

# POLAND

## in the European Union - perspectives of membership

*Politics – Economy and Society –  
Culture – International Relationships*

*Andrzej Rudowski  
Mariusz Sulkowski  
(ed.)*



# **Poland in the European Union - perspectives of membership**

Politics – Economy and Society – Culture – International Relationships

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Translation  
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## Introduction

Year 2017 marks 13 years of Poland membership in the most important organization integrating the Old Continent - the European Union. In 2004, the year of accession, the EU was at the top of its development - not only did it accept 10 new members increasing its own economic and demographic potential by about 80 million people, but it also healed the wounds caused by the division of the continent, which had lasted for over six decades. The member states created the biggest economic entity of the world, a free market with more than 500 million consumers producing the highest GDP of the globe, enjoying the fruits of the ambitious common currency *Euro* project since 2001. The image of European power was flawless at that time and its further dynamic development seemed obvious. That was the Community built by successors of Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi and the one accessed by Poland carrying hope of millions of its citizens<sup>1</sup>.

However, only three years later the world was struck by the gravest economic crisis since 1929. In spite of the fact that it originated in the USA, it turned out that it was the EU who struggled to overcome its consequences. Although the Community was still expanding with the accession of Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia and it was granted the Peace Nobel Prize in 2012 it was not able to overcome the rising problems. Since the breakout of the immigration crisis in 2015 and the Brexit there has been no doubt that the European Union faces the most significant identity crisis in its history. The myth of the European Union being a stable *perpetuum mobile* was destroyed when it hit hard the rocks of *Realpolitik*. Common interests turned out to be common only when providing profit to all members. When the crisis revealed different interests, the language of *reason of state* or *necessity to defend independence* reappeared. The slogans on necessity of transforming the foregoing integration model into the *two-speed Europe* with an avant-garde of member states tightening their cooperation leaving not only the stragglers but the whole peloton behind are heard more and more often. And it is not the margin of discussion anymore, since it can be heard in the states regarded to be the pioneers of the European integration.

The ambition of the editors of this book was to prepare a set of articles concerning the selected aspects of the subject of dynamic changes taking

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<sup>1</sup> In 2003 more than 75% of the Poles voted in the referendum for Poland joining the European Union.

place in Poland and the whole European Union. The papers present scientific interests of young researchers working at the Institute of Political Science at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. The work is divided into four topic areas: 'Political processes', 'Economy and society', 'Culture' and "Poland on the international stage'. The first part titled 'Political processes' includes two papers: *Internet and democracy. Development of digital citizenship in Poland* by Paweł Makuszcwski and *Coalition politics in Poland in the years 1991-2015 – in search of rules* by Kinga Wojtas. The first text analyzes the influence of the Internet (a symbol of globalization within the area of communication) in Poland on the development of civil attitude and the appearance of the category of Netizens comparing to other EU states. The author shows the ongoing changes through results of own research in the scope of activity of Polish citizens in the Internet during the election campaigns of 2015. The paper of Kinga Wojtas, rich in empirical data, concentrates on the problem of creating coalitions in the political environment in Poland and the durability of the ruling coalition in the context of program and ideology coherence among Polish parties.

The second part of this publication titled 'Economy and society' contains three articles: *Influence of economic crisis on the benefits resulting from the membership in the Economic and Monetary Union. Poland's perspective* by Łukasz Kaczmarczyk, *Poland – a land of prosperity?* by Piotr Broda-Wysocki and *Social work in politics and penitentiary rehabilitation in Poland and the selected EU states* by Jan Dezyderiusz Pol. The first one concerns the important subject of balance of profits and losses of the potential participation of Poland in the Eurozone in the situation of economic crises of the EU. After the possible Brexit Poland will become the biggest member state outside the Economic and Monetary Union. The paper tries to answer the fundamental questions: What are the reasons for such situation and what does this situation mean to Poland? In the next paper Piotr Broda-Wysocki analyzes the social-economic condition of Poland comparing to other UE member states. The author indicates limits derived from simplified manner of classifying Poland as a 'welfare state' with the dominating criteria of income. Changes in the Polish social policy are well shown in the detailed and thorough paper of Jan Dezyderiusz Pol, in which the author analyzes the use of social work in politics and penitentiary rehabilitation compared to other European solutions.

The third part of the book; 'Culture' is composed of two articles: *On the significance of Christianity for European integration and meta-political consequences of Polish accession* by Michał Gierycz and „*Spatial history-based*

*politics”? Remarks on relations between power and architecture in Poland after accession to the European Union* by Grzegorz Kęsik. In the first one M. Gierycz indicates that foregoing theories on the European integration more and more often disclose explanatory deficiencies and explain the reasons of the current EU crisis in an inadequate manner. The author underlines that it stems from the fact that they underestimate the importance of the factor of the Christian axiology as a determinant of the integration process. On the example of the Museum of Warsaw Uprising and the Museum of Polish History (still in organization) G. Kęsik refers to an interesting problem of changes in architecture which reflect political situation by showing relations between systems of power execution and architecture solutions.

The last part ‘Poland in the international arena’ includes four papers: *Poland: an ambitious pawn or a European partner? An outline of the evolution of Polish-German relations* by Monika M. Brzezińska, *Polish development cooperation after the year 1989. Continuity or change?* by Anna Skolimowska, *Place and role of Poland in the international security system in the light of parliamentary discussions on information provided by ministers of foreign affairs on tasks of foreign policy between 2006 and 2016* by Krzysztof Cebul and *Post-1989 changes in the status and functions of Polish frontiers* by Monika Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska. The first of those articles concerns the complicated Polish-German relations in their relation to the most important crisis’ of the EU: the Eurozone crisis, Ukrainian crisis and immigration crisis. In the next paper A. Skolimowska shows the positive influence of the Polish presence in the European Union in the scope of international assistance provided by Poland. The EU as the biggest donor in the world facilitates enhancement of development policy. K. Cebul in his interesting analysis of the discussion at Polish parliament reconstructs the vision of place and role of Poland within the frames of the international security system (UE, NATO) and also indicates differences in different parties understanding the categories of *independence* or *integration process*. The publication is closed with the article of M. Trojanowska – Strzęboszewska concerning the important – in the context of the immigration crisis – matter of the changing character of Polish borders being the external borders of the EU at the same time.

## **1. POLITICAL PROCESSES**



*Paweł Matuszewski*

***Internet and democracy.  
Development of digital citizenship in Poland***

**Introduction**

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century marks also the beginning of changes that currently are called Web 2.0. The key element of this process is the transformation of the user's role from a person passively consuming the offered content to a person who produces it, shares it and builds virtual communities [see: Lakomy 2013: 45–46]. With the development of Web 2.0, there appeared new, previously unavailable possibilities of participation in politics. Its users became the so-called citizens 2.0, digital citizens or "Netizens". They obtained an easy access to vast resources of political information originating from multiple sources. They can decide themselves what is interesting, whom they trust, and which information they deem trustworthy [Coleman and Blumler 2009: 2, 12–13; see: Danneman, Heimann 2014: 8]. Information technology enables exerting tangible influence on politics. Thanks to it, citizens 2.0 can, in a matter of moments, at any location or time (provided with Internet access), commence a campaign to collect signatures for an issue important to them, or sign a given petition themselves. In terms of technology, it is that easy to organize a protest, manifestation or a boycott. In terms of debates, with the social media, the Netizens received a possibility to participate in group discussions with other citizens, where they exchange their remarks and can mobilize people to participate in elections or campaign for a given political faction [see: Dalton, 2008: 57; Stieglitz, Dang-Xuan 2012]. Additionally, the new media enable two-way communication between the society and the elites. This way, citizens, who until now have been heard mainly through mass political actions, gained tools to express their individual opinions at the direct sight of the people of interest, e.g. on official profiles of politicians or public institutions. Obviously, it is the decision of politicians and institutions whether they participate in the dialogue.

A separate problem in the area of Web 2.0 and citizenship concerns the question whether Internet access leads to increased political engagement. From the perspective of instrumental logics, there are two strong arguments which support this thesis. In the classical concept of

Anthony Downs (1957), the reasons for lack of political activity were, among others, high costs of obtaining and processing information as well high costs of participation itself. The second generation Internet significantly decreases all of them. Despite this fact, no decisive results have been provided until now by researching relationships between Internet usage and political participation. Pippa Norris (2009) noted, on the base of European Social Survey conducted in 19 European countries, that there is a statistically significant relationship between Internet usage and political activity. According to her, regular users showed more activity in all 21 surveyed indicators of civic activity. Mossbender, Tolbert and McNeal (2008) indicate, for example, a rather high level of relations between participation in Internet discussions, reading messages online and participating in elections. In Poland, Michał Wenzel and Michał Feliksiak reached similar results during the parliamentary elections in 2011 [Feliksiak and Wenzel 2012]. However, meta-analysis of 38 research projects conducted by Shelley Boulianne (2009) showed that even if there is a relationship between Internet usage and political engagement, the statistical effect is rather minor.

A number of researchers, when explaining these varying results, indicate the possible influence of hidden variables that hinders drawing cause-effect conclusions [see: Kenski & Stroud 2006; Neuman, Bimber & Hindman 2011]. One of the reasons for this may also lie in the insufficient identification of relations between the factors, which removes the possibility of a correct prediction. Further research showed that clear interactions exist between interest in politics, cognitive abilities and Internet usage, which all affect the political engagement only as a consequence [see: Prior 2007; V. Shah, Nojin Kwak, R. Lance Holbe 2001].

In this context, it is worth mentioning the work of Pippa Norris (2000), which indicates that new media in itself does not increase the interest in politics. She argues that in this respect, the Matthew effect is more prominent [Merton 1968]. People who are interested in politics and have broad knowledge, thanks to Internet, become even more informed, whereas the uninterested ones have a vast choice of various Internet content and, upon seeing political information, they will more likely ignore it and choose something that interests them more.

There are research questions that arise in this observation. The first one is strictly exploratory in its nature and regards how the digital citizenship has developed in Poland in comparison to other EU countries. The second one inquires whether the observed trends allow to formulate a thesis about a positive correlation between Internet use and selected aspects of civic engagement.

## Methodology

The analysis is based mostly on survey data from Eurostat collected in a module dedicated to the information society (*ICT usage in households and by individuals*) from 2014. In Poland, the research sample was randomly taken from households across the country, and questionnaire interviews were conducted among its inhabitants aged between 16 and 74. The sample size varied from 4 thousand to slightly above 8 thousand households and comprised from around 8 thousand to almost 18 thousand people. The survey method was above all a face-to-face interview (often supported by CAPI). In 2014 and 2015, 5% and 2% of the results respectively were from Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews<sup>2</sup>. Time ranges of each analysis may differ because Eurostat researches each area in different intervals and it also adds new questions related to the arrival of innovations in Information and Communications Technology (ICT).

In addition, in the article I used data from my own research of citizens' activity on social networking sites during election campaigns in 2015. They include information about users and their activities on Facebook fanpages of candidates in the presidential election and of national election factions (factions registered for the parliamentary elections) for the parliamentary elections. Subject of this research were Facebook pages of Andrzej Duda, Adam Jarubas, Bronisław Komorowski, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Marian Kowalski, Paweł Kukiz, Magdalena Ogórek and Janusz Palikot in the period from 31 March 2015 to 10 May 2015, alongside the pages of factions of Kukiz'15, Nowoczesna (Modern), KORWIN party, Partia Razem (Together Party), PiS (Law and Justice), PO (Civic Platform), PSL (Polish People's Party), Zjednoczona Lewica (United Left) in the period from 11 September 2015 to 25 October 2015.<sup>3</sup> All data was publicly available and was collected automatically using an API connector<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/ff2b43fe-048a-4af9-96af-2a405a34898d/isoc\\_sdds\\_hh\\_pl\\_2014.htm](https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/ff2b43fe-048a-4af9-96af-2a405a34898d/isoc_sdds_hh_pl_2014.htm) (DoA: 18 May 2016).

<sup>3</sup> In the presidential election, only the candidates who obtained mean results of over 0.5% of support in polls. In both cases, the starting date is the day when the National Election Committee announced the list of registered candidates or election committees. The end dates of the observation are the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> round of presidential election and the date of parliamentary election.

<sup>4</sup> Data and software for analyzing it was provided by BrandON Media Sp. z o.o. on the basis of a cooperation contract with the Politics Sociology Unit at the Institute of Political Sciences of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw.


It is worth specifying more exactly the basic empirical category of the digital citizens. I deem them to be people who used Internet within 3 months before the measurement (see: Mossberger et al. 2008: 9–12).

As an indicator of civic engagement, I treat the following: seeking information from pages of public authorities, consumption of online news, online consultation of political or civic decisions, participation in Internet discussions on political and civic issues, engaging in interactions on official political fanpages.

## Results

It is worth commencing the analysis with establishing the basic issue, namely the percentage of people using Internet in Poland in comparison with other EU countries. Chart 1 shows a clearly increasing percentage of respondents, from 2004, who have used Internet in the previous 3 months. It grew from 29% to 68% in Poland and from 45% to 79% in the whole EU. The phenomenon of increasing Internet usage is hence a European trend, which Poland is not just a part of but also closes the gap between other countries. The difference between the EU average and Poland was 16 percentage points in 2004 and fell to 11 percentage points in 2015.


**Chart 1. Percentage of individuals who have used Internet in last 3 months (%).**



Source: Own work.

This trend has not always been in line with indicators of civic activity. Between 2008 and 2015, there was an increase in the percentage of EU citizens who used Internet to find information on official web sites of public authorities (from 33% to 40%). It is worth noting, however, that this upward trend did not take place in Poland. In fact, there was a decrease among the Polish Internet users from 37% to 27%. Hence, this is not a form of civic activity that would be widespread. On the other hand, one has to admit that 20% of Polish citizens in 2015 in fact engage in this activity, which translates into a considerable number of 6 million people.

**Chart 2. Percentage of individuals who used Internet to obtain information from public authorities' web sites** (dashed line – all individuals, solid line – individuals who used Internet in the last 12 months).




Source: Own work.

When comparing data from the years 2004-2015, one can notice the rapid growth in usage of Internet as a news source. In Poland, this process happened somewhat slower in comparison with other EU countries, but a clear progress has been visible in the last 3 years and the indicator is close to the European average (2015: Poland 47%, EU 54%). Big changes can also be observed among the Internet users themselves. Despite a decrease in the 2000s, the number of people searching for news online has been growing regularly since 2011. In the years 2009-2011, around 30% of 2.0 citizens exploited this possibility, while in the years 2014-2015 – 70%, which gives a

result similar to the EU average. To summarize, Internet constitutes a source of information for the majority of Netizens in Poland and the EU and this number will probably continue to rise.


**Chart 3. Percentage of individuals who used Internet to read/download online newspapers/news** (since 2013: online news sites/newspapers/news magazines; dashed line – all individuals, solid line – individuals who used Internet in the last 3 months).



Source: Own work.

Although the role of Internet as an information source is increasing, there have been no distinctive changes in the last few years in the way it is used in areas such as political consultations (e.g. for city projects) or petition signing. This is characteristic both for Poland and the whole EU. Only 4% of Polish Internet users and 2% of all Polish citizens used Internet this way. EU averages for this measurement are respectively around 10% and 8%.


**Chart 4. Percentage of individuals who used Internet to take part in on-line consultations or voting to define civic or political issues (e.g. urban planning, signing a petition; dashed line – all individuals, solid line – individuals who used Internet in the last 3 months).**



Source: Own work.

The Poles, in comparison to the EU population, publish online expression of their opinions on civic or political matters more rarely (EU-28 – 11% and PL – 5%). Since the beginning of measurements of both groups, percentages have remained unchanged in time both for all inhabitants and for the digital citizens' subcategory.

**Chart 5. Percentage of individuals who used Internet to post opinions on civic or political issues via websites (e.g. blogs, social networks, etc.; dashed line – all individuals, solid line – individuals who used Internet in the last 3 months).**



Source: Own work.

The above results are worth confronting with a number of authentic, not declarative, behaviors of Internet users. Table 1 presents data on likes, shares and comments left on Facebook pages of candidates for city presidents and of the national election factions in the 2015 election campaigns. In total, 397,114 users were monitored during the presidential campaign and 241,887 users during the parliamentary campaign.

On the part of candidates and political factions, the communication was quite intense. In the research period, presidential candidates published approximately 4.42 posts daily and national election factions in the parliamentary election published 3.69 posts daily. It is safe to say that Facebook constituted a communication channel that was important and permanently updated.

Data indicate that political posts generated relatively high interest among users. Making an approximation (median was used because the distribution was right-skewed and the average was affected by outliers), each post received about 425 likes (one user can like a post only once), about 50 shares (one user can share a given post only once) and about 25-30



comments (one user can place any number of comments under a post). This means that one piece of information published by a political faction or a candidate engaged on average a few hundred people. Furthermore, a couple dozens of them shared this information further, which made it visible to other friends, who were not necessarily interested in politics. It is, however, difficult to assess results of such dissemination of news. It may garner interest, or it may irritate and make someone block the friend who shared it. Nonetheless, it is undisputable that this mechanism delivers political information also to the ones who would not seek it on their own.

A detailed analysis requires also taking into consideration the fact that there are significant differences in results between particular fanpages. However, this is not the subject of this article. This analysis was conducted in different publications (see: Matuszewski 2016a, Matuszewski 2016b, Matuszewski & Grzybowska-Walecka 2015).

**Table 1. Likes, shares and comments under posts on Facebook fanpages of candidates in presidential election and under posts of national election factions in the parliamentary election in Poland in 2015.**

2015 presidential election				2015 parliamentary election			
Fanpage	Median of likes	Median of shares	Median of comments	Fanpage	Median of likes	Median of shares	Median of comments
A. Duda	914,5	74	41,5	PiS	648	20	39
A. Jarubas	62	8	2	PSL	14	6	2
B. Komorowski	1195	58,5	188	PO	648	67	50
J. Korwin-Mikke	2573	126	142	KORWiN	528	66	22
M. Kowalski	178	19	11	---	---	---	---
P. Kukiz	520,5	80	51,5	P. Kukiz	471	86	33
M. Ogórek	414,5	27,5	44,5	ZL	194	42,5	10
J. Palikot	108,5	13	19,5				
---	---	---	---	Partia Razem	772	131	29
---	---	---	---	Nowoczesna	721	146	62
Total:	425	41	33	Total:	428	54	22

Source: Own work.

### Discussion and summary

The collected data allows reflecting upon selected areas of digital civic activity. Most often Internet is treated as a source of news. About 2/3 of Netizens use it this way. About 27% search for information directly on web sites of public authorities. Digital citizens far more rarely enter interaction

that is political or civic in nature. About 7% express their opinions but only 4% participate in consultations or sign petitions. Possible conclusions about the meaning of this data need to be put in the right context. Although the percentages seem low, none of these activities is common in the Polish society. Data shows, however, that the Polish engage in them online much more often than offline.

Excluding percentage of individuals who used Internet to read/download online news sites/newspapers/news magazines, Polish citizens and Polish Internet users in all considered indicators noted results below EU average. I purposefully use two points of reference to stress that these indicators regard all population and Netizens as well. Worse results of the Polish citizens 2.0 can partially be explained by the level of Internet usage. Among the people who have used it in the previous 3 months, 77% of Polish Internet users did it daily while EU average in this respect is 85%. It means that on average European Netizens are a bit more 'Net-active' than the Polish ones. Naturally, a better category for reference would be a group of daily users because it could eliminate the possible effect of highly intensive online presence. Unfortunately, this is not included in the aggregated Eurostat tables.

The increase in Internet access in Poland does not translate into an increase in frequency of searching information on web sites of public authorities. Data presented in Chart 2 show that the percentage of Internet users who use this possibility declines in time while the percentage among all citizens stays at a similar level. There are two most probable explanations of this phenomenon. Firstly, the ones who had been using web sites of public authorities continue to do so, whereas "new" Internet users do not use that possibility. Secondly, the number of "old" Internet users who quit searching for information on web sites of public authorities is balanced out by the number of "new" ones who do the same. In both cases, the trend will stagnate. It is worth noting here that these results in the EU countries are different. The percentage of citizens searching for information on web sites of public authorities grows regularly, while the percentage of such people among Internet users remains unchanged. This may mean that these activities are becoming more popular among people who have had Internet access for some time, but also in certain proportions this Internet usage increases both among the experienced and less experienced users.

Internet access in Poland and the EU is related to an increasing consumption of news online. In the case of Poland, this is not a clear trend. Till 2011, the percentage of Internet users reading news online gradually fell to the level of 29% (from 47% in 2004). However, a minor growing trend

was noted among all citizens (from 14% in 2004 to 18% in 2011). This indicates a situation where “new” Internet users read news online far more rarely (in given years hardly ever) than more experienced users. Only since 2012 a clear growing trend is visible, namely one in which increases can be explained only by taking into consideration the fact that an ever higher percentage of Internet users read news online. In other words, there is a high probability that Internet in fact supports this civic activity. This would be in line with economic concepts which indicate that content variety, comfort of usage and the speed of obtaining information reduce the costs of seeking political knowledge, and so potentially support its development (see: Downs, 1957). A similar relationship is indicated by Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal – they say that online news reduces the individual costs of acquiring information, facilitates discussion, and increases the benefits of political participation by magnifying political interest. In addition to reducing information costs, the Internet may provide alternative or more diverse information than mainstream media (2008: 66).

Collected data does not confirm the assumption that Internet supports taking part in online consultations or voting to define civic or political issues (e.g. urban planning, signing a petition). The percentage of people engaging online in the discussed way does not change significantly in either all the EU countries and in Poland despite the fact that the number of Internet users considerably increases. It is possible to claim that the ones uninterested in this form of activity stay uninterested, although Internet provides them with convenient possibilities of engagement (see: Norris 2000).

Eurostat data indicates that there probably is no relationship between the growth in Internet access and expressing opinions online on civic or political matters. The results regard a comparison of two years, which is why this conclusion needs to be treated with caution. Nonetheless, comparison only of Internet user groups in 2013 and 2015 shows that there are no significant statistical differences between them. As these observations apply also to the total population, it is possible to claim that Internet access alone does not result in users sharing their opinions.

Data from Facebook indicate a stable, real engagement in politics of hundreds of thousands of users. On average, every post published on an official fanpage was liked several hundred times, shared several dozen times, and commented by several dozen people. Obviously, these indicators were much higher regarding some particularly important posts. It is worth mentioning two important matters here. Firstly, the discussed data allows realizing the approximate information reach. Each share, like, or comment

increases the probability that given political content will be seen by someone from a pool of friends of the user engaged in certain fanpages. It is feasible to estimate that even if friend pools overlap, several million users were exposed to at least one political piece of communication in the 2015 election campaigns. Secondly, the data regards only engaged users and, as one can assume, they only constitute a minority of the ones who consume political content on Facebook. The majority observes fanpages without leaving any trace in form of likes, shares or comments<sup>5</sup>.

The above results are the same as the survey data. According to CBOS data, 32% of all Polish adults (meaning not just the eligible voters) read, during the parliamentary campaign, articles of political nature online (Feliksiak, 2015). This means that, depending on the political activity, Internet was used by about 6-10 million people (while there were 15.6 million voters; source: parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/Frekwencja/000000/3, accessed on 10.06.2016 r.). This number is hard to ignore and demonstrates the significance of cyberspace content.

One final remark - it is important to stress that the presented results are based on visualizations in a simple exploratory analysis. Therefore, it would be valuable to test the presented regularities on the basis of more advanced methods of statistical analysis. Unfortunately, in the case of Eurostat statistics, this is hindered by lack of public access to raw data. Among others, because of this, the presented regularities should be treated rather as phenomena which co-exist and not as cause-and-effect mechanisms (see: Hedström & Swedberg 1998).

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<sup>5</sup> According to Sotrender data of October 2015 (election month) only one in five users interacted with fanpages ("Politycy i partie - Fanpage Trends 10.2015", 2015).

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***Coalition politics in Poland in the years 1991-2015  
- in search of rules***

Starting a coalition is one of the key moments of the political game in parliamentary systems [Budge, Laver 1992: 6]. In multi-party systems, the process of forming a cabinet, based on the results of election, is the most important moment that shapes the character of the future politics. It is, of course, related to the growing importance of the executive and its dominance in the planning, initiating and decision-making processes. This paper refers to the analysis of coalition politics of the Czech Republic, performed by the author, uses the theoretical tools applied therein and poses analogous questions [Wojtas 2011: 27-43]. This analysis provides the impetus for subsequent research on coalition politics in Poland and is, therefore, a set of basic data which will be used in papers on Polish coalition politics to follow. The research concerned seven terms of the Sejm (first election in 1989 was not entirely free) and the cabinets appointed between 1991 and 2015 (the analysis of the first government of Waldemar Pawlak was not taken into account as it did not have the chance to carry out its commitments, and neither were the minority cabinets of Marek Belka, Jerzy Buzek and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz).

The purpose of this paper is to seek answers to the following questions:

1) what is the proportion of effective number of parties in votes, seats power and cabinet power? 2) what is the configuration of powers among the parties who form the coalition? 3) what is the ratio of parties' seats power to the combined power of coalition parties? Does the portfolio allocation result from the power of coalition parties in the Sejm? These three questions were, as mentioned previously, the object of analyses in the article on the Czech Republic. In this paper, one more question was posed: whether the coalition parties in Poland within the studied period were ideologically cohesive (whether their programmes were cohesive). In order to answer this question, the system of codes and RILE (right-left scale) of party programmes created by CMP – the Comparative Manifesto Project - was used.

The collected quantitative data serve the purpose of attempting to give an answer (or rather give an impulse for further research) to a more general question – what are the consequences of ideological cohesion or



difference between cabinet parties for the party system; whether e.g. programme similarity (taking up a policy-seeking strategy by the parties) [Budge, Keman 1990: 14] translates into the cabinet's durability. Due to the size of this paper, only parts of answers or clues for further research will be presented. That is why an analysis of a number of factors explaining the observed tendencies was foregone (historical context, transformation theory, character of elites). Such are the fundamental questions without which the data presented above is only a fragment of the image of coalition changes in Poland during the period in question. Only subsequent research may contain these elements and show the context, explain leaders' decisions on entering into alliances and trace the mechanisms of ministerial allocation.

The search for answers to the posed questions is preceded by a short theoretical introduction, placing this paper in the context of the research to date, indicating institutional conditions for forming a coalition and characterizing the theoretical tools which were selected for analysis.

### **Coalition theory**

Research on coalition politics is one of the most important and richest trends in empirical analyses of Western European and American political sciences. At first, the main focus points were the duration of the coalition, the process of forming one and portfolio allocation [Riker 1962], while currently, the point of interest is also, or maybe most of all, what is happening between the formation of a government and its dismissal [Strøm, Müller, Bergman 2008].

This paper is based on the empirical approach to researching coalitions called "European politics"<sup>1</sup>, which treats the functioning of a coalition government as one of the aspects of political process and suggests more general conclusions to be formulated on the basis of the observed empirical premises. According to this approach: 1) a party government is one of the components of the political process and its functioning depends on the mechanism of the party system; 2) studies of coalition must be based on comparative analysis; 3) members of the coalition (parties) cannot be treated as homogeneous actors; 4) it is necessary to take into account the influence of external factors (such as governance model or political

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<sup>1</sup> The European politics research trend is related to the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), established in the 1970s. The most serious competition for the empirical approach is the game theory of European coalitions in particular, prevailing in American analyses (in the USA, the executive power is in the hands of a single party, hence the name of the one-party system).

scandals); 5) minority governments cannot be treated as deviations; 6) studies must take into account informal or partly formal connections of the parties [Antoszewski 1997: 308].

This paper fits in the tradition of studies focusing on country effects and other contextual factors, as Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller indicate [Strøm, Müller, Bergman 2008: 19]. This approach is focused on studies of individual states and as a consequence takes into account the meaning of symbols, values, traditions, specifics of the image of the left and the right resulting e.g. from the history of the country<sup>2</sup>. Naturally, while seeking coalition games, the institutional approach will also be used. While analyzing the empirical material using tools designed for researching stable democracies, it is worth remembering that it was the initial stage of building Polish pluralist politics that underwent the study.

### **Formal rules for the appointment of government in Poland**

The studied period needs to be divided into two stages: the time when the Small Constitution of 1992 was in force, and the time of the Constitution of 1997. They described the mechanism of government formation in different ways. Both of these normative acts included the dualism of the executive power, but the Small Constitution, bestowing real political power on the president, weakened the Council of Ministers in the hierarchy of executive power elements, and in the process of appointing the cabinet, it gave the Head of State powers which surpassed the pure parliamentary model, such as the so-called presidential ministries. In this act, five variants of government formation were envisaged; the president took part in all of them, and the decision to appoint a government did not lay only within the responsibilities of the parliament [Jednaka 2004: 77] (except for the fifth variant: art. 62 Constitution – the Sejm had 6 months to express the vote of confidence. A vote of no confidence meant early elections).

Pursuant to the Constitution of 2 April 1997, the Polish governance system has a parliamentary character – the Council of Ministers (consisting of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the ministers) must have the support of the majority of the Sejm (at least half of the statutory number of deputies – according to Article. 154 of the Constitution). Appointing a cabinet with the majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of deputies is also possible (Article 155) if it was impossible to appoint a government during the previous stages of the procedure. The duration of the cabinet is the time between receiving the vote of confidence

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
<sup>2</sup> The value of this research was emphasized by Laver 1986.

until its loss or the establishment of a new Council of Ministers after the subsequent elections. According to Wiesława Jednaka, appointing a new prime minister, change to the configuration of parties forming the cabinet and loss of the majority character of the cabinet for a minority one can also be considered as the end of the functioning of a cabinet [Jednaka 2004: 28]. It is also worth noting that in the Polish political system, the constructive vote of no confidence was adopted, which protects the durability of the cabinet. However, during the studied period, despite attempts, it did not occur.

### Quantitative view on coalitions

In this analysis, the effective number of parties index by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera [Laakso, Taagepera 1979: 3-27] was used. The index serves the purpose of indicating the number of important parties at various levels (votes, seats power and cabinet power). The index is a good indicator to show changes to the party system, but since it concentrates on the size of the party, it disregards its power resulting from quality changes (such as ideology or type of leadership) [Blau 2008: 180]. Using this model, however, will make it possible to depict the evolution of the Polish party system, and then to seek for explanations of the observed changes.

**Fig. 1. Effective numbers of parties in votes, seats power and cabinet power 1991-2015.**



Effective number of parties in votes and seats power according to Jarentowski 2012: 36, Effective number of cabinet parties – on the basis of data from premier.gov.pl.

The effective numbers of electoral and parliamentary parties indicate a stabilization of the party system and a reduction of the number of relevant entities, which was a consequence of the conducted institutional reforms: a change in calculating the number of seats on the basis of the number of votes from Hare-Niemeyer to d'Hondt (1993) or the introduction of an election threshold. Until 1997, between the lines corresponding to the effective number of electoral parties (votes) and the effective number of parliamentary parties (seats), there was a visible large distance (Fig. 1). This meant a high level of provision reduction indicator which significantly diminished the number of parties in the Sejm. After the 1993 election, the former indicator was as high as 9.81, and the latter was 3.88. It meant that there was still a multi-party system, but not an extremely diffused one, as it was in 1991 – 10.85 in seat power. In the second term of the Sejm, three parties enjoyed considerable power, and not 11 as two years earlier. A reduction of the effective number of parliamentary parties was also connected to the passing of the new act on political parties (of 27 June 1997). As Antoni Dudek points out, in comparison to the previous regulations from 1990, the new act clearly hindered the creation of parties, stipulating that the application for registration be signed by one thousand people, and not only 15 as it had been before. As a consequence, all groupings became obliged to re-register – out of over 300, only several dozen succeeded, and only slightly more than a dozen of them were visibly politically active [Dudek 1997]<sup>3</sup>.

Another important factor in reducing the number of parties was the strengthening of the rules of competition, which first corresponded to the division into communism vs. anti-communism [Grabowska 2004] (called genetic by Andrzej Antoszewski [Antoszewski 2004: 210]) that fostered the consolidation of fighting camps. The anti-communist side, facing problems with unification (which was very important in the then institutional conditions), made attempts at coordinating its activities, resulting in e.g. creating the Solidarity Electoral Alliance. This rivalry was destroyed after the 2005 election: the post-communist side (consolidated until then), after the great loss in this election (drop from 41% of support in 2001 to 11.3%), became involved in quarrels, while in the post-solidarity camp, there was a split and the Polish party system became dominated by the competition between the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice (PiS). The communism vs. anti-communism division was replaced with Solidarity Poland vs. liberal Poland competition [Cześniak, Kotnarowski 2001: 129-

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<sup>3</sup> A. Dudek, E-book – read via EPUBReader, which disabled page numbering. When this work is quoted, the number of section and its title will be given.

158], which became the new axis for the rivalry of the studied period. Changes to the party system, which were brought about by the 2005 election, could be observed using the numbers of effective parliamentary and electoral parties – they increased from 4.5 in 2001 to 5.86 and from 3.6 to 4.26 respectively. It was connected to the Self-Defense Party – Samoobrona (which was in the chamber already in 2001) and the debuting League of Polish Families (LPR) entering the Sejm, and at the seats power level – with secessionists' independent candidature from Borowski's post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).

The 2007 election brought about a stabilization of the PO-PiS rivalry and a defeat of Self Defense and LPR, which resulted in these two indices dropping to their lowest levels in the studied period: 3.32 and 2.82 (fig. 1).

