Sachverhalte einen entscheidenden faktischen Bezugspunkt teilen: das Reich Gottes. Während sich der explizite und theoretische Chiliasmus auf die künftige Gottesherrschaft als welthistorische Epoche fixiert, sich auf den äußeren Rahmen bezieht, geht es dem schwärmerischen, impliziten Chiliasmus gleichsam um die Innenausstattung: die Art des Zusammenlebens. Beide sind futurisch, sehen nach vorn, der explizite Chiliasmus in die weite Ferne, der implizite in unmittelbar bevorstehende Zukunft und Gegenwart. Beide Bewegungen verhalten sich damit in vielen Fällen zueinander wie Theorie und Praxis, wie Programm und Programmverwirklichung.

² Nigg 1944: 209ff. Bezuggenommen wird auf folgende Werke Luthers: „Eine Heerpredigt wider den Türken“ (1529) (HWDT), „Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen“ (1520) (VDFEC), „Von der babylonischen Gefangenschaft der Kirche, ein Vorspiel“ (1520) (VDBG), „Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können“ (1526) (OKA), „Von weltlicher Ueberkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei“ (1523) (VWU) sowie „Wider die räuberischen und mörderischen Rotten der andern Bauern“ (1525) (WDB).

Weisheit, Fried, Freud, Seligkeit“ [VDFEC 319]. Auch Althaus betont die paradisi-ähnliche Qualität des Reiches, und lokalisiert es noch entschiedener im Jenseits: das Reich liegt jenseits der Welt, denn es bedeutet die „Aufhebung des Gesetzes unserer Welt, der Sünde und des Todes“ [Althaus 1957: 361]. Nicht Erziehung und Entwicklung seien imstande, die Welt der Dämonen und des Todes, des menschlichen Übermuts und der menschlichen Gier zu überwinden [Althaus 1931: 482], sondern erst ein übernatürliches Reich Christi: dort gebe es keine Fortsetzung der natürlichen Seinsweise des Menschen aus Fleisch und Blut, sondern unvergängliche Lebendigkeit. Dieses Reich liegt, als ein transzendentes Reich, jenseits aller Möglichkeiten des Menschen [Althaus 1957: 318], und damit gehört es nicht zum jetzigen, sondern zum kommenden Äon [Althaus 1957: 298f]. Es bedeutet: „Der Mensch jenseits seiner selbst; diese Welt jenseits ihrer selbst“ [Althaus 1957: 361].

Ein maßgebender Vertreter derselben Position war eineinhalb Jahrtausende zuvor bereits Augustin: Das Reich ist keine Weltordnung, es findet nicht zu Weltbedingungen statt. Es überwindet diese Bedingungen und verkörpert den ewigen Frieden: Es bringt den „Frieden im ewigen Leben oder ewiges Leben in Frieden“ [De Civitate Dei XIX 11³] als ein „Reich ruhevollsten Friedens, wo man ohne Bedrohung durch Feinde herrscht“ [XX 9]. Das Reich ist Friedensreich, und es setzt einen Menschen voraus, der sich in Althaus' Worten „jenseits seiner selbst“ befindet: einen Menschen, in dem alle Leidenschaften der Natur erlöschen und dem das ewige Glück von ewiger Dauer zuteil wird [XIX 27]. Dieses Reich, „erfüllt von allem Guten, frei von allem Bösen“ [Flasch 1980: 397ff], wird kommen, aber es kommt nicht in der Welt, sondern jenseits der Welt, unter einem neuen Himmel und auf einer neuen Erde [XX 14].

Diese gemeinsame Hauptlinie theologischer Positionierung zum Chiliasmus bleibt ohne explizite Begründung. Stets aber finden sich behutsame Hinweise auf den Menschen, wie er ist und wie er sich als solcher für das Reich nicht eignet. Diese anthropologischen Tatbestände gelten offenbar als so evident, daß weitere Ausführungen überflüssig sind. Althaus nun ergänzt diese lange Tradition durch eine Argumentation, die geeignet ist, das Chiliasmusproblem als solches zu erledigen. Er wiederholt nicht nur den Standpunkt, das Reich könne seinen Ort nur im Jenseits der Welt haben, sondern er löst die Verbindung zwischen

³ Auch die folgenden Zitate mit römischen Ziffern beziehen sich auf „De Civitate Dei“, hier in der von Wilhelm Thimme aus dem Lateinischen übertragenen und von Carl Andresen eingeleiteten und kommentierten Ausgabe des Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlags, 2. Aufl. von 2011.

Reich und Geschichte, und damit zwischen Reich und Welt. Er vertritt damit eine radikale Zuspitzung der Position, die bereits seit den Anfängen der christlichen Theologie herrschend gewesen war. Seine Argumentation ergänzt den anthropologischen Schwerpunkt der bisherigen theologischen Position durch eine eschatologische Argumentation. Diese ruht auf zwei Pfeilern, einer Neudeutung des Eschatologiebegriffs und dem Nachweis, daß auch die alttestamentarische Endzeitprophetie im Christentum keinen Ort mehr habe.

Althaus postuliert zunächst, die „letzten Dinge“ (also der Gegenstand der Eschatologie) könnten überhaupt nicht geschichtlich verstanden werden. Es gehe bei diesen letzten Dingen nicht um Geschichte, sondern um das Jenseits der Geschichte. Dieses Jenseits der Geschichte rücke mit dem Ablauf der Zeit nicht allmählich näher, sondern sei in jeder Generation gleich nah, es sei die universale, gemeinsame Erfahrung aller. „Die Erwartung der Parusie hat die gleiche Aktualität wie die Erwartung des Todes. Auch in diesem konkreten Sinne der ständigen Möglichkeit des Endes ist jede Zeit für uns, die wir sie erleben, letzte Zeit“ [Althaus 1957: 275]. Unabhängig davon, ob dieses Ende chronologisch näher oder weiter entfernt sei, gelte: „Es ist wesentlich zu jeder Stunde ganz nahe“ [Althaus 1957: 274]. Die Begegnung mit Gott ist also niemals mehr geschichtliches Ereignis, sondern wird auf ausdehnungslose Jetztpunkte reduziert [Walter Sparn⁴]. Althaus stellt dem zeitlichen Verständnis von Geschichte ein „axiologisches“ entgegen [Wimmer 1979]. Eine so verstandene Eschatologie verweist nicht auf ein Zukünftiges in der Geschichte oder auf ein Jenseits der Geschichte, sondern auf den absoluten Grund der Geschichte, der immer und überall gegenwärtig ist.

Für Althaus ist die Rede der Eschatologie also nicht hypothetisch, sondern kategorisch, denn sie hat es nicht mit dem Ende der Welt in etwa biologischer oder physikalischer Hinsicht zu tun, sondern nur mit ihrem theologischen Ausgang. Bei dem geht es ausschließlich um das Gottesverhältnis des Menschen. Auf diese Weise werden die letzten Dinge der Geschichte entwunden, und die wird eschatologisch gleichgültig. Bedeutsam bleibt „Geschichte“ allein in Form der Glaubens- und Unglaubensgeschichte des Einzelnen. Was zählt, ist einzig die Umwandlung des individuellen Selbstverständnisses durch den Glauben an Christus. Es gibt also keine Erlösung durch fortschreitende Geschichte, sondern Erlösung ist die Erlösung von der Geschichte [Althaus 1957: 249]. Nicht in der Geschichte kommt

⁴ „Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen“. Über die geschichtstheologische Herausforderung eines Milleniums, S. 199ff in: ders, Hg, Apokalyptik versus Chiliasmus? Die kulturwissenschaftliche Herausforderung des neuen Milleniums. Erlangen 2002.

das Reich Gottes, sondern als die Überwindung von Geschichte: es sprengt die Gestalt der Welt und liegt außerhalb der Welt [Althaus 1957: 251]. Schon die Parusie, die diese Erlösung von der Geschichte bringt, ist kein geschichtliches Ereignis mehr [Althaus 1957: 251].

Althaus ist mit dieser Position Teil einer breiteren Strömung, die Prophezeiung und Geschichte voneinander trennt und Prophezeiung ins Psychische verschiebt. Nicht mehr auf korporative Geschichte soll es ankommen, sondern auf die individuelle Entscheidung über die Ausrichtung der eigenen Existenz. Die äußere Wirklichkeit ist das Uneigentliche, das Eigentliche liegt im Ereignis der Christusbegegnung, in der Selbsthingabe an Christus [Ratzinger 1977]. Die ist das eschatologische Ereignis. Als solches ist sie individuelles, nicht kollektives Ereignis, und bleibt damit außerhalb dessen, was gemeinhin als geschichtlich gilt. Eine solcherart existenzialisierte Eschatologie handelt nicht mehr vom künftigen Ende der Welt, sondern von der gegenwärtigen Entweltlichung der menschlichen Existenz [Moltmann].

Wo Eschatologie Privatsache wird und keinen Bezug mehr zur Geschichte hat, da versperrt Althaus zusätzlich auch der frühen biblischen Prophezeiung den Zugriff auf Geschichte. Diese Wendung ist die zweite argumentative Abstützung von Althaus' These, es könne keine Reichsabbildung in der Welt geben. Seine Argumentation in Hinblick auf diese Prophezeiung lautet hauptsächlich, seit Christus hätten Hoffnungen auf nationale Erlösung keinen Ort mehr. Formal sei ein im Sinne nationaler Erlösung verstandener Chiliasmus im Osten durch den griechisch-philosophischen Geist der alexandrinischen Theologie und im Westen durch Augustin erledigt worden. Von der Sache her aber ist er bereits seit Christus gegenstandslos: Christus ist der letzte Messias. Er zerbricht alle irdisch-nationalen Erwartungen und wendet sich leidenschaftlich gegen das nationale Messiasideal seiner Zeitgenossen [Althaus 1957: 310]. Mit Christus endet jede korporative Geschichte, die aus christlicher Sicht von Bedeutung wäre. Was sich nach Christus politisch ereignet, hat keine Heilsrelevanz mehr. Es gibt, seit Christus da ist, keinen anderen Tempel mehr als die christliche Gemeinde [Althaus 1957: 312]. Mit Christus endet die Vision vom innerweltlichen Endreich.

Aber schon die Textgrundlagen stützen, so Althaus, eine solche Hoffnung nicht. Das Buch Daniel enthält nur scheinbare Weissagung, bezieht sich aber auf bereits vergangene Geschichte. Die Apokalypse des Johannes verarbeitet Zeitgeschichte. Die dort dokumentierte Weissagung vom Antichrist enthält keine Aussagen

über die Zukunft. Auch aus dem Geschichtsverlauf läßt sich die Erwartung nicht begründen, die Kraft des Bösen nehme allmählich zu. Das Böse ist vielmehr stets und in unterschiedlicher Gestalt präsent. Die Kirche ist aufgerufen, den Antichrist in ihrer jeweiligen Gegenwart zu suchen und muß auch die ständige Möglichkeit bedenken, selber antichristlich zu werden [Althaus 1957: 283ff]. Überhaupt ist, so Althaus, die Fixierung auf Vorzeichen unbiblich, denn sie macht aus der stets aktuellen Eschatologie eine Theorie für die Zukunft. Theologisch ist nur, was sich mit einer Naherwartung des Endes verbindet, während eine Theorie der fernen Endzeit ihren theologischen Ernst verliert [Althaus 1957: 263-79].

Genauso gegenstandslos wie die alte Prophezeiung ist für Althaus eine neue säkularisierte Prophezeiung. Die deutet er als einen Evolutionismus philosophischer Herkunft, der das Kommen des Reiches als fortschreitende Bewegung lehrt. Dieser Evolutionismus hat insbesondere in die us-amerikanische Theologie hineingewirkt, aber er wurde früher schon von Schleiermacher geteilt. Althaus wendet dagegen ein, die Kirchengeschichte mit ihren Kämpfen, Spaltungen und dem Wandel der Verkündigung stelle sich kaum als Fortschritt dar [Althaus 1957: 230ff]. Auch einen Fortschritt der subjektiven Sittlichkeit gebe es nicht. Die Annahme, ein solcher Fortschritt sei möglich, mißachte den Unterschied zwischen Himmel und Erde [1957: 243ff]. Mit diesem letzten Argument kehrt Althaus zurück zu der schon von Augustin und Luther vertretenen anthropologischen Akzentuierung der zentralen antichiliasischen These: das Gottesreich liegt nicht in der Welt, sondern jenseits der Welt.

II. Neben diesen ersten und bekannten Strang des theologischen Antichiliasmus tritt eine zweite, ebenso tragende und konstante Gemeinsamkeit: die Abstützung der antichiliasischen Argumentation auf die Organisation. Als eine in der Tendenz auf Dauer angelegte soziale Einheit mit definiertem Ziel und Steuerfähigkeit gegenüber ihren Mitgliedern ist die Organisation Gegenmodell zum bewegungsformigen Neochiliasmus der frühen Neuzeit und Moderne. Aber auch bereits in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Chiliasmus der Antike übernimmt die Organisation eine zentrale Aufgabe. Während Augustin seinen Antichiliasmus noch ausschließlich auf die Kirche stützt (1.), tritt bei Luther an die Seite der Kirche der Staat (2.), und bei Althaus ist es nur noch der Staat ist, der ihm Rückhalt bietet (3.).

1. Schon Augustins Kampf gegen den Chiliasmus ist hauptsächlich organisationsgestützt, und zwar kirchengestützt. Er geht von der These aus, daß die Kirche die Form sei, die ein in zeitlicher Hinsicht (und nur insofern) in die Welt

hereingezogenes Gottesreich höchstens annehmen könne. Das Reich als solches liegt jenseits der Welt, die Tausendjahrperiode aber kann durchaus in der Welt stattfinden⁵. Damit leistet Augustin Doppeltes: er besiegt den Chiliasmus für lange Zeit, und er stabilisiert die Kirche. Die kirchliche Organisation ist entscheidende Waffe im antichiliasmischen Kampf und zugleich größter Nutznießer des Sieges in diesem Kampf. Wirksame Waffe ist sie, indem sie als jugendfrische Organisation einem zeitgenössischen Chiliasmus, dem einstweilen jeder praktisch-politische Ehrgeiz fehlt, die Tausendjahrperiode entzieht und ihn seiner Sprengkraft beraubt durch die Behauptung, sie selber übernehme sein Anliegen [Nigg 1944, Thomas Ruster 2001]. Das Millennium wird vom eschatologischen Faktum zur kirchenhistorischen Periode, von der Inspirationsquelle des Einzelnen zur allgemeinen Kirchenverfassung.

Zugleich ist die Kirche hauptsächlicher Nutznießer des von Augustin geführten Angriffs: sie erfährt einen Zuwachs an Würde und ihre Existenz wird gesichert bis ans Ende der Welt. Dieser erhebliche Vorteil wird von Augustin mit Feingefühl in zweifacher Weise gemäßigt. Erstens wird die Kirche nicht in sämtlichen ihrer aktuellen Bestandteile zur Reichsverkörperung. Augustin stellt die chiliastische Qualität der Kirche unter einen inhaltlichen und zeitlichen Vorbehalt. Gegen Positionen einer undifferenzierten Gleichsetzung von Kirche und civitas Dei hält Kinder (1954) daran fest, Reich Gottes sei die Kirche nicht in ihrer Gegenwartsgestalt, sondern erst in ihrer Zukunfts- und Zielgestalt. Die Kirche verkörpert nicht das ganze Reich Gottes, sondern nur denjenigen Teil des Reiches, der sich im Anbruch befindet. Und auch nicht die ganze Kirche ist mit dem anbrechenden Reich Gottes identisch, sondern nur ihr verborgener Kern. Das Reich Gottes ist gleichsam die „Entelechie“ der Kirche. Die Gleichsetzung von Reich Gottes und Römischer Kirche wird damit nach beiden Seiten hin eingeschränkt. Der Chiliasmus wird also vergegenwärtigt und zugleich futurisiert. Die Kirche ist noch nicht das Reich Gottes, sondern wird zum Reich Gottes erst am Jüngsten Tag.

Seine Organisationszentrierung stabilisiert Augustin durch eine zweite Differenzierung. Wo soziale Veränderung ausgeschlossen ist, da läßt er, auch in der

⁵ Augustin schloß mit dieser Position an frühere Autoren an. Er war zunächst Anhänger der eusebianischen Reichstheologie gewesen, stellt dann aber die schon zuvor von Tyconius vollzogene Wendung gegen das in der frühen Kirche bis ins zweite Jahrhundert vorherrschende, endzeitlich-zukünftige Verständnis der Apk 20 auf feste Grundlagen. Tyconius hatte das Tausendjährige Reich nicht mehr als erst eine bevorstehende, sondern schon gegenwärtige Phase verstanden, als die Zeit der Kirche (vgl. Flasch 1980).

monarchischen Hierarchie der römischen Kirche, Raum für die Zukunftserwartung und Vorwärtsrichtung des christlichen Glaubens. Zwar geht die konstantinische Wende parallel mit dem Niedergang eines Utopismus, der in erheblichem Umfang Ausdruck von Unterdrückung und Verfolgung der frühchristlichen Gemeinde war. Aber die christliche Hoffnung bleibt und fordert Raum. Augustin schafft ihr diesen Raum, indem er unterscheidet zwischen statischer Kirche und wanderndem Gottesvolk, zwischen unveränderlicher, dauerhaft stabilisierter Institution und der Gemeinschaft derer, die sich begründete Hoffnung auf Bewährung im Gericht und Teilhabe am Gottesreich machen können: der *Civitas Dei*. Die ist Adressat der Verheißung, die Kirche demgegenüber *corpus permixtum* aus guter Saat und Unkraut, Institution auch der Verworfenen. Zugleich gibt es auch Bürger des Reiches außerhalb der Kirche: Augustin nennt Hiob und die Sibylle. Erst das Jüngste Gericht wird offenbar machen, wer zu den Gottesfürchtigen und wer zu den Selbstgerechten gehört und gehört hat. Zu rechnen ist mit anonymem Christentum ebenso wie mit Scheinchristentum. Diesen Möglichkeiten gibt Augustin Raum: die Kirche hat ihre besondere heilsgeschichtliche Stellung, aber worauf es zuletzt ankommt, ist die Zugehörigkeit zu dem nicht mit der Kirche identischen Gottesvolk. Die äußere Starrheit seiner Geschichtstheorie wird auf diese Weise begrenzt und der Kirche ein Triumphalismus unmöglich gemacht.