**Table 1. Polish coalition cabinets in 1991-2015.**

Election	Prime Minister	Cabinet duration (in months) <sup>4</sup>	Parties forming the cabinet	Ratio of cabinet party powers	Ratio of parliamentary parties' power to combined power of coalition parties	Ratio of cabinet party powers to parliamentary party powers	Majority supporting the cabinet <sup>5</sup>	Effective number of cabinet parties
1991	Jan Olszewski	6	PC ZChN PSL PL (PSL"S", SLCh) independent	0.27 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.50	0.27 0.28 0.29 0.17	1.03 0.49 0.16 0.27	166	1.27
	Hanna Suchocka	15	UD KLD ZChN PL (PSL"S", SLCh) PChD PPPP independent	0.19 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.23	0.32 0.19 0.24 0.15	0.60 0.80 0.81 1.06 1.86 0.46	193	5.63
1993	Waldemar Pawlak	16	PSL SLD BBWR independent	0.43 0.33 0.00 0.24	0.44 0.56 0.59	0.98 0.59	303	2.85
	Józef Oleksy	11	SLD PSL independent	0.48 0.38 0.14	0.56 0.44	0.84 0.87	303	2.55

<sup>4</sup> Data in accordance with R. Matyja's calculations [see: Matyja 2013: 426].

<sup>5</sup> The appearing differences (in reference to the data used in the works of W. Jednaka or R. Matyja) in the number of cabinet-supporting deputies result from the source of data, as the authors used sejm.gov.pl materials – data concerning clubs at the end of the term. Data contained in table 1 come from pkw.gov.pl or from the announcements of the National Election Commission available in the Official Journal of the Republic of Poland (Monitor Polski). The data concerns clubs just after the election. The differences did not influence the result of the study in any of the cases. The data concerning real support for Sejm cabinets in this paper were drawn from A. Dudek's paper.

	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	21	SLD PSL independent	0.48 0.43 0.05	0.56 0.44	0.84 0.98	303	2.42
1997	Jerzy Buzek	32	AWS UW	0.73 0.27	0.77 0.23	0.94 1.19	261	1.66
	Jerzy Buzek alone Solidarity	16	one-party minority government				201	
2001	Leszek Miller	30	SLD_UP PSL independent	0.75 0.13 0.13	0.84 0.16	0.90 0.77	258	1.68
	Marek Belka	18	one-party minority government				216	
2005	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	6	one-party minority government				155	
	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	2	PiS LPR Samoobrona independent	0.43 0.10 0.14 0.33	0.63 0.14	0.68 0.69 0.63	245	3.08
	Jarosław Kaczyński	16	PiS LPR Samoobrona independent	0.48 0.10 0.14 0.29	0.63 0.14	0.75 0.69 0.63	245	2.96
2007	Donald Tusk	48	PO PSL independent	0.47 0.16 0.37	0.87 0.13	0.54 1.22	240	2.60
2011	Donald Tusk	34	PO PSL independent	0.50 0.15 0.35	0.88 0.12	0.57 1.26	235	2.53
	Ewa Kopacz	14	PO PSL independent	0.53 0.16 0.32	0.88 0.12	0.60 1.33	235	2.49

Based on data from premier.gov.pl and pkw.gov.pl.

Coming to the analysis of the fundamental indicator in this paper (table 1) – the cabinet power index or effective numbers of cabinet parties, regularities analogous to the ones outlined above can be observed since

1997. It could be observed that the three analyzed indices were increasingly convergent, which means a lower disproportionality between the number of relevant electoral, parliamentary and cabinet parties. The year 2007 and the appointment of the first cabinet of Donald Tusk was characterized by the greatest convergence in this respect: the effective number in votes was 3.32, in seats: 2.82 and in cabinet: 2.60. The last value would be lower if not for the participation of 7 independent ministers in this government.

By analyzing individual coalitions, it is worth noting that after the 1991 elections, despite fragmentation of the chamber, the cabinet created by Jan Olszewski was characterized by the lowest level of cabinet power: 1.27. This cabinet, although formally a minority one (the parties forming it had a total of 166 seats) gained the support of the majority – 250 seats [Dudek 2013: 5.1] and as a result was subjected to the analysis. The result of 1.27 did not lead to stability – Jan Olszewski's government lasted only for 5.5 months. The most important party in the government (table 1) was the Centre Agreement (PC) – 0.27 of ministries, the Christian National Union (ZChN) – 0.13; the low value of the index was caused by ministerial portfolios being entrusted to independent politicians – the mathematical spreadsheet treated them as one party, and the strongest one in this situation. Therefore, in practice, this government was not of a party character in its classical understanding (parliamentary tradition) – as a party members' support to the Council of Ministers [Lijphart 1999: 10]. Political parties in Poland at that time were indeed in their initial phase. As it can be observed, referring to the words of Antoni Dudek, the rule behind Olszewski's cabinet was actual isolation of the post-communist SLD and the anti-communist Democratic Union (UD), which was in conflict with the president due to a "war at the top" [Dudek 2013: 5.1]. Therefore, the coalition potential of the two largest groupings in the Sejm was close to none in the case of SLD and restricted in the case of UD, although it had the largest number of seats (62) and was the potential party to initiate a coalition. This situation of rivalry, based on conflicts in the anti-communist camp, was the source of power of Jarosław Kaczyński (leader of PC), which efficiently blocked the actions of president Lech Wałęsa, who first saw Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Liberal Democratic Congress, KLD) in the role of the Prime Minister and then Bronisław Geremek from the Democratic Union [Dudek 2013: 5.1].

The second cabinet, formed on the basis of the composition of the parliament which emerged as a result of the 1991 election, consisted of UD, KLD, ZChN, People's Party (PL), Party of Christian Democrats (PChD) and the Polish Beer-Lovers' Party (PPPP) – therefore, UD was included in the coalition game. The cabinet power index was 5.63 – the highest in the



researched period. Therefore, this coalition was a minority one, but similarly as with Olszewski's government, it received the vote of confidence from the chamber – 233 deputies supported it. The government was led by Hanna Suchocka (UD), since the cabinet could be described as a ministerial one<sup>6</sup>. The isolation of the UD came to an end, which in turn was the result of a conflict between Lech Wałęsa and Jarosław Kaczyński (PC did not make it to Suchocka's cabinet). The strongest party in the Parliament was UD, as it was previously mentioned – its share of seats in relation to the total numbers of cabinet party seats was 0.32, but it took only 0.19 of ministries, which meant that it was the most undervalued grouping (after PPPP) within the coalition – its cabinet power to seat power ratio was 0.67. The largest surplus of ministries in comparison to seat number was achieved by Christian Democrats – the ratio of its cabinet power to seat power was 1.86. The People's Party also achieved a small advantage in portfolios – the ratio was 1.06. Seeking for rules governing tenders before appointing this cabinet, the conflicts which took place in the post-Solidarity camp must be mentioned again: Wałęsa and Kaczyński had an argument and SLD was separated.

The 1993 election brought about, as it was mentioned before, a significant reduction of the number of parties in the Sejm and the victory of SLD, which gained 171 seats. The effective number of cabinet parties was 2.85. The indicator was inflated by the participation (0.24) of independent ministers. The leader of the SLD-PSL cabinet, which included Andrzej Olechowski – then a member of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms (BBWR), was Waldemar Pawlak from PSL, not an SLD politician, which could be expected, taking into account the configuration of powers in the Sejm. This advantage of PSL was also visible in the number of portfolios allocated to it: 0.43. SLD took 0.33 of all portfolios. The People's Party, as beneficiaries of this agreement, gained power in the government which was proportional to its seat power – the ratio of cabinet power to seat power was 0.98, while the victorious SLD was under-represented in the cabinet – the indicator was 0.59 for this party. Similarly as with the cabinets of the 1st term of the Sejm, a large number of ministries were entrusted to nonpartisan politicians: 0.24.

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<sup>6</sup> Ministers enjoyed the freedom in decision-making and the Prime Minister played an organizational and coordination role in the Council of Ministers.

<sup>7</sup> If a party achieves a representation in the allocation of ministerial portfolios that is proportional to the number of seats in the parliament available for the coalition parties, this index has the value of 1. A value lower than 1 means under-representation, higher than 1 – over-representation of the party in portfolio allocation. Of course, this index does not take into account the importance of individual ministries.

SLD had to agree to play a secondary role due to UD's firm refusal to enter into a government composed of post-communists, the hostile attitude of Lech Wałęsa, who demanded to be presented with three candidates for the position of the Prime Minister, finally Waldemar Pawlak and his closest co-workers' high aspirations [Dudek 2013: 7.2]. SLD and PSL were stuck with each other due to their post-communist origins [Jednaka 2004: 276] and the resulting ostracism on the part of other parties. The influence of socio-political split into communism vs. post-communism can be indicated as a rule governing the process of creating this cabinet – none of the post-Solidarity parties wanted to enter into a coalition with parties from the other side. It is also worth noting that the president, due to the first cohabitation after 1989, lost his political significance in the process of creating the cabinet, and since the vast majority (303 people) supported the government, he had to accept SLD and PSL's decision.

The second cabinet, appointed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> term Sejm, was based on the same parties, but had a reversed configuration of powers – SLD played the dominant role (0.48 of portfolios), PSL lost its influence (0.38), and the number of independent deputies diminished (0.14). These changes translated into a drop in the effective number of cabinet parties to 2.55. SLD and PSL participation in the cabinet was proportional (and underestimated due to independent deputies) to the power of these parties in the Parliament – it was 0.84 for SLD and 0.87 for PSL. These values were, therefore, comparable, and it can be said that the distribution of influence was fairer than in Pawlak's previous cabinet. The nomination of Józef Oleksy's cabinet was a result of a conflict between coalitions, but also parties in the coalition and President Lech Wałęsa. After a period of helplessness, he wanted to resume an active role in creating politics – he was even planning to dissolve the parliament ahead of its term and was seeking ways to evade constitutional restrictions in this matter [Dudek 2013: 7.4]. Therefore, Pawlak's dismissal and Józef Oleksy's resulting assumption of the position was a consequence of Wałęsa's political game, which SLD used in order to gain a dominant role in the cabinet and use its advantage in the Sejm. Under the then institutional conditions and rivalry situation, it meant a continuation of the SLD-PSL cooperation. Therefore, the factors here were the socio-political split: post-communism vs. anti-communism and Lech Wałęsa's political ambitions.

After 14 months, due to Prime Minister Oleksy being accused of spying for Russia, another reconstruction of the cabinet took place – this time, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz became the leader. The creation of this cabinet occurred in a changed political reality – Aleksander Kwaśniewski

(SLD) was the president. This was the end of cohabitation. Cimoszewicz's cabinet meant a larger participation of PSL ministers at the expense of independent ministers (0.05) and reinforced the People's Party in the number of seats they had – 0.98, while for SLD it was 0.84. These changes caused a drop in the effective cabinet party number to 2.42. When reflecting the mechanism which brought about Cimoszewicz's cabinet, the basis was the no-alternative approach of the SLD and PSL agreement, diagnosed above (despite opposition's ideas to appoint a government to rebuild the state's credibility) [Dudek 2013: 7.8], and the decision who was to become the Prime Minister was influenced by PSL's reluctance towards the first candidate indicated by SLD – Marek Borowski.

In the 1997 election, part of the post-Solidarity camp in the form of Solidarity Electoral Action (201 seats) won. AWS, after a period of distancing itself and negotiating with the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (6 seats) and then with PSL (27 seats), formed a cabinet with Freedom Union (UW – 60 seats), created as a result of the unification of the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress. The leader of the cabinet was Jerzy Buzek. This consolidation of the center-right translated into the effective number of cabinet parties of 1.66. Due to the fact that only in coalition with UW (out of the anti-communist side of the split) could AWS get a majority in the Parliament, UW's politicians received a slight surplus of portfolios in the cabinet in relation to the power of coalition parties: 1.19. For AWS, this indicator equaled 0.94. It did not mean, however, that UW had a strong representation in the cabinet – it had only 0.27 of portfolios. The allocation of portfolios was, therefore, proportional to the number of parliamentary seats of the majority groupings. The shape of this cabinet was influenced by the still ongoing socio-political split: anti-communism vs. post-communism, even though SLD was trying to overcome it, suggesting to UW that they form a coalition together [Dudek: 8.2]. AWS-UW coalition lasted for 31 months, which was the best result since the beginning of the transformation. It is worth noting that adopting the new constitution in 1997 ended the period of real political power of the president in the process of forming a cabinet – since then, political transactions were conducted mainly between parliamentary groupings [Antoszewski 2004: 209].

The 4<sup>th</sup> term of the Sejm was characterized by the dominance of SLD in a coalition with the Labor United (216 seats), which nonetheless did not mean an independent majority. The coalition formed with PSL and portfolio allocation confirmed the party's advantage: SLD had 0.75 of portfolios, while the People's Party: 0.13. It meant that in comparison with its parliamentary power, which was the backstage of the cabinet, SLD achieved a more

proportional result (0.9) than PSL (0.77). SLD's power was also visible in the effective cabinet party number: 1.68, which was close to the result of Jerzy Buzek's government. After 2001 election, the shape of the cabinet was influenced by the post-communist split for the last time. In the then configuration of the Sejm, SLD was forced to cooperate with PSL, since they did not decide to accept Self-Defense in "the society" [Jednaka 2004: 197]. After the dismissal of Miller's government as a result of the Rywin scandal, a minority government of Marek Belka was functioning and the post-communist camp was disintegrated.

The 2005 election brought about a change in competition rules in the Polish party system – the end of rivalry based on the split into anti-communism vs. post-communism. The PO-PiS coalition, much awaited before the election, was not formed, but the two parties, who both (broadly speaking) originate from the post-Solidarity movement, were redefined as two sides to a new conflict. In the face of that change, the winner of the election – PiS – had to seek a coalition partner among other parties. The formal coalition with LPR and Self-Defense was set up after half a year of the functioning of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz's minority government. Marcinkiewicz received his vote of confidence from the Sejm through votes of PiS, LPR and Self-Defense [Dudek 2013: 10.2]. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz's coalition government was created in May 2006 and was characterized by a proportional allocation of portfolios in relation to the seat power of the parties in the parliament: PiS – 0.68, LPR – 0.69, Self-Defense – 0.63. This meant that PiS, despite its result in the election, shared the portfolios with the coalition partners. It is also reflected in the effective cabinet party number: 3.08 (the index value was increased by allocating one third of ministries to independent politicians).

In July 2006, after two months, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz was replaced by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS. The Cabinet was based on the same majority, while Kaczyński reinforced his party's participation in ministerial portfolio allocation – the effective cabinet party number dropped to 2.96, and the ratio of PiS's cabinet power to coalition parties' seat power increased to 0.75. The principle behind forming these two coalitions and their duration was a mathematical formula: indicating PO as the main political adversary, inability and unwillingness to establish an agreement with PSL, who was in the opposition and disgraced by Rywin's scandal, PSL's reluctance (despite talks) to cooperate with Kaczyński [Dudek 2013; 10.4] – all this forced PiS to cooperate with LPR and Self-Defense.

In the early election in 2007, called as a consequence of the corruption scandal, dissolution of the coalition and the agreement of the two main powers to dissolve the parliament, the Civic Platform won. The party received 209 seats. Despite the opportunity to start a coalition with Left and Democrats (LiD), originating from SLD [Dudek 2013: 11.1], PO's leader Donald Tusk decided to start an alliance with PSL. This cabinet was characterized by the highest advantage in portfolios for the coalition partner since 1991 – the portfolio number to seat number ratio for PSL, as a coalition party, was 1.22. A. Dudek indicates that one of the reasons for the stability of the new coalition was the fulfillment of PSL's staff demands and honoring the party's monopoly in controlling state authorities and companies dealing with the countryside and agriculture [Dudek 2013: 11.1]. Generosity towards PSL meant that PO was a party for whom the aforementioned indicator was only 0.54, which was comparable only to SLD's result after the 1993 election, when Pawlak became Prime Minister. It is worth remembering that the victorious SLD gained then 171 seats and PSL – 132, while in 2007, PSL received the advantage and introduced only 31 deputies. The PO-PSL coalition meant a final end of the post-communist split and shaped the role of the People's Party as a pivot in the party system. The effective number of cabinet parties was 2.6, which was a consequence of entrusting 0.37 of ministries to independent politicians.

After the 2011 election, won once again by PO, the cooperation between PO and PSL was maintained, and the principle of "appreciating" the coalition partner was continued. The number of portfolios allocated to PSL compared to the party's number of seats as a member of the coalition was 1.26. The effective number of cabinet parties was 2.53. 34 months into the cabinet's functioning, the Prime Minister changed – Donald Tusk, nominated for the President of the European Council, resigned from his position and nominated Ewa Kopacz as his successor. Her cabinet, despite huge personnel changes, maintained the distribution of power between the coalition members, only slightly reinforcing PO, which led to a decrease in the effective number of cabinet parties to 2.49. The government functioned until the 2015 election. The rule behind the two post-2011 cabinets was the PO-PiS conflict.

### **Ideological (programme) cohesion of coalition parties**

The analysis so far was focused on the numbers of portfolios allocated to parties forming the cabinet, the proportions of this distribution in relation to the parties' parliamentary power and the party specifics at the cabinet level – the seat power. These basic characteristics were devoid of reflection

regarding the quality perspective in coalition analysis – ideological (programme) issues. This part of the article concerns the search for the answer to the question on the ideological cohesion of Polish cabinets after 1991.

Parties' ideological cohesion at the programme level was researched here. In order to perform a quality analysis of party programmes, a system of codes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), conducted since 1979<sup>8</sup>, was used, allowing the coding of programme content (phrases) according to a key which was created by the team and consists of 7 categories and 56 codes distributed among them. The method assumes that the space (number of sentences) concerning a given issue in the programme is an indicator of its significance for the party and allows to place the party on the left-right scale (RILE index). The aforementioned seven categories are: 1. External relations, 2. Freedom and democracy, 3. Political system, 4. Economy, 5. Welfare and quality of life, 6. Fabric of society, 7. Social groups. The participation of each of the 56 sub-categories (codes) was summed up in seven programme categories for the 10 cabinets (one-party minority governments were not analyzed, and if only the Prime Minister changed while the coalition stayed the same, the cabinet was treated as one calculation unit). Table 2 shows the weight (percentage participation) of the seven programme categories in the programmes of each of the parties in the analyzed coalitions. Firstly, information on the importance of each category for coalition parties was obtained. Secondly, after comparing the value of RILE index, whose positive values mean how right-winged the programme is (the higher the value, the more right-winged the programme), and negative values determine how left-winged the programme is (the higher the value, the more left-winged the programme), a portrait of programme cohesion of the coalition was obtained for each party (last row of table 2).

On the basis of data presented in Table 2, it is possible to make the following observations:

- The issues which were the most frequently mentioned by parties in their programmes in the years 1991-2015 were: Economy, and Welfare and Quality of Life, not surprisingly, taking into account the challenges of transformation;
- At the same time, Freedom and Democracy was treated marginally (except for KLD in the 1991-1993 election period), which in the face of the challenges of constructing a democratic state is puzzling. A

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<sup>8</sup> All information on CMP and data concerning parties comes from <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>, accessed from 1.10.2015 to 10.12.2015.

consensus of all parties in relation to democratic values can also be assumed, which would explain the absence of these issues in election programmes. No coalition in Poland has been built on the basis of this category;

- Fabric of Society, characterized by codes concerning the attitude to the national vision of social life, traditional morality or law and order was losing its importance – it was the most important category for ZChN, but not for later parties who called themselves conservative or conservative-national (PiS or LPR), which, as the research shows, focused on left-winged or center values in their programmes;
- The role of farmer-related issues was visible (Social groups) in the programmes of parties referring to this electorate – PSL and Self-defense. However, PSL was not consistent in this matter;
- The Political System category gained importance as late as during Jerzy Buzek's times – until 2001, the ruling parties' programmes dealt with these issues marginally. It can be assumed that the appearance of system reform issues resulted from a certain calming of the political situation and the necessity to perform a constitutional reform and end the period when the Small Constitution was functioning as a temporary system solution.

**Table 2. Coalition cabinet parties in 1991-2015 – significance of programme issues and place on the left-right scale (RILE)<sup>9</sup>.**

	Prime minister	Jan Olszewski (I '92)				Hanna Suchocka (VII '92)					Waldemar Pawlak (XI '93)			Józef Oleksy (IV '95)		Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (II '96)				
		coalition parties		PC*	ZChN	PSL	PL	ZChN	UD	KLD	PSL-PD	PChD	PPPP	SLD	PSL	BBWR	SLD	PSL	SLD	PSL
		% votes	seats																	
		8.22	8.25	8.18	5.16	8.25	11.6	7.07	5.16	1.05	3.09	20.4	15.4	5.41	20.4	15.4	20.4	15.4		
		44	46	48	28	46	62	37	28	4	16	171	132	16	171	132	171	132		
Policy categories																				
External Relations			5,6	3	9,1	5,6	8,6	15,7	9,1	2,7	0	3,2	9,3	0	3,2	9,3	3,2	9,3		
Freedom and Democracy			11,1	11,6	3,6	11,1	19,5	42,2	12,7	9,9	2,6	13,8	5,3	8,7	13,8	5,3	13,8	5,3		
Political System			7	0,9	0	7	8,1	9,4	0	3,6	1,6	3,2	4	8	3,2	4	3,2	4		
Economy			14	25,4	23,6	14	26,2	16,4	23,6	20,7	17,7	44,3	16	46,9	44,3	16	44,3	16		
Welfare and Quality of Life			8,4	18,2	23,6	8,4	12,9	3,1	23,6	10,8	18,3	20,1	20	9,2	20,1	20	20,1	20		
Fabric of Society			33,4	11,2	7,3	33,4	4,1	0	7,3	19,8	15,8	4,3	0	1,1	4,3	0	4,3	0		
Social Groups			7	16,1	0	7	5,9	1,6	18,2	0,9	3,6	6,3	40	13,4	6,3	40	6,3	40		
RILE*			38,9	3,6	12,7	38,9	20,5	37	12,7	26,1	15,1	-10,5	-8	6,5	-10,5	-8	-10,5	-8		

	Prime minister	Jerzy Buzek (XI '97)**		Leszek Miller (XI '01)		Marek Belka (VII '04)	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (XI '05)	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (IV '06) Jarosław Kaczyński (VIII '06)		Donald Tusk (XI '07)		Donald Tusk (XI '11) Ewa Kopacz (IX '14)			
		coalition parties		coalition SLD-UP	PSL	coalition SLD-UP	PiS	PiS	Samobrona	LPR	PO	PSL	PO	PSL	
		AWS	UW												
		33,8	13,37	41,40	8,98	41,40	26,99	26,99	11,41	7,97	41,51	8,90	39,18	8,36	
		201	60	216	42	216	155	155	56	34	209	31	207	28	
Policy categories															
External Relations			5,3	6,5	5,2	2,7	5,2	5	0,6	4,2	10,8	8,2	16,4	1	
Freedom and Democracy			3,2	1,9	0,2	2,6	0,2	0,3	0,3	5	0	1,6	0,6	0,2	0,4
Political System			21,3	16,8	20,5	40,2	20,5	12,2	12,2	7,5	8,9	16,8	18,4	17,1	20,4
Economy			19,6	24,6	20,8	9,5	20,8	13,1	13,1	35,1	30,4	21,8	17,3	21,1	13,3
Welfare and Quality of Life			25	32,8	29,3	9,5	29,3	44	44	18,3	13,2	27,8	27,6	33,3	18,8
Fabric of Society			19,2	6,3	6,9	6,9	6,9	14,4	14,4	4,3	11,9	10,8	16,1	5,1	6,4
Social Groups			1,6	5,5	6,7	9,4	6,7	7,6	7,6	13,1	6	7,2	6,3	5,2	30,6
RILE			17	-2	-3,7	35,9	-3,7	-1,6	-1,6	-5,6	8,3	6	2,3	-4,4	18,3

<sup>9</sup> A-in order to improve the legibility of data in the table, next to positive (right-wing) values of RILE, the symbol "+" was omitted. Based on [visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu].



Looking at the extreme left and right values of the coalition parties in the studied period, it needs to be noted that the most right-winged groupings were ZChN +38.9 and KLD +37, which was significant after the 1991 election<sup>10</sup>. The later coalitions were more center-oriented and only the PSL programme in 2001 achieved +35.9 on the RILE scale. The lowest level of left-orientation among the studied parties was achieved by SLD before the 1993 election: -10.5. It can be, therefore, concluded that the Polish party system, taking into account programme issues, was dominated by rivalry around the center on the left-right axis during the studied period. It is an interesting statement which could lead to erroneous conclusions concerning a lack of intensity in the dispute in Poland; however, it was intense, but could not be pinpointed in the classical left-right spectrum.

In what concerns ideological (programme) cohesion of the coalition, it is worth noting that:

- The coalition with the most divergent programme from the point of view of left-right division was the coalition behind Leszek Miller's government (SLD -3.7, PSL +35.9) – 39.6 of difference, which did not translate into a lack of durability, as its collapse was related to Rywin's scandal and not programme conflict;
- Coalitions formed by parties with the most convergent programmes were the 1995-1996 governments of Józef Oleksy and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD -10.5, PSL -8, 2.5 difference). Also Donald Tusk's first government, created after the 2007 election, was characterized by left-right convergence: PO +6, PSL +2.3, difference of 4.2;
- As it could be noticed when following the above data on PSL, this party was characterized by the highest index of ideological changes registered on the right-left axis: from -8 in pre-1993 election programme to +35.9 before 2001 election. It seems paradoxical that after both of these elections, the People's Party entered into an agreement with SLD. Therefore, the pivotality of PSL, diagnosed above, takes a new meaning (taking into account that pivotal parties are in the center of the rivalry situation and can enter into agreements with both sides of the political competition [Herbut 1997: 143]); it is visible that the cabinet rivalry on the left-right axis was not significant in the studied period, and the "central" position of PSL was not connected to its programme.

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<sup>10</sup> Due to structural changes in the Porozumienie Centrum, CMP did not elaborate on data for this party for 1991. They cannot be filled in arbitrarily, because it would disrupt the project's methodological coherence – the programme coding system requires a certain team of researchers and supervision over the process.

- After the 2005 election, when PiS won, there was a central-left coalition and not a central-right or nationalist-conservative one as it is generally thought. RILE value for PiS in its election programme was -1.6, Samoobrona had -5.6 and only LPR had a positive value of 8.3.
- Analyzing the tendencies among coalition parties, it can be noted that the governments of the first two terms were definitely right-winged, while in the subsequent terms a shift towards the center could be observed.

## **Conclusions**

To finish these reflections and answer the questions put forward in the introduction, it can be noticed that the first two terms of the Sejm were characterized by a high level of effective number of parties in votes and seats. The effective number of parties in cabinets (1.27 and 5.63), in turn, after the first free election in 1991, reflected the difficulties with appointing a majority cabinet in such a fragmented government (effective number of electoral parties was 10.85). A positive tendency could be the parallel downward trend (1997 and 2007) or upward trend (2005) in the values of the analyzed indicators – this means that rivalry in the parliament started corresponding to the rivalry in the cabinet, which is characteristic for the parliamentary system. It was possible only after adopting the new constitution in 1997, which limited the influence of the president in the process of creating a cabinet. It is worth noting that the observed consolidation did not always translate into the time the cabinets lasted; only the two cabinets formed by PO, after the 2007 and 2011 elections, made it through the whole term without losing the majority and undergoing crises which called for a sudden change of Prime Minister.

When summarizing the analysis of the coalition parties' distribution of power and its correspondence to the allocation of portfolios in the studied period, it can be noted that the group which systematically achieved larger influence in cabinets than in the parliament was the Polish People's Party (PSL). PSL assumed the position of a pivotal party in the system, which was not connected to placing the party at a constant, central spot on the rivalry axis (reminder: from the point of view of programme changes and moving along the left-right axis, PSL was the most dynamic grouping in the researched period). Due to an advantage for PSL, groupings which initiated coalitions had to accept rather large concessions – here, SLD had the biggest losses in 1993 and PO in 2007. The party which was the most over-represented in the studied period was the Christian Democrats Party in

Hanna Suchocka's cabinet – it was allocated almost twice as many portfolios (1.86) as it deserved from the simple proportion of influence.

It is also worth emphasizing that in the coalition cabinets in the studied period, independent politicians played a significant role – in Jan Olszewski's government, they were almost half of the Council of Ministers. The only cabinet in which ministerial portfolios were allocated only to people formally connected to parties was Jerzy Buzek's majority government. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that it has been characteristic for Polish cabinets to appoint as their heads people who are not party leaders, which can be regarded as a violation of a certain rule, characteristic for mature parliamentary systems. Only Miller, Kaczyński, Tusk and Kopacz (as a person acting as the leader) led their parties when performing the function of a Prime Minister.

The most important conclusion from the analysis of government coalition parties' ideological cohesion is that the left-right continuum does not play an important role in entering into cabinet agreements, and that there was no significant relationship between a greater programme cohesion and the life-time of the cabinet during the majority of the studied period. The most ideologically divergent cabinet of Leszek Miller lasted for 30 months, and its collapse was not related to programme differences between SLD and PSL. Certain symptoms of programme significance on the life-time of the cabinet could be noticed in 2007, when PO-PSL coalition was formed; it survived the 2011 election and functioned for a total of 8 years. At that moment, however, the question arises whether it was a lack of significant programme differences that impacted the durability of this alliance, or whether, taking into account the stability of Miller's government, PSL is a perfect coalition partner, satisfied with influence, position, appanage, while programme issues (unless they concern several fundamental issues such as maintaining the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund) play a secondary role.

Confronting the findings with the title of the article and concentrating on seeking rules behind coalition politics, it can be assumed that the basis for alliances in the researched period was not the ideological convergence in the right-left spectrum. An important role, in particular during the first two terms, was played by personal animosities (between Wałęsa, Mazowiecki, Kaczyński) and conflicts within the post-Solidarity camp concerning the "thick line" [Jednaka 2004: 275] and accounting for the Polish People's Republic. The programme factor appeared only in a limited spectrum – for example the reluctance of parties which eventually co-formed Suchocka's cabinet towards the candidacy of UD's leader, Mazowiecki (of a more left-winged orientation) led them to promoting Aleksander Hall – the

leader of a right-winged fraction of the UD [Jednaka 2004: 275]. This list would not be complete without the institutional factor in the form of a constitutional guarantee for the role of the president in the process of forming the cabinet.

The most important determiner of the decision concerning with whom to form a coalition was, until 2005, the socio-political split between post-communism and anti-communism. After the fiasco of the PO-PiS alliance forecast before the election in 2005, the new coalition "rule" became the conflict between these two parties. It is worth to verify the ideological dimension of this rivalry on the basis of CMP research. The unfulfilled coalition, after the 2005 election, would be one of the most ideologically cohesive: PiS -1.6, PO +1.01 – the distance on the left-right scale would be only 2.61. In 2007, RILE value for PO was +6, and for PiS +9.82. Only before the 2011 election, a significant difference between the parties' programmes appeared and the difference grew to 21.87: PO -4.4 while PiS +17.47 [visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu] – therefore, PO (with the label of "liberal") was more left-winged than PiS, which in the common perception functions as a "social" party<sup>11</sup>. It is worth remembering that the RILE index concerns the total assessment of left- and right-orientation in a party's programme (and is of universal character) – to obtain a full picture, it would be necessary to study in which categories PO was more left-oriented, and PiS was right-oriented. It is an interesting and important theme for future analyses.

Finishing this paper, it is necessary to mention once more that its purpose was only to create a perspective for further research – analyses in this study need to be supplemented with a commentary on the practice and context of political processes taking place in Poland in the studied period, the role of elites or the international situation, such as Poland's accession to the EU.

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<sup>11</sup> This paradox can also be explained by election behaviour research, see: Czeńnik, Kotnarowski 2001: 129-158.

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## **2. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY**

*Łukasz Kaczmarczyk*

***The influence of the economic crisis on the benefits resulting from the membership in the Economic and Monetary Union. Poland's perspective***

The conditions and the shape of the debate on the possibilities of extending the Euro zone changed considerably during the economic crisis in Europe<sup>1</sup>. On the one hand, Euro zone states focused on the internal problems of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and on the other hand, there was an increase in euro-skeptical tendencies and a simultaneous decrease in the approval of the societies of states outside the Euro zone for the adoption of the common currency. In this context, it is worth noting that the plans for Poland to adopt the Euro by 2011, presented by the Civic Platform-Polish People's Party government<sup>2</sup>, were not taken up by Beata Szydło's government. This was, among others, due to the necessity to reconsider the cost-benefit trade-off of Poland's introduction to the monetary union during an economic crisis<sup>3</sup>.

The starting point for this paper are the obligations taken up by Poland in what concerns EMU membership upon its accession to the European Union, taking into account the extent to which it fulfills the nominal and real convergence criteria which were to constitute the prerequisite for obtaining profits from replacing zloty with the European currency. Symptoms of economic slowdown in the Euro zone and its spectrum of institutional and structural deficiencies, which they expose, presented in the subsequent part of this paper, caused the expected positive

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<sup>1</sup> The debate on the future of monetary integration in Europe and Poland's role in this process was also intensified by the United Kingdom's decision to exit the European Union made in June 2016.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Donald Tusk's statement during the 18th Economic Forum in Krynica in September 2008 [Bankier.pl 2008].

<sup>3</sup> The process of preparing to the accession to the Euro zone will probably be influenced by the office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Euro Adoption in Poland within the Ministry of Finance closed down in January 2016 [Wprost.pl 2016]. Representatives of the "classic" theory of optimum currency area (OCA), such as R. Mundell, P. Kenen or R.I. McKinnon suggest that renouncing the national currency is only profitable if the profits from currency integration are greater than the costs resulting from losing autonomy in conducting monetary and exchange rate policy [Rosati 2013: 9].



consequences of adopting the common currency to be treated only as an opportunity seizing which requires initial measures to strengthen the state's economic and institutional potential [Mucha-Leszko 2011: 9]. Therefore, in the third part of the article, the main categories of profits which Poland can obtain if it adopts the Euro are presented, based on theoretical and empirical analyses and taking into account the negative influence of the Euro zone crisis on their emergence.

### **1. Poland's obligations in adopting the common currency. Nominal and real convergence criteria**

When acceding the European Union in 2004, Poland became a member of the EMU as a state under temporary derogation, which is, however, linked to an obligation to fulfill nominal and real convergence criteria (determined in Article 140 of TFEU). Their fulfillment enables the revocation of derogation and opens the way to adopting the Euro. As part of its preparations to the participation in the monetary union, a state is additionally obliged to peg the exchange rate of the national currency to Euro as per the ERM II and, at the moment of accession to the Euro zone, to renounce its autonomic monetary policy and join the banking union<sup>4</sup> and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It is also worth noting that no time restrictions were set for the nominal convergence criteria to be entirely fulfilled, which on the one hand allows the member state to choose the best moment to finalize its accession to the Euro zone, and on the other hand, as the example of Sweden shows, to postpone the adoption of the common currency virtually indefinitely [Rosati 2013: 8].

In accordance with a complex assessment of economic convergence in EU member states with a derogation, including Poland, presented by ECB in "Convergence Report" published in June [ECB 2016], in 2015, Poland fulfilled most of the Maastricht criteria (see table 1). Due to zloty not participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, only the exchange rate

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<sup>4</sup> The banking union is based on the centralization of supervisory competence at the EU level. The first element of the union, the so-called SSM – Single Supervisory Mechanism, established by a resolution of the Council of October 2013, became active on 4 November 2014. From April to June 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted resolutions on creating the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), in accordance with which the Single Resolution Board and the related Single Resolution Fund were created. The last stage of creating a banking union will be the introduction of centralized deposit guarantee scheme.

criterion was not fulfilled<sup>5</sup>. It indicates a relatively high stability of the Polish economy, especially taking into account that negative economic phenomena (low growth rate, instability on financial markets, large discrepancies in the economic cycle phase among EU states) can increase the changeability of certain reference values, through which they also hinder the fulfillment of criteria related to them.

Experiencing the prolonged economic crisis in Euro zone states proves that fulfilling nominal convergence criteria is not a condition which guarantees that dynamic economic growth will be obtained and the growth of the level of wealth will speed up, and the participation in EMU can result in growing macro-economic instabilities, notably in the case of states with weaker economic foundations [NBP 2014: i]. Moreover, the economic slowdown period promotes the accumulation of problems resulting from a lack of the so-called real convergence, which manifests through significant differences in the level of EU state development [Kozłowska 2013: 1].

Table 1. Nominal convergence criteria.

Criterion type	Indicator	Threshold value in the reference period	Indicator value for Poland	Does Poland fulfill the criterion?
Fiscal	<b>Public debt</b>	60% GDP	51.3% GDP	YES
	<b>Budget deficit</b>	3% GDP	2.6% GDP	
Monetary	<b>Average inflation rate</b>	0.7% - average inflation rate in three EU member states with the most stable prices + 1.5 percentage point	-0.5%	YES
	<b>Average nominal long-term interest rate</b>	4.0% – average interest rate in three EU member states with the most stable prices + 2 percentage points	2.9%	YES
Exchange-rate related	<b>Participation of national currency in ERM II</b>	Abiding by the limits of exchange rate fluctuations for at least 2 years and no devaluation of the national currency in relation to the currencies of other EU states	No participation in ERM II	NO

Source: Own work on the basis of [EBC 2016].

<sup>5</sup> Moreover, as part of fulfilling the institutional convergence criteria, Poland has to implement changes in its legislation on the functioning of the National Bank of Poland (Act on the National Bank of Poland, Tribunal of State Act) and changes to the Constitution [ECB 2016: 83].

## 2. Structural deficiencies of the Euro zone

Although the source of recession in the European Union was the economic melt-down in the USA<sup>6</sup>, problems in the Euro zone were also caused by numerous structural deficiencies, which led to the mechanisms in the EMU not sufficiently preventing member states from irresponsibly conducting their economic policy (including fiscal policy) [MF 2015b: 1]. It not only deepened the economic problems of the monetary union, but also caused the risk of Euro zone disintegration to increase<sup>7</sup> [Grosse 2011: 2]. The aforementioned deficiencies have a considerable influence on the distribution of benefits and costs related to adopting the Euro and the functioning within the common currency area.


De-centralized financial supervision in the zone did not stand up to the challenges of limiting threats to the stability of the financial sector, mostly due to strong connections between the banking systems of member states. In other words, the network of financial supervision institutions (safety net) was not adapted to the extent of integration of European financial markets. The result of the financial sector's problems was the necessity to recapitalize banks which were threatened with bankruptcy using public funds. This in turn gave rise to the problem of excessive public debt, and consequently to negative phenomena in the area of real economy (fig. 1).

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<sup>6</sup> The basic channel through which economic problems spread during the crisis were difficulties in the financial sector. Besides global connections between financial markets, this process was accelerated by systematic drops in consumption, investment and turnover in international trade [EC 2009: 24]

<sup>7</sup> Institutional deficiencies and gaps in the EMU confirmed the indications of some economists that the Euro zone does not fulfill the basic requirements of the OCA. Among the properties of the optimum currency area enumerated by R. Mundell, the creator of the OCA theory, were high flexibility of the labor market (workforce mobility) and the necessity to conduct supranational fiscal policy which helps to limit asymmetric economic shocks appearing within the common currency area [Mundell 1961].

**Fig. 1. Correlation between bank crisis, debt crisis and economic crisis in the Euro zone**



Source: Own work on the basis of [Albiński 2014: 33].

Economic growth slowdown had a negative impact on budget revenue, while public spending rose systematically due to rescue packages for the financial system and the launch of economic stimulation programs, which deepened state budget deficits. Moreover, the inefficacy of European states' economic and fiscal policy coordination and supervision mechanisms manifested itself in the form of a growing public debt not only in peripheral Euro zone states (Greece, Spain, Ireland), but also in Italy and France, which are considered pillars of the single currency area. Particular attention in this context is drawn to a number of deficiencies in the Stability and Growth Pact adopted in 1997 as the central mechanism of mobilizing the states in the zone to conduct responsible fiscal policy; among these deficiencies are:

- inappropriate structure of fiscal convergence criteria, focused on the budget deficit criterion but with a rather lax interpretation of public debt level requirements; a consequence of political elites' endeavors to create the widest possible circle of Euro zone member states was ignoring the opinion of economists indicating that the solvency of a state depends most of all on the level of public debt and not budget deficit [Grosse 2013: 18];
- politicizing the excessive deficit procedure provided for in the Pact, which led to large Euro zone states not fulfilling fiscal criteria or

postponing their fulfillment and then not being punished out of fear of retaliation when budget difficulties arose in other Euro zone states;

- symptoms of insufficient engagement of Euro zone states in observing fiscal convergence criteria or attempts at evading them, such as falsifying public statistics or revising them numerous times (Greece, Portugal), as well as "creative macroeconomic accounting", for instance in tax policy, which improves budget balance in the short term<sup>8</sup>;
- mistakenly assuming correlation of fiscal criteria and the state's macroeconomic situation, which led to fiscal indicators going up due to increasing economic discrepancies and not the performance of appropriate public finance policy; it is visible through the correspondence between speculative bubbles on economic markets and a dynamic increase in tax revenue [NBP 2014: 8n].

The influence of market signals on the motivation of Euro zone states to implement necessary economic reforms turned out to be less effective than forecast and expected. The decline of interest rates, stimulated by investors' optimism, caused the supply of loans on the national market to go down, while the increase in demand for financial measures in the economy was satisfied with external financing. Free movement of resources from states with surplus (e.g. Germany) to less wealthy economies in the zone, who experienced financial shortage, fostered the integration of financial markets within the EU. Since the investors perceived the whole Euro zone as a single area, the inappropriately conducted economic policy did not cause their trust to diminish and the high-risk premiums in the form of yields for government securities to increase. At the same time, it enabled increasing or maintaining high public finance deficits regardless of the obligations resulting from the Stability and Growth Pact [MF 2015b: 1].

Although the aforementioned financial flows satisfied the current needs of economic actors, in the long term, they contributed to the formation

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<sup>8</sup> Before acceding the single currency area, states have repeatedly taken adoptive measures so that they could fulfill convergence criteria and be positively verified during the assessment of preparation for monetary integration. After the accession, notably in the case of Mediterranean states, a loosening of fiscal policy and ongoing divergence in maintaining other economic indicators on the required levels could be observed. This phenomenon is called "boxer's syndrome", as the state behaves like a boxer who adjusts his weight before weighing [Kozłowska 2013].

of imbalance, especially due to the fact that the obtained resources were not spent on long-term investments which would improve competitiveness, but rather on ongoing consumption and property purchase [ibidem]. State-level measures did not prevent the imbalance from increasing during the pre-crisis period, and when the crisis broke out, they did not prevent the decrease in competitiveness, difficulties in paying back taken up loans and the increase in social and economic costs of adaptation, especially in poorer areas of the zone. In the scale of the whole Euro zone, it translated into an increase in developmental disproportion.

Moreover, there were no crisis management procedures or mechanisms developed in the Euro zone – no finance facilities for member states threatened with insolvency or suffering from economic difficulties in the face of diminishing trust on the part of financial market actors and rating agencies. The imbalance was also fueled by the fact that although the functions of national central banks of the monetary union member states were taken over by ECB, it does not fulfill the function of the last resort lender, which is important for the credibility of the banking sector.

Economic problems emphasized the low effectiveness of the decision-making system in the Euro zone. Institutional deficiencies at the European level proved to be particularly visible within the Euro zone, although mostly as a result of numerous commercial and financial connections between the members of the zone and limited possibilities to conduct an autonomous budget policy due to coordination processes.

The presented "construction faults" in the Euro zone highlighted the economic and political segmentation tendencies observed during the crisis, which are a consequence of disturbances in the distribution of supportive economic integration costs and benefits among central and peripheral states in the Euro zone. Examples of this asymmetry include the strengthening of the role of intergovernmental institutions within the zone (including the Euro group<sup>9</sup>), which fosters the privileged position of the largest member states, or attempts of influential zone members to burden the less wealthy members of the zone<sup>10</sup> or private entities<sup>11</sup> with the costs of fighting the economic slowdown.

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<sup>9</sup> Group of Ministers of Finance from Euro zone member states, created in 1997, formalized in Protocol no. 14 on the Euro Group to the TFEU.

<sup>10</sup> It is indicated, among others, by Germany's pressure to perform fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation in the most indebted states in the Euro zone (Portugal, Greece) as a way to regain competitiveness on world markets [Grosse 2013: 23].

A factor which alleviates the consequences of the crisis is the currently implemented legal and institutional reform of the EMU, which envisages a number of instruments and legal solutions fostering economic stability; some of them concern only the Euro zone while others are carried out differently than in the case of states from outside the Euro zone [MR 2015a: 3]. The most important institutional changes within the EMU, aimed at neutralizing the consequences of the ongoing crisis and effective prevention of economic disturbances in the future, were presented in Table 2.

Institutional reforms in the Euro zone are moreover accompanied by a management model shift in the EU towards the so-called two-speed Europe with a monetary union as the central area. It is indicated by, among others, the concentration of assistance instruments around the problems of crisis-stricken zone members at the expense of states remaining to-date outside the zone [Grosse 2012: 3n]. Consequently, a large part of the instruments created by the EU as a reaction to the crisis was targeted only at solving economic problems of the single currency area [NBP 2014: i].

Table 2. Institutional reform of the Euro zone

Area	Reform elements
<b>Fiscal discipline increase</b>	European semester Directives on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (six-pack element) Fiscal pact, Two-pack
<b>Mitigating risk resulting from conducting inappropriate economic policy</b>	Macroeconomic imbalance procedure Euro Plus Pact European semester
<b>Crisis management and financing mechanisms</b>	Two-pack, ESM ECB programs for increasing money supply in the economy (government bond purchase in the Euro zone states) and the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism (LTRO and TLTRO)
<b>Adapting financial supervision to the level of integration of European financial markets</b>	European Supervisory Authorities European Systemic Risk Board Changes in banking sector regulations (CRDIV/CRR) Banking union
<b>Improving effectiveness of decision making in the Euro zone</b>	Extending competence and increasing the practical significance of the Euro zone

Source: Own work on the basis of [NBP 2014].

<sup>11</sup> For example, at the beginning of 2012, the nominal value of bonds issued by the Greek government and purchased by private entities, mainly commercial banks and investment funds (so-called haircut), decreased by 50% [ibidem: 27].

### **3. Main categories of benefits from Poland's accession to the Euro zone**

An analysis of the benefits of Poland's accession to the Euro zone was conducted in relation to the selected economic, institutional and political areas, with emphasis on restricting the opportunities to obtain the benefits in the context of an economic crisis. In every area, both short-term benefits, manifesting right after adopting the Euro as a result of changes in business activity conditions, as well as long-term ones, fostering changes in the economy, were taken into account [Wójcik 2008: 19].

#### **3.1. External trade**

The analysis of losses and profits resulting from adopting the common currency within the international commercial exchange area is heavily influenced by the risk of incurring losses by economic actors as a consequence of sudden changes in exchange rates that have taken place in the last few years. This, in turn, is the effect of a growing number of speculative transactions on the currency market and a limited possibility of forecasting currency exchange rates in the context of a significant diversification of economic actors on the market and their expectations. Moreover, according to NBP research, foreign exchange rate risk is indicated by Polish SME owners as one of the main barriers for the development of their business on the international scale [MF 2015a: 1]. Adopting the common currency would then ensure a reduction of exchange rate risk in commerce mainly with Euro zone partners, but also outside EMU for settlements in Euro. For transactions settled in other currencies, the risk will diminish with the increase of the significance of Euro as the settlement currency.

Transaction costs in foreign trade, incurred by consumers and entrepreneurs, are related to currency exchange (margin between buying rate and selling rate of a foreign currency – the currency spread), using instruments for hedging exchange risk and the necessity to compare prices in various currencies, forecast exchange rates, calculate and record them. Benefits for the Polish economy due to a drop in the aforementioned costs will be, on the one hand, proportional to the scale of commercial settlements in Euro, whose share in all commercial transactions is estimated at 70% for exports and 60% for imports [MF 2015a: 1], and on the other hand, to the significance of Euro as an international currency.

Lack of foreign exchange rate risk and lower transaction costs would induce a recovery of commercial exchange between Poland and other Euro zone countries due to increased stability and predictability of commercial activity conditions. Intensive business contacts should, in turn, translate into



a higher level of competition on the markets, which is usually beneficial for customers. The drop in business in the group as well as the decrease in trust towards Euro in international settlements, caused by the Euro zone crisis, can, however, limit trade benefits from Poland's participation in the single currency area.

### **3.2. Lower interest rates**

Joining the monetary union will result in a drop in interest rates in the Polish economy. The European Central Bank usually maintains interest rates at lower levels than the cost of money established by the National Bank of Poland. Reduction of interest rates can, therefore, translate into benefits for both the National Treasury and the private sector, proportionately to the rate of integration of the national financial market with the European market [Kozłowska 2013: 1].

Costs of credits and loans, dropping along with the interest rate set by the central bank, will ensure wider access to financing for enterprises and individual consumers, which will also be supported by a lower exchange risk premium [Wójcik 2008: 20]. State investments and consumer demand, stimulated in this way, should translate into an acceleration of production and economic growth. Moreover, lower interest rates and the related decreasing public debt financing costs determine the extent of benefits for the state budget as a debtor on account of Treasury bond emissions.

The economic crisis significantly modified the perception of the positive outcomes of lower interest rates, mostly by emphasizing the consequences of the so-called financial deepening, manifested by an increase of financial markets' role in the economy and of household lending [Wójcik 2008: 12]. Excessive expansion during the pre-crisis period contributed to the creation of numerous speculation bubbles, which collapsed and posed a number of threats to the financial stability of private entities and the public sector (for example in Spain and Ireland). The tightening of financial supervision and security norms regarding lending on the state and European level during the crisis can limit the possibility of a credit boom occurring [MF 2010: 8]. It is also worth mentioning that the common financial market, on the one hand, ensures an easier access of state entities to foreign capital, but on the other hand, in an imperfect regulatory environment, increases the exposure to contagion effect – the possibility that an economic instability caused by foreign factors will occur.

Moreover, Euro zone crisis changed the perception of risk on financial markets: stability and credibility, before ascribed to the Euro zone states *ex ante*, yielded to the differentiation between states which conduct a

responsible budgetary policy and those who don't, which in turn gave rise to differences in the interest rates for state bonds. This implies that a long-term drop in the costs of obtaining financial means by Poland, expected as a consequence of the accession to the monetary union, will depend on the state's credibility assessment by investors, who will shape the trust towards state securities from the angle of macro-economic stability and rationality of the conducted fiscal policy [MF 2015c: 1].

### **3.3. Exchange policy**

Losing the opportunity to conduct foreign exchange rate policy independently after acceding the monetary union is considered to be one of the most important costs of adopting the common currency. As [Rosati 2013] and others emphasize, the cost of a lack of autonomy in exchange rate policy can be relatively high for states which are poorly integrated with the common currency area. In the case of Poland, a medium-sized state with an open economy, they will be of minor importance. It is, however, necessary to remember that the accession to the Euro zone is connected with the obligation to introduce the Polish currency to the ERM II and limit the fluctuations of zloty against Euro for at least two years before the European Commission's assessment.

Poland's relatively minor economic problems as compared to these of the Euro zone states during the crisis, however, prompt the conclusion that maintaining a flexible currency exchange rate can significantly contribute to the alleviation of negative external consequences of the unfavorable economic conditions. Structural differences between Western economies, based on high innovation and dynamic development of services and the Polish economy, competing mainly in cost and pricing criteria [Geodecki et al. 2012: 6] cause autonomous exchange rate policy to be the main factor in maintaining competitive advantage in the global markets, and renouncing it should be preceded by leveling up developmentally to the best-developed Euro zone states. Moreover, economic difficulties in the Euro zone proved that adopting the common currency does not necessarily lead to an increase in the economic growth rate on the basis of structural changes in the aim of greater innovation, regardless of the state of convergence in the period preceding the accession to the Euro zone [see: Rosati 2013: 31n].

### **3.4. Political and institutional benefits**

Partisans of Poland's fast accession to the monetary union emphasize that the imperative to protect state interests needs to be carried out taking into account that Poland's economic and political potential does not allow for

isolation in the global trade and independent definition of the conditions for Poland's participation in the global economy [Kozłowska 2013]. Therefore, regardless of the balance of short-term costs and benefits from adopting the common currency, acceding to the Euro zone is currently treated as a condition of obtaining strong political position in the EU, i.e. increasing the opportunity to fully participate in the process of making decisions concerning the directions and scope of institutional reforms in the EU. The President of the NBP, as a member of the ECB Governing Council, will be able to participate in the Bank's decision-making processes regarding monetary policy in the Euro zone. The Minister of Finance will be entitled to co-decide on the shape of the zone's economic policy as part of the Euro Group. Currently, this influence is indirect, pursuant to the Fiscal Pact and Euro Plus Pact, both signed by Poland [Rosati 2013: 20]<sup>12</sup>.

For Poland, benefits from greater political and financial solidarity within the Euro zone can be described as ambiguous. The measure of the cost of Poland's obligatory participation in ESM and ECB structures is the size of contributions and purchased shares, as well as potential participation in aid programs for Euro zone states threatened with or suffering from economic problems. Although the majority of the financial contributions can be treated as an investment (opportunity to obtain revenue from loans), maintaining a stable economic situation in Poland limits the possibility of attaining positive net position on account of relevant flows.

## **Conclusions**

The performed analysis indicates that one of the basic reasons for current economic difficulties in the Euro zone was the dominance of the political factor when establishing the principles of EMU functioning, which resulted from the willingness to obtain additional international credibility in the eyes of the widest possible circle of states constituting the monetary union. Marginalization of economic rationality, lack of appropriate institutional solutions and gradual "watering down" of previously-adopted safety mechanisms lie at the heart of Euro zone's low resistance to negative outside influence and destabilizing internal factors. These phenomena result in the necessity to precede Poland's decision to adopt the common currency

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<sup>12</sup> Among other suggestions concerning the institutional strengthening of the Euro zone are: considerable enlargement of Europe's administrative apparatus, creating a separate chamber for monetary union's member states within the European Parliament, creating a separate budget for the Euro zone, dividing the European Commission into commissioners representing the Euro zone and other EU states [Raport końcowy... 2012].

with a well-balanced calculation of economic and political costs and benefits, resulting from the lifting of derogation concerning the participation in the 3rd stage of the EMU. Although fulfilling the formal requirements for replacing the Polish zloty with the European currency in the form of nominal and legal convergence criteria, in the light of the ECB's assessment, does not present major difficulties, determining the appropriate moment to accede the Euro zone might be a challenge, particularly in the context of dynamic structural changes in the zone and, more probably, of the future re-conceptualization of the European monetary union.

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### ***Poland – a welfare state?***

Is it possible to say about today's Poland that we live in a wealthy country, a well-developed welfare state, a country of prosperity, without risking exposing oneself to criticism? Years of sacrifice related to the so-called system transformation and experiencing differences in the level of living between the socialist reality and the West's prosperity place our ideas at the margin of highly developed states in the best of cases, and usually among the poor countries. An echo of these social convictions are also policies and slogans of the dominating political powers. This content is abundant in appeals to conduct reforms which would save us from the imminent catastrophe, to rebuild the destroyed reality, to finally construct a fair social order, weed out the undeserved wealth and eliminate poverty.

This paper focuses on income aspects. It does not, by any means, exhaust the notion of welfare, not to mention well-being. Such areas as education, healthcare, security or housing conditions, presented in a number of cross-sections, would be a necessary element of every paper concerning these notions if it could take up as much space as a medium-sized essay. In the present text, a number of restrictions were thus consciously adopted.

Having put forward these explanations, let us relate to the question set in the introduction in three points, taking into account that the context of this paper puts the author in a position where he is rather subject to criticism than one to dissipate doubts. As a matter of fact, however, without questions there are no answers; therefore, let this thesis-like character be the axis of this work.

### **Poland in the ranking**

Referring to statistical data is sometimes perceived as using an objective source of knowledge. In reality, it is not that simple. Measurements differ (they are differently constructed and measure different things), and their interpretation may be surprising. Despite these troubles, it is hard to imagine any socio-economic reality without them.

Where is Poland located on a global level? It is a rather hard question, since the world consists of numerous different realities, areas, blocks, etc. The European Union has 28 states (after the Brexit referendum, this number may decrease to 27), 19 of whom are in the Eurozone, and 34 states are in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. If we consider such membership as a proof of development, Poland, by

having a place in them, no matter how remote in some aspects, will have a fairly good standing on the global scale. This position will not, however, be perceived as such by the society, because comparisons will be restricted to studying relationships in the wealthy club, and will not take into account the poorest countries in the world. It is also possible, regardless of political memberships in a club, to simply acknowledge that the level of wealth is dictated by a single measurement for the whole world – the income. It can be measured as GDP or GDP per capita. A ranking created in such a manner would have a larger perspective of positions, but the differences between its top, middle and bottom could be surprising even for societies around the middle – a poorly developed country is one in which Gross Domestic Product per capita does not exceed USD 1,045 per year, while a wealthy country is one where it exceeds USD 12,736 [Rocznik Statystyki Międzynarodowej 2015: 26]. Last but not least, measurements dominated by economy do not have to be the best, since quantity does not always capture quality well.

Having gone through these reservations, let us have a closer look at several facts in order to outline a reference point and make an attempt at answering the question. In Europe, treated statistically as a whole, GDP per capita in 2013 was USD 29,086; in African countries: USD 2,114, while in North America: USD 52,384. The world's average is USD 10,564, so it can be assumed that Poland is in the middle-wealthy area, although not necessarily the fastest-developing one [ibidem: 66-67]. According to OECD's report "*Better Life Index*" [psig.com.pl], a Polish household in 2015 earned on average USD 16,234 (with OECD's average being USD 23,938). Consequently, this gives us more or less a middle ranking<sup>1</sup>.

However, such a perspective is not satisfying due to referring to very imprecise measurements. No one doubts that Poland is at a different level of development than poor African countries, although it can be discussed whether we are all aware of the real differences and tragic situation of some communities. A more sensitive reference point is constituted by primarily European states, especially members of the EU, as Poland has been since

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<sup>1</sup> It is necessary to remember, though, that the position depends on what is measured. When speaking of prosperity, it seemed logical to take income into account. If other areas of possible measurement (which can also have a considerable influence on development processes) were to be taken into account, Poland's position in the rankings would be completely different. For example, in educational rankings, in 2015 we had the 11th place in the world and the 5th place in Europe [Wyborcza.pl 2015], but from the point of view of income diversity, it is 27th place (in 2013 among 29 OECD states for which data was available – [Wyborcza.biz 2016]).

2004. Let us refer to 2013 due to the completeness of data (taking into account also their extensive selection). Poland (considering that the higher the position, the better) occupied 16th place among 28 states from the perspective of the risk of poverty or social exclusion, 18th place from the point of view of poverty risk taking into account social transfer (the state's social policy), and 5th place in low work intensity in household [ibidem: 79nn].

Before we move on, let us formulate a very imperfect outline of an answer: Poland is not a very wealthy country, but it is in the club of wealthy ones and is placed in the middle of their ranking, which suggests that in comparison with poorer countries in the world, it could pass as a welfare state.

### **Prosperity measures, or more on poverty**

It is hard to assume that a binary way of thinking is the best one when reflecting on poverty, wealth, misery or prosperity. Does a lack of poverty mean wealth? It would be naive to think it is so. Does a high level of wealth (however it is measured) mean a lack of problems in the country? Surely not. Simplifications resulting from a lack of measurements for wealth, prosperity, well-being or richness often obstruct the image of both poverty and wealth. A diminishing scale of unfavorable phenomena or ones thought to be unfavorable is, therefore, often interpreted as an improvement of the quality of living.

In 2016, over half of Poles (55%) assumed that their financial resources were mediocre and sufficient for satisfying basic, everyday needs. Fulfilling more complex needs required saving money. 3% declared living in poverty (they could not satisfy their basic needs)<sup>2</sup> and as many declared living in luxury and being able to afford certain extravagance. In a 12-year perspective (2004-2016), the size of the "middle" group, despite fluctuating slightly, remained at the same level. It was always the largest group. It is noteworthy that the number of people declaring extreme poverty decreased (from 9% to 3%, and it was an almost consistent downward trend in time)

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<sup>2</sup> For comparison: the rate of extreme poverty in 2015, measured with the living wage, was 6.5%, poverty line (which is the income threshold entitling to apply for social assistance benefits) was 12.2% and relative poverty (referring to minimum subsistence levels) was 15.5%; all the data for a 1-person working household [Bendowska, Bieńkuńska, Luty, Sobestjański, Wójcik 2015].



while the number of people declaring being wealthy grew (from 0% to the aforementioned 3% – CBOS 2016). Briefly speaking – most of us feel neither wealthy nor poor. Maybe because of this majority it is hard to notice that numbers for wealth went up while numbers for poverty went down?

This is a record of certain awareness among Poles. Hard data show that 5.4% did not have enough money for food in 2015 (although in 2014, 12.6% self-assessed their household budget as good, while 31.7% said it was bad), An average monthly available income per person was PLN 1,712 in 2014 and it probably was not too big an amount, taking into account that the income quintile share ratio of available income was 6.4 at the same time [Bendowska, Bieńkuńska, Luty, Sobestjański, Wójcik 2015]<sup>3</sup>. To put it simply: 20% of the wealthiest people had 6.5 times larger income than 20% of the poorest people (although the diversification in both these groups can be even larger). But there is one more important question: where does the income come from? In most cases from remunerated work. It was the source of income for 61.9% of the population (on average). In the case of the wealthiest people, it was the source of income for 76.5%, in the case of the poorest ones: 41.9% [Dochody i warunki życia ludności Polski 2015: 162].

Therefore, work is important for welfare<sup>4</sup> (even better if it is stable and appropriately remunerated). In Poland, the unemployment rate in 2014 was 9%, while long-term unemployment rate was 3.3%. The first figure in particular gains periodic publicity in the media. Indeed, as we have stated above, the key to a good, or at least better, life is work; its lack is a fundamental determiner of poverty. However, beside the mentioned unemployment, the rate of employment in the same year was 51.2% (according to other data, calculated for a different age group, it was 66.5% – Dochody i warunki życia ludności Polski 2015). If these two figures are added, it still does not equal 100% (even if pensioners, old-age pensioners and disabled people of economic activity age are taken into account)<sup>5</sup>. So the problem might be not the simple lack of a job, but access to work and its intensity, or the possibility to fulfill one's potential to work and achieve income.

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<sup>3</sup> The index mentioned at the end is a comparison of 20% of the highest income (5th quintile) with 20% of the lowest income (1st quintile).

<sup>4</sup> T. Piketty (2015) mentions it many times in his book. It might be problematic, however, to have access to appropriate work – see e.g. J. Rifkin (2001).

<sup>5</sup> Such a result – unemployment rate – places us on the 16th position in the EU, while employment rate (the higher figure) on the 20th place; [see: Rocznik Statystyki Międzynarodowej 2015: 72].

Such a statement evades social awareness, as it is easier for politicians and the mass-media (even without understanding the measurements) to refer to the unemployment and poverty or social exclusion. However, none of these categories measure prosperity or well-being. They measure lack of appropriate income level (income poverty, including extreme poverty – living wage), material deprivation, social exclusion, etc. It is easier to help a poor person who does not have enough income in relation to some benchmark, without ensuring this person's further well-being and conditions for development, than to guarantee proper functioning of the whole remunerated work system<sup>6</sup>. Complex measurements of poverty are not, therefore, and cannot be measurements of welfare.

### **Have much or be able to do much – appetite comes with eating**

In 2015, according to Poles' declarations, life at a level which satisfied only their basic needs was on average corresponding to an income of slightly more than PLN 1,000 per person. Life at a medium level was supposed to be enabled by ca. PLN 1,500-1,900 per person, while an affluent life – ca. PLN 2,500 per person. Circa, since the distances between responses in these three income brackets (indications of lowest and highest amounts) were extremely different. At the lowest income level, the difference of the expected income (between the lowest and highest value) was PLN 5,900, at the medium level – PLN 19,750, and at the wealthy level – PLN 49,773 [CBOS 2015].

How much do we need to have a decent life? The relative poverty line in Poland was estimated at EUR 3,202 annually (for a one-person household). It was not the lowest figure among the EU states (Hungary: EUR 2,738, Romania: EUR 1,318). But in Denmark the amount was EUR 16,668, in Sweden – EUR 16,272, in Finland – EUR 14,221 and in Luxembourg – EUR 20,592 [Dochody i warunki życia ludności Polski 2015: 182]. The differences are enormous. Poverty in one country means incredible wealth in another one, not even one that is remote in terms of geography or civilization. Therefore, both poverty and wealth are relative categories. A high poverty line in Luxembourg is linked to the high cost of living in that country. Living

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<sup>6</sup> On poverty and social exclusion measuring, see: e.g. Lister (2007), Deniszczuk, Kurowski, Styrz (2007), Broda-Wysocki (2012), Golinowska i Broda-Wysocki (2005).

is certainly cheaper in Romania; if it cost the same as in Luxembourg, while the level of income stayed the same, it would be hard to imagine that the citizens could afford anything. Mechanical comparison of two countries' data concerning poverty and drawing conclusions on their prosperity says nothing of the factual conditions of living in these countries, although it may be supposed that in a generally wealthier country being poor is overall less challenging than in a poorer one.

The crux of the matter is located somewhere else – in the notion of social cohesion, comprising different values and opinion [see more on that term: Golinowska, Kocot 2016]. What values are considered most important? What is the level of trust towards people and public institutions? What is the level of satisfaction of needs, in particular the needs of children as those who will build the future welfare? Poles traditionally value health and family happiness as well as love (so, the private sphere). Work and interpersonal relations in a social perspective are less appreciated. In this case, the potential of trust is twice smaller than in the private sphere [Bieńkuńska, Łysoń, Sobestjański 2015]<sup>7</sup>. The questions is why differences in the social distribution of the appreciated values, in the approach to satisfying own needs and the needs of the future generation seem to be vital in describing the difference of prosperity between countries which have achieved a certain degree of wealth.

It is also important to modify the perception of the problem of low wealth and poverty. Comparing the poorest with the wealthiest will not lead to anything else than showing the poor what they will never achieve. It also is not certain whether the poor would like to, or even if they are able to, imagine the wealth which some members of the same society experience. Of course, we can roll out egalitarian and justice-related arguments; however, from the point of view of a stable social and developmental policy, they seem to be insufficiently effective<sup>8</sup>. That is why the new approach prefers comparing problem situations to the average (average level/standard of living). If it is reasonably high, in accordance with the aforementioned data, it

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<sup>7</sup> Earlier, this issue was discussed also in the terms of social capital. In the Polish context, this problem was presented by R. Putnam (1995 and 2008).