2. Luther markiert und verursacht das Ende einer Phase, in der ein theologischer Antichiliasmus sich organisatorisch ausschließlich auf die Kirche stützen konnte. Gegen den Neochiliasmus des 16. Jahrhunderts, der auf ein Leben zielt, das geistlich von individueller göttlicher Inspiration und politisch von brüderlicher Liebe der Auserwählten geprägt ist, bedarf es eines zusätzlichen Instruments. Gegen die innere Erleuchtung, die der Chiliasmus kultiviert und die allerdings den Kernbereich kirchlicher Aufgaben betrifft, setzt Luther in bewährter Weise auf die - nun allerdings protestantische - Kirche (a.), gegen die naive chiliastische Forderung nach der allumfassenden Liebesgemeinschaft aber benötigt er den Staat (b).

a) Das chiliastische Schwärmertum, mit dem es Luther zu tun hat, will sich direkter göttlicher Einwirkung unterstellen. Es wendet sich gegen klerikale Vermittlung und möchte der schöpferischen Selbsttätigkeit des Geistes keine institutionellen Schranken setzen. Münzer will dem „inneren Wort“ Raum schaffen, das aus dem „Abgrund der Seele“ hervorquellend und in dem sich Gott den Gläubigen offenbart⁶. Gegen die vom Schwärmertum Müntzers oder Karlstadts vertrete-

⁶ vgl. Holl 1923.

ne These vom freischwebenden Direktzugang zur Transzendenz [Haas 1997, Maurer 1952, Schumann 1952] setzt Luther, wie schon gegen das Papsttum, die Bibel- und Schriftkirche. Erst auf dem Weg der Schrift werde aus dem Geist ein Heiliger Geist. Der biblische Text hat für Luther notwendig Vorrang vor individuellen Eingebungen. Die Schrift setzt den äußeren Rahmen für jede Geist- und Glaubenserfahrung, und erst der Schriftbezug überwindet die schwärmerische Tendenz zu geistlicher Selbsthilfe und Selbstheiligung [Joest 1967: 190]. Zwar muß das Innere dem Äußeren nachgeordnet werden, aber es bleibt unverzichtbar: ohne den Zuspruch des inneren Worts läuft die Schrift leer. Der Verzicht auf den selbstgewählten Heilsweg und die eigengewählten Gnadenmittel [Steck 1955: 20] führt dazu, daß die neue Organisation der protestantischen Kirchen sich gegen die Schwärmer alsbald durchsetzt. Die Abstützung auf die Schrift und die berufenen kirchlichen Schriftausleger erwies sich auch deshalb als wirksames Mittel gegen die chiliastische These von der schriftfreien Direktinspiration.

b) Wo er gegen den schwärmerischen schriftfreien Gotteszugang auf die Kirche setzt, da widerspricht er der schwärmerischen Gemeinschaftsidee, der nach dem Vorbild einer idealisierten christlichen Gemeinde imaginierten egalitären „Ideal-Gemeinschaft“ der Reinen und Frommen⁷ mit der Bergpredigt als Gesetz⁸ mit der theologischen Stabilisierung des Staates. Armee und Polizei sind weder fragwürdiger Notbehelf noch auf Dauer überholbar, sondern theologisch gerechtfertigt, und zwar gerade mit Blick auf die Schwärmerbewegung⁹. Diese Position verdeutlicht Luther, in uneinheitlicher Begrifflichkeit, in der Rede von den zwei Obrigkeiten, zwei Gewalten, zwei Reichen oder zwei Regimenten. Zwei Personengesamtheiten werden jeweils durch Gott regiert, und zwar in verschiedener, ihrer Eigenart jeweils angemessener Weise.

Luther legt den Schwärmern zwei Hindernisse in den Weg. In einem ersten Schritt begrenzt er den Bereich sozialer Gewaltlosigkeit - also den theoretisch schwärmerischer Norm zugänglichen Raum - auf eine Sphäre noch innerhalb der christlichen Gemeinde. Frei von institutionalisierter Gewaltausübung sind nur die wirklichen Christen, eine Gruppe, die deutlich weniger umfangreich ist als die der getauften Christen („Die Welt und die Menge ist und bleibt Unchristen, ob sie gleich alle getauft und Christen heißen“, VWU 52f). Nur hier, unter den im „Reich Gottes“

⁷ vgl. Mühlmann 1961.

⁸ so die Religiös-Sozialen Bewegung gem. Paul Althaus 1921, S. 33f. Vgl. Außerdem Holl 1923.

⁹ vgl. Ebeling 2006.

versammelten wirklichen Christen, bedarf es keiner Staatsgewalt, hier haben Vergeben, Schonung, Lieben, Dienen und Friede ihren Ort [WDB 126] und nur hier ist der Wirkungsbereich alttestamentarisch-eschatologischer Prophezeiungen wie etwa Jes. 2: „Sie werden ihre Schwerter zu Pflugscharen und ihre Lanzen zu Sicheln machen“) [VWU 54]. Nur hier, wenn überhaupt, haben bestimmte Sozialideale des Schwärmertums ihren Ort. Außerhalb aber, im „Reich der Welt“, herrschen Schwert und Organisation [vgl. Althaus 1921: 38f]. Hier bedarf es des Rechts, das lehrt und zwingt [VWU 51], hier ist das Schwert unverzichtbar. Die bewaffnete Staatsmacht erfüllt, indem sie das Böse zurückdrängt, Gottes Auftrag [OKA 146]. Gott bedient sich, der unterschiedlichen Natur beider Reiche geschuldet, jeweils verschiedener Herrschaftsmittel, und das dem Reich der Welt angemessene Mittel ist das Schwert. Auch der Einsatz des Schwertes ist also mittelbarer Ausdruck göttlicher Liebe.

Diese Indienstnahme des Schwertes schließt willkürliche Zwecksetzungen aus. Das Schwert dient nicht beliebigen Zielen, sondern seine Verwendung ist auf bestimmte Aufgaben begrenzt. Es steht dem Fürsten nur zur Bekämpfung der Bösen und zum Schutz der Frommen zur Verfügung. Den christlichen Fürsten verpflichtet Luther, sich an Christi Liebeshandeln ein Beispiel zu nehmen. Christus habe nicht Verherrlichung gesucht, sondern Hilfe gebracht, und so solle der Fürst gegenüber seinen Untertanen handeln [VWU 78]. Er solle nicht mehr Herrscher sein wollen, sondern sein Tun müsse ganz und gar „auf anderer Nutz, Ehre und Heil ausgerichtet sein“ [VWU 76].

Die Staatsmacht erfüllt also bei Luther die Aufgaben, die ihr nach christlicher Lehre traditionell zukommen: die Wahrung von Recht und Frieden. Sie ist damit Instrument der göttlichen Weltordnung. Daraus ergeben sich für den Träger des Schwertes drei Konsequenzen. Seine Aufgabe ist erstens nicht minderwertig, sondern eine Gottesdienstvariante genau wie die Liebeswerke in der christlichen Gemeinde. Gerade durch seine pflichtgemäße Beteiligung an den Weltordnungen erfüllt der Christ Jesu Liebesgebot [Althaus 1921]. So hat der Soldat, dessen Amt der Welt so nötig sei wie Essen und Trinken [OKA 146], den gleichen Anspruch auf Wertschätzung wie jeder andere Handwerker. Beide verrichten verschiedene Arten von Gottesdienst [VWU 60, 63]. Eine zweite Konsequenz ist die Festlegung des Schwertträgers auf einen bestimmten und defensiven Berufszweck: seine Aufgabe ist nicht die Herbeiführung des Gottesreichs (wie bei Müntzer) oder die Beförderung sonstiger willkürlicher, schwärmerischer Ziele, sondern die Abwehr des Bösen [OKA 144].

Dieser Dienst, die Abwehr des Bösen, ist schließlich drittens Daueraufgabe, denn „die Bösen sind immer viel mehr sind als die Frommen“ [VWU 53]. Adressaten dieser Daueraufgabe sind zunächst auch die, die irgendwann später Christen werden, denn „kein Mensch ist von Natur aus Christ oder fromm, sondern allzumal Sünder und böse“ [VWU 51]. In der Welt ist und bleibt der Mensch ganz und ausnahmslos der Sünde und dem Tod verhaftet [DUDM 268f]. Damit bleibt öffentliche Gewaltausübung nötig, solange die Welt besteht, denn das Böse hört nicht auf. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Reich Gottes und Reich der Welt steht nicht zur Disposition, sie ist deutlich und unüberwindbar und besteht bis ans Ende der Welt. Das Amt des Schwertträgers wird also aufgewertet, dienstleistend auf das Wohl der Untertanen bezogen, schwärmerischer Zweckentfremdung entzogen und auf Dauer stabilisiert. Der Staat, den Luther gegen das Schwärmertum stellt, ist also der aufgewertete, der gerade in seiner bewaffneten Funktion als Variante göttlicher Weltherrschaft klassifizierte Staat.

3. Wie Luther setzt auch Althaus auf die Organisation als Werkzeug gegen diejenigen religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart, die Staat und Wirtschaft im Geiste der Bergpredigt umgestalten wollten. Grundlegend für den Neochiliasmus der 1920er Jahre war die Überzeugung, Christenleben dürfe sich nicht in Innerlichkeit und persönlicher Rettungsgewißheit erschöpfen, sondern müsse das gesamte Leben in den Blick nehmen. Das Liebesideal einer wörtlich genommenen Bergpredigt sollte nicht mehr nur in kleinem Kreise verwirklicht werden. Vielmehr müsse das Reich Gottes „reale Weltverfassung“ werden, denn in der christlichen Liebe schlummerten die Organisationskräfte einer neuen, besseren Welt [Althaus 1921: 11f].

Gegen diesen Weltumgestaltungsanspruch macht Althaus sich zum Anwalt der christlichen Gemeinde, und damit der Stabilität und des Staates. Die Theologie dürfe es nicht unwidersprochen lassen, wenn biblische Kerngedanken wie das Reich Gottes entstellt und mit fremden Inhalten gefüllt würden [Althaus 1921: 32]. Althaus will den Staat, und zwar auch den liberaldemokratischen Staat seiner Gegenwart, stützen gegen chiliastisch-anarchische Tendenzen, die ihn im Liebeskommunismus auflösen wollen. Sein Plädoyer für Staatsakzeptanz ruht, anders als das Luthers, auf zwei Säulen: einer anthropologischen und einer soziologischen.

Der anthropologische Hauptvorwurf gegen die Sozial-Religiösen wiederholt die eingangs angedeutete Position: die Abneigung gegen Macht und Staat sei die Folge eines Irrtums über die menschliche Natur, ihre Selbstsucht, Rohheit und Sünde

[Althaus 1921: 38]. Ohne Zwangsgewalt und Staat würden „die Kinder Gottes von den gewalttätigen und rohen Mächten der Geschichte einfach niedergetreten“ [Althaus 1921: 37]. Der zweite, soziologische Teil von Althaus' Argument geht davon aus, daß nach chiliastischer Überzeugung das Reich Gottes ein Reich der Liebe ist, ein Reich der Herrschaft des Evangeliums in den Herzen. Es ist damit ein Reich der Zwanglosigkeit und der Freiheit, denn nach chiliastischer Ansicht kann Liebe „immer nur aus der Freiheit geboren werden, als freie, quellende, ursprüngliche Bewegung“ [Althaus 1921: 33f]. Gerade die Freiheit der Liebe aber setzt, so Althaus, die Rechtsordnung voraus und damit Staat und Zwang. Erst der durch staatlichen Zwang geschaffene Handlungsraum ermöglicht Handlungsfreiheit und schafft damit der Liebe Raum. Keinen Raum lassen der Liebe Gewaltstrukturen, die in staatenloser Anarchie entstehen. Die Liebe Gottes kann erst da politisch wirken, wo dem Einzelnen Vermögen und Handlungsspielraum rechtlich und damit staatlich gesichert sind [Althaus 1923: 16].

III. Ein seit den Anfängen der Kirche bis heute von der Theologie vertretener Antichiliasmus war nicht in der Lage, den Gottesreichsgedanken vollständig in das Jenseits der Welt zu verlegen. Dort hatte er nach anthropologisch begründeter Ansicht seinen eigentlichen Ort. Die Organisationszentrierung des Antichiliasmus illustriert, wie stark der Chiliasmus insbesondere seit dem Spätmittelalter auf innerweltliche Wirksamkeit drängt. Gegen dieses Drängen findet der theologische Antichiliasmus im Mittelalter hinreichenden Schutz in der Kirche, seit dessen Ende aber wird der Staat zur antichiliasmischen Hauptstütze. Dieser Wechsel illustriert die zunehmende innere und äußere Schwäche der Kirche und zeigt zugleich, wie sehr die Theologie in ihrem Kampf gegen den Chiliasmus auf die Stabilität und Dauerhaftigkeit angewiesen ist, die ihr nur stabile und große Organisationen bieten können.

Literatur

- Althaus Paul (1921), Religiöser Sozialismus. Gütersloh.
- Althaus Paul (1923), Staatsgedanke und Reich Gottes, Langensalza.
- Althaus Paul (1931), Grundriß der Ethik. Erlangen.
- Althaus Paul (1957), Die letzten Dinge. Lehrbuch der Eschatologie. Gütersloh.
- Böcher Otto (2000), Apokalyptische Strukturen in der Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, S. 1-18 in: Zeitschrift für Bayerische Kirchengeschichte, 69. Jahrgang 2000.
- Cohn Norman (1961), Das Ringen um das Tausendjährige Reich. Bern.
- Court John M (2008), Approaching the Apocalypse: a short history of Christian millenarianism, London und New York.
- Dassmann Ernst (1993), Augustin. Heiliger und Kirchenlehrer. Stuttgart.
- Dietze Walter (1963), Quirinius Kuhlmann. Ketzer und Poet. Berlin.
- Ulrich Duchrow (1983), Christenheit und Weltverantwortung. Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struktur der Zweireichelehre, Stuttgart.
- Ebeling Gerhard (2006), Luther. Einführung in sein Denken, 5. Aufl. Tübingen.
- Flasch Kurt (1980), Augustin. Stuttgart.
- Alois M. Haas (1997), Der Kampf um den Heiligen Geist - Luther und die Schwärmer, Freiburg/Schweiz/
- Holl Karl (1923), Luther und die Schwärmer, S. 420-467 in ders., Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, Bd. 1, Luther, Tübingen.
- Joest, Wilfried (1967), Das Heiligungsproblem nach Luthers Schrift „Wider die himmlischen Propheten“, S. 189 - 193 in: Ivar Astheim, Hrsg., Kirche, Mystik, Heiligung und das Natürliche bei Luther, Göttingen.
- Kinder Ernst (1954), Reich Gottes und Kirche bei Augustin. Eine Studie über das Verhältnis von Kirche und Eschatologie im Blick auf das Generalthema der Vollversammlung des Weltrates der Kirchen in Evanston 1954 (Luthertum; H. 14), Berlin.
- Kreck Walter (1961), Die Zukunft des Gekommenen. Grundprobleme der Eschatologie. München.
- Kühn Johannes (1923), Toleranz und Offenbarung. Eine Untersuchung der Motive und Motivformen der Toleranz im offenbarungsgläubigen Protestantismus zugleich ein Versuch zur neueren Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, Leipzig.
- Künne Adolf (1997), Hg, Der Christ in der politischen Verantwortung heute – Die Zwei-Reiche-Lehre auf dem Prüfstand, Herford.
- Luther Martin:
- „Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen“ (1520) (VDFEC),
- „Von der babylonischen Gefangenschaft der Kirche, ein Vorspiel“ (1520) (VDBG),
- „Von weltlicher Überkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei“ (1523) (VWU)
- „Wider die räuberischen und mörderischen Rotten der andern Bauern“ (1525) (WDB):
- „Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können“ (1526) (OKA),
- „Eine Heerpredigt wider den Türken“ (1529) (HWDT),
- allesamt in: Albrecht Beutel, Hrsg., Martin Luther. Christ und Welt. Schriften IV, Verlag der Weltreligionen, Berlin 2015.
- Maurer Wilhelm (1952), Luther und die Schwärmer. Berlin.

- Moltmann Jürgen (1995), *Das Kommen Gottes. Christliche Eschatologie*. Gütersloh.
- Mühlmann Wilhelm E (1961), *Chiliasmus und Nativismus*. Berlin.
- Nigg Walter (1944), *Das Ewige Reich. Geschichte einer Sehnsucht und einer Enttäuschung*, Erlenbach-Zürich.
- Nigg Walter (1949), *Das Buch der Ketzer*. Zürich.
- Schilling Heinz, Martin Luther (2012), *Rebell in einer Zeit des Umbruchs*, München.
- Schumann Friedrich Karl (1952), *Schwärmerei als gegenwärtige Versuchung der Kirche*, Berlin.
- Sparrn Walter. „Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen“
- Sparrn Walter (2002), Über die geschichtstheologische Herausforderung eines Milleniums, S. 199ff in: ders, Hg, *Apokalyptik versus Chiliasmus? Die kulturwissenschaftliche Herausforderung des neuen Milleniums*. Erlangen.
- Sternberger Dolf (1978), *Drei Wurzeln der Politik*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Steck Karl Gerhard (1955), *Luther und die Schwärmer*, Zollikon-Zürich.
- Wimmer Walter (1979), *Eschatologie der Rechtfertigung*. Paul Althaus' Vermittlungsversuch zwischen uneschatologischer und nureschatologischer Theologie, München.

Fred Lazin

Ben Gurion University, Israel

The changing context of Jews in American Politics – 1930s to the Trump Era

Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, w jaki sposób zmieniał się status Żydów w Ameryce od lat trzydziestych ubiegłego wieku do czasów obecnych. Zaprezentowane analizy skupiają się na amerykańskiej polityce wobec imigracji Żydów do USA, stosunku amerykańskiego społeczeństwa i władz politycznych do Żydów oraz wpływie żydowskich organizacji na politykę amerykańską. Autor wyodrębnia trzy okresy charakteryzujące się różnym statusem Żydów w USA. Wnioskiem płynącym z przeprowadzonych analiz jest teza, iż Żydzi w USA przeszli drogę od etnicznej i religijnej mniejszości, która znajdowała się na marginesie społeczeństwa i polityki do bycia wpływowym i zaliczanym do głównego nurtu aktorem w amerykańskiej polityce.