<sup>8</sup> An egalitarian distribution of goods is not an achievement. It is much more important to equip people with the ability to transform the available resources according to their aspirations and goals [see: Sen 2000: 92nn]. But the discussion whether the most important factual achievement of neo-liberalisation was not the creation, but redistribution of wealth and income, is still going on [Harley 2008: 213].

can be a real point of reference and the aim of poorer social layers' aspirations. Prosperity is not built with colored pictures of wealth, but with a reasonable construction of capabilities allowing to achieve a satisfactory, time-related standard of living<sup>9</sup>.

In welfare states, not only formally declared freedoms and statutory potential ways of fulfilling them are of importance. Any person should have the opportunity to aspire to prosperity in the sense of freedom and capability. It places them in a situation of choice and responsibility. A restriction for such actions is not low income as such, but an income so low that it makes it impossible for the person to develop and use this capability. Moving the stress from achievements to capabilities, or from distribution of the existing goods towards creating new ones seems to be a fundamental boundary condition for creating and maintaining prosperity, whose distribution would be perceived as relatively fair<sup>10</sup>.

It might be the reason why Strategy Europe 2020 established very ambitious goals of smart growth (knowledge-based economy, creating a high added value), sustainable growth (efficient use of resources) and growth supporting social inclusion (mainly by supporting employment) [Strategia Europa 2020]. The sense of these goals was lost in the bureaucratic newspeak and complicated logic of the political language of high, medium and low development of countries. Nonetheless, after overcoming problems

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<sup>9</sup> This approach is visible e.g. in the last report of UNICEF called Fairness for Children. A league table of inequality in child well-being in rich countries, 2016, in which, besides often-used income categories, appear such matters as social justice and equal opportunities, education, health and appropriate health-promoting behavior, satisfaction with life and immigration. The report analyses bottom-end income inequality in rich countries, or in other words, the situation of the poor in rich countries. The most egalitarian among wealthy countries are the Scandinavian countries. The available income per one child among 10% of the poorest households in these countries is lower than the medium income by 38% (medium, not highest income!). In 19 out of 41 of the discussed states which were deemed to be wealthy, this value exceeds 50%, and in the south of Europe – 60%.

<sup>10</sup> Help, which is not often linked to the possibility to choose and does not create an alternative in such a way that the aided person can take part in the achievements resulting from the support activities, will be considered to have no alternatives, so it will turn into a sense of entitlement rather than a feeling of gradual improvement of the situation and a march towards prosperity [Sen 2000: 74nn]. Of course, society can take up some part of responsibility for someone's prosperity, especially if there is the threat that it will fall to a very low level. It does not mean, however, that the society has to equally deal with the performance of this person's other goals [Sen 2000: 89].

resulting from the extreme poverty of the majority of population and kindling the ambition to build prosperity, it might be worth looking at these provisions more favorably.

Instead of making conclusions, let us try to suggest an answer to the question in the title. Poland is not a poor country, where containing hunger, illiteracy and public security are problems while the level of living is determined by an income of 1-2 dollars a day. This relatively good starting position loses its value and appreciation by way of oversimplified comparisons with wealthier and much wealthier countries. In rankings constructed in such a way, we are placed in the middle, although obviously depending on more detailed criteria, this place can fluctuate. Giving in to the mannerism of fighting with low income and poverty, using simple comparisons of the Romania vs. Luxembourg sort, we lose sight of the factors which condition Poland's further development – from a non-poor country, and even a moderately wealthy one, to a welfare state. This stage does not concern simple support to the poor; it concerns creating conditions for free and responsible actions, not a simple redistribution, but creation of an added value which is assessed as morally good. It is the source of welfare, whose indicator is a good and satisfying average standard of living for as many members of the society as possible, and not an illusory situation where everyone is rich and wealthy.

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***Social work in the penitentiary policy and rehabilitation in Poland and in selected EU countries***

The dynamics of social, economic and political processes in Poland after 1989 has led to tendencies developing freedom of initiatives and to seeking new ways in which the state and its citizens could function. One of the most important reforms that had to be implemented was adopting a new Executive Penal Code in 1997 and its significant amendment in 2015, which followed a number of previous ones. The provisions enacted and the consequences of different reforms in this legal area resulted in modern forms of work with prisoners appearing in penitentiary practice. However there are still questions appearing to what extent the accepted provisions really serve new forms of rehabilitation. Can we approach optimal solutions and will the developed conclusions allow to refine the accepted solutions? The Polish prison service, as other areas of social life, is continuously transformed and might gradually introduce solutions bringing better effectiveness of remedial influence [See: Kozaczuk 2004, and also Machel 2007: 11-14.]

The subject of connotation of penitentiary politics with social work executed in Poland (important for prisoners and society) seems important for the discussed matter. The adopted and implemented various solutions in this area have been used by Western European states for years. Among the factors influencing it the following may be listed: different political and social situation, economic system and priorities set in reintegration of prisoners. Post-war resolutions and changes in European prison systems were treated adversely in Poland and were denied as ideas not matching a socialistic state. The official ideology and different patterns accounted for favoring repressive solutions, which were inhumane towards prisoners. On the other hand social welfare in the communist system was concentrated on securing existential goods of citizens of Polish People's Republic [Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa - PRL], especially after the II World War with so many needs present. The post-war system of social politics was influenced by the political and economic system of PRL so it was ideologically, politically and economically dependent on the Soviet Union. Significant changes have been only executed since the social and political changes of 1989 and they are still not satisfying.

Some definitions of concepts may be useful here. Source literature gives information making the matter of penitentiary more precise. "Penitentiary politics due to its purpose concerns the correct functioning of provisions and institutions in power and those of the future, which are designed or developed. (...) Penitentiary politics forms certain slogans originally in the scope of making the technique of executing penalties better. They slowly develop towards perfection, reach a higher level, do not limit themselves only to making the technique better and aim at reaching substantively higher targets. (...) Penitentiary politics is the part of penal politics which refers only to penalty and other means of limiting freedom while penal politics refers to all kinds of punishment included in a given legal system..." [Śliwowski 1982: 22-23]. Penitentiary prevention focuses on the problem of executing penalties and serves optimization of actions for reintegration and rehabilitation.

Specifying the concept of social work it is worth mentioning that since 1917 it is described as activity of providing assistance to people in need. Since then together with evolution of societies all over the world new definitions of social work have been appearing [see. Kamiński 2000].

The definition preferred in this paper is the one dating back to 2000: "social work is a profession supporting a social change, solving problems arising in interpersonal relations and empowerment and release of people to enrich their welfare. Using theories of human behaviors and social systems social work intervenes in places where people enter into interactions with their environment. Human rights and social justice are fundamental for social work" [www.ipsir.uw.edu.pl]. *The Act on Social Service* specifies social work as "(...) professional activity aiming at aiding persons and families in enhancing or regaining ability to function in the society by fulfilling appropriate social roles and creating conditions in favor of this purpose." [The Act on Social Service, Article 6, Point 12].

Coincidence of the scopes of social politics and penitentiary politics is justified as families of criminals and also perpetrators leaving prisons themselves are potential clients of social service and social work "services". Conditions of their lives and social standard in the years to come after being released from prison may influence either social reintegration or crime repetition. Complementariness of actions in social and penitentiary politics is an important complement of practical solutions expected by society. Lack of rational presence and activity of social workers in appropriate life moments of prisoners is a serious drawback here.



It is worth mentioning that E. Kantowicz, who studies the subject, claims that " (...) social work can be and is, in increasingly wide scope a kind of antidote to social problems" [See: Kantowicz 2005: 68]. This thesis has a chance to become a fact under the condition that legal changes in favor of it will be followed by precise practical solutions.

Basing on law currently in power we can undertake actions to make rehabilitation of prisoners effective and support their social reintegration after they are released from prison. The following acts regulate this case directly: Executive Penal Code and Act on Social Aid and, to some extent, Act on Prison Service and also Act on Court Custodians [See: Journal of Law No 90, item 557, Journal of Law No 115, item 728 - as amended, Journal of Law No 79, item 523, Journal of Law No 98 item 1071]. Social law in relation to state's social politics includes 32 statutory acts encompassing former prisoners with legal solutions [See: Auleytner 2005: 191].

Changes successively made in penitentiary politics reflect tendencies of perfecting enforcement of custodial sentences and constant modifications confirming the fact that social work may be an alternative to actions taken so far are not seen. At the same time the discourse on effectiveness of penitentiary rehabilitation and substitute actions reflects a need for changing the currently used methods. Probably it is difficult to substitute penitentiary rehabilitation with social work but other solutions may be introduced, which would allow presence of a social worker in prison and specify his/her possibilities of acting in manners comparable to those in different institutions [see: Stępniaak 2004: 29-36].

Penitentiary politics is fundamentally related to penal politics and it may be said that the first one specifies rules for practical execution of penitentiary rehabilitation. Once again it is worth underlining that statutory law changes should initiate practical actions. However, there are still some problems which require studies and analysis and precise solutions. "(...) small effectiveness of ruled custodial sentences executed in prisons measured with repetition of crimes and repetition of sentencing require new research and studies. As a result of these factors numbers of persistent criminals in prisons and released ex-prisoners enlarging the social outcast are even excluded from the society have increased in recent years" [Szymanowski 2010: 11]. According to the opinion of M. Porowski, referred to by H. Machel, penitentiary politics can be executed in three variants. Both authors name the repressive variant underlining the isolating function, rehabilitation variant preferring the civilizing function and the repressive-reforming variant, which emphasizes equality of both functions. The shown

preferences depend on the penitentiary politics executed nowadays towards a certain number of prisoners [Machel 2003: 45].

Executing the penitentiary politics in complex and specific social space of prisons and remand facilities it must not be forgotten that there is an interesting possibility to act in favor of social reintegration of prisoners, which is included in activity of social workers. Unfortunately, Poland has not seen creation of a social work model in prisons yet. It is worth mentioning that instructional materials used by students of Non-Commissioned Officer's School of Center for Prison Service Training [Polish Centralny Ośrodek Szkolenia Służby Więziennej (COSSW)] take up the subject of social work for the benefit of prisoners in limited scope. "Social work is a commonly recognized professional activity allowing persons and families to identify personal, social and environmental difficulties adversely influencing them. Social workers makes it possible for them to overcome these difficulties through sustaining, rehabilitating, securing or adjusting activities. The current tendency to improve the manner of post-penitentiary assistance is the one of developing a model of social work for the benefit of people isolated in prisons. This should be an integrated activity aimed at preparing a prisoner to enter an environment and preparing an environment for the arrival of a prisoner. Establishing a contact between a prisoner and a social worker when the first one is still in prison or remand facility would enable the execution of the following exemplary tasks:

- providing interim shelter,
- gaining social insurance allowance,
- opinion of disability level,
- employment support program for permanently unemployed,
- listing governmental and local-governmental institutions for social assistance,
- listing NGOs working in local communities,
- making a prisoner aware of the scope of pathology in his/her environment and methods of fighting it.

Currently a similar role is played by professional court custodians as in accordance with Article 167 § 1 of Enforcement Penal Code a prisoner, before being released from prison, has the right to apply to a penitentiary court for establishing a professional custodian for him/her, especially if the conditions of life awaiting him after the release from prison can make social reintegration harder. Considering reluctance of prisoners towards court custodians and excessive number of prisoners released conditionally or

having their sentences suspended and supervised by custodians it is doubtful that this statutory solution will be successful." [Karczewski: 143-144].

Article 38 and 41 of Enforcement Penal Code is worth mentioning here as it prefers execution of penitentiary assessment. "Social work in our country is still placed outside the judicial system, in the area of general social service system, more precisely as a type of allowance within its frames." [Stępnia 2004: 38]. As the cited author states, social work somehow remains in opposition to traditionally understood rehabilitation, although "...in today's reality prison does not teach activity, creativity or independence, which are so much needed in social functioning..." [Kędzierski 2008: 53].

Analyzing this matter one needs to be aware that effective introduction of social work to judicial system would require acquisition of further professional competences by social workers. This is a demanding challenge especially as the current environment of social work professionals constantly highlights the lack of an act on the profession of a social worker. A draft of the act is ready but there have been no further legislative works [See: [zalaczniki.ops.pl](http://zalaczniki.ops.pl)]. The remaining matter in this context is the relevant manner of introducing rules of employment and scope of activity of social workers, who could execute social work in prisons into penitentiary politics. Social workers' engagement and their work should not substitute the proper rehabilitation work, because certain rules of functioning of prisons will remain contrary to it.

As mentioned above, the current social work related to prisoners is executed on the basis of the act on social assistance. However, both regulations and practice indicate that the whole activity is mainly performed within the frames of post-penitentiary assistance, which is given after the release of a prisoner. Therefore there is still lack of possibility of professional introduction of social work to prisons, because penitentiary politics and social politics show limited possibility of postulated correlation already used in other countries [more: Szczygieł 2002, Stępnia 2001]. Performing these actions by Prison Service pedagogues is an interim solution.

A problem still remains with the foregoing work load of workers, who have too many duties and cannot "cross" prison walls within the scope of social work. In the used analysis we are mainly interested in the matter of corrective personnel strictly responsible for penitentiary rehabilitation [See: Machel 2003: 80-162]. "If the idea of rehabilitation of criminals is to have a practical dimension prison must have features of a pedagogical institution.

Otherwise this idea will not have any chance of implementation." [ibidem: 51]

The postulate put forward by P. Stępnik – an advocate of social work - in the situation of penitentiary rehabilitation crisis the rule is not to deteriorate the social situation of prisoners [Stępnik 1998: 40]. In further deliberation the author of this rule justifies social work in prisons. Dividing prisoners into categories he considers the possibility of providing social work in certain types of prisons. He finds out that "...gradual employment of social workers in prisons would simplify practical introduction of methods of social enhancement of convicts as priorities in penitentiary work." [ibidem: 41].

Underlining the significant role of social work he notes that transfer from traditionally executed rehabilitation to the one correlated with social work offers new opportunities. It is possible "...by assistance in creating minimal social conditions necessary to live in accordance with law (employment, accommodation, material support, advisory service etc.). From this point of view social work basing on a highly valuable idea of providing convicts with some minimal set of conditions to live in accordance with law in an open environment does not have to break off with the mocked, or at least criticized idea of rehabilitation of criminals." [ibidem: 147-148].

As mentioned before, in Poland we still experience concentration of social actions taken after a convict is released from prison. This situation bears specified consequences and influences not only prisoners but also their families. All the more that functioning is even more difficult after leaving prison than it is before and after the imprisonment.

Executive Penal Code sets forth the purpose of executing a custodial sentence, Act on Social Assistance stipulates rules for providing it to former prisoners and their families while Act on Prison Service allows creation of teams supporting the activities. [See: Article 67, §1 of Executive Penal Code, Article 7 of Act on Social Assistance, Article 8, Point 3 of Act on Prison Service]. Analyzing these acts we can notice that there are no solutions which would allow a relevant legal connection and introduction of complementary elements. "Social work does not resign from any challenge if it can help people to function in the society in the best possible way" [Piasecki 2002: 103]. A transfer of solutions from the currently executed rehabilitation to social work in prisons would be a certain chance. However, there are no correct legal solutions and the subsequent changes in penitentiary politics. Let us remember that it is not a new idea in Poland. In 1959 there was an experiment to employ social section clerks. "...penitentiary departments

were created together with position of a social section clerk dealing with post-penitentiary assistance. A fund of prisoner's self-help was established, which has had no equivalent in other countries" [publikacje.edu.pl]. Social section clerks were responsible for: gathering data on convicts and their families, assistance in finding employment after release, directing the convicts in need to social aid centers, help in getting clothes, IDs. Work of those clerks in 25 prisons was suspended and their duties were assumed by post-penitentiary educators [Piasecki 2002: 100-101]. The following statement by a practitioner, penitentiary educator, author of the analyzed paper sounds remarkably meaningful: "...currently only social work fully meets the challenges of Polish penitentiary science at the threshold of a new century." [ibidem: 103].

It is worth remembering that the discussion over the scientific dimension of social work in the Western European countries has been held since 1980s. Currently these countries have developed practical solutions concerning the use of social work in penitentiary science. For example, in England, while still in prison, convicts contact a custodian working in prison and indicate individual problems which they may encounter after being released. Custodians organize courses where prisoners learn to tackle current and potential problems. In Germany prison service offers advisory services concerning financial, personal and social problems. Post-penitentiary assistance there relies on cooperation among prison administration and social organizations which, inter alia, help in seeking employment and accommodation. In Sweden, France and Norway prison administrations also primarily try to provide convicts with accommodation and work. In Switzerland those leaving prisons without a domicile are directed to so called transitory houses and in Austria - to hotels [Rekosz 2010: 18].

Hopefully, recently in Poland social work has started to be treated as a new scientific discipline called "social assistance and social work theory" [Wiatrowski 2008: 78-79].

An important action partly solving problems of post-release adaptation is provided by the efficient functioning of court custodians. Their status is set forth in Act on Court Custodians [See: Act on Court Custodians, Journal of Law of 2001, No 98, item 1071]. Since the mid-90s basing on the British experience, the activity of so-called penitentiary custodians was experimentally initiated [Machel 2003: 295-299]. In Poland they appeared in Białystok district and probably also worked in some other districts. However, it turns out that there is no legal basis to use this term for

custodians working in prisons in accordance with Article 164 of Executive Penal Code. It is rather indicated that the name "penitentiary custodian" was conventionally used for those performing their duties mainly in prisons, assuming duties of prison educators [ibidem: 296].

"A penitentiary custodian provides assistance to prison administration in preparing prisoners to be released and uses the time of imprisonment to prepare their families for their return. If the family does not await the return of the convict a custodian organizes the first days after the release. [Szczygieł 2002: 217]. The fundamental thing related to the activity of court or penitentiary custodians is the fact that they do not perform strictly social work and are strictly connected to the judicial system to execute the post-penitentiary rehabilitation and prevention [see: Article 169-172, Executive Penal Code].


To sum up it may be argued that social work is present in politics and penitentiary rehabilitation of our state. However, penitentiary practice indicates on one hand some of its limitations and on the other - possibilities of including it in rehabilitation activities. Skillful organization of the penitentiary rehabilitation system in connection with social work can be an alternative for the foregoing solutions used in practice. Modified penitentiary politics stands a chance to contribute to creating a model providing for participation of social workers in the repairing process for those in prison. Once again it needs to be underlined that in spite of the fact the social work executed in accordance with current law enables supporting prisoners and their families it is the lack of unequivocal provisions which makes any progress in this area difficult. The area of the existing social assistance and social work in the light of real needs is still a challenge for activities in penitentiary space. Specialized training of social workers and their appropriate placement in prison systems is an idea which is not related to substituting penitentiary educators but rather to professional support for foregoing initiatives.

While source literature indicates opinions of authors who reject the classic rehabilitation for the benefit of social work, the correlation of suggested activities instead of substituting the foregoing ones seems more justified. It is enough, however, to consider the number of persons dealt with by penitentiary educators and the need for different types of social work wards to confirm that the effects of activities are related to job and workplace conditions. There are interesting opinions placed on the forum of Independent Self-governing Union of Prison Service Officials and Workers. One of educators anonymously states: "The unit in which I work is a semi-

opened prison unit. The number of prisoners fluctuates on average between 190 and 230. Apart from me there is one more educator employed, so there are about 95-115 prisoners per each pedagogic group. The character of this unit, which makes it different from others, is that prisoners from 3rd unit both learn and work being employed in all work places of the prison (production center, kitchen, laundry, maintenance, cleaning services) and external groups outside of the prison. Taking into consideration the total number of prisoners, most of them frequently take advantage of visits and leave the prison. Consequently it causes increase in influence and obligation related to servicing prisoners. Accumulation of duties, especially nowadays in holiday period, caused the fact that while admitting a John Due prisoner to the prison I trusted in calculations of the term of periodical assessment made in the previous unit. It turned out that the term was miscalculated. There was a 3 days difference concerning, as I understand The Head's care to rightfully execute the custodial sentence. I am, however, forced to raise the question of totally unreal, even from the perspective of common sense, demands which you make towards me. I understand that the construction of the scope of my responsibility universally matching all educators' positions, possibly in the whole country, enormously facilitates your work. Hard as I try, I am not able to understand the sense of the definition created by you, which regulates a completely new concept of so called "educator with no education group". You specify and sanction the existence of 1 post in the penitentiary department (senior educator), who was not assigned any education group and his job is to perform actions enigmatically referred by you as penitentiary "influence". Because of that and the fact that I am not able to "serve" 200 prisoners on my own I request temporary delegation of a chaplain working on full time basis in the penitentiary department to assist me. It might happen that with his help I will be able to make miracles" [Nszzfipw.p2a.pl].

The number of social workers per number of social aid clients is clearly stipulated in Act on Social Aid. "Social Aid Center employs social workers proportionally to the number of residents in the community at the ratio of one social worker per 2000 residents but not fewer than three workers" [Act on Social Aid]. Therefore, if new solutions are suggested in this field, there is always the financial issue. Polish prison service budget does not guarantee sufficient amount that would allow introduction of this type of innovation, so the forecast seems to be unambiguous. Taking into consideration the fact that penitentiary units can keep from (more or less) 60 to 1480 convicts a conclusion can be drawn that prisoners constitute a significantly large group that should be kept under custody of social workers. It is proven by the information on population in penitentiary units [See: sw.gov.pl].

**Chart 1. Population of prisoners in Poland between 2000 and 2014**



Source: [prisonstudies.org (a)].

After analyzing the relationship between penitentiary politics and social work executed in Poland towards prisoners it is worth mentioning solutions used in selected EU states. It is particularly important to gain solutions which would create cooperation between the social aid system and penitentiary politics in Poland.

By definition, social work supporting particular persons and families in enhancing or regaining ability to function in society by playing appropriate social roles and creating conditions being favorable to this purpose is particularly close to the pursuit of penitentiary rehabilitation. A broadly understood activity of social workers in many countries was extended by working for the benefit of prisoners and those who stayed in prison and so called open environment and closed environment were merged [Stępniaak 1998: 55]. Prison limits its influence only to rehabilitation and prevention in the environment of convicts while sometimes the need of support concerns also their families. Therefore, support out of prison is a better solution. In that situation a social worker can effectively accomplish certain assistance goals. Following the example of other countries social work should be introduced to the strand of custodial sentence execution. Accepting the division into penitentiary influence and rehabilitation influence we assume that they can smoothly penetrate the environment of prisoners and their families during the stay in prison and after the release. Keeping certain intensity of support and accompaniment and even control of environments of ex-prisoners would naturally involve social workers in subsequent stages of custody and aid directed towards them. "Penitentiary influence is: total influence of prison's administrations on prisoners, which aims at keeping good health, discipline, security against demoralization, safety and their rehabilitation. Rehabilitation influence is programmed,



individualized influence on prisoners (also therapeutical) aiming at changing their attitude towards obeying law and moral norms" [Machel 2003: 23].

Underlining the fact that social work is not penitentiary or post-penitentiary rehabilitation close to pedagogy or psychology, it should be reconsidered how to correctly join these strands with each other. "Highlighting the educational role of social work led to the proposal of specifying the described activity with the phrase "social-educational work", which should cover activities for the benefit of individuals, groups and whole societies..." [Kantowicz 2005: 105]. Each state regulates social aid in a slightly different way and unification is even more difficult due to different rehabilitation standards. Polish law in Article 2.1 of Act on Social Aid uses the following definition: "Social aid is an institution of social politics of the state aimed at enabling persons and families to overcome difficult life situations, which they are not able to cope with, using own privileges, resources and possibilities (Journal of Law 2015 item 163).

Integrating the system of social aid and penitentiary politics offers a chance of accommodation of convicts released from prisons and their families to the requirements of the society, particularly in the scope of obeying law and functioning in accordance with social expectations. Therefore it would be possible to protect the society and complete rehabilitation started during imprisonment. This case was settled by P. Stępniaak who claims that: "rehabilitation puts traditional pressure on education work while social work exposes the guardianship function" [Stępniaak 1998: 65]. At the same time as P. Stępniaak notes by treating prophylactics as a form of crime prevention we can follow England, France, Italy, Germany and Denmark from the early 20th century when they preferred this solution as a success of social work while dealing with criminals [see. Stępniaak 2007: 163]. "Western European Countries give them (rehabilitation and social work - author's note) different content and differently set their priorities of influence" [ibidem: 164]. Naturally a question appears if social work in penitentiary units can be an alternative to penitentiary rehabilitation. A meaningful commentary complements the author's opinion on the mentioned subjects. "Social work requires common effort, which we do not like to make. Due to that the paradigm of rehabilitation will remain alive as it is comfortable, justifies apparent actions and enters the culture of apparent effort. It assumes that only prison personnel should work with prisoners. Other members of society or - better - a collection of persons are excused from that. In some sense it means social sweeping the problem under the rug. Easy, comfortable, practical, peculiarly opportunistic. None of these adjectives may be referred to social work with prisoners, Both their

success and generally the sense of its undertaking depend on social will of participation" [Stępniaak 2014: 128-129]. In the countries which built penitentiary politics with no totalitarian burden it is surely achievable, but in Poland it is still difficult to execute [ibidem: 128]. The table below shows some of the problems of penitentiary system in selected countries.

**Table 1. Penitentiary systems in selected European countries - comparison of major problems**

Penitentiary system	Major problems
Denmark	The problem of ethnic minorities and drugs in prisons, psychiatric problems of prisoners related to imprisonment, violence used by organized groups of prisoners, overcrowding in prisons
France	Drastically increasing number of prisoners; the rate of prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants has risen from 75 in 2001 to 100 in 2015, major overcrowding in prisons, high percentage of foreigners (21.7% of prisoners); bad conditions in prisons
United Kingdom	Drastic overcrowding in prisons (149 prisoners per 100,000 citizens), high level of mortality among prisoners (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report [2013-2014]); very high rate of psychiatric problems among prisoners; increasing tendency of prison population
Poland	Overcrowding in prisons (high rate of 201 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants); crisis in convicts' employment; obsolete infrastructure, dominance of protective functions in open and semi-open types of custody; lack of trained penitentiary staff; technical standards and treating prisoners in a way characteristic to units of the highest level of security


Source: [Nowak 2015: 58].

The solutions presented below used in different countries are hard to compare directly to the Polish ones. There is a significant role of the number of prisoners and financial possibilities of authorities responsible for custody over prisoners. However, some concepts should be considered as they might turn out to be useful for our solutions in the future.

Danish and other Scandinavian penitentiary systems working in penitentiary and reintegration politics are thought to be modern [see. The Report of Supreme Chamber of Control (Polish: Raport Najwyższej Izby Kontroli) *Social Re-adaptation of Prisoners Convicted to long Imprisonment*: 67-68]. In Denmark the penitentiary politics and penalty execution are performed pursuant to Execution Act, Program of Assumptions for Prison and Probation Work of 1993 and European Prison Rules, while the penitentiary system and post-penitentiary assistance belong to Department of Prison Service and Probation. Danish prison and probation services are combined. "In recent years a low rate of 62 prisoners per 100,000 residents

has been achieved. Danes consequently close consecutive prisons and remand centers aiming at decreasing the number of convicts. It is proven by the successively falling number of prisoners and an offer of "renting" a pretty large number of prison cells submitted to Norwegian prison service. Danish prisons hold a small number of prisoners convicted to long sentences - only 2% of the sentences rendered are those over two years of imprisonment, 2/3 are below 4 months long and 80% below 6 months. As far as life imprisonment sentences are concerned, convicts may be released upon a motion of the minister of justice or pardoned by the king or queen under the condition of 5-year-long probation period. Prisoners sentenced to life in prison spend there 16 years on average. Indefinite detention is also characteristic to the Danish system and it is considered to be more lenient than life in prison and it is used towards dangerous offenders committing sexual or violence including crimes (rapists, robbers, murderers, arsonists). Convicts spend on average 9 years in prison and they are subjected to 5 years' probation. With time prisoners are moved from closed units to the open ones, then to hostels and later they are conditionally released." [Nowak: 59-60]. All actions taken in Denmark are concentrated on decreasing the negative influence of prison isolation and decreasing social and financial costs within the scope of penalties execution. It is crucial that convicts remain in control of their life and stay in one person cells with possibility of therapy or curing if such necessity occurs. Residing in a hostel they have unlimited possibility of contacting friends and family and are paid for the performed work or they receive social benefit, if they are unemployed. Prisoners placed in central prisons are obliged to learn or work (37 hours per week) and they have possibility of continuing their education and employment out of prison. The Internet access is limited or entirely forbidden. The effects of such penitentiary politics and penitentiary system functioning decrease chances of repeat crime. "The aim is to continue to limit custodial sentences in favor of using substitute measures. If there is necessity of imprisonment - assumption of "normalization" of prisons lets convicts adapt socially" [NIK report 2015: 68]. Post-penitentiary assistance (material and inhabitation related) remains at the disposal of the state and trainings in the area of psychological aid, therapy and professional counseling are performed by non-governmental organizations. The above mentioned actions together with a number of other initiatives connected with activity of local governments in such integrated penitentiary politics allow convicts to smoothly go from the period of isolation to functioning in freedom [ibidem: 61-62].


**Chart 2. Population of prisoners in Denmark between 2000 and 2014**



Source: [Prisonstudies.org (b)].

The French system of social aid works in a different way. It is complicated and many public institutions and social insurance offices are responsible for its execution. "Social aid as one of elements of state's social policy constitutes a part of the social protection system and it is complementary to pensions of the social security, which are universal" [Cieplą: 3]. The penitentiary politics of France is in practice created by Ministry of Justice and governed by Management of Penitentiary Administration. Re-adaptation and reintegration of prisoners are the duties of Integration and Probation Service [NIK report 2015: 68-70]. In the French system prisoners have the right to education, which concerns particularly persons delegated to basic education (juveniles and the worst educated, illiterates and foreigners delegated to learn the French language). The educational offer also provides tailor-made professional trainings. Work is not an obligation and mainly those sentenced to long imprisonment are employed. There is a penitentiary advisor seeking work places for prisoners finishing their sentences. Released prisoners may apply for temporary allowance for ex-prisoners and those entitled to receive assistance from the Work Office are granted the right to health and family allowances. The unemployed are refunded annual costs of medical treatment. The French Ministry of Justice concludes contracts with non-governmental organizations, which provide help to people leaving prisons. The French penitentiary system and actions related to social reintegration are negatively assessed due to the fact that prisons are overcrowded, of low standard, and reintegration activities are of low effectiveness. Negative effects of the overgrowth role of NGO sector in penitentiary politics are also underlined" [ibidem: 70]. In spite of taking different actions French rate of repeat crimes increases [Nowak 2015: 64-65].


**Chart 3: Population of prisoners in France between 2000 and 2014**



Source: [Prisonstudies.org (c)].


Solutions implemented in the United Kingdom are also worth considering. The system used there concentrates on the retributive role of justice and restrictive character of penalties and on supervision over perpetrators of crimes and offences. "Two of the constituent parts - England and Wales - have common administration of penitentiary system - National Offender Management Service superior to National Probation Service and Her Majesty Prison Service; The Northern Ireland and Scotland have their own: Northern Ireland Prison Service and Scottish Prison Service" [Nowak 2015: 66]. The following legal provisions are considered the most important: Criminal Justice Act of 2003, Offender Rehabilitation Acts of 2014 and multiple Prison Order Acts. National Offender Management Service underlines the rehabilitating function of punishment and its retributive justice and isolation-related importance and also coordinates activity of Her Majesty Prison Service and National Probation Service, which takes care of supervision over isolation penalty execution and providing assistance to prisoners in social re-adaptation process [ibidem].

**Chart 4. Population of prisoners in Scotland between 2000 and 2014**




Source: [Prisonstudies.org (d)].

**Chart 5. Population of prisoners in Northern Ireland between 2000 and 2014**



Source: [Prisonstudies.org (e)].

**Chart 6. Population of prisoners in England and Wales between 2000 and 2014**



Source: [Prisonstudies.org (f)].

14 private prisons holding about 11% of all convicts are a peculiar phenomenon in England and Wales. The prison penalty is usually served in cells for several men. The following elements are constant: 30 minutes of walk a day, minimum one hour visit a month, unlimited but censored correspondence, paid prison phone, paid printed e-mail. Furloughs are granted at the end of the imprisonment period and in exceptional, random situations. Education is possible and provided by private entities on contract basis. Prisoners may participate in courses and trainings and basic education, which are organized only in 22 prisons. Employment gives chances of receiving remuneration, which is fully given to the prisoner, but usually it is lower than the market payment. "The system used in the United Kingdom seems ineffective due to poor conditions in prisons, strict sentences, low level of activities available to convicts and restrictive attitude of Prison Service. Since more pressure is put on punishing than re-adaptation

prisoners usually repeat their crimes" [NIK report 2015: 72-73]. Similarly to Poland prisoners under smaller rigor may work within prison or for external employers. Former prisoners can apply for assistance and support to a number of NGOs. "Some of the forms of aid offered by them is co-financed with public money. NGOs focus mainly on aid in the area of: employment (Unlock), gathering financial means to execute a particular life goal (Hartman Trust), fighting addiction (Shelter), re-adaptation (Hartman Trust, Unlock, NACRO), legal counseling (Unlock), supporting families of prisoners (Action for Prisoners' and Offenders' Families, Family Lives) and residential aid (Shelter, NACRO). Analyzing PFG (Prisoner's Finance Gap) i.e. a period between leaving prison and receiving allowance/salary showed that in majority of cases the assistance forms listed above are insufficient and former prisoners are forced to take advantage of help from relatives or borrow money" [NIK report 2015: 67-68]. Assessment data showing the process of repeating crime is meaningful - it indicates 57%, only 36% of prisoners commence work, therapy or education after being released from prison [NIK report 2015: 68].