Słowa kluczowe: Żydzi, USA, Trump, aktorzy polityczni

Abstract: The aim of the article is to show how the status of Jews in America changed from the 1930s to the present. The presented analyses focus on American politics regarding Jewish immigration to the USA, the attitude of American society and political authorities towards Jews, and the influence of Jewish organizations on American politics. The author distinguishes three periods characterized by different status of the Jews in the USA. The conclusion from the conducted analyses is the thesis that Jews in the USA went from an ethnic and religious minority, who was on the margins of society and politics to being an influential and mainstream actor in American politics.

Keywords: Jews, USA, Trump, political actors

1. Introduction

This article addresses the changing status of Jews in American politics from the 1930's to the present. During this time their status evolved from being outsiders to mainstream actors. The analysis focuses on three periods. The first, the nineteen-thirties, deals with the response of American Jews to Hitler's anti-Jewish

policies. American Jewish defense organizations urged President Roosevelt to protest against these policies. They also favored the admission of German Jews under the immigration quotas. The second, the nineteen-seventies and -eighties, covers the American Jewish advocacy movement for Soviet Jewry which began in the late nineteen-sixties and culminated in 1988-1989 when the Soviet Union allowed free emigration for Jews and granted religious and cultural rights to those that remained. The final section discusses the 2016 Presidential campaign which resulted in the victory of the Republican candidate Donald J. Trump over his Democratic rival Hillary Rodham Clinton. The campaign marked a possible change in the socio-political environment in the United States which threatened the status and sense of security among American Jews.

2. The 1930s; The American Jewish response to Hitler's anti-Jewish policies

Adolph Hitler came to power in March 1933 [Lazin 1979]. Initially, his regime began ousting Jews from Germany's economy, society, and cultural life.¹ Until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German (and Austrian) Jews could leave Germany.

For most German Jews who wanted to emigrate, however, the major obstacle became finding a country willing to admit them. Much of the world had yet to recover from the economic depression of 1929. Virtually no country wanted to accept refugees, and many had even less desire to welcome Jewish refugees. Following Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938, President Roosevelt called an international conference in Evian France to deal with the plight of Jewish refugees [Bauer 1974: 231-236]. Participating countries, including the United States, offered few places of refuge for European Jews wanting to flee Hitler's Third Reich.

The promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 denied citizenship to German Jews and eliminated and or restricted their employment in many fields. Kristallnacht, the state organized pogrom of November 9th and 10th, 1938, resulted in more than one thousand synagogues and prayer rooms destroyed, seven thousand Jewish shops and businesses vandalized and tens of thousands of Jewish males under arrest [Volker 2016: 670-676].

¹ There is no evidence to suggest the existence of a master plan of genocide in the early 1930s [Bauer 1981: 20-21]. By 1945 Hitler's Final Solution had murdered six million European Jews. In his biography of Hitler, Volker argues [2016: 658] "...he never lost sight of his "final goal"—the eradication of European Jews. In the beginning, however, "eradication" meant displacement and not mass murder." In late 1937 Goebbels noted "Jews must leave Germany and all of Europe."

The most prominent and influential American Jewish defense organization at the time was the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Established in 1906 in response to pogroms in Russia it consisted mostly of wealthy American Jews of German origin.² Most of its small membership resided in New York City with some members in other American cities. AJC leaders saw themselves as representing (speaking for) American Jewry.³ With few exceptions, they were non-religious Jews.⁴ Two AJC members, Judge Irving Lehman and Mr. Samuel Rosenman served on President Roosevelt's staff.

With each new anti-Jewish policy of the Hitler regime, the AJC asked the State Department and the White House to protest. But, neither spoke out against Hitler or his anti-Jewish policies. The State Department considered these policies to be an internal German matter.⁵ In dealing with the President and the State Department, AJC preferred a quiet, behind the scenes, approach; it opposed active public protests and demonstrations especially by Jews. At one time, AJC urged Protestant ministers to protest State Department policy [Lazin 1979: 291]. President Roosevelt protested Hitler's anti-Jewish policies only after the Kristallnacht Pogrom in November 1938; he recalled his Ambassador from Germany [Lazin 2005: 296]. Throughout the period, the AJC defended both President Roosevelt and the State Department against criticism by other American Jewish individuals and organizations.

AJC also favored entry of German Jews to the United States within the immigration quotas. In 1933, influenced by the depression and high unemployment most Americans and members of Congress supported the quota system which restricted immigration.⁶ Also, many Americans opposed immigration of Jews.⁷ AJC leaders feared that to suggest an increase beyond the quota limitation of twenty five thousand per year for immigrants born in Germany would likely lead to Congress

² The overwhelming majority of American Jews at the time had come from Eastern Europe between 1880 and World War I.

³ They can best be described as *Shtadlanim*, the Yiddish word for self-chosen leaders of the community.

⁴ Dr. Cyrus Adler, the President during most of the 1930s, was an observant Jew (religious).

⁵ Initially, Judge Irving Lehman urged AJC not to pressure President Roosevelt on the Jewish issue as he had to deal first with the economic crisis in the United States. Lehman also supported the State Department position that Hitler's persecution of German Jews was an internal German matter (Letter, Judge Irving Lehman to Dr. Cyrus Adler, January 20, 1933 (Adler Papers, AJC Archives, New York City).

⁶ The quota system limited overall immigration and gave preferences to immigrants from northern and western Europe at the expense of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.

⁷ Typical of the mood in the country was the response to the Rogers Wagner bill in 1939 which called for the admission of twenty thousand German children during 1939 and 1940. The bill died in committee.

reducing the number of refugees from Germany allowed to enter from Germany.⁸ Therefore, they worked to facilitate the issuance of visas within the quota limitation. This proved to be problematic. For example, only thirteen hundred German born persons entered as immigrants in 1933, thirty five hundred in 1934 and three years later in 1937 only eleven thousand. The quota was finally filled in 1938. The actions of American consuls in Germany limited the issuance of visas to German Jews. Many discriminated against Jews, using the Likelihood to Become a Public Charge clause (LPC) of the immigration law. AJC efforts succeeded in allowing for bonds to be posted in the United States to guarantee that the immigrant would not become a public charge. They also managed to have the State Department end the requirement of an immigrant needing a police report from his/her local police department, confirming good behavior.⁹ They also succeeded to exempt German Jewish students on student visas from the requirement that recipients return to Germany after the completion of studies [Lazin 1979].

Clearly, during the 1930s, the AJC (and American Jewry) lacked influence and clout in American politics. They failed to influence their President to criticize Hitler's anti-Jewish policies and actions and they were unable to open the gates of the United States (within the quota allocation) to accept Jewish refugees from Germany. There are many interrelated explanations for their lack of influence and clout.

First, the United States was in the grips of a great economic depression. Tens of millions of Americans were out of work. Unemployment reinforced American isolationism. In Congress a majority favored noninvolvement of the United States in the affairs of Europe and Asia and wanted a minimum or no immigration especially by Jews and other "undesirables." Moreover, anti-Semitism in the United States contributed to the opposition to Jewish immigrants. Different types of anti-Semitism thrived in many parts of the United States. The nativist Protestants saw the Jews as foreigners and dangerous; Father Coughlin, a Catholic priest, with the largest radio audience in America, portrayed Jews as the killers of Christ and part of an economic cabal ruling the world; and the German American Bundists, who worshiped Hitler and his ideology, believed Jews to be corrupters of American society and culture.

⁸ In 1933, the Jewish population of Germany numbered about 520, 000.

⁹ If a Jewish person fled Germany and applied for a United States visa in Paris, State Department regulations had required his/her going back to Germany to get the document from the local police chief.

Second, American Jews were insecure in Protestant America. They were seen by others and they saw themselves as outsiders. They were sensitive to anti-Semitism and discrimination in American culture, the media and in the economy. Many leading law firms, banks, major corporations and entire industries did not employ Jews. Higher education institutions limited Jewish enrollments and did not hire Jewish faculty. In many ways they were second class citizens in the United States. Despite the wealth, prominence and success of many in the AJC, they shared this insecurity about their American Jewish identity. Their fear of a potential anti-Semitic response, restricted their political activism and advocacy on behalf of their fellow Jews in German. For example, in the late 1930s AJC President, Dr. Cyrus Adler, worried that if the State Department did criticize Hitler's anti-Jewish policies that this might lead many Americans to think that Jews controlled the American government [Lazin 2005: 294].

3. In the aftermath of World War II (and the Holocaust)

The events of the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel influenced the post-war standing and status of Jews in the United States. First, the Third Reich's murder of six million Jews made anti-Semitism "socially unacceptable" in the United States. Second, during World War II the tri-faith paradigm of American society [Schultz 2011] triumphed. Catholics and Jews had become "American" in a process of transition begun in the early 1900s. The United States was no longer a Protestant country; it had become a nation of three faiths- Protestant, Catholic and Jewish. Along with these two changes, post war America provided economic and employment opportunities for American Jews. They entered in droves into higher education, law, medicine, business and the media [Silberman 1985]. By the 1960s Jews were overrepresented as students and faculty at many of the better American universities.

The establishment of Israel together with the 1967 War, gave American Jews a new backbone in politics and a great deal of pride in being Jewish.¹⁰ The Black power movement of the late 1960s, in turn, justified those wanting to view American Jewish interests as a public interest in the United States.¹¹ By the 1970s American

¹⁰ According to Ralph Goldman [1995: 4,5] "...state of Israel {psychologically} changed the Jewish image from that of victim to victor." Leon Uris's novel *Exodus* (1958) which retold the story of modern Jewish history culminating in the military prowess of the new Jews of Zion had a similar effect.

¹¹ The Black Power ideology [Carmichael and Hamilton 1967] conceived of their being more than one public interest.

Jews had become prosperous, suburban and politically influential. In many ways they were mainstream; Goldberg [1996: 4ff] argues that “to some extent American Jews were no longer a minority, but part of a majority in a psychological sense” [Silberman 1985]. For some they had become white. This change in status and influence in American politics is evident in the following case study of the American Jewish advocacy movement for Soviet Jewry.

4. The American struggle for Soviet Jewry, 1960s to 1989

Israel became an independent country in May 1948. Following military victory against soldiers from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, a cease fire and armistice agreements, Israel then confronted a demographic threat of existential proportions. First, its population lacked a critical mass to insure survival (there were too few Israelis) and its relatively large Arab minority with a very high birthrate provided a long-term threat to the Jewish majority in Israel.

To deal with these threats, the government of Israel called on the Jews of the world to immigrate to Israel. Significantly, in the early 1950s, it established a Liaison Bureau (*Lishkat Hakesher*) to encourage and facilitate the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel.¹² Liaison Bureau emissaries at the Israeli embassy in Moscow worked to preserve Jewish identity and spread knowledge about Israel among Soviet Jews. A second branch worked in Western Europe and the United States to get Western governments to pressure the Soviet Union to grant Jews cultural and religious rights or let them leave for resettlement in Israel. In principle, the Liaison Bureau was not anti-Soviet; it did not call for a regime change. They sought rights for Soviet Jews that were guaranteed in the Soviet constitution. They did, however, accuse the Soviet Union of committing cultural genocide against Soviet Jewry. The Soviets began to let some Jews leave in 1968.¹³

The Liaison Bureau focused its efforts on trying to influence the American government to pressure the Soviet Union to allow its Jews to emigrate. It assigned agents to the Israeli Embassy in Washington D.C. and Consulate in New York City.¹⁴

¹² At the time there were two major Jewish communities outside of Israel. One in the United States with almost six million persons and a smaller Soviet Jewish community of between two and three million persons. The Israelis believed that the Soviet Jews were better candidates for immigration; they doubted that many American Jews would want to leave their ‘promised land’.

¹³ The desire to please the United States and its allies often governed Soviet policy toward emigration of Jews. Similar considerations (*vis a vis* West Germany) also influenced Soviet emigration policy toward their German minority [Lazin 2005].

¹⁴ At times its agents also worked at Israeli Consulates in Los Angeles and Chicago.

The agent in New York recruited American Jewish organizations to the advocacy effort on behalf of Soviet Jewry. In 1971, Liaison Bureau agents helped establish the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) an American umbrella advocacy organization that attracted every major Jewish defense, religious and social organization. The NCSJ led the struggle for Soviet Jewry among mainstream American Jewish organizations. It conducted a public campaign to influence Congress, the State Department and the White House to pressure the Soviet government to act on behalf of Soviet Jewry; let them live as Jews or let them leave for Israel.

At the time President Richard Nixon favored trade with the Soviet Union. He proposed giving Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union to help it finance trade with the United States. When the Soviet Union initiated an education tax on Soviet Jews leaving for Israel, Senator Jackson (D Washington) proposed an amendment (Jackson Vanik Amendment) denying the Soviets MFN until they allowed free emigration of Jews.¹⁵

A historic meeting took place on April 30, 1973 between President Nixon and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the NCSJ. In the meeting President Nixon explained that he favored trade with the Soviets and opposed the Jackson Vanik Amendment. He argued that the amendment harmed the interests of the United States. As their President, he asked them to oppose the amendment. Following his presentation, President Nixon left the meeting and those present voted to support the amendment; American Jewish leaders went on record as opposing the President of the United States. Forty years before AJC had refused to publicly criticize the American President. Now, in 1973, the major American Jewish leaders publicly put their concern for Soviet Jews before an interest the President had defined as being 'the national interest.'

In a series of summits between Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan after 1986 the United States made it clear that détente required granting Soviet Jews the right to leave and religious and cultural freedom for those that remained. In late 1988 the Soviet Union began to open their gates to allow Jews to leave and to grant greater religious and cultural freedom for those that remained.¹⁶

¹⁵ The educational tax required departing Jews to repay the Soviet Union for the higher education and professional training they had received.

¹⁶ Following the West's response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, in 1981, closed its gates to Jews wanting to leave the country.

For many, these decision by the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the nineteen thirties, American Jewish leaders in the nineteen seventies and eighties had more political success than their predecessors. They succeeded in having their government pressure the Soviet Union to allow free emigration of Jews and cultural and religious rights for those that remained. Moreover, pressure from the American Soviet Jewry advocacy effort helped Soviet Jews to get preferential treatment as persons seeking to enter the United States. From 1968 until late 1989 almost all Soviet Jews wanting to enter the United States did so either as refugees or parolees.¹⁷

The success of the American Jewish advocacy effort for Soviet Jewry to open the gates of the Soviet Union and to gain preferential treatment for Soviet Jewish refugees in the United States might indicate significant political power and clout for Jews in American politics. However, there is another explanation for the success of advocacy for Soviet Jews. Since the late nineteen-forties, the United States had engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. The Cold War contributed to widespread American political support for advocacy for Soviet Jewry advocacy. The Cold War also gave preference to Soviet Jews wanting to resettle in the United States because they were fleeing the vilest of regimes; and necessarily because of American Jewish pressure to admit them.

Importantly, when the Soviet opened the gates to free Jewish emigration, some sources expected that over a million Jews would leave the Soviet Union. More than ninety percent wanted to come to the United States. In response, with the Cold War ending, the American government imposed a quota in 1989 which limited the entry of Soviet Jewish refugees.¹⁸

American Jews in the nineteen-seventies and eighties felt more at home and were far less insecure as American Jews than their co-religionists in the nineteen-thirties. They were powerful mainstream Americans. When their own government

¹⁷ Tens of millions of persons around the world competed for the fewer than one hundred thousand refugee places each year. The Attorney General had the power to parole someone into the United States. The parolee received less financial support than refugees but were also eligible for citizenship.

¹⁸ Almost all major American Jewish organizations accepted the quota or limitation on Soviet Jews entering the United States [Lazin 2005].

restricted the immigration of Soviet Jews in 1989, they acted with restraint. Most Soviet Jews would go to Israel (many against their wishes); American Jewry did not challenge the government policy to restrict their entry.

5. The 2016 Elections and Jews in American Politics

The 2016 presidential election in the United States rattled for many American their sense of security and mainstream status in the American political system. Their concerns focused on the campaigns of Donald Trump for the Republican nomination and as the Republican candidate for President of the United States.

Candidate Trump launched crude attacks on Muslims and immigrants. He portrayed Muslims as being a ‘Trojan Horse’ and terrorist threat to the well-being of the United States.¹⁹ He fabricated tales of Muslim’s in New Jersey cheering as the World Trade Center Towers collapsed during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He described Mexican immigrants as rapists and criminals.

These attacks on Muslim and Mexican immigrants reminded some American Jews of the hostile and threatening atmosphere in the United States of the nineteen-thirties when anti-Jewish views dominated the immigration issue. For example, nativist anti-Semites used the trojan horse metaphor to characterize the threat of admitting German Jewish refugees who might be used by the Nazis to spy on America. Similarly, Trump’s negative views of Mexicans and later of African countries recalled the Nazi dehumanization of the German Jews.²⁰

Most alarming, however, was the appearance during the campaigns of 2016 of anti-Semitism on social media. When certain Jewish reporters criticized candidate Trump, they were targeted with a barrage of anti-Semitic tweets which sometimes included their photos pasted over drawings of persons being placed in a gas chamber or an oven. Trump’s style and campaign normalized anti-Semitic language in public discourse on social media and media in general. For example, a Breitbart article commented on a Jewish correspondent: “Hell hath no fury like a Polish, Jewish American elitist scorned” [Dailkos.com]. Tens of millions of

¹⁹ Some of his supporters suggested that adherence to Shariah Law prevented Muslims from becoming real Americans.

²⁰ The reference to Sharia Law recalled the claim by some anti-Semites that adherence to the Talmud and Jewish law prevents Jews from becoming true Americans.

American heard and or saw a Trump supporter at a rally chant “Jew S A” instead of “USA.”²¹

In a widely publicized incident candidate Trump retweeted a cartoon from a white supremacist site with a picture of Hillary Clinton surrounded by dollar bills, a six pointed Jewish star, and the caption “most corrupt” [Politifact.com]. While Trump claimed that the cartoon contained a deputy sheriff’s star, many Jews saw the ad as an anti-Semitic canard which focused on Jews, money and corruption. And here it is being tweeted by a mainstream American politician, who would soon be President of the United States.