Indications deriving from the report of Supreme Chamber of Control may be the final part of the subject studies. It expressly shows that the system of supporting social re-adaptation in Poland is not con-generic and does not constitute an entire system. NIK described actions of particular state authorities as not coordinated. The number of rehabilitation programs supporting social re-adaptation of convicts gradually increased (in 2012 there were about 4750 programs, in 2013 more than 6300 programs and in the first half of 2014 - almost 4400 programs) but it did not always impact their quality. Vast majority (93%) of assessed rehabilitation programs did not have their assessments and manners and tools of measuring their effectiveness formed correctly. In many cases they were placed in programs only to meet formal requirements. Workers and officers of penitentiary and therapy departments of prisons and remand centers are burdened with work related to excessive number of prisoners per one educator (even 110 persons) or one psychologist (even 369 persons). In spite of that they perform systematic work with prisoners, inter alia, create and run rehabilitation programs, develop individual influence programs, individual therapy programs, organize sport and cultural events. "Supreme Chamber of Control draws our attention to basic problems of Polish penitentiary system i.e. rare adjudication of non-custodial sentences; lack of public debate on philosophy of approaching criminal conduct of citizens, reaction of the state, courts, standards of penalty execution including imprisonment. It is connected to frequent populist slogans which are confusing as to concepts

and cause unwelcome emotions while developing useful solutions; instability of law - multiple amendments to the Executive Penal Code and amendments to executive provisions not always caused by real problems; lack of cohesion in actions and division of competences among different institutions responsible for rehabilitation of criminals, system dismemberment, alienation of entities which should work in symbiosis; overcrowding in prisons, high number of prisoners and permanent high rate of 201 prisoners per 100000 residents (data for 31.12.2014). (...) "While there are common system traits of penitentiary, post-penitentiary and re-adaptation formulas existing in respective states, there are also significant differences in approach to the subject. Reviewing the system solutions accepted in other European states is clear that none of them has solved the analyzed problem in optimal manner, which would fully satisfying from to basic for state politics points of view: good of social totality and good of a citizen" [NIK report 2015: 66].

The subject analyzed in this paper shows important aspects related to the effectiveness of rehabilitation and re-adaptation actions towards prisoners against the penitentiary politics executed nowadays in Poland and the selected EU states.

The suggested set of problems can constitute a reason for further consideration on the basis of different fields of science and could bring in-depth reflections on new, efficient solutions for the benefit of rehabilitation of prisoners. "Theory of social work embodies an idea which provides the description and explanation of social work essence and purposes, on one hand as a social phenomenon, on the other - as specific action." [Payne as quoted in: Kantowicz 2005: 822]. Further struggle in the area of including social work in the aggregate of tasks of penitentiary rehabilitation brings chance for effective correlation of these to fields.

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### **3. CULTURE**

Michał Gierycz

***On the significance  
of Christianity for European integration  
and meta-political consequences of Polish accession***

Recently<sup>1</sup>, the Nobel Prize Committee appreciated Takaaki Kajita and Arthur B. McDonald's discovery proving that neutrinos have mass [Wyborcza 2015]. The existence of neutrinos was theoretically predicted by Wolfgang Pauli as early as in 1930<sup>2</sup>, but this discovery was truly ground-breaking, as neutrinos, which are particles that react with matter very weakly, were impossible to register at all for a long time. Empirical physics was, therefore, unable to see what theoretical physics had known for over half a century.

There are numerous proofs that the role of religion in political science is similar to the role of neutrinos in 1930's physics. Some people notice that it might be of crucial importance, but still the dominating positivist paradigm of science hinders not only the observation, but also the creation of an appropriate theory. Political science, built upon the spirit of positivist science, tries to research objective facts. However, the influence of religion can rarely be measured with "hard data". Political science researches the here and now, while the main impact of religion is of long-term nature<sup>3</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on the article "*Chrześcijaństwo – zapomniany warunek pojednania i integracji w Europie. Perspektywa politologiczna*" [Christianity – forgotten condition for reconciliation and integration in Europe. Perspective of the political science] published in Polish in *Oblicza pojednania. Faces of reconciliation*, edited by Joanna Kulska and published by Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2016. This paper is a modified and extended version of the article.

<sup>2</sup> Pauli made a conclusion on the existence of these particles as a result of an analysis concerning the energy distribution of electrons created during beta decay. The existence of neutrinos was confirmed experimentally as late as in 1956.

<sup>3</sup> As an example, it can be mentioned that as recently as in the 19th century, all kinds of revolutionaries accepted the moral truths of Christianity as obvious, although they were trying to eradicate it. They stopped to be obvious only for their great-grandchildren. Would a political scientist of today be able to indicate which convictions, out of the ones important for the functioning of our political system, are still supported by the "smell from the empty bottle", as Robert Spaemann calls the undertone of Christianity in the secularized air of today's Europe? Would they be ready to see it as an important research problem?

etc. Not going into details of the dilemmas regarding the political science of religion<sup>4</sup>, it is necessary to signal that the evidential process started here will be, out of necessity, of circumstantial nature. While looking for the impact of Christianity on political integration and reconciliation, we are asking for the significance of something that evades the traditional scientific approach, even if the reflection on political issues is deepened, while at the same time such works as those of Weber, Schmitt or Kantorowicz show the need to take this factor into account. The situation of religious political scientists may be similar to the situation of Wolfgang Pauli, who until his last days couldn't accept that it was impossible to empirically prove what had been for him unambiguously proven in theory.

In this article, the starting point is the phenomenon of European integration from the perspective of its initiator, Robert Schuman. The purpose of the first two paragraphs of the performed analysis is to reveal and understand specific solidarity- and reconciliation-related characteristics of integration. The third paragraph concerns the discussion of certain theses concerning the conditions for its existence. Then, the currently noticeable problems with maintaining specific European integration characteristics in the political practice are presented in the 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph. These problems indicate that the attempt at understanding the phenomenon of integration, presented at stages 1-3, is insufficient. As a consequence, in accordance with the hermeneutic circle, the subsequent, 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph goes back to the questions regarding the conditions of the integration project, emphasizing the significance of the religious factor, which is often omitted or marginalized in the political science narration, including axiological bases of integration. Further, potential consequences of unification and integration within the EU, related to the marginalization of the significance of Christianity in the process of European integration (6<sup>th</sup> paragraph), as well as Poland's potential role in reversing this trend (7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> paragraphs), are presented.

### **1. European integration: reconciliation and solidarity**

When Robert Schuman was presenting his *Declaration*, which was to become the cornerstone of the process we are still participating in, he said that it is a brave and creative act for peace. He was convinced that in order to achieve a real peace, there must be first a unified Europe, what requires for the long-standing conflict between Germany and France to be obviated [Schuman 2003: 93-94]. Thus, he outlined something that can be called an

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<sup>4</sup> I elaborate on this topic with Rev. P. Burgoński in *Politologia i religia [Political science and religion]*, which is the introduction to the book under the same title. *Zarys problematyki*, Elipsa, Warszawa 2014.

axiological integration circle. Reconciliation between nations is the basis for integration, which is the guarantee of peace in Europe. This peace, however, is ultimately nothing else than true reconciliation. European politicians have not lost the awareness of the meaning of this mechanism. It is worth mentioning that in 2012, the then President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, when receiving the Nobel Peace Award, stated that although "peace might have come to Europe without the Union ... it would never have been of the same quality. A lasting peace, not a frosty cease-fire. To me, what makes it so special, is reconciliation" [Rompuy, Barroso 2012]. It seems that the relationship between reconciliation and the integration process could be presented through the following scheme:



However, the outlined scheme requires elaboration. For Schuman, reconciliation in the European context meant more than just building a new, pan-European organization. In his *Declaration*, he does not emphasize the created organization in the sense of formal cooperation, but rather its material *essence*. For him, it is key to overcome conflict, unify nations, finally to achieve the United Europe. Taking into account that, from the formal point of view, he was announcing the creation of an organization of coal and steel, it could seem to be a form of idealistic metaphor. However, it was not. Despite the presented scheme, Schuman was simply aware that the road from reconciliation to united Europe is not obvious or direct. He said that Europe would not emerge immediately as a coherent structure [Schuman 2003: 94]. The United Europe was, for him, a result of preliminary actions, which can be the fruit of reconciliation. He said that the coherent structure of Europe would be built step by step, creating a true solidarity in the first place [ibidem]. For Schuman, solidarity was an adequate, although not self-evident, consequence and tool of reconciliation, and as such required conscious action. He thought that if reconciliation is to be something more than a momentary ceasefire, it needs to be transformed into caring for

others, taking into consideration their righteous needs when making decisions, putting the advice from St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians to "carry each other's burdens" into practice. Solidarity was to become a practical performance of the reconciliation, as long as it was more than politics inspired by sentimental pacifism [Schuman 2003: 27].



Why was the issue of solidarity so important for him? Why was it not enough to pass from reconciliation to the European structure? It can be said that it was because history has verified negatively such attempts at building peace (it is enough to mention the League of Nations here). Schuman was convinced that a change in political thinking was necessary: if the national interest was still the only perspective for making decisions, the results of reconciliation would quickly be forgotten in the name of a higher, "national" cause. That is why Schuman had a skeptical attitude towards the Council of Europe as the institution supposed to integrate the whole Old Continent, although without a doubt, the organization was created as a result of reconciliation. He was convinced that the united Europe could only exist if it was based on a new way of thinking and acting – the readiness to take up the deed of solidarity. Otherwise, antagonisms would sooner or later resurface and the idea of European peace would become only an unfulfilled dream. It is worth mentioning that he considered solidarity not only *ad intra*, but also *ad extra*. In his *Declaration*, he emphasized the need of solidarity with Africa.

## **2. Genius of integration: solidarity-based organization**

Robert Schuman, when proposing the new, European organization of coal and steel, referred to the idea of "community". This term, as Jürgen Wahl notes, was not well understood by the then politicians and commentators. It was not and is not a typical category of international politics.



The fullest reference to the notion of Community is the category of solidarity. A community in its essence is a place where the problems of one person become common for everyone; difficulties are overcome together, and the success of one person is closely related to the success of others. It reflects, therefore, the conviction which was fundamental for the initial stages of integration: that European states need to completely rebuild their mutual relationships [Wahl: 46]. The first expression of this reconstruction was the readiness to give up what the winners rightfully deserve (for their victory) and what the losers are entitled to (despite everything), and putting the common good above "own interests", taking into account also the good of foreigners.

It would not be an overstatement to say that this intuition of solidarity contains the *genius* of the after-war take on the European relationships: at the very beginning of the integration, the foreigners were noticed, including yesterday's criminals, and their needs were seen as important [Gierycz 2008: 74-176]. Moreover, self-restraint of the largest states was regarded as appropriate. The states, in the name of community of interests with smaller countries, were supposed to accomplish common goals together. The community was, however, devised as an organization in which states act without differentiating between their position, authority and force [Schuman 2003: 19]. Although states are different from one another, ultimately the good of each of them is related to the interests of others, so Schuman argued that individual strength is not of such importance – common goals need to take into account the interests of all parties. It is worth to emphasize that this conviction was the source of such political institutions as unanimity in decision-making or the idea of "supranational officers", who could not take into account the interests of their state of origin in the decision-making process. Not without a reason, the Communities were to be indissoluble. It was a reflection of the conviction that they were not to be anything additional, incidental. On the contrary, they were to become a constitutive element of political identity. The community, in its essence, is not a purposive pact, but a living relationship.

The use of the term "community" thus reflected the requirement for a new type of international organization, which in time started to be called supranational. Its fundamental principle was supposed to be a rather institutionalized solidarity. The idea of supranationality and that of solidarity were closely related to one another. Theoretically, they wouldn't have to be – imperial or domination-based structure could just as well be of supranational character. For Schuman, however, supranationality was a way to institutionalize solidarity, which was the community's *raison d'être*.

### 3. Arguments for solidarity-driven community

The basic problem of the idea of Community is how to convince states to go this way. Why would they resign from revanchism and take into account the interests of other, less important countries? The whole idea seems to be a mockery of *Realpolitik*, bordering on utopian thinking. Why would states make the step of solidarity towards reconciliation?

Undoubtedly, for Schuman, the "framework" of argumentation was his belief in common sense. He wrote that this new policy was based on solidarity and increasing trust. It was an act of faith in the common sense of nations finally convinced that their rescue lied in mutual understanding and cooperation [Schuman 2003: 28]. The faith in common sense required good argumentation. Schuman did not take it lightly. In this context, literature usually focuses on one or several out of the three "common sense" arguments: historical, economic and realistic.

The historical argument boils down to two statements. The first one says that in order for there to be real peace, there must first be a unified Europe [Schuman: 93]. The second one emphasizes that in the past, new attempts at building peace were made, which after all led to war and ensuing destruction [Schuman: 26]. Going this way does not, therefore, make sense – there must be a different manner. Schuman was also aware that in time, the force of his argument would diminish. He noted that something more than recalling the monstrosities and tragedies of war was necessary [Schuman: 27].

It is often emphasized that an important argument for the adopted integration methods was economic prosperity. Undoubtedly, legitimization through success was an important way of legitimizing the whole integration process. As Jacques Santer notes, in the 1950s, it was believed that the ideas and values put forward by the Founding Fathers would not be accepted by the Europeans unless they could live in a world of prosperity and social justice [Santer 2007: 23]. Without a doubt, Schuman agreed with the idea of taking action where psychological maturity and technological development allow to forecast spectacular results [Schuman 2003: 28]. He was also aware that legitimization through success was ambivalent. Of course, it is easy to be in favor of something if it is profitable, but he also wrote that one is not always the master of one's own choices [ibidem].

This statement seems all the more significant that ultimately, a solidarity-based policy often means quickly noticeable losses and, possibly, long-term profits. In the case of solidary cooperation, the right political question is not "how much can we earn" but "how much can we lose". Thus,

Schuman's final common sense argument refers – however paradoxical it sounds – to *Realpolitik* logic. He notes that nowadays nations are far from being self-sufficient, and this mutual dependence causes them to become unable to rejoice in their neighbor's tragedy with Machiavellian malice [Schuman 2003: 26]. Their own means are not sufficient for their needs. Although this is a harsh truth, it is necessary to be aware of it [Schuman: 19]. As a matter of fact, the real interest of anyone lies in recognizing and practically accepting everyone's mutual dependence. Egoism is not profitable any more [Schuman: 29]. This argument seems to be particularly obvious nowadays, in the heyday of globalization.

#### **4. Current situation**

Is it really so simple? Currently, the EU is at the stage which, to some extent, Schuman expected: the historical argument seems an anachronism, and the economic argument has to a large extent ceased to work. For the Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese, Hungarians or Cypriots, the EU is not a synonym of economic prosperity any more. Is the mere awareness of co-dependence enough to act in solidarity or to take into account the needs of others? The question seems to be rhetorical when leading European companies, with the silent support of European powers, are planning to cooperate with Russia and build another pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, which is in obvious conflict with the fundamental geopolitical interests of Central and Eastern European states; when hundreds of thousands of immigrants are treated as a problem of several states and not of Europe as a whole; and finally, when financial threats directed at politically and economically weaker states are heard more and more often and remind that in the EU as well, we are risking the dictatorship-like use of material advantage, which Schuman wanted so badly to prevent.

It is also clearly visible that European institutions are starting to fail in their role of a tool of solidarity. There is little question that the real power lies outside them<sup>5</sup>. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande even say that the European Union now constitutes a new order of ruling, which is best portrayed using the idea of an empire. Its essence is the acceptance of power asymmetry which shatters the fictional equality of states. Just as the constitutive elements of pre-modern empires were feudal units, modern empires, including the EU, consist of states of different level of sovereignty (fully sovereign, semi-sovereign and non-sovereign) [Czaputowicz 2014: 364]. Jan

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<sup>5</sup> At a conference organized by the University of Wrocław, Vice-President of the European Parliament Ryszard Czarnecki spoke about it *expressis verbis*, Wrocław 18.09.2015 (author's archive).

Zielonka arrived at similar conclusions [Zielonka 2004]. Regardless of the accuracy of these analyses, performed by leading European political scientists, it is clearly visible that institutional mechanisms of solidarity are beginning to prove insufficient and the risk of a complete collapse of Schuman's "Community of Equals" [Weiler 2003: 82], in the form of institutional structures built upon the inspiration of solidarity, is becoming more and more serious.

### **5. Forgotten element**

Why is it so? Why is EU clearly losing the ability to act in the logic of solidarity, even though it refers to the rhetoric of solidarity more and more often? There can be many answers. Some authors draw the attention to the inability to carry out the idea of a solidarity-based community as a union of 28 states. In line with this theory, it can be said that the extension of the EU dug the grave for its solidarity. Other authors emphasize the significance of the recent economic crisis in the EU. It is, however, worth to take into account a different explanation, which can be treated as a middle-range theory. There is a thesis which can be defended, and it states that the source of our problems concerning not the structures themselves, but rather the content they put into practice, is the consistent secularization of the European politics.

Let us return to the idea of a Community as suggested by Schuman. The typology of argumentation which he used and which was presented above calls for supplementation. Although Schuman believed in the common sense, he was also aware that common sense arguments may turn out to be insufficient and easily noticeable losses related to integration are hard to compensate with long-term profits. In his writings, the statement that the integration process needed a deeper motivation is prevalent; he himself was ready to make a "step towards Europe" thanks to being guided by a deeper motivation. In *For Europe*, he notes "forced by experience, after so much disaster and in the face of the terrible threat ... we have to fall back on the Christian law of a noble but humble brotherhood. Paradoxically (this would certainly surprise us if we were not Christians, maybe we are without knowing it) — we are now holding out our hand to our former enemies, not only to forgive them, but to build tomorrow's Europe together" [Schuman 2003: 27]. Further, he notes that the process of unification is learning the Christian brotherhood anew [ibidem: 28].

This remark by Schuman indicated the key meaning of the mostly lost religious dimension of reconciliation and integration in Europe. In most of important books concerning the European integration, its past, theoretical

grounds and general course, Christianity is not mentioned even once [Weiler 2003: 24]. Of course, literature sometimes mentions that what brought De Gasperi, Schuman and Adenauer closer was their religion [Łukaszewski 2002: 197]. It is true, without a doubt. However, something more important than the question of the private motivations behind the political engagement of three politicians is at stake here. In the light of Schuman's words, it is clear that a brave and creative act for peace, which was his Declaration, and its consequences were possible thanks to the Christian roots of its authors and the whole participating societies. Meta-politics, whose key element was Christianity, made the political project of European integration possible.

Faith, which turned yesterday's enemy into a brother, was, for the then leading politicians, above all an ultimate argument for the united Europe. Its significance against, as Schuman put it, a labyrinth of problems and choices to make, and among violent quarrels [Schuman 2003: 36], does not seem easy to question. Secondly, in particular after the German crimes of the Second World War, religion was an irrefutable social value, guaranteeing at least this smell from an empty bottle which allows keeping, understanding or acknowledging the value of Christian outlook on brotherhood also to those who do not identify with religious faith. Thirdly, Christianity brought about specific instruments and categories of thinking, enabling the ideas of a unified Europe, such as "solidarity" or "community" to become operationalized. Not accidentally, Schuman's reference to the Christian brotherhood reflected the deepest anchoring in the idea of solidarity. As a virtue and a moral value, demanding care for the common good, sharing with the one in need and taking joint responsibility, solidarity was in some way inscribed into the mentality shaped by Christianity [Salij 2000]<sup>6</sup>. It was the foundation on which Schuman based his whole project.

In other words, Schuman's idea of European reconciliation and integration assumed (and had to assume) aware or unaware Christianity. The project of the Community would be simply impossible to imagine in such a form in a pagan world, but also in the world of Islam or Hinduism. In such a sense, the Turks are right to say that the Union is a "Christian club" (even if they understand the expression slightly differently)<sup>7</sup>: the European cooperation was anchored in solidarity, which aimed to exceed itself by taking up specifically Christian dimensions: selflessness, forgiveness and reconciliation [John Paul II 1996: 363]. As Joseph Weiler notes, in 1950, the


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<sup>6</sup> Alain Finkelkraut [Finkelkraut 1999: 9] remarks that what distinguished people from other animals was that they did not recognize each other.

<sup>7</sup> However, problems with accession are not limited to these questions: see [Szymański 2006: 149-165].

idea of the Community of Equals, which was supposed to be the structural basis for long-term peace between yesterday's enemies, was more than an inventive project of experienced politicians. It was not only a call for peace in external relationships, but also a call for internal peace, for forgiveness and overcoming understandable hatred. In this particular historical context, the European notion of peace brings to mind reflections on Christian love, the Grace, and the images and values related to them [Weiler 2003: 82].

Coming back to our initial ethical circle of integration, it would be justified to present it as below, where the pattern in the background represents the Christian context of the whole project.



## 6. European Union: project without God and values?

It is worth returning to the question concerning the current situation of the EU. It is not a revelation that in the last twenty years, much has been done on the political level to deprive the integration project of Christian context. The Debate on the treaty establishing the Constitution, rejecting *invocatio Dei* and even any mention of Europe's Christian roots, or previous battles over referring to the religious heritage in the Charter of Fundamental Rights are only symptoms of a deeper conviction on the secular nature of the Union and its values. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, questioning the need to place any form of reference to God in the Constitutional Treaty, explained that Europeans live in a secular political system [Ikonowicz 2004]. D'Estaing's point of view departed from the conviction of European political elites<sup>8</sup> that

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<sup>8</sup> *De facto*, such a take on the role of religion was presented by European elites when passing the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this act, which is crucial for

religion, as a category pertaining at most to the private sphere, does not have any meaning whatsoever for the political sphere. Secularity seems to be synonymous to certain impermeability of the European politics: it is divided from religion by a tall and deep-seated wall.

An important question seems to be whether the wall of secularity separates the Union only from the rest of the world, which is mostly religious, or whether it supports also the construction of inner walls. An interesting coincidence seems to be the fact that more or less since the end of the debates on the significance of religion in the European politics, the European states have not seemed to be less and less capable of fulfilling the basic requirements of solidarity. The problems mentioned above show that despite our efforts to guarantee more and more solidarity in law (since primary legislation showcases an exponential growth of solidarity initiatives in the recent treaty reforms [see: Gierycz 2008: 407-414]), it is hard to admit that EU states are truly more solidary today than the Community used to be.

At the same time, European unity becomes more and more threatened by what was expected to strengthen it. One of the most important changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty was a significant increase in axiology in the legal aspect of the European Union [see: Barcz 2010]. The Treaty on European Union in its current version states unambiguously that "the Union is founded on values" [Treaty 2008: art. 2], at the same time giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights [CFR] the status of primary law. It was not a coincidence. The reference to values has, at least potentially, an irreplaceable integrating value. It makes it possible to define the deepest motivation to create and develop the Union in a way that is clear to every citizen of the EU. As a community of values, in the long term, the EU was to become an object of attachment that reached deeper than only to the financial level. The deeper values were supposed to help legitimize the Union's existence (especially in relation to procedural deficits of democracy in the EU), making it also a reference point for Europeans' political identity.

Nevertheless, the last years are rather a proof of an ongoing battle over the values in the EU than a signal of strengthening the unity in this respect. The massive disputes over the morality policy, taking place when the Parliament and the Council agreed to finance scientific research on stem cells [European Parliament 2006], European Commission's support for demands and claims of LGBTI groups [European Commission 2015], finally financing abortion in Third World countries [European Dignity Watch 2012] lead

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determining the identity of the united Europe, there was no room for referring to Christianity either.

researchers to call into question the axiological foundations of the EU. As Renata Badii notes, despite emerging from common European values (such as respect for human life), the decisions taken within the EU are based on specific interpretation of these values, which makes them rather a temporary agreement than an expression of true consensus regarding common rules [Badii 2008: 119]. From the theoretical perspective, Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde named this problem a long time ago, drawing attention to the fact that a non-regulated reference to values from within, due to the moral substance of an entity and the unity of a society, can prove to be insufficient and dangerous. It opens an opportunity for subjectivism, as well as positivism of popular judgments, which demand for themselves an objective validity and rather annihilate freedom than guarantee it [Böckenförde 1994: 119-120].

### **7. Poland in the EU – expectations and questions**

In the context of Poland's integration with the European Union, in particular in Catholic circles, it has often been emphasized that the Polish Christian culture as well as its religious and national ethos are a valuable reservoir of energy which Europe needs today [John Paul II 1998] or that Polish culture in the united Europe can become an impulse to combine the modern with the traditional [Sowiński 2003]. In the light of the analyses conducted above, these statements, often accepted even in the Polish public sphere with a certain dose of reluctance, seem to accurately describe Poland's most significant potential contribution to the integration project. In the context of reflection upon the current deficit of solidarity in the EU, it can also be noticed that Poland bears a special solidarity heritage, rooted in Christianity. The key role on the way to the political breakthrough of 1989, eventually leading to the collapse of communism in Central Europe, was played by the Independent Trade Union "Solidarność", which was directly inspired by the Catholic social science developed by Pope John Paul II. The word "solidarity" in the Polish context is not, therefore, a remote idea, but has its own specific meaning, verified by the recent history.

Of course, after 10 years, it is impossible to give a scientifically proven answer to the question whether Poland has contributed culturally to the Union. Cultural processes are long-term, as Fernand Braudel noted [see: Braudel 2006], and a decade is not a period of significance for them. Nevertheless, it can be evaluated whether the aforementioned expectations towards Poland have a solid foundation and any confirmation in the social and political sphere. Taking into account that the process of democratization, which has been taking place in Poland since 1989, was for the most part led



by elites who understood democracy as democracy of the periphery, or imitating the mainstream (Western) regime and culture, which nevertheless remains an unequalled example [Krasnodębski 2003: 19], the first question concerns whether the contemporary Polish society, when it comes to understanding the fundamental values, as well as the place of religion in individual and social life, is exceptional compared to other European countries. In other words, is there still a social substrate which enables Poland to exert its cultural influence. The second question which is worth asking concerns European politics: whether Poland's activities are noticeably reversing those tendencies in the EU politics which are secularist or undermine fundamental values. It goes without saying that in relation to the restrictions of this article, the answers to both of these questions will only be a starting point for further discussion<sup>9</sup>.

### 8. "Axiological condition" of Poland compared with Europe

Studies on religiousness in Poland, conducted since the 1980s, prove that it is a constitutive characteristic of the personal identity of the majority of Poles [Roguska, Wciórka 2005: 319]. As sociologists remark, almost all respondents (95%) claim they are religious, and one in nine considers

Figure 1. I believe in a personal God





Figure 2. Abortion is justified



themselves deeply religious [Roguska, Wciórka 2005: 320]. The declarations signal also that over half of adults (57%) take part in religious practices at least once a week, which proves that despite fundamental changes in numerous areas of life, secularization, which was expected after 1989, has not taken place [Roguska, Wciórka 2005: 321].

<sup>9</sup> More on what concerns the first question: see e.g. [CBOS 2005]; on what concerns the second question: see e.g. [Gierycz 2010].

Even a quick look at the map provided by the Atlas of European Values<sup>10</sup> is enough to see that Poland is clearly different from the rest of Europe. For the question concerning the faith in personal God, only in Poland in the whole Europe the positive answers amount to over 80%, which is over twice the European average and three times as much as the average of the "northern states", including Germany and France. Only Turkey, a Muslim state, achieved a similar result of declarations.

Figure 3. Euthanasia is justified





Figure 4. Homosexuality can be accepted



The difference in the attitude to God correlates with typical Polish attitude to fundamental values, which are an object of dispute or dissent in many European countries. In relation to the question of approving abortion [Atlas of European Values (a)] and euthanasia [Atlas of European Values (b)] as justified practices, the Polish society stands in complete opposition to the attitude characteristic of a large part of Western European societies. Disapproval of abortion and euthanasia is expressed by 70% of the society in Poland, while in Sweden, France, Spain or Great Britain it is the percentage of people approving of it. Analogically, differences can be noticed in relation to the approval of homosexual practices (and recognizing them as justified) [Atlas of European Values (c)].

### 9. Political significance of cultural identity – first trails of an answer

Are cultural differences reflected at all in the European politics? All the data here is only preliminary, and sometimes difficult to assess


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<sup>10</sup> This research project, conducted by a number of universities in Europe (Institute of Education London, University of Potsdam, Bogazici University of Istanbul, University of Banská Bystrica, University of Tilburg, Fontys University of Applied Sciences Tilburg) is directed at studying Europeans' attitude to religion, politics, work, society and family <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home.php?lang=en> [22.09.2016]

unequivocally. It can be noted, however, that even during the negotiations over the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe and the Lisbon Treaty, the Polish delegation was consistently striving to introduce some form of reference to God or Christianity in these documents. In today's EU politics, most information is obtained from observing the European Parliament. As I devoted my previous articles to the significance of Members of Parliament in the axiological discussion [see: Gierycz 2011, Gierycz 2010], here I would only like to mention a general tendency, noticeable in the EP.

The Euro-fam portal, during the 2004-2009 term, conducted observations of activity of the Parliament (including the course of voting) [Euro-fam], among others. As part of presenting MEP's activity on the website, the results of over 100 roll-call votes were shown, concerning ethically sensitive topics from the last three terms, with particular attention devoted to the 2004-2009 term (ca. 60 votes), marking the votes of MEPs as "+" (for), "-" (against) or "0" (withheld), depending on the presented attitude to the values which are characteristic for the universal understanding of human rights that is deeply rooted in the legal and natural tradition. In the overview of the votes, individual MEPs were divided into three groups: those supporting the "traditional" values (mostly "+" votes), those indifferent to them (no consistency in voting or withholding) and those who negated them (mostly "-" votes).

Table 1. Results of votes on "ethically sensitive" topics according to Euro-fam



Source: Euro-fam.

An analysis of the results of votes in national groups presented on the Euro-fam portal as a graph relating the proportion of votes to mandates clearly show that even though Polish MEPs were not equivocal in their axiological positions, as a group, they constituted – from the perspective of national groups – leaders in standing against modifications in the

understanding of human rights in relation to ethically sensitive topics. Over 60% of Polish MEPs consistently voted for traditionally understood values. The next states in order: Slovakia, Germany and Italy, had fewer than 30% of MEPs who consistently supported the interpretation of human rights grounded in legal and natural tradition (respectively: 29%, 26%, 20%). It is characteristic that Poland had the lowest, apart from Lithuania, percentage of indifferent MEPs – only 15%. Taking into account the size of the Polish national group, it means that they were a significant part of the axiological discussion in the EP. It is worth adding that these results correspond to the self-assessment of Polish MEPs shown during in-depth interviews, as well as to the assessment of external observers [see: Gierycz 2011].

It seems that the issue concerns not only the European Parliament, although the access to internal data from other institutions is much more difficult. It can be noted, however, that in the Council of the EU, Poland was one of several countries who opposed financing tests on human embryos as part of the EU Programme for Research (7th Framework Programme) [Poland's Declaration 2006: 3-4] and was eventually outvoted. Currently, Poland is one of the states blocking the so-called horizontal anti-discrimination directive [Prawy.pl]. This directive, adopted by the Parliament in 2008, was formulated in accordance with the expectations of LGBT groups. Its adoption would mean that using social privileges for married couples and families would be impossible, as well as applying a different value to married and same-sex couples in education or refusing to provide services for LGBT organizations with opposing views (e.g. renting a room in one's own house to such a couple [European Commission 2008: 10]). As was noted by Manfred Weber, the leader of EPP delegation, a result of the directive is the harmonization of family law through the back door. Despite strong support of the Commission and the Parliament, the project has been under discussion in the Council of the EU for eight years.

Some evidence for the significance of Polish accession for the solutions in the area of morality politics can also be noticed in the judiciary. It is enough to note that the Judge-Rapporteur in the Bruestle case, which was a breakthrough in the history of the Court of Justice, was a Polish judge – Marek Safjan, who specializes in the problems of bio-medicine. In this decision, art. 6.2.c of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions was construed, and it was stated that a human embryo is any human egg cell from the moment of fertilization, every non-fertilized human egg cell into which a nucleus from a mature human cell was implanted, and every non-fertilized human egg cell which was stimulated to division and

further development through parthenogenesis [Court of Justice 2011]. Therefore, for the first time in the history of EU law, fertilization was held to be the beginning of human life. It is a notable change in jurisprudence in comparison to earlier decisions, in which e.g. abortion was considered to be a mere medical service (see: Grogan case). The Tribunal once did not see a threat in the instrumentalization of the human body in the provisions of the bio-technological directive of 1998, which stated that "an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element." [see: Bosek 2011; Court of Justice 2001].

It is, finally, notable the Poles took advantage of the possibility to exert influence on EU moral politics by means of the European Citizens' Initiative. Over 15% of signatures under the petition "One of us", aiming to prohibit EU's financing of any activities threatening human life at the embryo stage (such as scientific research or abortions) and over 33% of signatures under the petition "Mum, dad and kids" originated from Poland [Glosdlazycia.pl]. This examples show that the Polish view, similarly to Polish MEPs' influence in the Parliament, is a significant support for the ideological and political forces which are often reduced to defensive positions in other states and which sometimes make it possible to change the direction of EU's actions in ethical issues which was before deemed to be the obvious one.

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Ode to Joy, EU's informal anthem, says: "*Brüder—überm Sternenzelt Muss ein lieber Vater wohnen*" (*Brothers, above the starry canopy there must dwell a loving Father*). Rocco Buttiglione comments on it in the following way: "Why should a German be willing to make sacrifices for the Greeks or why should an Englishman or an Italian be ready to die for Gdansk? Schiller gives a very simple and straightforward answer: because we are brothers. But: do we want to be brothers? And can we be brothers if we have no common roots, if we do not have a father who loves us and makes us brothers? The question of the Christian roots is not so abstract and far from the concrete problems of the political everyday life as some imagine." He concludes: „But we will not have a city in common if we will not have a sanctuary ... We have built no sanctuary and as a consequence our unity was fragile and our solidarity too weak to resist the hardships of the crisis.” [Buttiglione 2014/2015: 15]. Looking in a more general way – in a longer perspective, without a sanctuary, our values start to diffuse, and without values, the special political concept of European integration in the form

suggested by Schuman is not sustainable. The initial arrangements presented above do not allow to deny, while not giving a guarantee, that Poland, which does not give in to processes of hastened secularization, can contribute significantly to the long-term integration process by strengthening EU's meta-political foundations and, in the end, securing the *genius* of European integration.

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Grzegorz Kęsik

***“Spatial history-based politics”?  
Remarks on relations between power and architecture  
in Poland after accession to the European Union***

Relations between power and architecture have been known since ancient times. In the 20th century they were best expressed in totalitarian systems. This caused peculiar reluctance towards this form of ideological message in contemporary democracies. It is, however, impossible to escape from ideological meanings of architecture and the currently executed history-based politics of democratic states must find ways to use architecture for political purposes in order to be more effective. Since 2004 there has been a certain problem with the history-based politics itself in Poland (which de facto only recently has been executed in conscious and systemic manner by the state), as it seems that it still remains at the level of selection of ideas to be promoted through it. Deeper reflection on history-based politics, i.e. the form of promoting certain ideas, particularly by architecture and spatial forms, still remains a subject of thoughts and discussions. It often happens that museums which are significant for history-based politics are situated in objects which are incompatible with the ideas that they are to promote or their location is peripheral (not to say: random) and it doesn't take into consideration either the matter of mobility of visitors or accessibility of the place for locals and foreigners. This phenomenon (of some shallowness of Polish history-based politics, divesting it of an architectural and spatial advantage, which is important for presented ideas) deserves some deeper thoughts embraced in this paper. An attempt to connect history-based politics with spatial politics may be an important factor supporting effectiveness (and scope of influence) of the first of them.

**1. Relation of power and architecture**

Considerations over political possibilities of utilizing historical urban space should be started from showing relations between power and architecture themselves. In spite of the fact that these relations seem quite obvious not many publications approaching this problem in a comprehensive manner have been issued in Poland. Those existing are often supported by John Ruskin words stating that architecture "out of all arts is the one most entangled in politics as it executes certain vision of a human and his way of living regardless of personal preferences of those who deal with it. Despite

all kinds of artistic activity served and still serve political purposes the Shakespeare perception of the world is possible only for architecture lovers when every man regardless his preferences and skills is forced to confront surrounding buildings" [as cited in: Basista 2001: 176]. Therefore it is seen that durability of architecture and its commonplaceness in urban space make it a perfect tool to make politics based on multiplying and preserving clearly stated ideas. The influence of ideologies on urban space and city's architecture appears no sooner than at the end of 18th century. Before that we may rather talk about philosophy of power or rather views of single rulers towards architecture, which may be called pre-ideological.

The French revolution resulted in many new ideas, which in turn influenced further development of architecture and its relation with power. Since then a single ruler has no longer been a guarantor of law in favor of a collectivity of equal citizens who have been simultaneously subordinate to the state and its ideological "carriers" [Böckenförde 1994: 106]. Nation drew level with religion (so far being the main reason for development of architecture and spatial politics) and reached its emanation in the national state. Changes in the formation of the concept of nation had huge impact on the whole architecture of 19th and 20th century. In this case the architecture of power was often only reproduction, in big scale, of individual idealistic views of single persons. The thing worth mentioning here is the fact that at the beginning of 19th century public art, including architecture, declined in favor of individual art, for example poetry or music [Arendt 2000: 45]. Architecture of historicism, trying to copy and then adjust old styles to new needs became a perfect synonym of the rising nation and the reborn public sphere.

The above consideration yields a thesis that it is the nation and the nationalism based on it that were those ideas which formed the architecture of power of the last 200 years in the most significant way. It is worth underlining that nationalism is not considered an ideology by political science. At least it is not full ideology operating in a macro scale. Nationalism is rather an addition to other, big ideologies [see: Freedman 1996:7]. It practically always carries a will to powerfully influence public space, which in combination with full ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, socialism) gives different esthetic effects, the strongest authoritarian and totalitarian regimes due to a vast scale of construction investments characteristic to them. Significant participation of Nazism and communism within the frames of relations between power and architecture in the 20th century seem to cover all positive examples of similar solutions to contemporary people. It somehow eliminates the formula of ideological influence of power on urban

space and architecture from discussions on modern politics in general (including the history-based politics). Meanwhile, the reborn Polish state of 1918-1939 can pose, also for us, a fresh example still worth referring to in this area.

Relations of national elements and architecture remained particularly strong at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century. In the case of Poland, which regained independence in 1918 - much longer - as reaction to earlier incursion of the occupiers in the space of Polish cities. The so called national style (present also in other national states created after the First World War) in Poland was to be an expression of modern statehood based on national building tradition. Its purpose was to ostentatiously celebrate the rebirth of the Republic and to liberate urban space from foreign influence - signs of occupation [Chmielewska 2006: 190].

The national style in Polish interwar architecture especially strongly referred to the concept of Polish noble manor and also renaissance and baroque elements. These motives were copied in thousands of residential houses, train stations, post offices, military buildings becoming tools of political pressure for reconsolidation of Polish lands divided by the occupation [Wiśniewski 2008: 33]. Trends of monumental architecture were set by Warsaw concentrating no less than 30% of all development activities of that period. The monumental architecture mainly used elements of classicism, in smaller degree - renaissance, and was "exported" from Warsaw to politically important, selected places. A good example of this kind of activity was Katowice, the capital of the autonomous region of Upper Silesia, where the construction of the Silesia Parliament (pol. Sejm Śląski), the biggest edifice in Poland, created "the Polish imperial forum" architecturally underlining the right belongingness of this territory [ibidem: 34].

The appearance of modernism in art significantly changed the character of relations between power and architecture. Before that political decisions specified not only the look and location of a specific building but also the choice of certain ideas related to these factors, often contrary towards each other. Nation eventually became a carrier of traditional architecture when the architecture of modernism, basically very idealistic, made this idealism a supranational phenomenon [Jencks 1987: 40]. Therefore the 20th century dictators, who changed urban space in the most visible way, brought to power by their nations could support only the architecture compatible with the spirit and expectations of the nation and thus the tradition. This way the use of traditional architecture was firmly connected with the concept of nation and nationalism. The character of

modernism in turn remained the one expressing supranational, cosmopolitan ideas.

Contemporary relations of power and architecture can be based on two basic decision models - traditional and modern. In the case of historic space there are six of these models: preservation, restoration, modern creation, traditional creation, retroversion and reconstruction [Kęsik: 153]. Some of the six models presented are the battlefield of the rivalry between the traditional and the modern currents (preservation and restoration) while others are associated with only one of these currents (modern creation and retroversion to the modern one and traditional creation and reconstruction to the traditional one). Details of the above mentioned models are described in the book quoted in the note to this paragraph. For the needs of this paper a simplified division of the modern political decision it is assumed making it an idealistic choice between the traditional and the modern architecture.

## **2. History-based politics**

Before the start of further consideration on the ways of relating architecture and space to history-based politics (with the latter being decisive) it is worth to explain the concept of history-based politics. What is it, what are its basic purposes and what currents are dominating it nowadays? History-based politics are intentional and conscious act performed by a broadly understood government aimed at enhancing a certain vision of the past among the society [Stobiecki 2008: 175]. In model conditions of a democratic state history-based politics should be based on mutual discourse among different interest groups trying to affect the society by implying their vision of the past in a more potential way. It differentiates democratic history-based politics from politics made by a totalitarian state, where the vision of the past is identical to historical propaganda incapacitating the society and eliminating any discussion on this matter [ibidem: 176]. In addition to these two models, there is the authoritarian model of history-based politics with one specific, dominating vision of the past with limited discourse. Different visions exist there but they are deprived of any chance for competing and taking place of the dominant one.

The next important aspect of history-based politics is who it is directed to. The definition indicates the society (of a particular state with its government making this politics), but history-based politics can also constitute a tool used not only for the internal purpose. Thus there is an important division here into internal and external recipients of history-based politics, which in democratic conditions means "enhancing the public discourse with the past, both inside and outside a country, by different forms

of institutions of this discourse. These institutions come at a central state level but also at a local and regional level" [Cichocki 2006: 11]. Such a precise definition of history-based politics creates proper frames for one of forms of its institutions - museums. As physically existing objects they have specified location and exhibit.

In the case of connecting the aforementioned phenomenon with architecture - with relations mentioned in the first part of this paper - a division separating two major ideological currents of modern history-based politics will be useful. These currents rooted in the 19th century are the liberal and conservative ones [Dudek 2008: 193]. The first one (dominating in Poland in the first decade after 1989) assumes a limited role, or even lack of state's actions within the scope of history-based politics. It does not mean, however, that such politics is not created - image of the past is created mainly by the media. In the ideological sense the liberal current of history-based politics relates too strong feeling of national identity and pride to concepts such as xenophobia and megalomania. National ideas appear here as a kind of archaism or even threat, which should be countered by highlighting dark moments of own history at the cost of glorious moments [ibidem: 194]. The conservative current in turn (whose modern development has taken place since the Polish accession to the European Union) assumes active participation of the state in promoting positive aspects of our history - parliamentary and self-governance traditions, respect for rights of individuals, tolerance and also many martyrdom elements of the 20th century - in order to build the feeling of identity and national pride. The conservatives are not afraid of nation or nationalism as they believe that the ideas promoted by them are "defensive nationalism" (equal to patriotism), being somehow opposite to offensive chauvinistic nationalism [Bobrzyński 2007: 286].

### **3. Materialization of history-based politics in space**

The concept of history-based politics institutions should be also related to the concept of its materialization in space in the form of certain architecture and location. Of course, museums are not the only institutional form for history-based politics, but from the perspective of spatial politics it is the most obvious form that can be analyzed from the perspective of architecture and location of the given object. This point presents three museums significant for the modern history-based politics: Warsaw Rising Museum, Porta Posnania and Polish History Museum. What implies this particular choice? The activity of all three institutions is *de facto* dated after 2004, i.e. after Poland joined the European Union. (these time frames are also

used for this paper). The museums are crucial for the shape of modern history-based politics and not all of them are placed in the capital city, which allows to create balance between local and nationwide value of ideas presented through them. Finally - architecture of these objects does not have a uniform character, in spite of the clearly dominating modernistic form, which is a significant subject for further considerations.

Decision No XXVI/492/2004 of 11th March 2004 of the Council of the Capital City of Warsaw on establishing the Warsaw Rising Museum was the first significant tangible sign of the return of conservative thought to the main current of discussion on history-based politics in Poland. The museum was placed in a historical building dating back to the beginning of the 20th century, a former tramway power plant at the crossroads of Przyokopowa and Grzybowska streets in the Warsaw district of Wola. The museum was ceremonially opened on 31st July 2004, a day before the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw Rising, by the then President of Warsaw, and later President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński. During the first 10 years of existence the Museum was visited by almost 5 million guests, 30.000 exhibits were gathered, the Archive of Spoken History was created with over 3500 recorded interviews with participants of the Rising and 170.000 own publications were issued [www.1944.pl]. In this way the Warsaw Rising Museum significantly contributed to popularizing (especially among the young Polish generation) the patriotic event of 1944, which was marginalized in communist Poland due to political reasons. Unfortunately, from the perspective of spatial politics the location of the building beyond the strict city center is not very profitable, especially in relation to outside promotion of the history-based politics embraced by it. This matter was improved by opening the second line of the underground in 2015, but the name of the station located near the Museum (Daszyński Roundabout; Pol: Rondo Daszyńskiego) does not relate to the Museum in any way, contrary to station names like: "Copernicus Science Center" (Pol: Centrum Nauki Kopernik) or "National Stadium" (Pol: Stadion Narodowy). The architecture of the Museum's buildings is kept in traditional spirit as it is a historic building in industrial style. Modern way of presenting the exhibits does not destroy the characteristic climate of the place "remembering" the Rising and restoring the specific climate of old Wola. Thus the Warsaw Rising Museum as a building in urban space fulfills the criteria of conservative current of history-based politics (traditional architecture), but its location - significant from the perspective of the division of history-based politics to internal and external - remains an element that needs to be worked on (for example by changing the name of one of stations of the second line of the underground)

The next building analyzed in this paper is Porta Posnania. In this case the building is situated outside Warsaw, in Poznań – the capital city of Wielkopolska Province. It was ceremonially opened on 30th April 2014, a day before the 10th anniversary of Polish accession to the European Union. Porta Posnania is operated by Centrum Turystyki Kulturowej TRAKT, a municipal cultural institution established by the decision of the Council of Poznań No LVIII/785/V/2009 on 7th July 2009. The key building here is a new, modernistic main building, located in the oldest part of the city together with a modern catwalk over Cybnia river joining it with remaining of historic stronghold of Ostrów Tumski island. The bright construction of the building is diagonally cut with a narrow crack with the distant cathedral of Poznań being visible through it. The official website of the institution provides information that "Porta Posnania is the first Polish center for interpretation of heritage, which uses new technologies to join the tale of the cathedral island history with development of Poznań and the narration of the beginning of the Polish state. (...) Porta Posnania is a resting site - not only from work, but also from everyday routine. It is a natural space, where we spend our free time, meet our friends, rest from professional work (...). It particularly shows the role played by the island in the times when the Polish state was formed in the European context. The past is shown through success gained in spite of multiple difficulties and effectiveness of actions of the island related community. The community building own here and now and own future [www.bramapoznania.pl]. Therefore the Poznań's "museum" contains almost all traits of the liberal current of history-based politics - neutrality, connection of patriotism with everyday life activities, underlined European context, getting rich, being thrifty and successful (within the meaning of material values rather than the spiritual ones [Dudek 2008: 195]. From the perspective of spatial politics Porta Posnania is fully coherent with the current of history-based politics that created it. The modernistic construction of the building totally cuts off from traditional buildings of this part of the city. The location in turn (close to the frequently visited cathedral) aims both at internal recipients (local and national ones) and external recipients (foreign ones).

The third discussed site important for history-based politics is the building of Polish History Museum. It is under construction and is to be finished in 2018 to celebrate 100th anniversary of Poland regaining independence. The museum itself was established on 2nd May 2006 by the then Minister of Culture and National Heritage (at the same time one of the main representatives of the conservative current of history-based politics) Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski. The temporary seat of the museum was in

Warsaw, at Mokotowska 33/35. The new seat was planned over Trasa Łazienkowska. For this purpose in 2009 a public tender was held to develop the place. However, as a result of poor interest in it taken by the liberal party then at power, no contract for implementing the project was signed and the idea was brought to a standstill. No sooner than in 2015 did the government of Ewa Kopacz (also representing the liberal attitude towards history-based politics) suggested the location of Polish History Museum in the Warsaw Citadel, where previously Polish Army Museum had been projected. Finally, in November 2015 a new conservative government approved the said location and divided the building between Polish History Museum (28.000 m<sup>2</sup>) and Polish Army Museum (12.000 m<sup>2</sup>) by the decision of vice prime minister Piotr Gliński [www.muzhp.pl]. Analyzing the project of new museum buildings created by WXCA Wroński Jaworski architecture office we can see simple, modernistic pavilions shaped similarly to Porta Posnania [ibidem]. Therefore the building is not architecturally consistent with the demand of the most important museum for the conservative current of history-based politics in Poland. There is a similar case with the location - Warsaw Citadel is not placed in the strict center of the capital city. Admittedly the new buildings are to be raised directly next to Wisłostrada, which makes them easily accessible, but such location is actually better for Polish Army Museum (which was the original plan) than to Polish History Museum. The museum being a key educational and information "outpost" of history-based politics of the state (presenting its complete history) should be located in the strict center of Warsaw, next to busy tourist routes, especially those frequented by foreigners in order to be an important argument not only in internal history-based politics but also the external one. Is there a better location? The answer may be found below.

#### **4. Saxon Palace as a chance for history-based politics**

Saxon Palace together with its colonnade placed in the western frontage of the current Plac Piłsudskiego in Warsaw was blown up by Germans just after the surrender of the Warsaw Rising in 1944. The only remnants are the arcades with Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. During the post-war rebuilding of Warsaw it was decided that the building would not be reconstructed. The first serious attempt was made during Lech Kaczyński's term of office. On 18th May 2006, after many unsuccessful attempts, a public tender for performance of reconstruction works of the Saxon Palace was held. It was won by Warsaw-based company Budimex Dromex S.A. The project and reconstruction of the palace was to cost PLN 201,000,000 and the development would last three years. Warsaw city hall was planned to be



placed there [Kęsik 2014: 241]. Unfortunately due to unfavorable political conditions and officially due to the fact that some cellars of the palace uncovered during the reconstruction were entered into the register of monuments and the rising reconstruction costs, on 25th January 2008 Warsaw authorities finally cancelled the contract with Budimex Dromex without legal sanctions because of the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances independent of the parties [ibidem: 244]. The uncovered cellars were covered with dirt again and the whole case was politically forgotten with huge loss to the local society demanding the reconstruction and to the whole national community. In the situation of no perspectives of prompt reconstruction of the western frontage of Plac Piłsudskiego financed with municipal money an NGO called "Forum Rozwoju Warszawy" presented its own idea of organizing the space [www.forumrozwoju.waw.pl]. Reconstruction of Saxon Palace for the 100th anniversary of regaining independence (which unfortunately seems almost impossible) is lobbied by "Saski 2018" organization [www.saski2018.pl].

Rebuilding of Saxon Palace in agreement with empowered municipal authorities (representing the previously ruling Civic Platform [Pol.: Platforma Obywatelska]) is a significant challenge for history-based politics and spatial politics of the current conservative government. The reconstructed Saxon Palace placed in direct proximity of the Royal Route (Pol.: Trakt Królewski) frequently visited by tourists (also foreigners) could be a perfect location for Polish History Museum. The architecture of the palace - straight, monumental classicism with characteristic colonnade over the Tomb of Unknown Soldier - being a representative site of pre-war Warsaw could successfully compete in idealistic and visual aspect with the Stalinism based Palace of Culture and Science, which still dominates the capital. Rebuilding Saxon Palace would be a very good spatial accompaniment for the ideas represented by the conservative current of history-based politics in Poland. Therefore, it is a pity that Polish History Museum will be created in spatial and architectural conditions dictated by the stepping down liberal government. Surely in 2018 the modern facility near the Citadel will be opened, but spatial and architectural factors will keep working contrary to the conservative thought presented there, which will unnecessarily deteriorate their possible tone.

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The question raised at the beginning of this paper was whether there is anything that may be called "spatial history-based politics". The evidence for the relation between power and architecture presented above, both in

the past and contemporary, as well as the characteristics of history-based politics itself, strictly connected with state's activity and political decisions, undoubtedly show the necessity for further consideration of the proposed new concept. This paper brings out the simplified but obviously reality-adequate ideological divisions within the frames of history-based politics and spatial politics. It is perhaps the first significant statement in the discussion on the deeper understanding of the matter of the quality of institutions within this phenomenon. The museums presented in this paper are important for the development of Polish history-based politics after the accession to the European Union as indicated by their ideological variety and even equivocation of messages within the given current. This is arguably caused by lack of ideological continuity of power in Poland between 2004 and 2016, in spite of significant dominance of the liberal parties during that period.

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#### **4. POLAND IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA**

Anna Skolimowska

***Polish development cooperation after the year 1989.  
Continuity or change?***

**Introduction**

Poland's involvement in the provision of international development assistance is a product of several factors. Firstly, it is a result of repaying a "debt of gratitude" to the international community for their extensive foreign aid, which caused socio-economic changes after 1989. Such aid was an essential element of institutional transformation. During the 1990s, economically developed countries and international organizations allocated substantial financial resources to assistance activities regarding Poland. This aid contributed to the success of the institutional transformations and socio-economic reforms which had begun in 1989 [*Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju* 2003].

Secondly, there is a strategic justification for Polish cooperation in the areas of development aid. Considering the fact that development aid is an instrument of overcoming the global development gap, combating poverty as well as social inequalities which are potentially a source of international conflicts and tensions, the activities undertaken by Polish institutions in this matter are an element of building a stable and peaceful harmony between nations. The countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to which Poland has belonged since 1996, grant development aid in the belief that sustainable development of humanity is of interest to everyone, and that welfare in developing countries and the ones currently undergoing transformation brings benefits to developed countries with better prospects for improvement.

Joining the incentive of global development cooperation is treated universally as a responsibility of all nations of the world, as it stems from premises of an ethical, moral, social, economic and political nature [*Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju* 2003].

Thirdly, Polish involvement in global development cooperation is expected to simultaneously increase the extent of the country's influence in the international arena as well as strengthen Polish prestige as a country which, while belonging to a group of highly developed countries (as a member of OECD, European Union, NATO, The Council of Europe), does not

forget about the problems of the more impoverished parts of the globe [*Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju* 2003].

Fourthly, the motives of Polish involvement in international development cooperation are of pragmatic, political and economic nature. The reasons for this include the promotion of democracy, human rights, etc. in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, and Polish strategic activities, which are supposed to help extend the West's influence in those countries. It is also a matter of building international security by the means of, for example, aid in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of the many economic motives for this are: creating market outlets for Polish products and services, promotion of export, supporting Polish companies on the markets of developing countries and betterment of trade balances through preferential loans (for example, the People's Republic of China is one of the main recipients of Polish aid).

The aim of this article is to analyze the evolution of Polish development policy from 1989 until the year 2016, which is the moment of recapitulation and redefinition of European and international development aid's directions, in which Poland also participates.

It is then assumed that the specifics of Polish development aid since 1989 have evolved in the scope of geographical dimension (priority areas), strategic principles, instruments, and the means of its performance, as well as in the financial dimension. This evolution is a product of Polish development cooperation as part of the broader institutional environment (in both the European Union and the United Nations).

With reference to the subject at hand, it is important to ask the following questions: what are the institutional, strategic and financial specifics and priority areas of Polish development aid? Does Polish membership in the international organizations active in the area of development aid influence the essence of Poland's involvement in this matter? Has there been a change or perhaps stagnation in Polish development aid with regard to its directions, principles, priorities or ways of implementation after 1989?

This article is divided into two parts. The first one pertains to Polish development cooperation. Against this background, it delves into the subject of evolution of Polish development policies, from the moment of institutional transformation in 1989 until modern times, especially in the context of membership in the European Union which is the biggest development aid provider on the global scale.

The second part of the article pertains to the analysis of the institutional and strategic dimensions of Polish development policy as well

as its instruments. With all of this in mind, this analysis will cover Polish activities of development, their scale in comparison to other member nations of European Union, and Polish priority areas.

This analysis is carried out with reference to both the internal dimension as well as in the context of development policy principles which have been assumed by the forum of international institutions, especially the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) since 2015.

### **Development cooperation – history**

Before 1989, the Polish People's Republic (PPR), while being part of the communist bloc in spite of being geographically one of the countries of the North<sup>1</sup>, was perceived by countries of the south as a poorer and underdeveloped part of the wealthy world [Bagiński 2002]. At this time, the PPR did not pursue its own sovereign foreign policy. The country's activities in the area of development cooperation were realized instead according to the Soviet foreign policy doctrines. The PPR developed strong economic relations and supported, as part of international organizations and international conferences, activities leading to the resolution of convoluted global problems, such as environmental and demographic problems, and a decrease in the development gap between the North and the South. The PPR also cooperated with countries of the South, which shared the ideal of development in the socialist direction. The basis for the performance of that activity was Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON]. During this period of time, numerous important trade relations were formed with Africa, Asia and Latin America. Those relations were limited by the way of functioning within the bloc system and a lack of sufficient resources, which prevented independent political and economic dialogue with countries of the South [Bagiński 2002].

Despite these conditions, before 1989, the PPR was perceived as a country supplying development aid, fulfilling this task in accordance with the principles of Soviet foreign policy doctrine. The PPR demonstrated greatest

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<sup>1</sup> Geographical division into Northern and Southern hemispheres had been adopted by researchers of international relations as a means of showing the advancement of the division between global zones of wealth and poverty. The North was described as the wealthy countries, which had a population characterized by a longer average life expectancy, higher percentage of population with access to education, and a higher income per capita in contrast to other regions of the world. This group consists of: members of the European Union, USA, Australia, Japan and a few other Asian countries with a high standard of living. The countries of the South (in Africa, South America, Asia) were poorer than in the North.

activity during the 1970s by supporting the New International Economic Order<sup>2</sup>. Between the 1960s and 1990s, Polish engineers were involved in modernization projects in Iraq, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola and Cuba. Aid was also given in the form of medical help in many different parts of the world [Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2015: 45]. The technical aid was provided in the form of scholarships for students from developing countries and advisory activities (Jankowski 2015: 86-88).

The 1970s, which in Poland were a time of economic prosperity, had been financed by loans and international obligations granted on the grounds of the decision made by Edward Gierek, the 1<sup>st</sup> secretary of Polish United Worker's Party. This caused Poland a plethora of economic and political problems at the end of the decade as well as in the 1980s<sup>3</sup>. At this time, the international community supported both Polish society and the members of the "Solidarność"<sup>4</sup> movement with medical and food aid.

The year 1989 in Poland was the start of deep societal, political, and economic changes, resulting from the victory of the "Solidarność" civil movement, bringing changes in the Polish political arena. The process of economic transformation began. It consisted of the transition from a command-and-distribution economy to the market economy model. Polish internal transformation was accompanied by the country's opening to integration structures of the Western world. The Republic of Poland in the 1990s joined the Council of Europe (1991), the Organization for Security and

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<sup>2</sup>It is a collection of political and economic propositions introduced in the 1970s by the poorly developed and developing countries during the United Nations conference concerning the subject of trade and development. Their aim was to encourage international cooperation for the sake of decreasing the gap between developing and poorly developed countries. Those demands were meant to put the international economic system under scrutiny (primarily for the benefit of third world countries), renouncing from the Bretton Woods system, which benefited the countries which enacted it, especially the United States.

*Nowy Międzynarodowy Ład Ekonomiczny*, Encyklopedia PWN, <http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/nowy-miedzynarodowy-lad-ekonomiczny:3948856.html> (accessed on: 02.07.2016).

<sup>3</sup> In 1971-1975 Polish international debt rose from USD 100 million to USD 7 billion and exhibited a tendency for further rise.

<sup>4</sup> In the 1980s, the USA pursued a careful policy with regard to Poland. On the one hand, the economic instruments were used to limit the activity of communist authorities against trade unions, while on the other hand, the USRR was warned about the consequences of a possible Soviet invasion of Poland. At the same time, the American side increased the level of economic aid to Poland. In 1981, the American Administration announced an increase of loans to Poland, using the economic instrument as a form of influencing the changes occurring within the country.



Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999. Negotiations for Poland's membership in the European Union started in 1998. They were successful and Poland officially joined with full membership in 2004.

The economic and political situation of Poland in the 1990s was a product of the transformation process which had required assistance from the Western world. The difficult economic condition of the country had caused a halt in Polish development aid activities. The activities were resumed in the middle of the 1990s.

The time of membership negotiation with the European Union was crucial for the formation of Polish cooperation ideas. This stage opened a new chapter in Polish development cooperation history in the strategic and institutional dimension as well as the directions of its activity.

### **Polish development cooperation – the strategic dimension**

The first document which regulated Polish development cooperation in the period around accession was called "The Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation" [*Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju* 2003]. In this document, the aim of Polish development aid is highlighted as fostering the achievement of sustainable development and reducing poverty in the countries that are beneficiaries of Polish aid [ibidem]. The document also notes that the principles of Polish development cooperation are in agreement with Millennium Development Goals (MDG)<sup>5</sup> and with the principles of the EU development policy.

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<sup>5</sup> *Millennium Development Goals* (MDG) were adopted in the Millennial Declaration by the heads of state of 189 countries attending the United Nations summit in 2000. The Eight Millennium Goals are an obligation of the international community to reduce poverty and hunger, ensure an equal standing of men and women, improve health care, improve the state of education, battle AIDS, protect the natural environment, and also ensure creation of a global partnership between nations to foster development. The deadline for the fulfillment of those goals was also set to 2015. The Millennium Goals include: 1: Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by decreasing by half the number of people whose daily income doesn't exceed 1 dollar. 2: Achieving universal education on the primary level through providing all the boys and girls with the opportunity to finish a full cycle of studies on the primary level. 3: Promoting gender equality and social advancement of women through elimination of unequal access to first and second level of education by 2005, and on higher levels by 2015. 4: Reducing child mortality through decreasing the child mortality rate by 2/3 for children aged up to 5. 5: Improving maternal health

The main tasks associated with Polish development cooperation are: supporting a lasting economic growth, abiding by human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principle of proper governance, promotion of global security and stability, transmission of experiences in Polish institutional transformation, development of human potential, supporting the development of public administration, local structures, environmental protection, prevention of ecological problems, and providing humanitarian and food assistance. The development cooperation, as an integral part of foreign policy and international relations, serves as a means through which basic goals of Polish foreign policy are fulfilled: Providing security and stability to the country and its population, protecting its interests and developing the economic cooperation of all the countries of the world. Poland's security will be achieved by halting potentially conflict-generating tensions on the North-South line, its economic interests – by greater involvement of developing countries also during the transformation into a world economy, including trade and investment activity with our country, natural environment – identification and elimination of ecological hazards. An important effect of this assistance will be the promotion of Poland as a politically stable, economically thriving, culturally interesting country with plentiful quality human resources that is open to cooperation. Spreading positive information about Poland will directly impact the development of a multitude of cultural, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation forms and

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care by decreasing mother mortality rate by  $\frac{3}{4}$ . 6: Limiting the spread of AIDS/HIV, malaria and other illnesses, and reducing new infections. 7: Ensuring sustainable natural resources management methods through inclusion of sustainable development principles in national strategies and programs and application of methods halting degradation of natural environment. Decreasing by half the number of people without ensured access to clean water. By 2020, achieving a considerable betterment of at least 100 million slums' residents' quality of life. 8: Instilling global development partnership through the creation of an equal, indiscriminate, transparently governed trading and financing system, with the participants of the system obliged to promote good practices of managing and governing, develop, limit poverty, take into account the needs of the poorest developing, island and landlocked countries, create a strategy that ensures jobs for the new generation, increase the access to medicines for developing countries and give them access to modern technology. Source: *Milenijne Cele Rozwoju*, <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Milenijne.cele.rozwoju.53.html> (accessed on: 30.06.2016).

increase the movement of persons between countries [*Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju 2003*].

After its accession to the European Union, development cooperation became a new organizational, financial and curricular platform that would allow for the fulfillment of Polish foreign policy goals: promotion of democracy and proper practices of governance, especially in the countries of Eastern Partnership. Through the accession of the Republic of Poland to the EU, an important worldwide donor and a participant of development cooperation, the expectations towards Poland regarding development cooperation increased considerably. At the same time, the accession made way for new opportunities, such as the effective use of EU's resources.

The development cooperation is a new area of Polish policy which until 2011 was not subject to complex regulations. The recommendation to coordinate activities in development cooperation stems from the Lisbon Treaty (art. 210 TFEU), under which the EU and its member states coordinate their policies and consult each other with regard to their assistance programs. According to article 208 of the TFEU, EU and its member states respect obligations and take into account goals which they approved as part of the UN and other competent international organizations. The Republic of Poland adopted the following: Millennium Declaration (2000), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), European Consensus on Development (2005), European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008).

Aiming to coordinate Poland's development cooperation in 2011, the Parliament of the Republic of Poland adopted *Act on Development Cooperation* [*Ustawa o współpracy rozwojowej 2011*]. Development cooperation in this sense means activities of the government administration bodies which provide developing countries, in accordance with international solidarity, with:

- 1) Development aid, especially for: a) promotion and support of the development of democracy and the civil community, the development of parliamentarism, the principles of proper governance and abiding by human rights, b) support of their lasting socio-economic growth, undertaking activities which reduce poverty and improve the population's quality of health, as well as level of education and qualifications.

- 2) Humanitarian aid, which consists of providing assistance, care, and protection for populations affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other humanitarian crises caused by nature or humans [*Ustawa o współpracy rozwojowej 2011 art. 2.1*].

Development cooperation is also understood as educational activities which are to raise awareness of global problems and the codependency between countries, called “global education”. Development cooperation can be realized in particular in the form of:

- 1) financing tasks entrusted to entities participating in the realization of development cooperation
- 2) financially aiding a developing country’s budget
- 3) granting loans
- 4) reducing or converting a developing country’s debt
- 5) co-financing or providing technical aid during the implementation of financial activities, especially from the budgets of other countries, European Union or other international organizations
- 6) contribution to international organizations, institutions, programs and funds
- 7) organization of courses and consulting for entities participating in the performance of development cooperation
- 8) publishing and dissemination of publications
- 9) organization of informational activities [*Ustawa o współpracy rozwojowej* 2011 Article 4].