An anti-Semitic message also appeared in Trump’s final TV video ad for his presidential campaign [Salon.com]. In the video Trump spoke about how international bankers exploited and drained the wealth from the American economy, hurting middle and working-class Americans. And then three faces of American villains appear in the video—the financier George Soros, the chair of the Federal Reserve Janet Yellen and the CEO of Goldman Sacks Lloyd Blankfein. All three are prominent American Jews who have major roles in the American economy. By implication the ad suggests that they are ripping off the American economy while serving a cabal of international financiers.

The Trump ad reinforced the anti-Semitic claim that Jews control and exploit the American economy. More importantly, Trump refused to condemn or disavow the other more blatant anti-Semitic messages of some of his supporters. Bradley Burston argued that Trump became an “influential public figure who enables, tolerates, excuses and pumps Jew-haters.”²² Some argued that Trump was “dog whistling” the white supremacists. For example, Trump told radio talk show host Alex Jones, who claimed that Jews control the media, “your reputation is amazing” [Vox.com]. When David Duke, former head of the Klu Klux Klan endorsed Trump, Trump refused to disavow him. And after becoming President, when American Nazis marched in Charlottesville, carrying torches and chanting Nazi slogans and “Jews will not replace us” Trump talked about “very fine people’ on both sides.”²³

²¹ The national news media carried this clip of the event which occurred in Arizona in October 2016.

²² Bradley Burston, “I hadn’t been called a kike since fourth grade. Donald Trump changed that.” *Haaretz October 5, 2016* [Haaretz.com].

²³ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks/-president-trump-infrastructure/>. When Julia Ioffe wrote a critical article about Melania Trump and received emails urging her to be gassed, Melania Trump admitted that her fans may have gone too far, but that they were provoked.

6. Conclusion

This article has presented an overview of the status of Jews in American politics from the nineteen thirties to the present. It described a transition of an ethnic and religious minority from being outsiders and peripheral to becoming mainstream and influential actors in American politics. This parallels (or may be the result of) the transformation of the United States, begun in the early twentieth century, from a Protestant country to a tri-faith nation of Protestants, Catholics and Jews.

The successful candidacy of Donald Trump for President in 2016 suggests a crisis of identity in the United States. Candidate and President Donald Trump questioned the place of Muslim's and non-white immigrants in American society. Some of his supporters object to the Muslim faith being accepted as a major American faith. They emphasize either the Christian origins and or character of the American way of life and/or America's Judeo Christian heritage. Concurrently, the white supremacist supporters of Trump fear the possibility of whites becoming a minority in a multi-racial United States. The white supremacists consider American Jews to be non-white.

While a minority of American Jews support Trump the overwhelming majority oppose his anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric and policies. They see his policies and rhetoric as a threat to their own security and well-being as Americans.

The alt right community with its white supremacist contingent may remain small and their political influence may decline. They may return to the fringe and extreme, outside of mainstream American politics. The same fate may await the vocal anti-Semites who surfaced during the 2016 campaign.

Regardless, the events of 2016 have shaken many American Jews who feel more vulnerable than before. The author Nathan Englander writing in the *New York Times* expressed the change that had occurred. In response to the Nazi march in Charlottesville Virginia with torches, swastikas and the chant "Jews will not replace us" he wrote, "There is the trauma of those assaulted by Nazis on American soil. The pain and violence and the lessons we draw from them. Because the children who witness a day like that, and a president like this, will not forget the fear and disrespect tailored to the black child, the Muslim child, the Jewish child" [NYT.com].

Bibliography

- Bauer Y. (1974), *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Joint Distribution Committee, 1929-1939*, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.
- Bauer Y. (1981), *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Joint Distribution Committee, 1941-1945*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Carmichael (1967), Stokely and Charles Hamilton. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation*, NY: Random House.
- Dailkos.com, www.dailkos.com/stories/2016/9/28/1545499/-steve-bannon-website-hell-hath-no-fury-like-a-Polish-Jewish-American-elitist.scorned
- Goldberg JJ. (1996), *Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Goldman R. (1995), *The Involvement and Policies of American Jewry in Revitalizing European Jewry, 1945-1995*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Haaretz.com, www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/i-hadn-t-been-called-a-kike-in-years-trump-changed-that-1.54446`76
- Lazin F. (1979), *The Response of the American Jewish Committee to the Crisis of German Jewry, 1933-1939*, *American Jewish History* (formerly *AJHQ*) LXVIII, No.3 (March, 1979):283304.
- Lazin F. (2005), *The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel versus the American Jewish Establishment*, Lexington Books.
- NYT.com, www.nyt.com/2017/08/15/opinion/Jewish-charlottesville-anti-Semitism.html
- Politifact.com, www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/jul/05/donald-trumps-star-of-david-tweet-recap/
- Salon.com, www.salon.com/2016/11/07/watch-donald-trumps-last-campaign-ad-is-a-fitting-end-to-an-anti-semitic-campaign/
- Schultz K. (2011), *Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to its Protestant Promise*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Silberman C. (1985), *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today*, New York: Summit Books.
- Ulrich V. (2016), *Hitler: Ascent 1989-1939*, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Uris L. (1958), *Exodus*, New York: Doubleday and Company.
- Vox.com, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/10/26/13418304/alex-Jones-Jewish-mafia

Rev. Adam Romejko

University of Gdańsk, Poland

René Girarda teoria mimetyczna. Między religią a polityką

René Girard's mimetic theory. Between religion and politics

Abstract: In the Western world, the popular belief is that the political and religious (state and church) spheres are independent (cf. Matthew 22:21). A person who points out that at the beginning of human culture (civilization) was different, is the French anthropologist and literary scholar René Girard. He emphasizes that religion (the sacrificial ritual) underlies human institutions, including those with a political character. In the developed theory, which is referred to as mimetic, he draws attention to violence, which in a collective form is able to build and sustain the existence of the human community. Four issues corresponding to politics appear in the mimetic theory: 1) building a political community based on aversion to others (individuals, minority groups); 2) the use of human mimesis in the management of social groups; 3) positioning as a victim that aims at political gains, etc.; 4) a modern concern for the victims, which is a weapon against political opponents. Mimetic theory can be used in researching political phenomena. In this article, the German talk-show maybrit illner (from November 2, 2017) was analyzed using "Girard's glasses".

Keywords: René Girard, maybrit illner, mimetic theory, politics, religion

Abstrakt: W świecie zachodnim popularne jest przekonanie, że sfera polityczna i religijna (państwowa i kościelna) są niezależne (por. Mt 22,21). Uczonym, który uważał, że u początków ludzkiej kultury (cywilizacji) było inaczej, jest francuski antropolog i literaturoznawca René Girard. Podkreśla on, że religia (rytuał ofiarniczy) stoi u podstaw ludzkich instytucji, w tym tych o politycznym charakterze. W wypracowanej teorii, określanej mianem mimetycznej, zwraca uwagę na przemoc, która w kolektywnej formie jest w stanie budować i podtrzymywać egzystencję ludzkiej wspólnoty. W teorii mimetycznej pojawiają się cztery kwestie korespondujące z polityką: 1) budowanie politycznej wspólnoty na podstawie niechęci do innych (jednostki, grupy mniejszościowej); 2) wykorzystanie ludzkiego mimetyzmu w kierowaniu grupami społecznymi; 3) pozycjonowanie siebie jako ofiary, które ma na celu zyski polityczne itp.; 4) nowoczesna troska o ofiary, stanowiąca oręż wobec politycznych

przeciwników. Teorię mimetyczną można stosować w badaniach politycznych fenomenów. W niniejszym artykule zanalizowano za pomocą „Girardowskich okularów” niemiecki talk-show maybrit illner z dn. 2 listopada 2017 r.

Słowa kluczowe: René Girard, maybrit illner, polityka, religia, teoria mimetyczna

Wstęp

Podkreślając inspirującą moc Biblii, przywołuje się przy różnych okazjach cytaty z niej pochodzące. Do najczęściej stosowanych należy rada, której Jezus udzielił faryzeuszom i zwolennikom Heroda: „Oddajcie więc Cezarowi to, co należy do Cezara, a Bogu to, co należy do Boga” (Mt 22,21). Chętnie odczytuje się te słowa jako usankcjonowanie rozdziału dwóch sfer: politycznej i religijnej (państwowej i kościelnej).

Uczonym, który w powyższej kwestii proponuje inne rozwiązanie, jest francuski antropolog i literaturoznawca René Girard. Jego zdaniem, u początków tego, co polityczne i religijne, mamy do czynienia ze ścisłym związkiem, a nawet jednością tych dwóch sfer. U zarania ludzkiej kultury stoi religia z jej „sercem” w postaci rytuału ofiarniczego. Ujawniające się uporządkowanie i powtarzalność ludzkich działań w ramach rytualnej przemocy staje się bazą dla tego, co zinstytucjonalizowane.

Poniżej przedstawiono podstawy myśli René Girarda, tj. teorii mimetycznej. Następnie wskazano na obecne w niej aspekty polityczne. W ostatniej części artykułu – na wybranym przykładzie – zaprezentowano hermeneutyczne walory idei Girardowskich.

1. René Girard – osoba i dzieło

René Girard urodził się 25 grudnia 1923 r. w Awinionie, w południowej Francji, w niezamożnej rodzinie inteligenckiej. Jego ojciec pracował jako kustosz w bibliotece muzeum awiniońskiego, aby następnie przejąć analogiczną funkcję w tamtejszym Pałacu Papieskim. Również matka należała do osób wykształconych – znała m.in. język włoski [Girard 2006: 24].

W czasie wojny – podobnie jak ojciec – Girard studiował paleografię w École des chartes w Paryżu. Przygotowywał się do pracy archiwisty, którą jednak postrzegął jako niezgodną z jego życiowymi ambicjami. Z tego powodu zdecydował się

wyjechać w 1947 r. do USA, gdzie przez rok miał być lektorem języka francuskiego. Z biegiem czasu okazało się, że amerykańska ziemia stała się jego domem – tam pracował zawodowo i (1951) założył rodzinę [tamże: 28; Girard 1996b: 1; Williams 2012: 9].

Girard był wykładowcą i profesorem na kilku amerykańskich uniwersytetach, m.in. na Indiana University, Duke University, John Hopkins University i Stanford University. Na ostatnim pracował w latach 1980-1995, do przejścia na emeryturę [Palaver 2003: 21]. Tam w 1990 r. powstało dzieło mające na celu popularyzowanie i rozwijanie myśli Girardowskiej. To Kolokwium nt. Przemocy i Religii (Colloquium on Violence and Religion, COV&R), które obecnie skupia ponad 400 naukowców z całego świata spotykających się na corocznym sympozjum [por. The Colloquium]. Girard zmarł 4 listopada 2015 r. w Stanfordzie.

René Girard jest autorem ponad 20 książek. Część z nich była wydawana z jego inicjatywy, inne były publikowane (w różnych językach) przez osoby zainteresowane jego myślą, w antologiach jego artykułów. Niektóre książki to zapis rozmów z nim przeprowadzonych. Można także wskazać na liczne artykuły naukowe oraz wywiady [np. Ludzkie, arcyłudzkie 2008: 16-20]¹. Do najważniejszych publikacji należą trzy: *Prawda powieściowa i kłamstwo romantyczne* (Warszawa 2001) [wyd. fr. Girard 1961]; *Sacrum i przemoc* (Poznań 1993-1994) [wyd. fr. Girard 1972] i *Rzeczy ukryte od założenia świata* [wyd. fr. Girard 1978]². Zostały one wydane w okresie 17 lat (1961-1978). Odbijają się w nich trzy etapy kształtowania się teorii mimetycznej – 1) mimetyzm i bazująca na nim rywalizacja; 2) mechanizm kozła ofiarnego jako fundament kulturowy; 3) dokonane w Biblii odsłonięcie prawdy o mechanizmie kozła ofiarnego. Problemem w recepcji myśli Girardowskiej był język francuski, w którym powstała większość jego dzieł. Jego idee stawały się intelektualną własnością świata z pewnym opóźnieniem – dopiero po przetłumaczeniu książek na język angielski.

Antropologicznym punktem wyjścia koncepcji René Girarda jest założenie, że człowiek to istota, w której życiu uwidacznia się najwyższa w świecie stworzonym zdolność do naśladownictwa. Pomimo że przekonanie o ludzkim mimetyzmie pojawia się już w starożytności, tj. u Platona (427-347) i Arystotelesa (384-322), to jednak – zdaniem Girarda – ich opinie spływają tę problematykę. Zdolność do

¹ Spis publikacji René Girarda zob. [Romejko 2015: 24-25, 560, 583-584].

² W języku polskim opublikowano fragmenty ww. opracowania [Girard 1983: 182-74; Girard 1988: 180-193; Girard 2013: 17-50].

naśladowania wpływa na różne sfery życia człowieka, w tym na jego pragnienie. Girard zwraca uwagę, że pragnienie nie jest czymś spontanicznym, ale jest ono uwarunkowane przez wybory innych – tych, których się naśladuje³.

Sposobnością do rozpoczęcia badania ludzkiego pragnienia były zajęcia z literatury francuskiej, które powierzono młodemu Girardowi. Analizując powieści, dochodzi do wniosku, że chociaż zmieniają się ich bohaterowie, to jednak schemat pragnienia pozostaje ten sam. Można go oddać za pomocą trójkąta, którego wierzchołki stanowią: 1) podmiot pragnienia; 2) przedmiot pragnienia; 3) pośrednik [por. Zambrzycki 2013: 42]. Mamy do czynienia z różnymi konfiguracjami ww. schematu; np. jedna osoba może być w tym samym czasie podmiotem pragnienia, sugerującym się pragnieniem innego, a jednocześnie, poprzez swój mimetyzm, wskazywać – jako pośrednik – drogę innym. Girard podkreśla: „Najróżniejsze formy pragnienia trójkątnego tworzą (...) pewną uniwersalną strukturę” [Girard 2001: 100].

Okazuje się, że dość szybko zmienia się rola, którą pełni pośrednik. Z naśladowanego wzoru staje się rywalem. Na siłę rywalizacji wpływa „rzadkość” dóbr, o które się konkuruje, a także „duchowy” dystans pomiędzy rywalami. Im są sobie bardziej (społecznie) bliscy, tym łatwiej o konflikt, gdyż każda z jego stron jest przekonana o zasadności swego roszczenia. Girard komentuje tę sytuację w dosadnych słowach: „Instynktownie wyobrażamy sobie stosunki braterskie jako serdeczny związek, ale przykłady mitologiczne, literackie i historyczne, jakie przychodzą na myśl, świadczą zupełnie o czymś innym: Kain i Abel, Jakub i Ezaw, Eteokles i Polinik, Romulus i Remus, Ryszard Lwie Serce i Jan bez Ziemi, i tak dalej” [Girard 1993: 84]. Nie należy się więc dziwić, że Girard mówi o mimetycznych „bliźniętach” czy „sobowtórach” [tamże: 109].

Konsekwencją „trójkątnego” pragnienia jest narastanie konfliktu, który z lokalnego przemienia się w ten o ogólnospołecznym charakterze. Stąd mówi się o *wojnie wszystkich ze wszystkimi* (łac. *bellum omnium contra omnes*) [por. Hobbes 2005: 206-207]. „Wszędobylski” konflikt jest niebezpieczny – w społecznościach archaicznych, tj. tych, które nie wypracowały mechanizmu „państwowej” prewencji analogicznej do współczesnego systemu sądowniczego i karnego; wiąże się z nim groźba nawet całkowitej ich destrukcji. W tym kontekście prawo talionu, m.in.

³ W teorii mitycznej używa się obok *pragnienia* innego terminu, tj. *pożądanie*, jednak z zastrzeżeniem, że nie będzie się go zawężało do perwersyjnych żądz, w tym tych o seksualnym charakterze [por. Girard 2002: 2; Girard 1996a: 5, przyp. 1; Goszczyńska 1988: 177].

wyrażone w Biblii w słowach „oko za oko, ząb za ząb” (Wj 21,24), jawi się jako zasada cywilizowana, gdyż kładzie ono wyraźną, a co za tym idzie akceptowalną, granicę dla zemsty [Schwager 1994b: 18].

Badania dzieł etnologów doprowadziły René Girarda do przekonania, że z zagrożeniem ze strony rozszerzającej się przemocy można sobie poradzić bez systemu państwowej prewencji. Przemoc można kontrolować przemocą dozwoloną w ramach rytuału ofiarniczego. Centralne miejsce zajmuje tu bazujący na mimetyzmie *mechanizm kozła ofiarnego*. Skoro można naśladować pragnienia innych, można także naśladować ich naznaczone agresją zachowanie. Girard stawia hipotezę, że u podstaw życia instytucjonalnego stoi kolektywny mord, który określa mianem *mordu założycielskiego* lub *mechanizmu założycielskiego* [Girard 1992: 87; Girard 1991: 168; Girard 1983: 126-127,135; Girard 2002: 97-98]. Jest to jego zdaniem zjawisko transkulturowe, tj. ujawniające się w podobnej formie w różnych miejscach i czasie tam, gdzie miało miejsce przejście od stanu natury do kultury (*hominizacja*) [Girard 1991: 29,44].

Agresja wobec przypadkowej ofiary, która pociąga za sobą agresję innych, otrzymuje nowe znaczenie. To, co było do tej pory zatemizowane, staje się jednością. Dokonuje się specyficzne przewartościowanie oceny ofiary kolektywnej przemocy, które Girard określa mianem *sakralizacji*. Skoro panował chaos, a przemoc zakończyła go, to ofiara była winna społecznym niepokojom. Od tego momentu postrzegana jest ona inaczej – jako źródło pokoju. To, co przeklęte, przynosi błogosławieństwo. Ta ambiwalencja odbija się w treści terminu *sacrum*, który odnosi się nie tylko do bycia świętym, lecz także przeklętym. Podobny fenomen można zaobserwować w pozaeuropejskich kulturach [Girard 1994: 133,140-144].

Doświadczenie chaosu i powrotu pokoju (za sprawą kolektywnej przemocy) naznaczone jest pragnieniem, aby w przyszłości, w sytuacji kryzysowej, odtworzyć możliwie dokładnie wydarzenia związane z mordem założycielskim. Prowadzi to do aktywności, którą określa się mianem rytuału. Istotą tej ofiarniczej rekapitulacji jest nieznanomość zasad, na których się ona opiera. Inaczej to, co „boskie”, stałoby się tym, czym jest w rzeczywistości – ludzką konstrukcją w czystej postaci [Girard 1993: 10].

Literackim świadectwem przesłania zawartego w ofiarniczych rytuałach są mity. Ich charakterystyczną cechą stanowi permanentna prezentacja ofiary przemocy jako winnej, jej oprawców zaś jako tych, którzy wybierają właściwe rozwiązanie.

Girard przywołuje mity z kręgu europejskiego, jak i z innych obszarów kulturowych, m.in. chętnie analizuje mit o Edypie oraz mit o Romulusie i Remusie. W ramach tego drugiego opowiada się o powstaniu miasta, które jest symbolem kształtowania się ładu cywilizacyjnego [Girard 1983: 126].

Zbiorem tekstów, które prezentują odmienną perspektywę do tej zawartej w mitach, jest Biblia. Tam ofiara jest niewinna, przestępcami zaś są ci, którzy posługują się przemocą. Biblia nie jest pod tym względem wyjątkiem. René Girard podkreśla, że z podobną demaskacją mechanizmu kozła ofiarnego i bazującego na nim rytuału mamy do czynienia w starożytnej tragedii greckiej. Jednak było to intelektualne i duchowe przedsięwzięcie, które zakończyło się fiaskiem. Tacy autorzy jak Sofokles (496-406) i Eurypides (485-407) dochodzą do pewnego punktu, aby potem wrócić na „dawną drogę” [Girard 1993: 179-180; Girard 1991: 41].

Pod względem demistyfikującej mocy teksty biblijne nie stanowią homogenicznej masy [por. Schwager 1994a: 700-702]. W Starym Testamencie szczególnie wartościowe – zdaniem René Girarda – są: opowiadanie o Kainie i Ablu, opowiadanie o Józefie i jego braciach, teksty prorockie oraz psalmy, Księga Hioba, opowieść o sędziu Salomona. W Nowym Testamencie interesujące są następujące bloki tekstowe: Jezus i faryzeusze, Pasja, męczeństwo św. Szczepana, List do Hebrajczyków. Okazją do całkowitego odsłonięcia prawdy o zasadach mechanizmu kozła ofiarnego było nauczanie Jezusa Chrystusa, które w konsekwencji doprowadziło do Jego męki i śmierci (Pasja). Wprawdzie w stosunku do Jezusa autorzy nowotestamentowi nie używają określenia „kozy ofiarny”, to jednak pojawiają się inne, w tym „Baranek Boży”. Girard akcentuje, że miano „Baranek Boży” jest korzystne, gdyż pozwala ono uwypuklić niewinność ofiary, a jednocześnie uniknąć negatywnych skojarzeń, które łączą się z kozłem [Girard 2002: 169].

2. Polityczne aspekty teorii mimetycznej

W swej genezie polityka osadzona jest na tym, co religijne. Wyraźnie można to dostrzec, odnosząc się do idei *sakralnego króla* lub *sakralnej monarchii*, która do czasów współczesnych obecna jest w rytuałach koronacyjnych prymitywnych ludów. Odwołując się do niej, René Girard tłumaczy pochodzenie władzy królewskiej, z którą wiązano szczególną asystencję tego, co „boskie”. Jego zdaniem władza królewska swymi korzeniami sięga specyficznego wydarzenia w ramach rytuału ofiarniczego. Wybranej na ofiarę jednostce pozwalano spełniać wszelkie zachcianki, w tym te natury seksualnej. W ten sposób prowadzono do społecznego „chaosu”, który „usprawiedliwiał” nadchodzącą (rytualną) przemoc. Przyszła

ofiara chętnie wcielała się w tę rolę, w pewnym sensie mszcząc się za zbliżającą się śmierć [Girard 1994: 160-161].

Girard stawia hipotezę, że odpowiednio przebiegła jednostka mogła skłonić do dokonania ofiarniczej substytucji – zamiast niej powinien zginąć ktoś inny. Nie było to trudne, gdyż w rytualnym odtworzeniu założycielskiego mordu i tak mamy do czynienia z substytucją pierwotnej ofiary [Girard 1993: 146-147]. Girard podkreśla, że czymś, co współgra z jego opiniami nt. sakralnej genezy monarchii, jest fakt, że w wielu prymitywnych kulturach król pełni jednocześnie rolę czarownika, który jako ofiarnik czuwa nad właściwym przebiegiem ofiarniczego rytuału [Frazer 1997: 40-41,139].

Przekonanie, że król jest w stanie kanalizować w sobie oparte o mimetyzm społeczne antagonizmy, a co za tym idzie, że ma „boską” władzę, nie oznaczało, że nie było chętnych do zajęcia jego miejsca. Podatnymi na tego typu pragnienia były osoby z otoczenia władcy, a więc pod względem społecznym mu bliskie. To centralny motyw starotestamentowej Księgi Hioba. Niestety, czytana jest ona z upraszczającej perspektywy prologu i epilogu, które w skrócie można oddać następująco: Bóg wystawił na próbę wierność Hioba, dotykając go cierpieniem, Hiob okazał się wierny, a więc zdał egzamin, i w nagrodę otrzymał znacznie więcej, niż posiadał w przeszłości. Nie dostrzega się, że Księga Hioba to świadectwo politycznego spisku, któremu nadano „boską” motywację. „Przyjaciele” Hioba, pocieszając go, starają się wykazać mu, że nieszczęście, które go spotkało, wynika z jego grzeszności. Stąd nie ma już dla niego boskiej łaski, która do tej pory była fundamentem jego władzy. Wniosek jest jeden: „umarł król, niech żyje król”. Brakuje tylko jednego do rytualnego pozbawienia władzy Hioba i powierzenia jej w ręce „godniejszej” osoby. Chodzi o to, aby była pełna jednomysłność, tj. Hiob – podobnie jak Edyp – ma uznać swą winę. Hiob jednak okazuje się upartą ofiarą. Choć ma świadomość grzeszności, nie przyznaje się do stawianych mu zarzutów, odrzuca bezlitosnego boga „przyjaciół”, a wyznaje Boga pełnego miłosierdzia (por. Hi 16,19-21; 19,25-27) [Girard 1992: 126].

Sakralne początki monarchii sprawiają, że nie do zaakceptowania jest liberalna idea *umowy społecznej*. Do tej kwestii nawiązuje René Girard w opracowaniu poświęconym twórczości Williama Szekspira. Analizując tragedię *Juliusz Cezar*, stwierdza: „Idea umowy społecznej jest wielkim humanistycznym wybielaniem mimetycznego współzawodnictwa, typowym wybiegiem i osłoną dla tych, którzy nie potrafią ścigać mimetycznej logiki wystarczająco daleko [...] Szekspir ściga

w *Juliuszu Cezarze* logikę mimetyczną aż po gorzki kres i znajduje tam nie umowę społeczną, ale jednomyślną przemoc mordu założycielskiego. Jeżeli jest myślicielem konsekwentnym, to rozwiązanie to z całą pewnością pojawi się nie w jednej, ale w wielu sztukach, być może nie zawsze tak wyraźnie, jak w *Juliuszu Cezarze*, ale przynajmniej *implicite* w krótkich wskazówkach i aluzjach, nietrudnych obecnie do rozszyfrowania, posiadliśmy już bowiem podstawową wiedzę o mordzie założycielskim dzięki *Juliuszowi Cezarowi*, owej tragedii, która najbardziej gruntownie bada i tłumaczy ten temat” [Girard 1996a: 289-290].

W sprawnych rękach mimetyzm może okazać się narzędziem przydatnym do zdobycia i utrzymania władzy. Dzięki niemu możliwe jest szachowanie bardziej ambitnych jednostek oraz grup społecznych. Na motyw ten Girard zwraca uwagę, analizując tragedię Szekspira pt. *Troilus i Kressyda*, w której Ulisses chce osłabić wpływy Achillesa. Widzi go także w zachowaniu Piłata, który bez powodzenia próbuje zapanować nad żądnym krwi tłumem. Zamiast Jezusa proponuje mu – i tak już skazanego – Barabasz. Zabieg ten jednak nie odnosi skutku. Stąd opinia Girarda: „Z chwilą, kiedy dochodzi do jednomyślności, tłum rzuca się na ofiarę wyłaniającą się z mimetycznego procesu, i nie chce już słyszeć o żadnej zamianie. Godzina substytucji minęła, nadeszła godzina jednomyślnej przemocy. Piłat dobrze to rozumie. Kiedy tłum nie godzi się na Barabasz, od razu wydaje mu Jezusa” [Girard 2002: 37-38].

Mimetyzm jest przydatny w działaniach mających na celu zachowanie porządku społecznego. W ich centrum widzimy przemoc wobec jednostki lub małej grupy, którą uznaje się za przyczynę społecznych zawirowań i dlatego karze się ją w kolektywny sposób. Przeradzający się w przemoc gniew przynosi „błogosławiony” owoc w postaci wracającej zgody i pokoju. Ten polityczny motyw wyraźnie odbija się w wypowiedzi arcykapłana Kajfasza, który wie, co należy zrobić, aby zapobiec kryzysowi wywołanemu przez nauczanie Jezusa: „...lepiej jest [...], aby jeden człowiek umarł za lud, niżby miał zginąć cały naród” (J 11,50).

Mechanizm ten powtarzał się w przeszłości wielokrotnie. Narodem, który w minionych wiekach służył jako kolektywny kozioł ofiarny, byli Żydzi. W nowszych czasach można wskazać na sprawę kapitana Alfreda Dreyfusa (1859–1935), francuskiego oficera żydowskiego pochodzenia, który w 1894 r. został fałszywie oskarżony o szpiegostwo na rzecz Niemiec. Jego proces spolaryzował Francję – z jednej strony odżyły antysemityczne resentymy, z drugiej zaś pojawili się tacy, którzy byli przekonani o kłamliwości oskarżenia [tamże: 158].

René Girard odnosi się również do ambiwalentnego spojrzenia w Europie na osobę cesarza Francji Napoleona Bonaparte (1769–1821). Nienawidzono go, jednocześnie zaś podziwiano jego polityczną i militarną sprawność. Sakralne zafascynowanie Napoleonem wyraźnie wpłynęło na ruchy zjednoczeniowe w przestrzeni krajów języka niemieckiego, które zdecydowały się pod egidą Prus na stworzenie silnego państwa o mocarstwowym ambicjach wobec Europy i świata [Girard 2010].

Instytucją, która podobnie jak Napoleon ma moc jednania nieprzyjaciół we współczesnej Europie i świecie, jest papieństwo. Tendencje te uwidoczniły się wyraźnie w XIX w. [tamże: 197]. Można na nie zwrócić uwagę i współcześnie. W minionych latach zestawiano chętnie osobę „strasznego papieża” Benedykta XVI z „dobrym papieżem” Franciszkiem [por. Romejko2013: 221-254].

Wielce interesującą ideą René Girarda jest *nowoczesna troska o ofiary*⁴. Współcześnie ujawnia się ona wyraźnie w krajach zachodnich, które są przekonane, że integralnym elementem ich tożsamości jest troska o najsłabszych. Problem polega na tym, że jest ona wykorzystywana w sposób instrumentalny, a jednocześnie przybiera obsesyjną formę. Girard podkreśla, że mamy do czynienia z „... paradoksalną stawką rywalizacji mimetycznych, konkurencyjnym podbijaniem ceny” [tamże: 178].

Zwraca się uwagę nie na wszystkie ofiary, ale na takie, które mogą stać się narzędziem do napiętnowania innych. Girard tłumaczy: „Istnieją ofiary w ogólności, ale najbardziej interesujące są te, które pozwalają nam potępić sąsiadów. [...] Kiedy podejrzewamy naszych sąsiadów, że ulegają pokusie kozła ofiarnego, ze wstrętem to ujawniamy. Bezlitośnie piętnujemy zaistniałe mechanizmy kozła ofiarnego, za które winę ponoszą nasi sąsiedzi, a jednocześnie sami nie potrafimy się obyć bez zastępczych ofiar. Wszyscy próbujemy wierzyć, że nasze urazy są słuszne, a nienawiść usprawiedliwiona, ale nasza pewność w tej dziedzinie jest bardziej krucha niż naszych przodków” [Girard 2002: 171,178].

Oskarżenie nie dotyczy tylko „podłych” jednostek, lecz także zbiorowości, przede wszystkim zaś chrześcijan. „Najpierw lamentujemy nad ofiarami, oskarżając się wzajemnie o to, że przyczyniamy się do ich powstawania czy zezwalamy na ich

⁴ René Girard w ten sposób zatytułował przedostatni rozdział opracowania *Widziałem szatana...* [Girard 2002: 175-184].

istnienie. Następnie lamentujemy nad hipokryzją każdego lamentu; wreszcie lamentujemy nad chrześcijaństwem, niezbędnym kozłem ofiarnym, ponieważ rytuał musi mieć ofiarę, a dzisiaj ofiarą jest zawsze ono: *the scapegoat of last resort*, i z nutką szlachetnego cierpienia stwierdzamy, że chrześcijaństwo nic nie zrobiło, «żeby rozwiązać problem przemocy» [tamże: 179].

Kwestia *nowoczesnej troski o ofiary* jest atrakcyjna z perspektywy politologa. Tego typu postawa jest obecna w retoryce politycznej, w ramach której podejmuje się wysiłki, aby potępić politycznego przeciwnika, mającego odwagę posiadania odmiennej opinii.

3. Hermeneutyczna wartość teorii mimetycznej – *casus talk-show maybrit illner*

Teoria mimetyczna René Girarda stanowi narzędzie, przy pomocy którego można interpretować polityczne i społeczne relacje zachodzące we współczesnym świecie. Autor niniejszego artykułu preferuje określenie „Girardowskie okulary”, rozumiejąc je jako specyficzną wrażliwość towarzyszącą pracy badawczej [por. Romejko 2015: 131]. Studia w Austrii (1999–2004) przełożyły się w życiu autora na dobrą znajomość języka niemieckiego oraz na codzienne korzystanie – drogą satelitarną i internetową – z programów niemieckich i austriackich rozgłośni radiowo-telewizyjnych. W dn. 2 listopada 2017 r., na falach niemieckiej telewizji ZDF, zaprezentowano cotygodniowy odcinek politycznego talk-show *maybrit illner*, zatytułowany *Europa läuft die Zeit davon. Warten auf Berlin (Europie ucieka czas. Czekanie na Berlin)* [maybrit illner]. Oglądając go z perspektywy Girardowskiej, łatwo można było dostrzec motyw budowania zgody pomiędzy jego uczestnikami, której podstawą była intelektualna niechęć do „politycznego innego”, a konkretnie w stosunku do Europy Wschodniej – w tym do Węgier i Polski. Zabrakło konsekwencji – nie przykładano tej samej miary, oceniając kraje zachodnio- i wschodnioeuropejskie.

Wśród gości talk-show była niemiecka minister obrony narodowej Ursula von der Leyen (ur. 1958). Pochwaliła ona unijny program studenckiej wymiany Erasmus, dzięki któremu jej dzieci studiowały w Polsce. W czasie ich pobytu miały tam miejsce wybory parlamentarne (2015). Odnosząc się do zmienionej sytuacji politycznej, wyraziła głębokie przekonanie, że w Polsce należy wspierać opór młodych demokratów („Diese gesunde, demokratische Widerstand der jungen Generation [...] in Polen, die muss man unterstützen“). Słowa te spotkały się z krytycznymi opiniami środowisk identyfikujących się z polskimi władzami.

Nie tylko słowa von der Leyen, ale także i wypowiedzi pozostałych gości wpisały się w logikę zgody opartej na niechęci wobec „politycznego innego”. W kontekście relacji polsko-niemieckich można zaryzykować i odświeżyć używane od końca XVIII w. stereotypowe i ksenofobiczne określenie *polnische Wirtschaft* (*polska gospodarka*), pod którym rozumie się niegospodarność, ogólny nieład, ciemnotę i zdemoralizowanie, a które przywoływano w Niemczech w sytuacji kryzysowej, chcąc poprawić nastroje społeczne. Towarzyszyło temu przesłanie, które można by wyrazić słowami: drodzy Niemcy, u nas nie jest tak źle, popatrzcie tylko na Polaków [Geremek 2005: 14-15]. Głównym wątkiem przewijającym się w audycji *Europa läuft die Zeit davon* jest specyficzna prezentacja Niemiec, które jawią się jako kraj cywilizowany, czego potwierdzeniem jest ich proeuropejskość (prounijność)⁵. Im dalej od „serca Europy” (od Berlina), szczególnie w kierunku wschodnim, tym gorzej.

Prowadząca audycję Maybrit Illner (ur. 1965), pochodząca z Berlina Wschodniego dziennikarka, na początku zapowiedziała, o czym będzie program: 1) o Brytyjczykach, którzy wychodzą z Unii Europejskiej; 2) o wschodnich Europejczykach, którzy coraz bardziej oddalają się od swoich sąsiadów; 3) o Grekach, którzy mają problemy finansowe; 4) o eskalacji sporu pomiędzy Hiszpanami i Katalończykami; 5) o Niemczech, w których trwają rozmowy dotyczące budowy koalicji rządowej, ale także o ich roli w Europie. Okazało się, że kolejność podjętych tematów była inna. Jednym kwestiom poświęcono więcej czasu, innym mniej.

Oceniając sytuację w Hiszpanii, wykazano więcej empatii niż wobec Węgier i Polski. Z jednej strony udzielono poparcia dumnym Katalończykom, którzy walczą z centralistycznym rządem w Madrycie, z drugiej podkreślono, że to wewnętrzna sprawa Hiszpanii. Dlatego czymś normalnym byłaby (ewentualna) deportacja aresztowanego w Belgii Carlesa Puigdemonta (ur. 1962), lidera katalońskich władz regionalnych, do Hiszpanii, którą zalicza się do bezpiecznych krajów. Von der Leyen zaznaczyła, że Hiszpania to kraj demokratyczny, który ma własną konstytucję, i dlatego Katalończycy nie mogą jednostronnie podejmować decyzji o politycznej secesji. Dodała, że gdyby Puigdemont uciekł do Niemiec, to zostałyby wydany władzom hiszpańskim, gdyż podobnie jak Belgia, także Niemcy stosują *europejski nakaz aresztowania*.

⁵ W audycji Europa jest używana jako synonim Unii Europejskiej.