According to the law, development cooperation is carried out in accordance with the Multiannual Program for Development Cooperation, referred to as “the Program”, which covers time periods lasting more than 4 years. The Program specifies the goals, geographical and thematic priorities of development aid, humanitarian aid and global education. To perform this Program, the Republic of Poland takes into consideration the arrangements and regulations of the European Union. The draft of the Program is developed by the minister responsible for foreign affairs [*Ustawa o współpracy rozwojowej* 2011 Article 5.1]. The issue of development cooperation is financed from the state budget, and the institution leading it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since 2012, the Department of Development Cooperation)<sup>6</sup>. In its activities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is supported by the know-how of the Polish Foundation for International Cooperation for

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<sup>6</sup> The minister responsible for foreign affairs in the field of development cooperation 1) coordinates 2) performs the tasks described in the Plan by funding the tasks entrusted to those involved in the implementation of development cooperation 3) carries out tasks using the Programs’ and the European Union’s financial instruments 4) consults the planned project with the competent authorities in developing countries. The Act on development cooperation: OJ 2011 No. 234, item. 1386 Article 13.

Development and the Program Council for Development Cooperation [Jankowski 2015: 106].

On the 20 March 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted the first Multiannual Program for Development Cooperation. At present, the current document used is the Multiannual Program for Development Cooperation for the years 2016-2020 [*Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020* 2015]. It is a government document containing all of the Official Development Assistance<sup>7</sup>, which is a continuation of the long-term development cooperation program for the period of 2012- 2015. The new program takes into account challenges which the Polish system of development cooperation has to face, including both changes in the world (such as the fulfillment of Millennium Development Goals deadline; the new agenda after 2015 is under discussion) and in the regional scope (the need to accelerate the transformation of the Eastern Partnership countries, the situation in Ukraine).

The goal of the proposed changes in the Program is to further strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of Polish development cooperation. The Program defines the objectives, thematic and geographic areas of the development cooperation and the basic principles and forms of assistance using instruments of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Program was developed by analyzing strategic documents, the needs and directions of partner countries' development, and the results of consultations with representatives of partner countries. Activities under the Program will be financed from the special reserve of the state budget for development cooperation both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from other organizations of government providing development cooperation.

Polish financial commitments for development cooperation in 2016-2020 will reflect the results of the Third International Conference's negotiations on Financing for Development in Addis Abeba. According to the stance of the Polish government on the 10 July 2015, Poland will strive to

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<sup>7</sup> Official Development Assistance is, as defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, donations and loans provided by government or international organizations to support economic development and prosperity in developing countries. Loans are treated as ODA when they contain a grant element of 25% of the total amount. In addition, a condition for classifying development cooperation as Official Development Assistance is that the partner state for which support is provided is on the list approved by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD Development Assistance, <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/aid/development.1938.html> (accessed: 07/03/2016)

increase official development assistance to 0.33% of GNI by 2030 [*Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020* 2015: 7].

Thematic priorities of Polish development cooperation are part of the international community's efforts to further reduce global poverty and to ensure inclusion and sustainable development, grounded in respect for democratic principles, human rights and principles of proper governance. The priority thematic areas are ones through which the involvement of Polish development cooperation has become a recognized brand and an activity in which Poland specializes. They are:

- **proper governance** – regional development, including the strengthening of local government, decentralization, security and the civil protection sector, strengthening competences and capabilities of public administration, strengthening the rule of law, fight against corruption, keeping legislation and institutions up to EU standards, access to reliable and objective information, independence of the media;
- **democracy and human rights** – the democratic electoral process, human rights and civic liberties, strengthening civic organizations, civic dialogue;
- **human capital** – improvement of health care quality, inclusive education and universal access to high-quality education, civic education, social integration of people from disadvantaged groups;
- **entrepreneurship and the private sector** – competitiveness and innovation of micro enterprises, social economy, entrepreneurship, particularly of women and youth, education and training;
- **sustainable agriculture and rural development** – in particular food security, productivity and competitiveness of agricultural production, access to markets, use of modern technologies in agriculture, modernizing local infrastructure;
- **protection of the environment** – renewable energy sources, energetic efficiency, water management, waste management, preventing the effects of natural disasters and catastrophes resulting from human activity [*Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020* 2015: 9].

Geographical priorities have been focused on a total of ten countries: four in the Eastern Partnership (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and six countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, Palestine, Senegal and Tanzania). In the case of Afghanistan and Tunisia,

countries that were previously considered priorities, there was an objective of gradually extinguishing any existing action within a maximum of two years, i.e. by the end of 2017. This mechanism will then allow for the fulfillment of Poland's obligations undertaken earlier in these countries. In comparison to other countries that are recipients of ODA, there are countries which have ceased to be priority countries on the list of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Assistance to those countries as well as the priority countries could still be provided via Polish foreign institutions such as the Foundation for International Solidarity or through contributions to international organizations as well as specialized agencies of the United Nations and through international funds. The funds allocated towards development cooperation with countries that are not priorities constitute 10% of the special reserve available to Ministry of Foreign Affairs [*Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020* 2015: 10].

Flagship initiatives within the Polish development cooperation are: Academy of Public Administration of the Eastern Partnership, Information Centre for Local Authorities in Moldova and Scholarship Programs: Stefan Banach Scholarship and Ignacy Lukaszewicz Program Scholarship.


Multilateral cooperation, under which such projects and development programs commence, constitutes the bulk (about 75%) of the ODA provided every year by Poland in favor of developing countries. The main (about 90% of multilateral aid) channel of aid delivery is still the European Union, mainly through contributions to the EU budget and through contributions to the European Development Fund (EDF). In addition, multilateral cooperation is carried out through international organizations, such as institutions of the UN System, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank Group and other multilateral development financial institutions [*Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020* 2015: 107].

The first Polish expenses concerning international cooperation were incurred in 1998 and since then the contributions of Poland within the framework of Official Development Assistance have been monitored and accounted for. A significant increase in spending for this purpose began with the accession to the European Union. By joining the EU, Poland has made contributions to the activities in the field of international cooperation for development amounting to USD 76.6 million [Jankowski 2015: 139]. The chart below shows the growing expenditure for the Polish development cooperation since 2004, proving its growing rank in the realm of Polish foreign policy.

In 2015, Poland spent on official development assistance (ODA) a total of PLN 1.668 billion, out of which within multilateral cooperation PLN 1.299 billion was spent. This accounted for 78% of total resources. Bilateral aid costs accounted for a figure of PLN 369 million (22%). The value of funds spent on development cooperation accounted for 0.1% of Polish gross national income (GNI) [*Polska pomoc w liczbach*].

The biggest part of Polish development assistance that was expended through multilateral institutions and organizations was contributed to European Union funds allocated to external development assistance. In 2015, Polish participation in these activities reached PLN 1,125 million. Part of it was the contribution to the EU budget that was allocated for this purpose (PLN 936 million) and the other was the payment (PLN 189 million) towards the European Development Fund (EDF), which is the main non-budgetary instrument EU uses for cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and overseas countries and territories (OCT). In favor of entities operating in the System of the United Nations, PLN 64 million was provided. In the framework of the World Bank Group, it was a figure of PLN 86 million [*Polska pomoc w liczbach*].

Chart 1. Polish Official Development Assistance in 2000-2015



Source: Own work on the basis of OECD 2016: 242.



## Summary

Polish development cooperation has evolved since 1989, which in the face of this analysis can be defined as a fundamental change. Poland has gone from a country which was undergoing an institutional transformation and was a beneficiary of development aid in the 1990s, to a country providing such aid. Having undergone such a change, as compared to the period before 1989 (when, within the communist system, a certain kind of Polish aid was provided to countries of the south), Poland faced several issues. First, the conditions of Polish international aid, which after 1989 were implemented through international organizations such as the system of the United Nations or the European Union. This implies that the strategic priorities of Polish aid were influenced by the inclusion of global trends such as the protection of human rights, eradication of poverty, etc. Poland specializes in the promotion of democracy and the model of institutional transformation. The direction of our activity also changed – from remote areas of the globe before 1989, to commitment focused on the immediate vicinity, especially in Eastern Europe.

Polish government administration bodies have then developed the legal basis for development cooperation in the form of legal acts, as well as a long-term program framework of this activity. In the fulfillment of this task, civic society organizations were also involved.

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*Monika M. Brzezińska*

***Poland: an ambitious pawn or a European partner?  
An outline of the evolution of Polish-German relations***

**Introduction**

Poles and Germans are difficult neighbors. On the one hand, they have always had animosities, rivalries and conflicts, while on the other, thanks to this proximity, both countries could grow, enrich each other and accomplish noble goals for many centuries. Polish-German relations, or actually great engagement in their positive rebuilding, especially after World War II, are for many countries a phenomenon and a role model to follow. However, this “mutual love” is not impeccable. It has specks of national pride, sense of own mission, rivalry, urge to dominate, or at least a desire to be one another’s equal on various stages of decision-making processes in Eastern Europe as well as in the EU. The possibilities of these two countries in this area obviously differ. It is difficult not to notice the significance of wealth, international affluence, as well as equally important leadership skills of particular politicians. All these elements, and many more, have a deciding influence on the image of the two states, their position in their mutual relations and within the world as well as possibilities of making decisions on a broader, global level.

This article will analyze the evolution of Poland’s position: how it was shaped and what it depended on. Was it helping or hindering partner cooperation between the two countries between whom there are major differences in the perception of national interests and self-identity on the European arena (Poland focuses on what is national, while Germans “feel better” staying on the European level)? Is it at all possible for Poland – with its ambitions but also historic experience and geopolitical position – to be able to accompany its western neighbor in shaping the new face of Europe? How do the Poles perceive it, and how do the Germans see us? Are both these images coherent with each other or is there an observable dichotomy? The analysis will encompass only selected political events with global crisis characteristics, in which Poland participated together with Germany.

The time span taken for the analysis will include years from 1989 until the first half of 2016. Of course, one needs to be aware that multiple events took place in that period: Eurozone crisis, war in Ukraine, or migrant

problems in Europe. All these events have certainly influenced one another and the Polish-German relations. One also needs to remember that in the meantime, the Polish political stage saw a power change, its foreign policy underwent a reorientation, which significantly influenced bilateral relations with our neighbors. There appeared also points of contention on Berlin-Warsaw axis such as the war in Iraq, Polish partnership with the USA, or *Energiewende*, none of which will be discussed due to the limitations of this publication.

### **Poland-Germany relations in the years 1989-2005<sup>1</sup>**

The Polish-German relations have never been easy. However, the year 1989, which became an iconic date of changes in Central Eastern Europe, began a period of improvement in mutual relations. Previously, standing on the verge of two worlds: Poland, East Germany and West Germany were more like countries on faraway continents of a related block than neighbors [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 49]. Nonetheless, the euphoria and the joy of regaining independence in Poland and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall commenced a new stage in the mutual relationship. As M. Mildenberger notes, it was a time marked by both experiences of the Iron Curtain and World War II, which did not make building mutual bonds easy. The first task to be performed by both nations was confronting their histories, wounds and experiences. It was difficult for both sides, which is why undoubtedly a great value lied in the approach and multiple meetings of the heads of governments from Poland and Germany – T. Mazowiecki and H. Kohl (for example during a Mass in Krzyżowa on 12 November 1989). The symbolism of reconciliation based on the symmetry of guilt and lawlessness that both

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<sup>1</sup> The article omitted the treaty base of Polish-German relations, you can read more about it, among others, in: J. Kukułka, *Traktaty sąsiedzkie Polski odrodzonej*, Wrocław 1998; J. Barcz, *Podstawy prawne stosunków Polski ze zjednoczonymi Niemcami*; K. Ziemer, *Der Stand der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen aus deutscher Sicht*, w: A. Domańska, A. Lewaty, W. Mincer, *Duetsch-polnische Beziehungen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Bibliographie 1900-1990, Band I Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Kultur in Epochen und Regionen*, Wisbaden 2000; K. Skubiszewski, *Zachodnia granica Polski w świetle traktatów*, Poznań 1975; W. M. Góralski, *Polska-Niemcy 1945-2007*, Warszawa 2007; E. Stadtmüller, *Granica lęku i nadziei. Polacy wobec Niemiec w latach dziewięćdziesiątych*, Wrocław 1998; W. Czapliński, *Traktaty polsko-niemieckie z lat 1990-1991*, in: L. Janicki, B. Koszel, W. Wilczyński, *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Studia politologiczno-ekonomiczno-prawne*, Poznań 1996, as well as in many publications of K. Ziemer, J. Holzer, B. Koszela, J. Kranz and many other experts in the field who deal with the said topic in detail.

nations committed during World War II [Mildenberger 2005: 164], allowed them to look at each other as equals: with full awareness of the experienced suffering and harm which both nations were part of. Despite being glad of improving relations, issues still remained, which were casting a shadow on both nations. For example, the Ten-Point Plan of the German foreign policy presented in the German Bundestag, which gave no assurance from the German side about accepting each other's borders, and which would leave question marks in Poland [Stadtmüller 1998: 13]. Instead of profoundly coming closer, there was a sense of lack of trust [Hajnicz 1995: 45]. Old fears were rekindled, which clearly revealed Polish anxiety of the "German hegemon" wanting to dominate Poland. And so, politician J. Łopuszański, when speaking in the Polish Parliament, claimed that the process of German reunification may become a factor in destroying Europe's order. He noted that German civilization expansion is possible, which in the past destroyed the Polish element [Stadtmüller 1998: 25]. The reunited Germany, next to Polish weakness and its newly shaping democracy, seemed to be a strong player on the international stage, which evoked many fears of various visions of German domination [Stadtmüller 1998: 24].

The two countries also had an obstacle towards having equal partner relations. It was their clear disproportion, among others, in demographic and economic potential. Despite this initial assumption, many systemic, political and economic factors tipped the scales towards Germany. This in turn generated in both nations further fears about Germany's position, role and significance in Europe. Germany found itself in a particularly difficult situation. On the one hand, it felt responsible for the events of the previous half-century, on the other hand, it wanted to actively join the politics of Europe and the world as a form of compensation. This, in turn, nurtured opinions concerning an alleged rebirth of German imperialism and urge to dominate. As A. Wolff-Powęska notes, the then Germany was a late nation and a political dwarf with a permanent identity crisis [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 50] who permanently ran away from itself and was able to rise up after a defeat of the national socialism. Its determinant came to be political "blending" into the supra-national structures and finding its way in the melancholic dream about the Holy Empire of the German Nation [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 51]. The German government chose a tactic of intensified activity at the European level, assuming that it was the only way to show its peaceful intentions and "put to rest" old fears of other nations, especially of Poland.

Poland also struggled with its own historical experiences. There was a high level of caution, although the Polish government tried, practically from the onset of its term with T. Mazowiecki in office, to make Poland part of Western European structures. Initially, it was done particularly to let Poland associate with the European Communities. On the one hand, in this situation, Poland counted on support from Germany, whom it saw as its proponent, and on the other, it permanently asked itself what course the expansion of reunified Germany would take. Skeptical voices doubting honest intentions of our Western neighbor were expressed not only by our country. M. Dobrosielski put it particularly directly, saying that he saw the German threat more often not in the possibility of aggression on Poland's borders, but in the possibility of economic dependency of Poland. He believed that reunified Germany would economically and politically be even stronger without the need to change borders to make us their vassals. He was afraid that Poland sooner or later may become a German colony [Stadtmüller 1998: 16]. It was not uncommon to look with caution at German engagement in the process of making Poland part of the family of democratic states. The vision of Germanic Europe worried both Polish politicians and ordinary citizens. Despite large skepticism, it was at the same time stressed that Poland's path to Europe led through Germany, who was perceived as our advocate on the international stage.

Similarly, on the German side, there was a conviction that Poland's entry into the European structures would mitigate the historic burdens and neighbor conflicts in the future, or maybe even contribute to their complete removal within the process of mutual reconciliation. Germany in its foreign policy was focused on supporting Polish presence in the European Communities; however, the matter of timing was debatable. German defense minister V. Rühle stressed it himself in his speech in Warsaw in 1996 that it was Germany's duty to enable the Polish State in what it needs and in what it strives for, meaning in a definitive return to Europe [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 119]. Also chancellor H. Kohl spoke in 1995 about a train rushing to Europe and that Poland and Europe need each other [Kohl 1995: 2].

The years 1989-1997 were a period of great emotions, hopes and engagement in revitalization of Polish-German relations. Both sides treated each other as partners despite completely different historic experiences and fears related to that. Time showed what the Polish feared the most – that the strength of Germany (demographic and economic) slowly dominated mutual relations. Poland was dominated by its western rival's interests and pushed into the role of a secondary or background player. A government change in

Germany influenced this particularly significantly. H. Kohl's contribution to the idea that Germany is responsible both for itself and the whole Europe was substituted by a new policy of G. Schröder who promoted a vision of "strong Germany" focused more on building its own position in Europe and Germany rather than on the image of a "good and help-providing neighbor". While until then the "reunification chancellor" liked to speak of Germany as a superpower with proper responsibility (*Großmacht mit entsprechender Verantwortung*) [Koszel 2012: 33], then the governing period of his successor was described as a "return to normal". G. Schröder identified more with Germany perceived as a "great superpower" (*Großmacht*) [Koszel 2012: 34]. The change in thinking and perception of its role and above all its position and possibilities in Europe and the world by the German government did impact further Polish-German relations. Since then, these relations were more intense and more often disproportionately asymmetrical.

### **Eurozone crisis**

When first Greek financial problems started to emerge, no one had yet anticipated what scale of problems they will have to deal with. Also, the governments of Poland and Germany probably did not realize then that a situation was arising that could bring about a "new quality" in their relations. It is worth noting that the status of both countries was significant, especially that of Poland who lifted itself from a position of a young democracy and started to aspire to the role of a local decision maker. Poland was developing a sense of strength thanks to stability and enhanced position in the EU and Poland's economic fortune. These aspects evoked hopes, if not for matching its western neighbor, then at least for inclusion into the circle of decision-making countries. As authors of the report 10 PL-UE indicate, Poland has made a major political advancement [Kałużyńska 2014: 13], learned to protect its interests while simultaneously acting with a sense of responsibility for the European integration process [Kałużyńska 2014: 11]. Polish foreign policy put special stress on protecting what is national. Our country gained an ability to influence and shape "the EU world" according to its interests and needs [Kałużyńska 2014: 21], it also used its EU membership to strengthen its international position and to model its external environment via the EU, an example of which is the leadership position in shaping EU's eastern policy [Kałużyńska 2014: 22]. This was described also by P. Buras in the German "Die Zeit" who stressed that Poland is a country placed in the heart of Europe and which deserves to be included in the European elite of leaders [Buras 2011: 31].

One of the newspapers editors seemed to strike the same tone and deemed Germany as a secondary player arguing that when Obama wants to talk to Europe, he calls Poland [Böhm, Heuser 2011: 3], giving Poland an attribute of a significant European player. There was a lack of agreement about Poland's role in Europe. One could observe a dissonance, on the one hand presenting our country as an equal partner, and on the other as a weaker EU member [Kurbjuweit, Neukirch, Reiermann, Schult 2011: 24-28] that thinks in friend-enemy categories. This discrepancy of opinions resulted mainly from different political expectations of both countries. Germany was used to run foreign policy within the Berlin-Paris duo and did not see Poland's possibilities or potential. Germany was focused on its strong presence in Europe and feared Polish resistance and lack of support in decisions, which would be led mainly by national interests. This opinion seemed to be supported by Polish politicians. A. Kwaśniewski complained in an interview for the "Tagesspiegel" daily that Germany did not treat Poland seriously and mutual relations between the countries were perceived by the German side rather as a necessity than a desired situation [Kwaśniewski 2006].

An article printed in one of "Focus" magazine editions was a blunt yet much revealing text about Germans' approach to Poles in terms of Poland's role and place in the European decision-making process. A photo of prime minister Donald Tusk was particularly meaningful. It presented him when kissing chancellor A. Merkel's hand and subtitled a grateful servant kissing the hand [van Ackeren, Kallinger, Moritz, van Randenborg, Thewes 2011: 28-32]. A different German newspaper, in an article by a Polish author, wrote that Polish strength is overestimated in the EU [Adamczyk 2011: 9], suggesting, however, that if Sarkozy did not suit Angela Merkel, she'd find herself a new "Sarko", meaning Poland [Brzezińska 2012: 47]. As A. Łada noticed, also the German support of D. Tusk's candidacy for the position of the European Council chairman might have been a gesture towards Poland and perceived by it as an expression of partnership and an increase in its role on the European arena [Łada 2015: 29]. It proves, however, that Germany treating its eastern neighbor in an instrumental and situational manner is more likely than actually accepting it as an equal partner. This assessment could also be supported by the idea of establishing the Eurogroup, who dealt with resolving the Eurozone crisis, but without Poland, as suggested by the former chancellor G. Schröder [Schwennicke, Mascolo 2011: 24-28]. Although German problems with France and Greece improved Berlin-Warsaw relations, Germany still had a problem with its eastern neighbor [Ehlers, Heyer, Neukirch, Puhl, von Rohr, Zuber 2011: 108-110]. It saw a



good friend in Poland [Urlich 2011: 1] but at the same time was still unable to give it more trust in the area of political decision-making process.

J. Habermas, when attempting to assess Germany's position on the international arena, noted that chancellor A. Merkel is rebuilding the Old Continent "after the German fashion" (Kędzierski). The philosopher also stressed that the old vision of Germany focused on cooperation and compromise is now substituted by an "undisguised desire for leadership" (Kędzierski). As long as PiS (Law and Justice party) governed Poland, as P. Żurawski vel Grajewski described it, the hard stance of the Polish government was able to force the German side, at least in some circumstances, to "speak with the Polish voice" [Żurawski vel Grajewski 2014: 119]. This situation changed drastically when PO (Civic Platform party) took power. Statements of the minister of foreign affairs R. Sikorski, especially the one in the German Association of Foreign Policy in Berlin (28 November 2011), became a clear acceptance of Germany's leadership in Europe. This, in P. Żurawski vel Grajewski's opinion, was seen this way in Poland and in the German media [Żurawski vel Grajewski 2014: 124]. Angela Merkel took over the leadership at the crisis summit until further notice [van Ackeren, Kallinger, Moritz, van Randenborg, Thewes 2011: 28-32] and Germany is today the real center of Europe based on the German model, which is accepted by some EU states [Brzezińska 2012: 43]. "Der Spiegel" expressed even some irony noting that, during the Eurozone crisis, some allies became more German than the Germans themselves [Ehlers, Heyer, Neukirch, Puhl, von Rohr, Zuber 2011: 108-110].

The crisis of the monetary union clearly showed that the actual European leader is Germany, who also is the biggest benefactor of the Eurozone [Młynarski 2015: 7]. At the same time, A. Merkel's policy, continuing G. Schröder government's priorities, preferred the national over the European [Młynarski 2015: 13], achieving it by "selecting" a partner, depending on the needs, in the person of N. Sarkozy (the famous duo "Merkozy") or optionally D. Tusk ("Merkusk") [Buras 2013: 10]. The latter one was, however, chosen far more rarely. Although Poland expected and aspired to be a partner on equal footing with Germany, the German economic advantage put it in a worse position. However, according to some experts, the problem lied more in the fact of instability of the Polish-German relations model rather than their asymmetry itself [Wierzejski 2014: 3], which has never been accepted by the Poles and has always been dissatisfying for them. Similar assessment of the Polish-German relations came from E. Kac and A. Łada, who indicated that the Polish side lacked a cooperation strategy and

that there were Polish-German differences in the approach to history [Kaca, Łada 2009: 94], which made building cooperation all the more difficult.

### **The Ukrainian crisis**

The conflict in Ukraine over time escalated into a war with Russia and became another challenge for the Polish-German relationship. Due to their negative historic experiences, the Poles sympathized with Ukraine and felt responsible for its future; the Germans, however, considering lessons of World War II, saw themselves as peace-minded player of the international arena. Both states, despite different motivations, agreed about the fact that their relations with Russia were not satisfactory, if not simply bad [Kucharczyk, Łada, Wenerski 2015: 11]. Nonetheless, when it comes to resolving the Ukrainian conflict on the international arena, A. Łada noted that Poles see its country as the only EU state having a border with Ukraine and Russia, and thus an important player in the EU eastern politics (Łada 2014: 8). The Germans saw it differently. Statements expressed by some German politicians in Bundestag, for example by K. G. Wellmann (CDU/CSU), related to key German interests in that part of the world [Wellmann 2012: 46], and G. Westerwelle, the then German foreign minister, spoke of the German role in the Ukrainian conflict saying that his country together with France should become the European decision center for this part of Europe [Westerwelle 2012: 6]. Although this reference to the Ukrainian conflict was only mentioned in the Bundestag, the words about the leadership role of Germany and France in Eastern Europe (here: in Ukraine) would mean a complete exclusion of Poland, which until then was considered (and Poland also saw itself this way) as the bridge between Central and Eastern Europe. This vision was taken even further by J. Wadephul (CDU/CSU) who said that Germany should become the advocate of the Eastern European nations [Wadephul 2012: 54]. By this he gave a clear sign that he excluded Poland from the decision-making group and saw other member states as partners who called upon the EU to turn towards Eastern Europe. What was interesting in the context of discussions and parliamentary debates is that despite mentioning the engagement of Polish foreign minister R. Sikorski, Germans ascribed themselves with the deciding and main role of “intermediary” in conflict resolution. It was a new narrative of Germany, who thus far had seen Poland rather as a “bridge” between Eastern and Western Europe [Brzezińska: unpublished materials]. This meant a significant reorientation and shift of the point of emphasis in the international decision-making process, because even in the 1990s Poland was seen in Germany as

the main proponent of Ukraine in its pursuits towards the EU, which had its effect in specific activities [Koszel 2008: 131]. Back in February, both countries took part in the Ukraine-Russia talks in Kiev, but the following summer Poland was not present at the meeting between Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine in Berlin. Our western neighbor explained this with formal issues, while the Polish side saw it as a sign of distrust and an attempt to exclude it from the decision-making process [Łada 2014: 8]. The reaction of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was instantaneous and strong: they demanded that the ones who took the burden of responsibility for negotiations with Russia, mainly Germany, proposed how they were going to solve this conflict [Kazimierczuk 01.09.2014].

Not all German deputies agreed with the said position. B. Fabritius (CDU/CSU) drew attention to the need to engage Poland in the Ukrainian issues, being convinced that Poland next to EU and OECD would stabilize neighbor relations [Fabritius 2014: 24]. K. G. Wellmann (CDU/CSU), at the same time, thanked Polish foreign minister R. Sikorski for his engagement as well as material and intellectual contribution to the mission of preventing bloodshed in Majdan [Wellmann 2014: 23]. As J. Reiter notices, despite the difference between Poland and Germany in the field of eastern politics it was inevitable, practically natural, that both countries still seemed to hold a common course [Reiter 2016: 8]. Due to historical reasons, instruments of executing foreign policy applied by both countries were also different. On the one hand, Poland was not convinced about the reasonability or effectiveness of activities towards Moscow based on dialogue and rather applied the strategy of deterring Russia; on the other hand Germany deemed dialogue as one of the main tools of resolving the conflict, or even its main strength [Łada 2016: 4].

Private relations of key decision makers on the Berlin-Moscow axis also influenced how the relations and positions of Germany and Poland were shaped in the context of eastern politics. When G. Schröder was German chancellor, personally a friend of V. Putin, German-Russian relations tightened and improved. Then, Germany did not need Poland as an intermediary or its “backing” in the form of political support for its eastern policy. The situation changed significantly when A. Merkel took office as head of government, as she was distanced from the Russian president. The annexation of Crimea added more fuel to the fire, which was instantly criticized by the chancellor, and encouraged Germany to seek a political partner, coalition partner and joint decision maker, among others, in Poland. Nevertheless, as time and experience of the Polish “partner” showed, the

relations with the western neighbor had not always been symmetric and Poland, depending on circumstances, was treated instrumentally.

### **The immigration crisis**

Migration policy, migrants and refugees are today the most burning issue of the Old Continent. Never in the previous 50 years had there been so many refugees in the world as there are today. According to UN Refugee Agency, this problem regarded over 51.2 million people by the end of 2013 [Chrapek 2014] – people who left their place of residence in a desperate act of seeking peace and the right to normal life.

According to the data presented by “Spiegel Online”, in 2014 alone over 218 thousand refugees got through the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, which was over three times more than in the year before (in 2013 it was 60 thousand, taking into account that Syrian refugees were the most numerous). This figure includes a great number of children – 26 thousand, out of whom over half were without parents or caregivers [Reimann 2015].

Germany remained the top desired destination for the refugees. As statistical data shows, in the years 2008-2013, 29% of all EU asylum seekers were on their way to Germany. In comparison, this number for other countries was about 15% (France), 13% (Sweden), 7% (Great Britain), or 6% (Italy), and no one pointed to Poland even though it was listed (which may indicate very low refugee interest in staying in Poland) [Eurostat 2014]. This data looked much different in 2015 in the face of a very dynamic situation in the world, new arising conflicts, or old ones intensifying or escalating. In Germany alone, the number of filed asylum applications reached 181,405, which, in comparison with the same period in the previous year, meant an increase of 112.4% [Bundesministerium des Innen 2016].

This situation, however, especially the sense of responsibility for it, was vastly differently understood and interpreted by various member states. Some like Poland (as well as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) presented a stance of opposition (putting more emphasis on protecting their own national interests) against setting specific quotas of allocating migrants for the purpose of their reallocation. However, Germany saw this as European solidarity, as a joint community task. There were ever more often statements such as the one of the Hungarian prime minister V. Orbán that *the migrant crisis was not a European problem but a German one: immigrants did not want to reach Poland, Hungary or Estonia; they all wanted to go to Germany* [Michalak 2016].

Also the then Polish prime minister E. Kopacz opposed the automatic immigrant quota allocation system imposed directly by the European Commission and indirectly by Germany. She noted also that our country is ready to receive part of the immigrants, however only after their previous verification as “actual ones” or “economic ones”. The latter ones, as she declared, would not be allowed into Poland [Potyrała, Wojciechowski 2015: 3]. The strong stance of the Polish government met with European critique and an urge by Germany to seek coalition partners among other group of states, mainly among Austria and France. The newly made coalition started a campaign for “forcing” the anti-migrant states to join the allocation mechanism for the sake of solidarity. As a consequence, Poland agreed on 14 September 2015 to receive around 10 thousand immigrants, while Germany, in comparison, accepted 40 thousand [Potyrała, Wojciechowski 2015: 5].

The intensifying crisis situation in the EU, lack of agreement towards the German vision of *Willkommenskultur* did not make a positive contribution to Warsaw-Berlin relations. Even the German press ridiculed the position of Central Eastern European countries in an article: *Warm welcome to Europe of egoists! (Herzlich willkommen im Europa der Egoisten!)* [von Bayer, Böhmer, Bolzen, Gnauck, Kálnoky, Schilzt 2015]. Also the words of a recent statement by the German president J. Gauck during Catholic Days in Leipzig seemed to confirm the sarcasm towards to Polish migration policy: he said that the *Polish can be amazingly merciful but they were unaware so far that mercy is not reserved only for one's own kind* [Leparz 2016].

However, it is hard to speak of mercy when some EU states asserted this policy, often dictated by Germany, as imposing by force ready-made solutions that are contradictory to national interests. As an example, EC's proposal, strongly supported by chancellor A. Merkel, referred to imposing financial penalties of 250 thousand euros for each refused refugee. The German politician described it as a “form of loyalty” [rp.pl: 2016] towards the receiving countries, while Poland perceived it as a punishment and a harsh instrument to force it to accept decisions that were against its reason of state.

This way, the migrant crisis not only divided Europe but also created a wall in Polish-German relations. There were more and more voices from Berlin that the PiS government is testing the limits of the deteriorating mutual relations. At the same time, it was emphasized that friendly cooperation with Poland is for Germany a goal in itself. That was why

Germany was convinced that in a difficult time, the policy of rapprochement should be cherished [Lang 2016: 1-4].

It is hard not to agree, especially knowing it was not the first conflicting situation behind us and surely there will be more than one ahead of us. It is not the situations but rather the method of their resolution that has the deciding influence on the shape of mutual relations and respect towards different reasons of state. As P. Żurawski vel Grajewski notes, the discussion in Poland is not about partnership in the Polish-German relations, but barely about the question whether our country will be able to accept Germany's leadership or not. In his view, as long as PO held power, it was clear that the Polish side was willing to accept the fact of German domination in the European arena (also in bilateral relations). However, PiS presented a strongly opposite view on this matter. German hegemony in the EU was something that could not be performed in the long term – J. Kaczyński argued on 12 May 2012 during the “Polska Wielki Projekt” Congress (“Poland the Grand Project” Congress) [Żurawski vel Grajewski 2014: 21-25].

Additionally, since the Germans were used to openness, compromise, and dialogue in foreign politics, they accused the Polish side of utter shortcomings in this area. They claimed the existing “communication channels” were insufficient and deficient, especially in terms of structures for informal dialogue [Lang 2016: 4]. Poland, however, opposed to just being informed about already made decisions or being imposed decisions without having the opportunity to be included in the decision-making process. This alone did not create rapprochement but divided and built additional distance.

### **Instead of a summary: final remarks**

Years 1989-2004

- As J. Kranz notes, Polish-German relations after 1989 and before Poland joined the EU were good but marked with a lack of partnership and low level of common interests [Kranz 2003: 40]. The initial period of reconciliation was for both sides full of fears and great baggage of problems of historical, economic and political nature. It was marked by high engagement, which quickly “burned out”. This opinion seems to be shared by A. Wolff-Powęska who focuses on the asymmetry in the area of foreign policy, decrease of mutual trust, absence of the right climate

for conversations and discussions, both on the Polish and German side [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 5].