Analogiczną opinię wyraził Christian Lindner (ur. 1979), przewodniczący Wolnej Partii Demokratycznej (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP). Oceniając to, co dzieje się w Hiszpanii, zwrócił uwagę, że w Niemczech panują zdecydowanie wyższe standardy polityczne. Zgodził się, że regiony mają prawo walczyć o swoją tożsamość oraz finanse, lecz podkreślił, że powinno to się odbywać w cywilizowany sposób. W Niemczech takie sprawy załatwia się – i tu jego zdaniem uwidacznia się różnica w stosunku do Hiszpanii – przed sądami.

W audycji podkreślano, że są w Unii Europejskiej państwa / regiony, które powinny się uczyć od tych, które mają znacznie bogatsze polityczne doświadczenie, a w konsekwencji wiedzę dotyczącą właściwych rozwiązań. Ona uzasadnia ich prawo do wytykania politycznych braków i niedociągnięć. Takim wzorcowym regionem jest zdominowany przez niemieckojęzyczną ludność, leżący na północy Włoch, Tyrol Południowy, z którego pochodzi biorący udział w rozmowie Reinhold Messner (ur. 1944), alpinista i były europarlamentarzysta z ramienia Federacji Zielonych.

Pewnym rozwiązaniem byłoby pójście w kierunku proponowanym przez Ulrike Guérot (ur. 1964), niemiecką politolog, badaczkę z European Democracy Lab. Podkreśla ona, że państwo narodowe to gorset, który wprawdzie wytrzymał dwieście lat, lecz teraz kończą się już jego możliwości. Stąd należy je rozmontować i powierzyć jego zadania instytucjom unijnym oraz regionalnym. Uczestniczący w audycji wyrażali opinie, że być może nieco za wcześnie na taki krok, lecz jednocześnie dawali do zrozumienia, że są na niego gotowi. Messner podkreślił, że jest Europejczykiem, a nie Włochem, Niemcem, Austriakiem czy Szwajcarem. Inni powinni tak jak on poczuć się Europejczykami. Cem Özdemir (ur. 1965) – razem z Simone Peter (ur. 1965) lider Związku 90/ Zielonych (Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen) – podkreślił, że jest praktykującym Szwabem, Niemcem i Europejczykiem⁶.

Czymś, co ma istotne znaczenie dla rozwoju europejskiej integracji, jest wspólna polityka obronna. W tym kontekście von der Leyen wyraziła zadowolenie z *brexitu*. Jej zdaniem Wielka Brytania była głównym „hamulcowym” w tej kwestii. Pozostają jeszcze sceptyczne kraje, takie jak Litwa, Łotwa, Estonia, Polska i Węgry, które preferują bliższe związki z NATO.

⁶ Cem Özdemir nie wspominał o rodzicach, którzy do Niemiec przyjechali jako gastarbeiterzy z Turcji.

Niemiecki historyk Heinrich Winkler (ur. 1938) podkreślił, że aby ściślejsza integracja była możliwa, niezbędne jest budowanie na wspólnych wartościach europejskich. Nie jest to łatwe, gdyż istnieją państwa, które nie są gotowe do przestrzegania kryteriów kopenhaskich, a dotyczących państwa prawa i podziału władzy. To Węgry pod rządami Viktora Orbána, i Polska pod rządami Jarosława Kaczyńskiego. Niezbędne jest podjęcie działań mających na celu zawrótanie tych dwóch krajów z niebezpiecznej drogi nacjonalizmu i niszczenia państwa prawa. Özdemir uzupełnił, że i w Europie Zachodniej ujawniały się w przeszłości podobne problemy. Wskazał na Włochy, rządzone przez Silvia Berlusconi, oraz Austrię, w której w 1999 r. sukces wyborczy odniosła Wolnościowa Partia Austrii (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ).

Czy Niemcy mają prawo pouczać innych, szczególnie zaś wschodnich Europejczyków? Lindner jest zdania, że tak. Kiedyś nie byli zbyt przyjaźnie nastawieni do obcych, ale zmieniło się to. W efekcie demokracja w Niemczech (i innych krajach zachodnich) umocniła się. Dlatego nikt w Niemczech nie postawi pod znakiem zapytania państwa prawa jak to uczynił Viktor Orbán na Węgrzech. Niemcy (Zachód) muszą być gotowe do działania, tak jak wtedy, gdy w Austrii rządzili ludowcy razem z wolnościowymi. Po Lindnerze krótko wypowiedział się Winkler, a następnie von der Leyen, podkreślając – o czym była wcześniej mowa – że należy wspierać zdrowy i demokratyczny opór polskiej opozycji.

Uczestnicy audycji zgadzają się, że Niemcy robią wiele na rzecz jedności europejskiej, a także innych krajów, w tym tych borykających się z problemem uchodźców. Niestety – pomimo nadzwyczajnego zaangażowania i gotowości do poświęcenia – same nie są w stanie wszystkiego rozwiązać. Czymś nie do zaakceptowania jest oczekiwanie, że to one będą brały odpowiedzialność za brak rozważności i rozrzutność innych. Jedynym krajem, na który w tym dziele mogą liczyć, jest Francja. Jednak i wobec niej – pomimo reform „mądrym prezydenta” Emmanuela Macrona – należy być ostrożnym. Może się bowiem okazać, że niemiecki podatnik będzie musiał ratować nie tylko zrujnowane banki hiszpańskie, ale i francuskie.

W audycji *maybrit illner* odzwierciedla się „germanocentryczna” narracja, wzmacniana poprzez niechęć w stosunku do „politycznego innego”, szczególnie zaś mającego wschodnioeuropejski rodowód. Niemcy prezentuje się jako miarę tego, co cywilizowane, postrzegając je jednocześnie jako kwintesencję tego, co unijne i zachodnie. To kraj, który „odrobił swoją lekcję” w przeszłości, i w szczególności

sposób jest powołany (motyw *nowoczesnej troski o ofiary*), aby strofować, a nawet karać opornych, głównie tych z Europy Wschodniej.

Można zaryzykować i stwierdzić, że uczestniczący w audycji dotknięci są quasi-religijnym (sakralnym) doświadczeniem politycznej jedności, która przekłada się na poczucie osobistego spełnienia. Z jednej strony partycypuje się w „cywilizowanym” porządku zachodnioeuropejskim, z drugiej zaś cieszy się możliwością uczestniczenia w misji kolektywnego pouczenia myślących inaczej. Nie ma znaczenia, czy oni akceptują udzielane nauki, czy też nie. Polityczny sprzeciw wzmacnia przekonanie, że trzeba chronić ich przed nimi samymi, a brak zrozumienia, że podejmowane działania mają na celu ich „dobro”, uzasadnia zastosowanie („szlachetnych”) działań mających na celu złamanie ich oporu.

Zakończenie

W powszechnym odbiorze polityka i religia to dwie niezależne sfery. Zachowanie rozdziału między nimi oceniane jest jako oznaka funkcjonowania nowoczesnego państwa. Myślicielem, który z dystansem odnosi się do tej idei, jest francuski antropolog i literaturoznawca René Girard. W ramach teorii mimetycznej wskazuje, że polityka i religia są ze sobą powiązane. Ujawnia się – jego zdaniem – następująca kolejność – z tego, co religijne, wyrasta to, co polityczne, w tym państwo. Religia, z jej ofiarniczym rytuałem, daje grupom społecznym narzędzie, dzięki któremu możliwa jest kontrola ludzkiej przemocy. Rytuał ofiarniczy to także początek instytucjonalnego uporządkowania.

Ważnym pojęciem Girardowskim jest *mechanizm kozła ofiarnego*, który polega na budowaniu zgody na podstawie niechęci w stosunku do innego (jednostki / grupy mniejszościowej). Pomimo że prawda o nim została odsłonięta dawno, bo w Biblii, nadal oddziałuje on na jednostki i zbiorowości, nawet na te, które identyfikują się jako cywilizowane.

Girard mówi także o *nowoczesnej trosce o ofiary*, w której zawiera się ambiwalentna postawa – krytykowanie agresji (w tym politycznej) połączone z chętnym sięganiem po nią w stosunku do tych, których oskarża się o skażenie przemocą. Zjawisko to można dostrzec w relacjach politycznych, np. w Unii Europejskiej. Zaprezentowano to na przykładzie talk-show *maybrit illner*, który wyemitowano dn. 2 listopada 2017 r. w ramach niemieckiej telewizji ZDF.

Bibliografia

- Frazer J. G. (1971), *Złota gałąź*, Warszawa, t. 1.
- Geremek R. (2005), *Niemieckie gadanie*, „Ozon” nr 35.
- Girard R. (1961), *Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque*, Paris.
- Girard R. (1972), *La violence et le sacré*, Paris.
- Girard R. (1978) *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde*, Paris.
- Girard R. (1983), *Rzeczy ukryte od założenia świata*, „Literatura na Świecie”, nr 12.
- Girard R. (1988), *Logos Heraklita i Logos Jana*, „Studia Filozoficzne” nr 10.
- Girard R. (1991) *Kozioł ofiarny*, Łódź.
- Girard R. (1992), *Dawna droga, która kroczyli ludzie niegodziwi*, Warszawa.
- Girard R. (1993), *Sacrum i przemoc*, Poznań, t. 1.
- Girard R. (1994), *Sacrum i przemoc*, Poznań, t. 2.
- Girard R. (1996a), *Szekspir. Teatr zazdrości*, Warszawa.
- Girard R. (1996b), *The Girard Reader*, red. J. G. Williams, New York.
- Girard R. (2001), *Prawda powieściowa i kłamstwo romantyczne*, Warszawa.
- Girard R. (2002), *Widziałem szatana spadającego z nieba jak błyskawica*, Warszawa.
- Girard R. (2006), *Początki kultury*, Kraków.
- Girard R. (2010), *Battling to the End. Conversations with Benoît Chantre*, East Lasing.
- Girard R. (2013), *Rzeczy ukryte od założenia świata. Geneza kultury i instytucji*, „Rocznik Antropologii Historii”, nr 2.
- Goszczyńska M. (1988), *Wstęp tłumacza*, „Studia Filozoficzne” nr 1.
- Hobbes T. (2005), *Lewiatan czyli materia, forma i władza państwa kościelnego i świeckiego*, Warszawa.
- Ludzkie, arcyłudzkie* (2008), „Newsweek Polska” nr 52.
- Maybrit illner vom 02.11.17. Europa läuft die Zeit davon – Warten auf Berlin*, <https://youtu.be/gun6VKdnkXo> [24.11.2017].
- Palaver W. (2003), *René Girards mimetische Theorie. Im Kontext kulturtheoretischer und gesellschaftspolitischer Fragen*, Münster – Hamburg – London.
- Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu* (2000), red. K. Dynarski, M. Przybył, Poznań.
- Romejko A. (2013), *Joseph Ratzinger jako wdzięczny kozioł ofiarny w świetle publikacji tygodnika „Der Spiegel”*, „Studia Gdańskie”, t. 32.
- Romejko A. (2015), *Polacy w Wielkiej Brytanii: interpretacja mimetyczna*, Tuchów.
- Schwager R. (1994a), *Biblische Texte als „Mischtexte”. Das hermeneutisch-spirituelle Programm der „Entmischung”*, „Katechetische Blätter”, nr 119.
- Schwager R. (1994b), *Brauchen wir einen Sündenbock? Gewalt und Erlösung in den biblischen Schriften*, Wien – München.
- The Colloquium on Violence and Religion*, <http://violenceandreligion.com/> [29.11.2017].
- Williams J. G. (2012), *Girardians. The Colloquium on Violence and Religion, 1990-2010*, Wien – Zürich – Berlin – Münster.
- Zambrzycki M. (2013), *Homo Bioelektromimeticus. System pojęć i hipotez modelowych*, „Studia Gdańskie” 2013, t. 32.

Discussions, Conference Reports, Reviews

Miroljub Jevtić

University of Belgrade, Serbia

25 Years of Politology of Religion

Abstract: The increasing influence of religion in politics - a fact which was suddenly noticed after the Iranian Islamic revolution, the role of religion in the downfall of the Warsaw Pact and socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the resurgence of Hinduism by using the Bharatia Janata Party in India, the increasing importance of Judaism as a political ideology in Israel along with other examples from different religions, all together represented a challenge for political science. At the time, political science disciplines were not able to offer a solution for these questions. As a result, a specific political science discipline emerged, namely the Politology of Religion. This is a specific scientific discipline because of its specific research subject, separating it from other disciplines. Therefore, Politology of religion is both a general and a specific political science discipline. It is general because without its findings the education of a political scientist is not possible. On the other side, Politology of religion is a specific discipline due to its research of political science themes, in the context of religion. This discipline was firstly introduced as a course in the Department of Political Science of the University of Belgrade, in the school year 1993/1994. So far, hundreds of undergraduate political science students attended this course. Meanwhile, both Master and Specialist studies in Politology of Religion were developed. There is a Doctoral course as well. Therefore, the Department of Political Science of the University of Belgrade, educates politologists of religion from the undergraduate level, to the PhD level. The peak development of this discipline was, however, the first in the world publication of a journal in English dedicated to politics and religion – The Politics and Religion Journal (PRJ). PRJ gets its most valuable recognition from its authors, who come from all over the world. As such, PRJ is one of the most-multicultural social science Journal in the world.

Keywords: religion, politics, research, science, politology of religion

When it comes to institutions which are dealing with Political Science, we can see that they are rather young, particularly when it comes to the differentiation of Political Science as a specific scientific discipline with a specific field of study, in contrast with other social sciences. For example, the Academy of Moral and

Political Sciences in Paris was founded in 1795. It consisted of departments of philosophy, ethics, political economy, law and history. However, there was no specific department of Political Science, as all above mentioned sciences were considered as political and there was no such thing as a distinctive Political Science at that time. Therefore, the Academy which was founded for the purpose of studying Political Science, claimed that there is no such thing. The first school in the world which was dedicated particularly to Political Science was L'ecole libre des sciences politiques. In 1945 this school became the Institut d'etudes politiques. Nowadays, there are 10 similar institutes in France. The last one was founded in 2013 in Saint Germain en Lay, only 20km away from Paris. This tells us a story about the development of departments of Political Sciences in this country.

It is quite similar in London. The London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE) was founded in 1895. It is also important to mention that this is the full name of this school, despite the fact that many refer to it as the London School of Economics. Since 1872 we can see a great development of Political Science around the globe, resulting in a fact that today, we almost cannot find a University in the world without a Department for political science.

If we first take a look at the curriculums and programs of these institutions, we can see that their main research focuses on the analysis of political theory, political order, comparative politics, political organizations, international relations, internal politics etc. All of these disciplines have a secular dimension. This is quite normal, as modern science is materialistic and based on facts, with a goal to be serious and precise. When it comes to religion, we can say that political science ever since its formation was very anti-religiously oriented, under the influence of French Enlightenment, which claimed that religion will disappear. Due to that fact, Political Science did not take religion into account and did not consider it as a source of political behavior and politics in general. On the other hand, when it dealt with religion through above mentioned disciplines, it was always through the understanding that religion will soon disappear.

This can be best seen in the work of Peter Berger, who said that "it is realistic to expect that believers in the XXI century can be only found in small sects, gathered with a goal to resist the world secular culture". It is almost impossible to understand that someone with such great authority can say something like this, only one year before the creation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the second largest Inter-governmental organization in the world, just after the UN.

Even though science should avoid using value statements, we will break this rule and say that Berger's statement was stupid. Later he said that he was wrong and by that he made an indirect apology, saying that the world today "is fiercely religious as it has always been, and in some parts even more than before".

As this is a work of the politology of religion, someone might ask why are we quoting a sociologist. We do so because the sociologist understood the significance of religion much before the politologists, giving birth to a special discipline: the sociology of religion. However, when they formed the sociology of religion, they did not pay much attention to it, unlike other social disciplines. This is because they all believed that religion will soon disappear as well, as Berger claimed. They formed the ISA (International Sociological Association) in 1949, with support from UNESCO. Research Committee 22 for the Sociology of Religion was formed 10 years later, in 1959.

At the same time, in 1949, the IPSA was formed (International Political Science Association), again with support from UNESCO. The headquarters of this organization is at the University of Concordia, Canada. Contrary to sociologists, politologists showed a higher level of rigidity towards religion. They failed to see that religion is the foundation of many modern states, such as Pakistan, formed in 1947, or Israel. Therefore, Pakistan is proof that religion is a fact of the future, not of the past. On the other hand, political science has the state as its main topic of research. Even though the state of Pakistan, formed in 1947, is two years older than the IPSA, it was not valid proof for it to be acknowledged that religion is the primary source of politics, same as a nation is. It is particularly important to emphasize the fact that Pakistan openly stated that they want to create a state for Muslims. Hence the name Pakistan, as "paks" in Urdu language means "state of religiously clean". Only after decades and important political events, such as the role of the Vatican in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 etc., that it became obvious that religion was the primary source of political behavior. Nevertheless, Political Science did not react. Only after 50 years, the IPSA founded RC 43 for Religion and Politics in 1999.

The situation with the most important political science association in Europe – European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), is similar. This organization was formed in 1970. Its standing group for Religion and Politics was formed in 2006. This is not hard to explain. Western political science, which was uncritically labeled as liberal, was very dogmatic and rigid when it comes to religion as

a source of politics. At the same time, behind the Iron curtain, science was based on dogmatic Marxism.

A great example of this is a research of Steven Kettell, member of our Editorial board. In 2012 he published his analysis 11 years after 9/11 [Kettell 2012]. This event, the attack of Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building, was labeled as a result of Islamic extremism. Everyone agreed that religion served as a source of political action which changed the world. 11 years after, Kettle's analysis showed that 20 leading political science journals published 7254 articles. And that only 184 of them, 2,54%, has religion as a primary or secondary research subject. More precisely, 97 articles has religion as a primary subject of research, while 87 articles has religion as a secondary source of analysis [Kettell 2012].

More or less, we dealt with Anglophone sources so far. Let's take a look how things are doing in other big cultures and states where political science is developed. For example, if we search "politologie des religion" on the online catalog of the French National Library, we can see that there is not a single entry containing this term. On the other hand, the library catalogue of the Institute d'études politiques has only one source under the same search: Politics and Religion Journal, which has a parallel French title "Politologie des religion". This Journal is published by the Center for Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance, from Belgrade. So, even though there is a French term "politologie des religions", coined just like "sociologie des religions", French authors did not publish a single article so far under this term. If we search Google using this term, we can get a result that "L'Observatoire du Religieux was founded in 1992", within the research project led by Prof. Bruno Etienne, affiliated with "l'Institut d'études politiques and a former member of l'Institut Universitaire de France". As a young group, they managed to become a distinguished organization 'within sociologie and politologie des religions'. This is the only time when the French used this concept. We repeat however, that this young group did not write a single book or scientific article using the term "politologie des religion". But, in the library of "l'Institut d'études politiques" there is an article, wrote by the author of this article. It has almost the identical title as the title of this conference. This is an article published in the Indian Journal of Political Science [Vol. LXX, No. 2, 2009, pp. 409-418]. This article is now 9 years old.

If you search the online catalogue of the Library of Congress, the world's largest library, with the keywords "politologie des religions", you will get only one result:

the above mentioned Politics and Religion Journal. So instead of a French journal, it is a Serbian journal promoting French culture in the USA. If you search the term politology of religion, the only result is a monograph titled Religion and Power-Essays on Politology of Religion [Jevtić 2008]. Politology of religion is only developed in the German speaking countries. Germans coined the term religionspolitologie and founded the “Institut für Religionspolitologiein” in the city of Duisburg. Unfortunately, according to internet sources, this institute is no longer active. Despite this fact, it is important to mention the moto of this Institute: “One who does not understand religion, cannot understand politics”, which is very true. It also says that Germans did not understand politics before, as they did not consider religion as a political factor. Moreover, if they understand what religion means for politics, they will not accept to have Muslims immigrants and have no idea what to do with them now. Similarly, the Germans are, partly, responsible for the Armenian genocide, as they supported the Ottoman Empire without thinking about what will remain when such a big state collapses, creating modern Turkey as a religiously homogeneous country. With numerous Christian minorities, Turkey today would have looked very different from what it looks like now, with a different political situation.

According to the above mentioned facts, it is important to say that Politology of religion as a specific political science discipline, was founded at the Department of Political Science, University of Belgrade, in the school year 1993/94. This is the first time in history, that this discipline has become part of the curriculum of Political Science. It is a general fact that, according to the sociology of knowledge, a science is not fully developed until it becomes a part of a University curriculum. As we can see, it happened for the first time at the Department of Political Science in Belgrade. It is very important to say that this process did not go without challenges. Just like political scientists in the world, political scientists in Belgrade did not see religion as important for politics. There was a huge opposition against this course of study. It is the same today. Politology of religion is a core course in the Political science department, while in International relations (IR), Journalism and Social Work departments, they had to wait for 23 years to accept this course as important for the education of a Political Scientist. Only after accreditation in 2015, Politology of Religion was accepted as an elective course in these three departments, but only as an elective, not as a core course. This is particularly important for the IR department, where students in their final year can choose between two modules: International politics and European integration. My colleagues who teach European integration find that Politology of religion is not necessary

for their students. Not even as an elective course. Even in a situation where the problem of Muslim integration caused French authorities to forbid prayers in the streets, teachers in this module claim that Politology of religion is not needed. However, it is important to see that Politology of religion is now an elective course in two and a half departments and therefore, shows a significant progress in the understanding of this topic.

Despite all the challenges, Politology of religion managed to create significant success and development at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. In the beginning, there was a two years specialist program in Politological studies of religion. Since 2015, they are transformed into Master studies in Politological studies of religion. At the same time, one can defend a PhD thesis in the Doctoral studies and attend lectures. Therefore, Politology of religion is fully developed in the Department of Political Sciences. All three levels of higher education give the opportunity for political-religious education for students.

In the last 25 years, over 1000 students attended lectures in bachelor studies. There are numerous master and several PhD dissertations. At this moment, there are 13 students in the Master studies and 7 of them in Doctoral studies.

The fact that Politology of religion is born in Belgrade is an internationally acknowledged fact. For example, Dr Stella Marega, University of Trieste, participated in a conference “Philosophy, Religion and Public Policy, at the University of Chester 2014”. She gave a presentation titled „Philosophy, Religion and Politics: Contributions and Perspectives of Politology of Religion”, where she said „I refer to a successful attempt done in the early '90s, when two distinct schools laid the theoretical foundations of a new discipline: political science of religion, also called Politology of Religion or Politicology of Religion. In Eastern Europe, Miroљjub Jevtic founded the Center for Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance at the University of Belgrade, Serbia, in 1993. In Germany, Claus E. Bärsh, (disciple of Eric Voegelin) gathered a group of scholars and researchers at Duisburg University, creating in 1996 the Institut für Religionspolitologie. Interesting contributions from this school were collected in 2005 in a volume programmatically entitled *Wer Religion verkennt, erkennt Politik nicht: 'Who disregards religion does not know politics'*”. A Similar statement was given by Nigerian colleagues in 2013 who said: “This possibly was why the political science of religion otherwise referred to as politicology or politology of religion was established in Serbia in 1993 before it became embraced in other parts of the world. The discipline was

formally established as an academic one in the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Belgrade, Serbia, that year“. The same thing can be found in the doctoral dissertation by Sergey S. Streljnikov titled “Mutual effects of political culture and confessional education in the condition of modernization in Russia”, defended at Tyumen State University 2014. In his thesis he states the following: “Thinking about the influence of religion on contemporary political processes is done in the research of Serbian politologist M. Jevtic who is a founding father of politology of religion” [Streljnikov 2014: 8]. These above mentioned statements confirm that Politology of Religion was born in Belgrade at the Department of Political Science.

The biggest success of the Belgrade school of Politology of Religion, is the publication of the world’s first journal in the English language in 2007. At this moment, there is one more journal of the same kind, published by APSA. However, this APSA Journal started publishing in 2008. The Politics and Religion Journal gathered so far hundreds of scholars from all over the world: as authors or as reviewers or as members of the editorial board and editorial board from abroad. Due to this fact, PRJ is one of the most international and most multicultural Journals in the world. In honor to the PRJ, numerous world famous universities organized scientific conferences. For example, two American Universities organized a conference in Florida in 2015. Similar conferences were organized in Argentina, Moscow, Beijing, Malesia etc.

If you search google using the term politology of religion in different languages: politology religion; politologie des religion; politologia della religione; politologia de la religion; religionspolitologie; politologia religii in Polish, Russian: политология религии or Arabic ن ي د ل ا ق س ا ي س م ل ع, you will find information which supports the above mentioned facts.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that Politology of Religion already took its place in the world of political science. This conference in Warsaw is best proof for this. It is obvious that religion has massive influence on politics, making the education of political scientists without this course, incomplete and unable to produce quality students and professionals, capable of conducting adequate political analysis. As the German colleagues said “One who does not understand religion, cannot understand politics”. In that sense, I understand this conference as a place for sharing a call to the ISPA and the ECPR to include Politology of Religion as a core course in the Political Science departments. Because it is more

than clear that after the Introduction in political science, Politology of religion is the most important course for understanding politics and therefore, for the education of a political scientist.

Bibliography:

- „A Bleak Outlook is Seen for Religion“, New York Times, 25.2.1968.
- Berger P. (2008), Desekularizacija sveta-preporod religije i svetska politika, Novi Sad.
- Dreyfus P. (1972), Du Pakistan au Bangladesh, Paris.
- Krynicky-Krieger A. (1974), Le Paskistanetat des purs, Paris.
- Kettell S. (2012), “Has Political Science Ignored Religion”, PS: Political Science & Politics, No. 1.
- Lončar M. (2017), Osnove političkog delovanja Hizmet pokreta, Belgrade.
- Jevtić M. (1974), Islamic understanding of war and the role of Islamic Conference in preserving peace, Belgrade.
- Jevtic M. (2009), “Theoretical Relationship Between Religion and Politics”, Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. LXX, No. 2.
- Petit Larousse (1961), Vol. 11, Paris.
- The World Almanac and book of fact (2016), New York.

Joanna Kulska

University of Opole, Poland

Sprawozdanie z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej

Socio-Political and Religious Ideas and Movements

in the 20th-21st Centuries

Ryga, 4-5 października 2018 r.

W dniach 4-5 października 2018 roku na Uniwersytecie Łotewskim w Rydze odbyła się międzynarodowa konferencja naukowa *Socio-Political and Religious Ideas and Movements in the 20th-21st Centuries*. Konferencja została zorganizowana przez Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Łotewskiego w Rydze, a w gronie współorganizatorów znalazły się cztery instytucje naukowo-badawcze z Polski i Rosji: Uniwersytet Opolski, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Państwowy Uniwersytet w Petersburgu oraz Rosyjska Akademia Nauk. Celem organizatorów było podjęcie zagadnienia roli wartości religijnych w szerokim ujęciu społeczno-kulturowym, zarówno z perspektywy historycznej, jak i współczesnej. Punktem wyjścia do sformułowania przedmiotu rozważań podjętych podczas konferencji przez przedstawicieli różnych dyscyplin badawczych stały się procesy zachodzące w obszarze rzeczywistości społecznej i politycznej, których zrozumienie i pogłębiona analiza nie są możliwe bez uwzględnienia idea i odniesień religijnych. Wskazywano w szczególności na fakt, że podjęcie tego rodzaju analiz jest konieczne, zważywszy na kierunek ewolucji czynnika religijnego obserwowany w okresie ostatnich dekad, niejednokrotnie zaskakujący dla badaczy z obszaru nauk społecznych.

W zmieniającej się dynamicznie współczesnej rzeczywistości politycznej rośnie ryzyko zagrożeń stabilności i bezpieczeństwa społecznego wynikające z manipulacji w obszarze wartości etycznych, religijnych i kulturowych, co jest widoczne zarówno w dyskursie publicznym, jak i w obszarze mediów. W następstwie rozprzestrzeniania się procesów globalizacji i ich negatywnych konsekwencji nasila się poczucie niepewności i dezorientacji, które przekładają się na wzrost

poparcia dla populistycznych haseł i quasi-religijnych idei, jak również radykalizację wspólnot religijnych. W związku z tym rodzi się potrzeba podjęcia analizy zjawiska sekularyzacji, w szczególności w odniesieniu do byłego bloku sowieckiego, które skutkowało rozwojem mitów politycznych i społecznych, kultywowanych w szczególności w obszarze edukacji, przestrzeni medialnej i polityce, a które w znacznym stopniu kształtują współczesne oblicze społeczeństw w Europie Środkowej i Środkowo-Wschodniej. Analiza wzajemnych, wielowymiarowych powiązań między ideami społeczno-politycznymi oraz religijną świadomości społeczeństwa została w związku z tym podjęta zarówno w ujęciu retrospektywnym, jak i współczesnym.

W konferencji wzięło udział ponad 30 badaczy z kilku państw z regionu Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, Rosji, Turcji oraz Wielkiej Brytanii. Polska nauka była reprezentowana podczas konferencji przez troje badaczy z Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Uniwersytetu Opolskiego oraz z Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

W pierwszej wprowadzającej sesji, podjęto kwestię ambiwalencji czynnika religijnego w obszarze idei, jak i praktyki społeczno-politycznej. Wprowadzeniem w ową niejednoznaczność wymiaru religijnego było wystąpienie Joanna Kulskiej z Uniwersytetu Opolskiego. Referentka podkreśliła w swoim referacie problem powszechnego, zarówno na poziomie medialnym, jak i naukowym, pomijania pozytywnego aspektu oddziaływania czynnika religijnego w formie licznych inicjatyw, podejmowanych zarówno na poziomie podmiotów o zasięgu międzynarodowym, jak i tych lokalnych. Podniosła też fakt wyłaniania się coraz szerszego obszaru kooperacji w zakresie rozwiązywania konfliktów i budowania pokoju między podmiotami religijnymi i świeckimi (Joanna Kulska: *Religion as a Source of Peace: Contribution of Religious Factor to Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*). Egzemplifikacja tego zagadnienia została zaprezentowana w tym samym panelu przez Annę Jagiełło-Szostak z Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, która wraz z Joanną Kulską omówiła ambiwalentną rolę czynnika religijnego w odniesieniu do konfliktu na Bałkanach. Referat, w którym religia została zaprezentowana nie tylko jako czynnik konfliktogenny, ale również pokojotwórczy, został oparty na doświadczeniach zgromadzonych przez obie referentki podczas warsztatów dotyczących rozwijania „kultury słuchania” (culture of listening) jako elementu procesu budowania pojednania na obszarze Bośni i Hercegowiny. Okazją ku temu stał się 4. *European Workshop on dealing with the violence burdened past of Bosnia and Herzegovina* zorganizowany w dniach 23-26 kwietnia 2018 roku

w Sarajewie przez Maximilian Kolbe Stiftung oraz Renovabis wraz z jedną najważniejszych organizacji międzyreligijnych działających na rzecz odbudowywania relacji na obszarze Bośni i Hercegowiny, jaką jest Rada Międzyreligijna w Bośni i Hercegowinie (Anna Jagiełło-Szostak, Joanna Kulska, *The Role of Religion in the Reconciliation Process and Peacebuilding – the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ahmići, Trusina, Bradina)*).

Podczas drugiej sesji w pierwszym dniu konferencji podejmowane były zagadnienia odnoszące się do odmiennego wpływu wywieranego przez różne religie i systemu filozoficzne współczesnego świata na kształtowanie wymiaru społeczno-politycznego współczesnych społeczeństw i państw. W panelu podjęto między innymi kwestię wpływu personalizmu francuskiego na formowanie się debaty intelektualnej w powojennej Polsce (Aleksiej Lokmatov: *Theory in Action. French Personalism on the Intellectual Landscape of Post-war Poland*) oraz zagadnienie zdolności adaptacyjnych islamu w warunkach liberalnej demokracji oferowanej w Europie przybywającym do niej migrantom muzułmańskim i ich potomkom (Bianca Maria Speidl, *Resilience as Advocacy for European Islam Today*). Ważnym głosem w panelu było wystąpienie Iriny Paert z Uniwersytetu w Tartu, która wskazała na rolę, jaką w konstytuowaniu się estońskiego kościoła prawosławnego odegrało męczeństwo jego pierwszych dostojników, na czele z biskupem Platonem, zamordowanych przez władze komunistyczne w 1919 roku. Referentka podkreślała w swoim wystąpieniu polityczne i semantyczne konsekwencje tego wydarzenia sprzed wieku jako elementu konstytutywnego tożsamości estońskiego kościoła prawosławnego (Irina Paert, *The Blood of Martyrs and the Making of the Estonian Orthodoxy: 1917-1919*).

W trzeciej sesji pierwszego dnia konferencji zainteresowanie słuchaczy wzbudziła prezentacja analizująca rolę instytucji religijnych we współczesnej litewskiej diaspory na terenie Anglii. Kościoły chrześcijańskie zostały tu zaprezentowane jako kluczowe dla procesów socjalizacji i integracji w obrębie diaspory litewskiej, stanowiącej po 2004 roku 30% ogółu populacji Litwy (Rasa Račiūnaitė-Paužuolienė: *The Reciprocity of Religious Movements of Lithuanian Diaspora and the Role of Religious Institutions in the Post-Secular England Society*).

W sesji czwartej, która otworzyła drugi dzień konferencji, dyskutowane były kwestie ewolucji idei i symboliki religijnej, zarówno w ujęciu historycznym, jak i współczesnym. W panelu zaprezentowano między innymi analizę zagadnienia przestrzeni religijnej i turystyki religijnej w kontekście figury Jezusa

w Świebodzinie. W referacie podjęto próbę dokonania rozróżnienia między turystyką i pielgrzymowaniem, a Polska została przedstawiona w nim jako przykład społeczeństwa post-sekularnego (Robert Parkin, *How Świebodzin Got its Statue: Reflections on Sacred Spaces and Religious Tourism*). Kwestia postsekularyzmu została zaprezentowana również jako jedna z najbardziej przełomowych propozycji odnoszących się do wzajemnych relacji między sferą świecką i religijną ostatnich dekad. Habermasowska koncepcja „społeczeństwa postsekularnego” jako takiego, w którym wierzący i niewierzący mają kognitywne powody, aby korzystać wzajemnie ze swoich zasobów w obszarze debaty publicznej, została ujęta jako nowa propozycja intelektualna dokonująca „przewrotu kopernikańskiego” w zakresie kształtowania dialogicznych relacji między *sacrum* i *profanum*, nie jedynie jako rzeczywistość postulowana, ale jako rzeczywistość odnajdująca już swoje praktyczne odniesienia w obszarze debaty publicznej (Dalia Marija Stančienė: *Inter-Confessional Dialogue in the Post-Secular Society*). Z kolei Michał Gierycz z Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego podjął dyskusję zagadnienia „nowego paradygmatu katolicyzmu”, dostrzegalnego – m.in. zdaniem kard. P. Parolina i kard. B. Cupicha – w nauczaniu papieża Franciszka, i jego konsekwencji dla społeczno-politycznej roli Kościoła katolickiego (Michał Gierycz: *On the „New Paradigm of Catholicity” and its Possible Consequences for Socio-Political Role of Catholic Church*).

W kolejnych panelach podejmowano przede wszystkim zagadnienia miejsca i roli religii, w szczególności prawosławia, w okresie komunizmu, w obliczu prześladowań religijnych na obszarze byłego ZSRR, zarówno Rosji, jak i Łotwy. Ważnym przedmiotem analiz była kwestia dziedzictwa procesów ateizacji oraz działań KGB na terenie dzisiejszej Łotwy zaprezentowana między innymi przez organizatorkę konferencji Inese Runce oraz Mārę Kiope z Uniwersytetu Łotewskiego. Autorki przybliżyły w swoim referacie założenia teoretyczne i konsekwencje społeczne kolektywizmu jako systemu ekonomicznego oraz ateizmu jako programu społeczno-politycznego zakładającego stworzenie „nowego człowieka radzieckiego” całkowicie odrzucającego wymiar transcendentny. Jak podkreśliły autorki, działania te służyły jako główne instrumenty „transformacji antropologicznej”, w której jednym z celów wobec społeczeństw państw bałtyckich było również osłabienie ich poczucia odrębności narodowej (Māra Kiope, Inese Runce, *Secularization in the Soviet Latvia: Tendencies, Methods and Experiments*).

Podsumowaniem tej części konferencji stało się wystąpienie Borysa Philippova, który podjął analizę współczesnych konsekwencji trwającej wiele dekad adaptacji

kościół i duchowieństwa w ramach systemu socjalistycznego. Jak zauważył autor, najważniejszym współczesnym pytaniem dla byłego obszaru radzieckiego w odniesieniu do relacji państwo-kościół nie jest pytanie o zwrot skonfiskowanego przez władze majątku kościelnego, ani kwestia wolności religijnej. Najbardziej palące zagadnienie to, zdaniem referenta, głęboka psychologiczna deformacja duchowieństwa, którego system moralny uległ transformacji pod wpływem realiów narzucanych przez komunizm i socjalizm. W tych warunkach nie chodzi jedynie o adaptację polegającą na współpracy z reżimem i służbami specjalnymi, ale o takie kwestie jak łapownictwo, kłamstwa, dostosowanie się do dominującej ideologii, i, co szczególnie ważne, racjonalizacja takich zachowań. Jak podkreślił autor, dla tych przedstawicieli duchowieństwa, którzy podlegli owej adaptacji, całkowicie niemożliwe jest dostosowanie się do wymagań i wyzwań, które wiążą się z funkcjonowaniem we współczesnych, zmodernizowanych społeczeństwach (Boris Philippov: *Exiting the Socialist System: the Problems of Churches in the Post-Soviet States*).

Michał Kmieć

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland

Paradoksy współczesnych Europejczyków

Recenzja książki Chantal Delsol

pt. *Kamienie węgielne. Na czym nam zależy?*, tł. M. Kowalska,
Znak, Kraków 2018, ss. 352.

Chantal Delsol jest francuską filozofką, dobrze znaną polskiemu czytelnikowi, identyfikowaną jako osoba, która reprezentuje poglądy na Zachodzie, ogólnie mówiąc, niepopularne. Wydana przez Wydawnictwo Znak książka *Kamienie węgielne. Na czym nam zależy* to kolejny głośny apel tej wybitnej intelektualistki do Europejczyków, w tym także i do Polaków, obok którego nie sposób przejść obojętnie ze względu na treść i język, który porusza struny duszy i zmusza do refleksji.

Książka w swoim zamyśle charakteryzuje „kamienie węgielne” europejskiej kultury, a właściwie cywilizacji. Są to kolejno: osoba ludzka, radość, nadzieja, prawda i transcendencja. Kamienie te stanowią odpowiedź na tytułowe pytanie: na czym nam (Europejczykom) zależy w życiu najbardziej. Delsol przekonuje nas, że właśnie te pojęcia głęboko tkwią w naszym życiu społecznym, to na nich ono się opiera a próba pozbycia się ich doprowadzi wprost do katastrofy ludzkości. W tym kontekście należy zauważyć pierwszą oznakę postnowoczesności myślenia Delsol. Nie pyta ona o to, co jest dobre i prawdziwe, lecz bada nasze pragnienia i potrzeby. Można odnieść wrażenie, że książka posiada wymiar nie tyle pragmatyczny, co wręcz utylitarny.

Europejski fundament został wybudowany na gruncie judeochrześcijaństwa. Pozbycie się religii z życia sprawiło, że Europa wraca do idei, które religię Chrystusową poprzedzały, bądź też przyjmuje idee, które do tej pory istniały obok chrześcijaństwa. Interesujące w tym kontekście wydają się być rozważania na temat eugeniki. Europa, odrzuciwszy chrześcijaństwo, wraca do myśli Platona i Arystotelesa, które ta religia oczyściła i odrzuciła. Nie może jednak przyjąć dziedzictwa greckich filozofów, które chrześcijaństwo przyjęło jako swoje, bowiem utożsamiane jest ono już tylko z nim.

W postnowoczesnej Europie tkwi głęboki paradoks. Kultura europejska charakteryzuje się głęboką niespójnością. Chantal Delsol pokazuje, że nieustannie odrzucamy *kamienie węgielne*, na których, w gruncie rzeczy, nam najbardziej zależy, które w sposób nieświadomy są czymś jak najbardziej pożądanym. Jednakże myśl Delsol również charakteryzuje się niespójnością. Z jednej strony zauważa, że usunięcie źródła sprawiło, że takie pojęcia jak *wolność* czy *godność* stały się puste. Z drugiej zaś Delsol przyjmuje postnowoczesność jako swoją. Adaptuje pewien postmodernistyczny sposób myślenia i mówienia o rzeczywistości, i nie tylko po to, by porozumieć się ze współczesnym czytelnikiem. Ciekawym faktem jest również to, że wspomina często o innych niż europejska kulturach, które wcale „nie mają się gorzej”, jakby chciała przekreślić wszelkie „tradycyjne przywiązanie”, wręcz zabobonne, do tego co własne, do tego co jej, co byłoby swoistym paradoksem. Książka przecież została napisana z miłości.

Rozdział pierwszy poświęcony jest omówieniu koncepcji osoby ludzkiej i jej godności. To najważniejsza część tej książki i chyba najbardziej niespójna w swych niejednoznacznych konkluzjach. Współczesny świat w rozwoju nauk biologicznych postrzega człowieka jako zwierzę całkowite zniewolone swą naturą. Jednak w obliczu katastrofy drugiej wojny światowej człowiek staje się najwyższą wartością. Ten paradoks rodzi przeróżne problemy. Wspomniany rozdział stawia pytanie: czy my, ludzie, chcemy po prostu być? Nie otrzymujemy wyczerpującej odpowiedzi. Przez słowa autorki przebija się niejasna idea *bycia dla samego bycia*. Choć Delsol wyraża smutek z powodu wymycia chrześcijańskiego znaczenia owych *kamieni węgielnych*, ostatecznie przyjmuje to za fakt i uznaje, że odwoływanie się do tych znaczeń byłoby niezrozumiałe dla jej czytelników (s. 29). Wiara zmienia się w tradycje społeczne, będące jedynie preferencją, której nie można dowieść. Godności osoby ludzkiej, twierdzi, trzeba bronić, ale nie tak jak wcześniej (znaczy bez odwołania do chrześcijaństwa). Problem polega na tym, że odarcie z racjonalizmu chrześcijańskiego *kamieni węgielnych* zmienia sposób ujęcia relacji społecznych. Zamiast etyki personalistycznej pojawia się logika pragmatyzmu czy nawet utylitaryzmu społecznego. Godność ludzka staje się u Delsol pojęciem technicznym. Celem obrony *kamieni węgielnych* jest ochrona ludzkości jako takiej. Skoro godność, prawda czy nadzieja nie są warte ochrony ze względu na to, że są czymś dobrym, prawdziwym, to stają się jedynie narzędziami ocalenia ludzi dla samego bycia. Jedynym celem staje się przetrwanie człowieka. Autorka przyznaje jednak, że bez duchowości, bez religii koncepcja godności upadnie. Jeśli bowiem Panem życia nie jest już Bóg, to jest nim społeczeństwo, które decyduje o tym, kto powinien żyć (s. 64). Czy zatem można twierdzić, że

nieistotny jest fakt, iż godność wywodząca się z koncepcji Boga została utraczona na rzecz konstruktu tradycji społecznej czy mitu? Czy rzeczywiście istotne jest tylko to, że musimy tę koncepcję obronić? Tym bardziej, że bronimy tego z powodu doświadczenia zła (Holokaustu). Czy faktycznie zło może nas skłonić do zachowania godności ludzkiej?

I tu pojawiają się kolejne ciekawe rozważania. Delsol z optymizmem podchodzi do myśli ekologicznej, która ma naprawić wiele błędów postnowoczesności. Ekologia uczy bowiem o obiektywnej rzeczywistości, o prawie danym ludziom, a nie przez nich stworzonym. Ten optymizm jest zaskakujący – stronnictwa ekologiczne są dzisiaj kojarzone jawnie ze światem antychrześcijańskim. Delsol przyznaje, że człowiek bez Boga przyznaje sobie status Absolutu w sposób naturalny. Jednak nie staje w pełni po stronie obiektywnej prawdy. Jej celem jest zwalczanie zła.

Kolejny rozdział rozprawia się z koncepcją szczęścia na rzecz radości. Ten rozdział z kolei wydaje się najbardziej spójny. Szczęście to koncepcja, która usypia Europejczyków. Uznano, że najlepszy dla ludzkości będzie brak myślenia, zadawania sobie najtrudniejszych pytań, by osiągnąć błogi spokój. Ludzkość zajmuje się jedynie złem, w którego cieniu tkwi. Jedyne, co jesteśmy w stanie zrobić, to ustawić kilka „znaków” w miejscach, gdzie naprawdę możemy się skrzywdzić. To nam wystarcza.

Rozdział trzeci ukazuje Delsol jako człowieka nadziei. Nie wszystko jest stracone. Pisze, bo ma nadzieję. Człowiek, przypomina, nie jest samowystarczalny. Przeciwnie, potrzebuje do życia innych, a także nadziei na osiągnięcie dobra, do którego dąży. Dzięki nadziei jesteśmy strażnikami tego, czego sami nie tworzymy. Została ona wyrugowana z życia publicznego, ponieważ nakłada obowiązek czekania na cud. Nowoczesny racjonalista odrzuca wszelką obietnicę i wszelką tajemnicę. Obietnica zbawienia jest kluczowa dla postępu. Postęp dany jest tylko w momencie, kiedy widzimy coś poza rzeczywistością. Możliwy jest, tylko gdy przyjmujemy dziedzictwo historii. Delsol, pisząc o postępie, rozważa go przez pryzmat pojęcia emancypacji społeczeństwa, ukazując, moim zdaniem, niesłusznie, zacofanie katolicyzmu na tym polu (wytyka choćby poparcie dla niewolnictwa, pomimo wielu dokumentów Magisterium świadczących o czymś zupełnie przeciwnym). Miejscami można odnieść wrażenie, że Delsol uprawia na swój sposób „nową teologię polityczną”, zainicjowaną przez J.B. Metz. *Kamienie węgielne* służą ludzkości do emancypacji od różnych form zła. W książce przeczytać nawet możemy, że Chrystus, którego Europa odrzuciła, pozostawił

po sobie koncepcję wyzwolenia od zła doczesnego (s. 196). A te wszystkie rozważania wieńczy stwierdzeniem, że nadzieja jak i postęp bez koncepcji zbawienia upadną. Utrata nadziei rodzi nihilizm. Nadzieja jest cnotą boską. Czy bez Boga jesteśmy w stanie ocalić nadzieję? Na to pytanie Delsol nie odpowiada w sposób jednoznaczny.

Rozdział czwarty poświęcony jest prawdzie jako gwarancji wolności. To bardzo mocne nawiązanie do Ewangelii. Prawda wyzwala człowieka. To niezwykle trudne słowa w świecie, który prawdę utożsamia z fanatyzmem. Rozdział ten zawiera w sobie jeszcze więcej paradoksów. Raz Delsol wspomina o tym, że prawda sama się narzuca, że przychodzi z zewnątrz (s. 236). Kiedy indziej powie: „Prawda nie jest więc dana z góry i nie narzuca swej uniwersalności, lecz wyłania się z konkretnego powszechnika. Obdarza nas racjonalnością bardziej poetycką niż naukową” (s. 272). Kiedy indziej powie, że Prawdy nie można posiadać, lecz można jej tylko szukać. Czy zatem prawda sama w sobie, aby nie przeobraziła się w fanatyzm musi być niepewna? Jak to pogodzić z Chrystusem, który mówi o sobie, że jest *Prawdą*?! To nie prawda stanowi problem, lecz jej oderwanie od miłości.

Ostatni rozdział, choć powinien być poświęcony koncepcji Boga, nie jest jednak prostą obroną religii i wiary. Delsol nie ukazuje dobra, które niesie ze sobą wiara. Walczy z ateizmem jako czymś szkodliwym dla wspólnoty politycznej. Zaskakujące uwagi czyni na temat naturalności politeizmu, co w świetle współczesnych badań wydaje się być co najmniej problematyczne. Ateizm jest walką z chrześcijaństwem, które stanowi o istocie *kamieni węgielnych*. Delsol zdaje sobie sprawę, że nie można zbudować jedności wspólnoty politycznej bez stanowiska, które należałoby określić jako *agnostycyzm życzliwy*. Jest to postawa jawnie odmawiająca wsparcia Boga jako rzeczywistości, lecz sceptycznie podchodząca do całkowitego odrzucenia Jego istnienia. Odrzucenie Boga, powie Delsol, sprawiło, że ludzie przestali zadawać pytania egzystencjalne. A jest to niezbędne dla normalnego funkcjonowania człowieka w tym świecie. Każdy, kto wychyla się w tę stronę, uznawany jest za osobę chorą psychicznie, i to właśnie stanowi postnowoczesny totalitaryzm.

Ostatecznie Delsol jasno przyznaje, że opisane przez nią *kamienie węgielne* nie powstały ot tak, lecz są dziedzictwem kultury judeochrześcijańskiej. Co więcej, zdecydowanie stwierdza, że współczesny schyłek chrześcijaństwa nie jest jego końcem. Jest ono wieczne, nie da się go zniszczyć. Można zatem uznać, że dopiero w końcowych konkluzjach Delsol staje w obronie wiary w Ewangelię.

Chantal Delsol ofiaruje nam niezwykle ciekawą książkę, będącą opisem upadku Zachodu i obroną wartości, na których nam najbardziej zależy. Myślę, że trafnie zdiagnozowała te wartości. Delsol jednak porusza się nieustannie w cieniu zła (a konkretnie w obliczu historii Holokaustu). Broni wartości, chcąc uchronić Europę od ponownego doświadczenia cierpienia. W rzeczywistości oplakuje śmierć Boga. Adam i Ewa znając dobro, przez grzech poznali także zło. Delsol prowadzi dialog ze światem, który utracił znajomość dobra jako takiego. Współcześni ludzie znają tylko zło. Można by odnieść wrażenie, że dialog z nimi można prowadzić tylko poprzez negację zła. Jak zauważa tłumaczka książki na język polski „nie jest to solidny fundament, ale nic lepszego chyba mieć nie będziemy” (s. 347). Byłaby to smutna konstatacja. Chrześcijanin jednak żyje w pełnym świetle dobra i prawdy. Metoda Delsol na pierwszy rzut oka wydaje się piękna, ale – jak się wydaje – nie dotyka istoty problemu.

Biographical note

Chantal Delsol – philosopher, political historian and novelist, profesor at Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University; founder of the Hannah Arendt Research Institute. Selected books: *La haine du monde. Totalitarismes et postmodernité* (2018), *Le Populisme et les Demeurés de l'Histoire* (2017), *Les Pierres d'angle, à quoi tenons-nous?* (2014).

Michał Gierycz – political scientist, associate professor at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Head of Division of Cultural Foundations of Politics at the Institute of Political Science. Among his research interest are: relations between religion and politics, European Union, morality policy, political anthropology. Selected publications: *Totalitarianism in the Postmodern Age. A Summary of the Report on Young People's Attitudes to Totalitarianism* (co-author, Warszawa 2018), *Europejski spór o człowieka. Studium z antropologii politycznej* (Warszawa 2017), *Europa und die Anthropologie seiner Politik* (co-author, Berlin 2016), *"United in Diversity": The Church's Experience and the European Union's Identity Motto* (Bolzano 2008).

Krzysztof Gładkowski – Associate Professor at The University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, main areas of research: history, theory and methodology of social sciences; political anthropology; protestanism at Górny Śląsk; cultural security; religious and political fundamentalism; civilisations and religions of the world.

Tadeusz Jarosz SDS – PhD in political sciences; directs the Department of Sociology and African Studies at Jordan University College in Morogoro (Tanzania). His research interests are focused on religious and political communication, religious public relations, Catholic Social Teaching, state-church relationships and secularization within the context of East African countries; publications: *Seeking for the essence of the paradigm of desecularization: inculturation – the self-manifestation strategy of the catholic church within the environment of secularization* (2014), *The Church as an Agent of Social and Economic development* (2015).

Miroljub Jevtić – full professor of political science at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade. Founder and editor-in-chief of the *Politics and Religion Journal*; author i.a. *Religion and Power: Essays on Politology of Religion* (2008).

Michał Kmieć – PhD student at the Institute of Political Science at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. In his doctoral thesis, he study the idea of the senate in the writings of political philosophers. Scientific interests: Old Polish political thought, political theology, thoughts of Feliks Koneczny and Gilbert K. Chesterton. Cooperated with the editors of *Civitas and Political Theology*.

Joanna Kulska – Ph.D., political scientist working at the University of Opole (Poland), director of the Europa Master program. Scientific interests: international cultural relations, reconciliation in international relations, the role of religion and the process of secularization in the contemporary world, models of state-church cooperation. Publications: *Oblicza pojednania. Faces of Reconciliation* (red., Opole 2016), *Stolica Apostolska w międzynarodowych stosunkach kulturalnych od Jana XXIII do Jana Pawła II* (Opole 2006).

Fred Lazin – professor emeritus at Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel and a resident of New York City. He earned an MA and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He has taught at American University, New York University, UCLA, George Washington University, Cornell University, Tufts University, and the City University of New York (CUNY). He has written and edited eleven books dealing with comparative public policy, Israeli politics and society, and Jews in American politics. In July 2019 Lexington Books will publish his manuscript *American Christians and the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry: A Call to Conscience*.

Rev. Piotr Mazurkiewicz – Catholic priest, full professor of political science at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Secretary General of the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Union (COMECE) in the years 2008-2012. Scientific interests: social doctrine of the Catholic Church, European identity, Church-state relations, political ethics; selected publications: *Church and Democracy* (2001), *Violence in Politics* (2006), *Europe as a kinder surprise* (2017), *Two towers and a minaret. Sketches from the Catholic social teaching* (2017).

Marguerite A. Peeters – director of the Brussels-based *Institute for Intercultural Dialogue Dynamics*, which studies the key concepts, values and operational mechanisms of globalisation and promotes an open intercultural dialogue on these issues; lecturer at Pontifical Urbaniana University; selected publications: *The globalization of the western cultural revolution* (2007), *Le Gender, une norme mondiale?* (2013)

Rev. Adam Romejko – associate professor at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Gdańsk, lecturer at the Gdańsk Seminary. In the field of his research interests are migration and Polish diaspora issues. Selected publications: *Polacy w Wielkiej Brytanii. Interpretacja mimetyczna* (2015) (*Poles in Great Britain: mimetic interpretation*). More on the website www.romejko.edu.pl.

Joachim von Wedel – associate professor at the department of Administration and National Security of the Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski (Poland). He has taught at universities in South Africa, Congo and Burkina Faso. Professor of social sciences at the New Georgian University in Poti (Georgia). Author of *Endzeitpolitik* (Leipzig, 2019).