- It became visible that there is “fatigue” with the process of reconciliation and that there are no further instruments to establish “what next”. The years 1997-1998 were a period of stagnation, lack of political concepts and time of concentration on internal affairs, especially in Germany.
- German change from a Christian democratic government to a social-democratic one (departure of H. Kohl and power takeover by G. Schröder) significantly influenced and changed Polish-German relations. Germany focused in its foreign policy on building its own strong position in Europe and the world, moving gradually away from the policy of “responsibility” towards the poorer neighbor countries. The policy of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel additionally emphasized the priority of German national interest in Europe [Młynarski 2015: 301].
- Unfortunately, to excessive extent, the Polish approach to Germany’s role in the process of European integration, including its possible leadership after 1989, was and still is varying in time, poorly conceptualized and inconsistent – i.e. dividing the Polish political scene [Żurawski vel Grajewski 2014: 2]. Hence, there was no long-term stable strategy on the Polish side towards its relations with Germany.

Eurozone crisis:

- Eurozone crisis exposed Polish ambitions for a leadership role in its region (or even in the EU) and Germany’s lack of readiness to treat our country as an equal partner on the European arena. Polish expectations turned out to be disproportionate and not yet adequate to actual possibilities, and also showed the asymmetric domination of Germany in this respect.
- During the Eurozone crisis, Poland aspired to be a European leader more than it was perceived as one by the western neighbor. It treated Poland as a “backup”, who is worth having on your side in case of, for example, a conflict with France.
- Nonetheless, the Eurozone crisis showed that Poland was willing to work on a compromise and that it could provide Germany with a much expected support by taking Berlin’s side with its fiscal policy [Buras 2013: 88].

### The Ukrainian crisis

- During the Ukrainian crisis, Poland and Germany strongly opposed Russian policy, including the annexation of Crimea. However, the two countries presented different visions towards the method of solving the Ukrainian-Russian crisis: Germany opted more for a culture of dialogue, while Poland presented a “policy of resolve” (i.e. “deterring” Russia). In this matter, their opinions differed.
- Exclusion of Poland from the talks during Russian-Ukrainian negotiations conducted in Berlin, was asserted by Poland as a failure of its foreign policy. This, on the one hand, undermined Poland’s position as a partner and ally of Germany, and on the other as the advocate of Ukraine in Europe and the EU.
- Despite some differences in the matters of eastern policy, both countries equally opposed intervening or militarily supporting Ukraine [Kucharczyk, Łada 2015: 29], all of which in turn showed an ability to speak with one voice in key matters.

### The immigration crisis

- The migrant crisis did not strengthen Polish-German relations. It actually exposed more clearly their differences in understanding the national interest. It also clearly showed that Germany has the deciding voice in the process of shaping the European migrant policy. Poland was just “ascribed” a role of a disgruntled country, who, without the possibility to influence the European politics, did it by opposing it and by finding coalition partners among states with similar views.
- Poland coined an opinion for itself as a state that breaks the “rigor” of European decisions (decisions which it regarded not only as undermining its sovereignty but also as ones indirectly imposed on it by Germany using EU instruments).
- Germany was perfectly skilled at forcing its own national interests using European rhetoric, and, depending on the needs, finding the right coalition partners. Usually, it was France, although the changing political situation resulted in Austria joining that circle.
- After the change from PO to PiS government, Poland expressed its opinions on the international arena more strongly, especially in areas



which were in opposition to its national interest (predominantly towards top-down setting of migrant quotas, or financial penalties for member states for their refusals).

#### Assessment of the Polish-German partnership

- The Poles hold fears towards German domination, seeing it this time not in terms of a territorial expansion but expansion in the areas of economy and politics.
- “Europe has become German” – wrote German sociologist U. Beck in 2012 referring to a growing role of Germany during the Eurozone crisis. Also, J. Habermas noted that the government of Angela Merkel was rebuilding the Old Continent “after the German fashion”. The philosopher complained that the old vision of European Germany focused on cooperation and compromise is now substituted by an undisguised desire for leadership. On the Polish side, M. Cichocki warned that it was not the integration process any more that defined the German development but rather German needs started to shape the long-term perspectives of integration. He said that the response to the question, asked in 1990: which one, European Germany or German Europe? – is today: European Germany in a German Europe [Kędzierski 2015].
- Although Germany distinctively tried to include Poland in the decision-making process, it was unable to understand the Polish reason of state. The cause for this was mainly a different type of attachment to national identity, its concept and the sense of community. Poles saw themselves above all as a nation, while Germans defined themselves through the lens of being European. Poles emphasized what was Polish, e.g. by opposing predefined EU migrant quotas, while Germany wanted to act by the principle of “European responsibility” (which did not mean ignoring national interests), which is especially visible in the actions of chancellor A. Merkel. As long as such contradictions will be appearing between the two nations, it will be difficult to build a peaceful European neighbor policy. There are no signs that these differences, at least in the near future, will change. Quite the opposite. The Eurozone crisis or the migrant crisis are to Poles arguments for strengthening its national identity. To Germans, they are a sign to engage even more in joint European activities. Analyzing Germany’s leadership role in the EU, it is worth noting that Berlin always tries to mask its role by showing broad

support for its postulates (for example in the negotiations with Greece or in the migrant crisis), or by agreeing upon them first with – according to the old mindset – the weakened Paris in order to present them as the best compromise for Europe [Kędzierski 2015].

- We do not have the awareness that civilization and economic asymmetry forces, especially the Polish, to take a position of a loyal ally. What Germany will be in the future depends also on their neighbors [Wolff-Powęska 2004: 56-57]. This is confirmed by the position of D. Tusk and of his government. As M. Kędzierski continued to assert – the condition of the EU, and paradoxically of Germany itself, would rather benefit from a return by Berlin to the policy of cooperation and compromise, which is postulated by many older German commentators, as well as to a certain reserve in forcing one's own concepts. Germany wants to be the leader of the EU. A true leader works, however, for the success of the whole team, not just for their own success [Kędzierski 2015].
- It is hard not to agree with the opinion of J. Kranz, who claims that despite Poland and Germany's common interests (which does not exclude differences of opinions in some matters), it is impossible to describe it as a partnership, or at least as a symmetry in that area [Kranz 2003: 3].
- Poland has not yet grown to be a European leader. However, this does not negate its role and significance in the EU because it still has a chance to be an ambitious local player, assured of its strength, value and functions it can perform in the region. It all depends, however, on wise decision, selected strategies, ability to make compromise and to convince other states with similar views about own reasons, as well as ability to make compromise with the ones with which it is not always necessarily possible to agree.
- As for today, Poland is not yet a symmetric partner of Germany but an ambitious European state with the potential to be a regional player.

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***The place and role of Poland in the international security system in the light of parliamentary discussions on information provided by ministers of foreign affairs on tasks of foreign policy between 2006 and 2016***

**Introduction**

The study concerns speeches of parliament members during four discussions held in the parliament on 15th of February 2006, 7th of May 2008, 29th of March 2012 and 29th of January 2016.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the study is to reconstruct the vision of the place and role of Poland within the frames of the international security system in the light of parliamentary discussions (the narrative-discursive level) on information provided by ministers of foreign affairs on assumptions of foreign policy by analyzing: (1.) evaluation of executed and planned tasks for Poland at the international level; and (2.) ways of perceiving the international environment - evaluation of the security system and also demands of its reorganization.

The analysis includes polito-linguistic approach, which combines rhetoric, political science and linguistics [Reisigl 2011: 153], as it creates the possibility of capturing this important context of the discourse. International security - the main research category - is a concept that may be compared to a container filled with different meanings by participants of the discourse. Different perspectives of perceiving the international security (points of view) condition the diversity, both in quantity and quality, within the scope of sets of values used for building (creating) these constructs by participants of debates. Assuming that any attempt of introducing an evaluation layer to the analysis would be an unauthorized interference with the discourse and would modify it, it must be underlined here that this paper does not aim at deciding whether the discussed visions are correct but only to recreate the narration constructs.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper uses unpublished article: K. Cebul, *The problem of security in parliamentary discussions held between 2004 and 2014 on information of ministers of foreign affairs on assumptions of Polish foreign policy*, Warszawa 2016. The article was prepared within the frames of the project financed from funds for keeping research potential granted by Faculty Commission for Scientific Research at the Faculty of History and Social Sciences of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warszawa.

### **Political discourse v political action**

For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that discourse (deriving from a wider concept) is a phenomenon and a communication process [Rittel 2005: 21] and political discourse is an occurrence somehow adopted by a political system and at the same time creating its verbal and non-verbal meanings [see *ibidem*: 24]. Assigning meanings to statements while explaining the reality, a question should be asked concerning the relation occurring between an act of speaking and a political action i.e. essentially between two actions placed, as it seems, at different levels. Does an act of speaking enable learning anything about the political reality and thus does it enable understanding it?

Referring to Paul Ricoeur a kind of limitation can be pointed here. While the explanatory function is related only to natural science, it is only (or maybe not less than?) understanding that is left for the humanities. In this case knowledge "is related to experiencing another mind or entity, which is similar to us" [Ricoeur 1989: 158]. It is due to the fact that language is a part of culture and culture lies in language. It means that recognition is possible through language. Therefore language is not only a part of culture (being only a tool) but, as pointed by Jerzy Bartmiński, it is also a codifier of culture [Bartmiński 1988: 8]. If so, we cannot understand a statement if we do not know the language in which it was formed. Understanding, as pointed by Eric D. Hirsch, is therefore a peculiar activity, i.e. "active construction of meaning" [Hirsch 1977: 205] and it is aimed at coordination of common activity of society enabling more comfortable conditions of its survival [Awdziejew, Habrajska 2010: 7]. The so described process is somehow interfered by a variety of points of view being a consequence of a variety of experiences. Experiencing this variety is inevitable and different views on the world and the dispute (contention) over its legality seem to be embedded in human nature as language is a tool for interpreting the reality so it projects the view of the world, strengthens some social values and some forms on contacts among people [Bartmiński 2006: 17].

Accepting the stance represented by Eve Chiapello and Norman Fairclough according to which discourses embrace representation of what the reality could or should look like [Chiapello, Fairclough 2008: 386-387], a question should be asked on who and why uses the given language form and also when and how it is used [Dijk 2001: 10]. If the shape of a statement is decided by its context, the roles played by speakers become important. If the participants of communication process are parliament members it is the relation arising in the area of power which is crucial for parliament debates. According to Ewa Laskowska intention is understood as what the speaker



expresses towards the listener and why this is the essence of an act of speaking [Laskowska 2004: 14]. Therefore each statement may not be considered separately and their context must be taken into consideration, i.e. (1.) social environment; (2.) cultural environment; (3.) historical environment; (4.) physical environment; (5.) situational environment relating to the language occurrence (understood as a contact between a speaker and a listener determined by identity of a place and time of giving the statement and receiving it being specific and special [Puzynina 1997: 27]; and (6.) level of the language occurrence i.e. statements preceding the analyzed statement [Rittel 2003:31-32].

Each parliamentary discussion is organized by the category of rivalry for power. It may rightly be considered as one of major factors influencing the form of a statement. However, it is not the only one. Does parliamentary rivalry not limit significantly the way of perceiving the purpose of the statement? Is the power (having power) the target itself or is it a tool enabling seeking proper purposes? There are no unequivocal answers to these questions. The widespread approach to the ethos of politicians combined with lack of trust and suspiciousness would indicate a positive answer to the first of the questions. Is that, however, not a far-reaching simplification? And it is not about any attempt to defend good names of politicians but rather about indicating that motivation for acting, including language acts, might be more complex than suggested by the perspective of a citizen, who is an observer, not a participant of the rivalry for power and therefore the picture seen from a distance might be simplified. Due to that it is safe to assume that: (1.) the list of sending-receiving strategies is long and diverse; and that (2.) the message is pragmatically conditioned (by i.a. subjective references of description, the model of reality perception, cultural-esthetic convention, descriptive function, the receiver's category). If so it should be recognized that this "pragmatic ambiguity" makes it difficult to find and define the rules for description construction [Witosz 1998: 198-199]. While Tomasz Żyro points that due to civilization changes "cultural capital based on discursive thinking is running down" and this model of thinking is substituted by "image thinking" or a chain of "non-associated images" and politicians "take after pop culture celebrities" [Żyro 2013: 83], political thought - responsible reflection - still breaks through in politics.

### **International security system - concept structuring**

Organizing security is conditioned by perception of threats. A threat is a situation in which probability of occurrence of a state dangerous for the environment appears. It should be understood as occurrence of internal or

international events which might probably cause limitation or loss of conditions for undisturbed existence and internal development or limitation or loss of state's independence and its partnership position in international relations [Pawłowski et al. 2002: 162]. Using the subjective criteria the following threats can be identified: political, military, economic, ecological, social, cultural, IT [Jemioło, Dawidczyk 2008: 40]. It is worth indicating that a threat can relate both to (1.) perceiving events subjectively evaluated as unprofitable or dangerous; and (2.) objective factors causing anxiety and concerns [ibidem: 162].

Contemporary threats to security, "appearing in the conditions dynamics, variability and complexity of social life are more and more complex, diverse and even hybrid" [Pietraś, Wojtaszczyk 2016: 7]. These "quantity and quality changes in conflicts yield in growing anxiety in social life, which in recent year has been enhanced by visions of bankruptcy concerning not only persons but whole states" [Zenderowski 2015: 17]. This results in "security policy becoming extremely complex, concerning a variety of areas of social life" [Pietraś, Wojtaszczyk 2016: 7].

Assuming that internal security is a state and process of balance between threats caused by internal factors and state's ability to protect its internal values and external security is a state and process of balance between threats caused by external factors and state's defensive potential [Nowak 2009: 67] it should be pointed out that the state of security (generally) is influenced by both external and internal factors [ibidem]. Therefore typology of conditions of national security can include internal and external conditions and relations between them, The internal conditions are related to what is happening inside the state. The external conditions involve factors characteristic to the environment of the national security influencing the given state [Kitler 2011: 101]

It is hard to draw a borderline between internal and external aspects of matters in international relations and security problems [Kostecki 2012: 64] especially taking into consideration the facts that: (1.) international security is a state and a process, in which states pursuing security protection through individual and group actions constitute the "driving force" [Balcerowicz 2012: 362]; and that (2.) national security is "the basic type of international security seen from subjective point of view [Maj 2015: 11]. Taking additionally into consideration that security structure (generally) contains four basic levels: (1.) subjective (personal, national, international, global); (2.) objective (values, means, tools, state's activity); (3.) process (politics, strategies, codependence); (4.) structural-execution (organizations, institutions, activities) [Nowak 2009: 66] - it is visible that possibilities for

connections, dependences, reciprocal conditioning and influence are essentially unlimited, so establishing borders seems impossible. The system's elements condition each other, and if so, it is impossible - at the level of international security - to overlook the internal functional dimension of states and contrary to that - not to include the importance of external factors while analyzing national security. This relation is already included in descriptive categories (for example participation, forming) used to specify the activity's character.

As Czesław Maj underlines we should talk about comprehensive security i.e. consider international and national security in con-generic manner including particular forms and levels remaining in strict connection and completing each other [Maj 2015: 23]. We should remember, however, that, as Radosław Zenderowski states, the state is probably "more and more helpless subject of international relations". It is due to the fact that states are not able to solve a growing number of problems on their own. Therefore they are somehow forced to cooperate with other participants of the international system [Zenderowski 2005: 131]. On the other hand if solutions are sought within the frames of the international system the key role is played by the potential of states. Threats for international security are best visible on states' level. They are also perceived and considered from perspectives of particular states, which in turn results in different interests making different positions and furthermore usually different visions of security (Cebul, Zenderowski 2016: 295-296). National interests, as noticed by Mirosław Sułek, influence targets of which security is the most important one. It is due to the fact that every political unit (similarly to a person) pursue survival. Security might be based on opponent's weakness or own power [Sułek 2013: 49].

### **Prospects of place and role of Poland - the discursive level**

Parliamentary debates concerning assumptions of foreign policy of the Republic of Poland are held at the beginning of each year. They include a presentation of the government standpoint and a discussion on the condition of Polish foreign policy. Four discussions held after parliamentary elections were chosen for the analysis: 2005 - discussion held on 15th February 2006 [Information 2006]; 2007 - discussion held on 7th May 2008 [Information 2008]; 2011 - discussion held on 29th March 2012 [Information 2012]; and

2015 - discussion held on 29th January 2016 [Information 2016]<sup>2</sup>. As indicated above the shape of the discourse is conditioned by the rivalry between ruling and opposition parties. Fight for power is combined here with dispute over international significance and role of Poland and therefore manners of executing the Polish foreign policy (courses of actions and possibilities) and assessments in this scope.

Each election brings change, reorganization or continuation of the balance of parliamentary power. Reconstruction of this balance makes it possible to show political divisions and power of influence of each conception presented during the debates. It should be argued that the power of influence at the parliamentary level should not be directly connected with support for the party. The standpoint on foreign policy does not have to be the main or the only factor behind voters' decision. Neither it has to be such a factor at all.

On 25th September 2005 the parliamentary election was held. As a result Law and Justice [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS] gained 155 mandates and created a minority government. Other parties in the parliament were: Civic Platform [Platforma Obywatelska RP - PO] - 133 mandates, Self-Defense [Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej] - 56 mandates, Democratic Left Alliance [Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - SLD] - 55 mandates, League for Polish Families [Liga Polskich Rodzin - LPR] - 34 mandates, Polish People's Party [Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - PSL] - 25 mandates, German Minority [Mniejszość Niemiecka - MN] - 2 mandates [2005 Elections]. The elections held on 21 October 2007 gave PO 209 mandates and allowed it to create a government coalition together with PSL (31 mandates). Other parties that got to the Parliament were: PiS - 166 mandates, Left and Democrats (LiD) - 31 mandates and MN - 1 mandate [2007 elections]. The elections held on 4th August 2011 allowed PO (207 mandates) once again to create government with PSL (28 mandates). Other parties in the Parliament were: PiS - 157 mandates, Palikot's Movement [Ruch Palikota] - 40 mandates, SLD - 27 mandates and MN - 1 mandate [2011 elections]. The elections held on 25th October 2015 gave PiS 255 mandates, which allowed them to create the government on their own. Other parties in the Parliament were: PO - 138 mandates, Kukiz'15 [K'15] - 42 mandates (Kukiz'15 is not a political party but an association), Modern Party of Ryszard Petru [Nowoczesna] - 28 mandates, PSL - 16 mandates and MN - 1 mandate [2015 elections].

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<sup>2</sup> Statements of each speaker were not indicated in the analysis included in this paper. They constituted the basis for recreating narrations of main political powers in Polish Parliament.

The key category for perceiving international security in parliamentary discourse is the area and process of the European integration. It is not perceived uniformly but it constitutes the environment for security and the processes inside it are described by participants of debates as increasing (guarantee) or decreasing (destabilization) the level of security of Poland. It should be indicated that the time limit of the analysis - 2006-2016 - is important from the perspective of the context (conditions) of the discourse. Before 1st May 2004 when Poland became a member state of the European Union (EU) there had been dominating standards of political correctness of a state pursuing membership in the Union [Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 2001: 192]. As a result of this peculiar pressure a shallow consensus for the support of the integration with the EU was created, as described by Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz. It concerned both the widely understood public opinion and opinions of politicians. The threat anticipated by E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz was described as "instability of consent" to the process of integration, which might have revealed and intensify as consequence of growth of the feelings of confusion and being uninformed [Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 1998: 90, 99-100]. The results of the parliamentary elections held on 23rd September 2001 were already a promise of it. The parliament was then also entered by: Samoobrona and LPR - parties considered as anti-EU from the perspective of political correctness. These parties got to the parliament again as a result of the election in 2005. Of course the support for these parties should not be perceived as conditioned only by anti-UE feelings or fears of the integration process, especially taking into consideration that joining EU was claimed to be the biggest success of the 3rd Republic of Poland by majority of Poles in the fall of 2004 and further studies showed preservation and spreading of positive approach towards rightness of that decision [see. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 2005]. However, taking into consideration that the public discourse was dominated by matters focused on economic advantages of the integration, both the shallowness of the consensus and the conditionality of the consent seem probable. Especially that challenging, i.a. by Samoobrona and LPR, the political correctness discourse within the scope of integration somehow forced pro-Union parties to reconsider this process.

Analyzing the discourse in the area of international security it should be also indicated that referring to the process of integration and generally Western Europe has wider context and is historically conditioned. Western Europe, not only currently, is an important reference point for Poland in many functional aspects. It should also be indicated that Western Europe was also that kind of reference point in the past [see. Cebul 2015: 68-70]. The

relations between Poland and Western Europe is best illustrated by contrary concepts such as: affiliation, participation, chance and on the other hand abandonment, betrayal, submission, dependence and fear. In some part it is also based on emotions, but since Poland joined EU the emotional argument has significantly weakened.

The key role for assessment and postulates formed in the area of international security of Poland is played by the diagnosis of the state of security at three levels (approaching it generally): (1.) political, (2.) economic, (3.) military [see: *ibidem* 73]. The characteristics of these levels presented below is adequate for all four debates and shows general, repeating elements (together with factors differentiating standpoints) included in each communication. This observation proves stability of points of view presented by parties and relative stability of divisions. At the political level it is about the widely understood functional (institutional-legal) and decision ground, which has internal and external dimension (in relation to both: Poland and EU). From the perspective of Poland we may discuss the internal dimension relating to effectiveness (organization) of the Polish state. It should be noticed that the integration area, being an external environment of Poland, is basically also a peculiar internal area as all major parliamentary powers recognize the subjective role of Poland in EU or at least they see such a possibility. Therefore Poland being included in EU mechanisms is a functional element of this environment (much concern is raised here regarding the effectiveness of the European Union, erosion of the system caused by uncontrolled inflow of immigrants and also the possible scenario of Great Britain leaving the EU - discussion of 29.01.2016). The manner of perceiving the place of Poland in the EU (relations with the EU) by each parliament party is important for conditioning certain creation possibilities but also for the perception of Poland by the EU environment.

Two categories are useful to analyze the relations between Poland and its EU environment: (1.) modified independence rule and (2.) classical independence rule [see: *ibidem*: 74]. The construction of these concepts and meanings assigned to them do not aim at evaluating each standpoint but are only an attempt to categorize some different points of view observed during the speeches of parliament members. It must be underlined that the importance of Polish presence and participation in the EU is basically recognized by all political parties (including Samoobrona and LPR, which were critical towards the conditions of Polish membership in the EU and plans of developing the integration; threat of losing independence understood as making Poland dependent on other countries - the discussion of 25.02.2006). Therefore it is important to reach beyond the narration often

used in parliamentary disputes showing particular parties or politicians as opponents of integration as well as the accusation of insufficient or even detrimental actions regarding the Polish national interest. They should be treated only as rhetoric figures aimed at discrediting the opposite point of view, because the analysis of parliamentary discourse takes its context (conditions) under consideration but it avoids assessment.

PO, PSL, SLD (LiD), Ruch PL (and as it seems also Nowoczesna) use a modified way of understanding independence, which is not approached only from a particular perspective of a country but a country placed in a structure of connections, so through this dependence. It seems that the classical concept of independence for a state, in the case of these parties is shifted to the level of the EU, which accounts for the fact that the assessment of the position of Poland is made in relation to stability and functionality of the whole system and from this very perspective. At the same time these correlations are treated by the aforementioned parties as objective necessity with no other alternative for Poland and as guarantee of peculiarly understood unity in the EU, i.e. conditions of security.

Standpoints of PiS, Samoobrona, LPR (with high probability also K'15) can be described referring to the category of decision independence, that can be basically directly derived from the classical concept of independence. Simplifying it, in accordance with this concept the only subject empowered to make some decisions is a state and these are key factors from the perspective of Polish national interest. However, not only do these parties fail to notice the environment in which Poland functions, which, as may be assumed, they recognize to be able to be somehow tested as enabled by Polish presence in the EU and instruments of influence related to it. For these parties the European Union is not a simple aggregate of national interests, which may be summed up and reconciled. The EU is an area of articulation, rivalry and execution of interests and the membership in the EU itself from the perspective of these parties only creates some rules of acting, but it never decides about any particular interest of any particular state that will be taken into consideration. This is determined by the state's influencing power.

On the other hand, the external dimension considered from the perspective of Poland is constituted by the whole international environment (including the European Union). The external dimension of the EU i.e. the elements surrounding the EU influencing both the security of the EU and Poland being the system's member should also be indicated here. The following categories also fit into this area: economic security (competitiveness of Poland, competitiveness of the EU), energy security, Eastern policy, fighting terrorism in the EU and its surroundings (fighting the

threat of Islamist fundamentalism - discussion of 29.01.2016, this threat was also indicated by PiS and LPR during the debate of 15.02.2006). Eastern policy and terrorist threats are areas of both political and military dimensions (see below).

The economic level of security is perceived as a possibility of development of potential and competitiveness of Poland and the EU. These issues were and still are clearly present in the discourse on integration. Admittedly the European Union is no longer perceived in one dimension, only from the perspective of economic profits which Poland can (should) gain, and politicians look at the economic integration from a wider perspective (seeing its meaning for other areas) as they see important elements of political security there. This is obviously an arguable matter but for some of parties: PO, PSL, SLD (LiD), Ruch PL - Poland joining the Eurozone would be equal to developing integration and thereupon enhancing security. The Eurozone is to be, in the assessment of these parties, a peculiar jointer of national interests of each state making them more and more uniformed and consequently cohesiveness of EU actions (both externally and internally). For PiS, Samoobrona, LPR in turn developing the integration with Eurozone mechanisms is seen as a threat to decision making independence of states, i.e. its significant deterioration by possible domination and control of stronger EU member states using this financial document (discussions of 07.05.2008 and 29.03.2012).

As far as the military dimension, often matched with political security by politicians, is concerned, it is conditioned mainly by Poland being a member of NATO and the alliance with the United States of America. NATO and the USA are the main guarantor of Poland's security. This military security system is particularly important in relation to Eastern policy (the conflict in Ukraine and threats connected to actions taken by Russia - discussion of 29.01.2016) and fighting terrorism (discussion of 29.01.2016). It needs to be underlined here that the military security is conditioned by political security indicated by following democratic standards. Thus perception of military security relates to the level of democratization of the environment and any deficit in this scope (for example Russian actions against Ukraine) are seen as a threat. As far as the Eastern Policy of Poland and the EU in relation to necessity of supporting Ukraine and the role of Ukraine in the international security system from Polish perspective is concerned (discussion of 29.01.2016) there is a visible consent among representatives of parliament parties, apart from the standpoint presented by K'15. The necessity of aiding Ukraine is contrasted by necessity of Ukraine



critically reviewing its past. and also instability of Ukrainian system - the problem of corruption.

## **Conclusion**

The presence of Poland in the European Union deteriorated the anti-Union attitudes visible before the accession among representatives of the main parliament parties. The EU is basically perceived as "internal environment" (in which Poland participates in creating the security system) and next to NATO and the USA - as a significant guarantor of security of Poland. In spite of such observation a clear division must be indicated. It concerns a possible scope of relations among EU member states, approval for development of integration and is based on different understanding of independence and therefore national interests and manners of their execution. Thus the vision of Poland is the starting point for the perception of international security (threats and stabilizers). Looking only at concepts presented by two biggest parliament parties: PiS and PO these are two separate projects which may be defined as: (1.) construction/reconstruction and (2.) continuation. They are based on different assessment of the process of democratic changes in Poland started in 1989. Trying to describe this construction it may be assumed that the standpoint of PiS concentrates on system dysfunctions of the transformation (construction/reconstruction) while the standpoint of PO underlines successes of the transformation period (continuation).

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***Post-1989 changes in the status and functions  
of Polish borders***

**Introduction**

Borders are an essential component of a state, beside territory, population and authority. As Malcolm Anderson first noted, frontiers are both institutions and processes [Anderson 1996: 1]. In such a meaning, frontiers are both a dynamic object and an instrument of state policy. Frontiers are established through political decisions and regulated by legal acts. No principles which organize economic, social and political life of societies can work without frontiers. "Frontiers as processes are instruments of state policy because governments attempt to change, to their own advantage, the location and the functions of frontiers [...] And the policies and practices of government are constrained by the degree of *de facto* control which they have over the state frontier" [ibidem: 2]. Such an understanding of frontiers emphasizes their dynamic and changeable nature. A frontier, as a site where varied state activities take place, can be a specific indicator of the state's character, as well as the state's relationships with its surroundings. In such a sense, the character of a frontier can be subject to modifications, while its status and functions (roles, objectives) can be subject to change. The same frontier can be, at certain time and in certain political (and geopolitical) circumstances a barrier, a wall, a protective cordon, a separation line, while at other times it can become a bridge, a site of exchange, contact and cooperation.

In such a sense, the process of transforming Polish borders will be presented from the creation of the Third Republic as a result of political and socio-economic changes within the state, which were the consequence of the collapse of the whole Eastern block and the Soviet Union, to the period after Poland's accession to the EU and the Schengen area. The article presents synthetically two key changes in the functioning of Polish borders, the functions they fulfil and their importance in international relations. The first change was connected with the creation of a new order in the Eastern and Central Europe at the turn of the 1980s. Then, Poland regained full political control over its borders and established new principles of their functioning, control and protection. Contrary to the isolationism of the previous era, the principles of border crossing were thoroughly liberalized, border traffic increased rapidly and border regions started to thrive. Since the end of the

1990s, these borders have undergone subsequent transformations, this time aimed at strengthening control of movement of persons and goods and protection of the border between crossing points. This process was an element of Polish borders' legal, institutional and operational Europeanization, conducted in connection with Poland's preparation to the accession to the EU and the Schengen area. Since then, the territory of Poland became part of the Schengen area in a formal, legal and political sense, while the functions of Polish borders were diversified due to their division into internal and external EU borders.

When describing these two transformations of Polish borders, particular emphasis will be put on the changing functions of the borders in the context of their openness *versus* closeness. These categories relate to the extent to which borders constituted or abolished barriers to the movement of persons and goods [Langer 1999: 5], became a place for contact and cooperation or separation and division. Border openness or closeness is determined by conditions and opportunities for legal border crossing at designated points. The openness-closeness is influenced also by identity documents and authorizations required to cross the border (e.g. passport, identity card, visas, temporary permit), additional documents (e.g. health certificate, personal invitation), as well as control procedures and practices conducted on the border by border guards. All these factors effectively influence border crossing opportunities and are determined by the binding administrative provisions of each state, legal regulations concerning particular borders and crossing points, as well as each state's bilateral and multilateral international agreements. A certain addition to the analysis of border openness is indicating their permeability, understood as practical possibility of crossing borders by undesirable factors inside and outside the checkpoints. A border's permeability is influenced by its whole technical infrastructure, physical means and modern technologies used to exert control as well as prevent and detect occurrences of illegal border crossing. An analysis using these research categories will allow to obtain an actual picture of the changing principles guiding the functioning of Polish borders.

### **"Opening" Polish borders after 1989**

Although the whole period of Polish People's Republic was not uniform, as far as border crossing principles in force at that time are concerned, despite periods of greater liberty in the matter, Polish borders back then were sealed and highly impermeable. The borders were set arbitrarily and imposed onto Poland both in terms of their location and establishing the rules for their crossing and control. They were distinguished

by the authorities creating numerous restrictions in border traffic, accumulating administrative difficulties in passport, visa, foreign exchange policy and structural restrictions in international traffic, both with officially allied and Western countries. What is more, border control and protection of socialist states' borders, including Polish borders, even though it was not adjacent to any Western European state, was fully militarized and conducted by special military formations. The objective was to render the borders as impermeable as possible for everything the then authorities deemed to be a menace not so much to state security, but to the stability of its political and economic system. The borders isolated the country from external influence, restricted movement of citizens (and the exchange of thought and opinion which it would entail) and all economic, cultural and social cooperation not only with states with other government systems, but even with neighboring countries.

A profound change of Polish borders' political status and the principles of their functioning took place along with the democratic transformations at the turn of the 1980s, which occurred in Poland and then in all Central and Eastern Europe. As a result of these transformations, the location of the Polish borders remained unchanged, unlike in other Eastern bloc countries, but their status, geopolitical significance and functions changed completely.

Above all, as a result of the union of East Germany with the Federal Republic of Germany, the collapse of the USSR and the declaration of independence by Poland's neighbors – the Republic of Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, as well as the division of Czechoslovakia, Poland gained six completely new neighbors. By the end of 1992, the political map of Europe changed thoroughly. On the West, the Third Republic bordered the Federal Republic of Germany (with a border of 489.37 km), on North-East the Russian Federation (with a border of 232.04 km with the Kaliningrad Oblast), and its Eastern neighbors became: the Republic of Lithuania (with a border of 104.28 km), the Republic of Belarus (with a border of 418.24 km) and Ukraine (with a border of 535.18 km). In the South, Poland acquired borders with the Slovak Republic (border of 541.06 km) and the Czech Republic (border of 796.04 km). Poland had to establish international relationships, determine the principles of political, economic, social and cultural cooperation with all its new neighbors, including issues concerning common borders. This task was not an easy one due to different interests and foreign policies of Poland's new neighbors, which gave rise to huge differences between its relationships with each of them.

During this exceptional period of creating a new geopolitical order in Europe, a priority of Poland's foreign policy became the aspiration to construct a system of collective security in Europe, balancing the relationships with two key neighbors: the disintegrating USSR and the uniting Germany, and cooperating locally with Central and Eastern European countries<sup>1</sup>. Poland, now bordering with the Federal Republic of Germany, became a borderline country for the European Communities and then the European Union, which greatly influenced its subsequent choice of political priorities. In the years to follow, they took the shape of striving to participate in European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes (within the NATO and the EU).

As far as borders were concerned, it was desirable to ensure their inviolability in the first place, as well as renounce the previous isolationism, which did not go in line with the interests of the society and the free-market economy. The situation was all the more favorable for Poland that in the early 1990s, the new neighboring countries officially confirmed the inviolability of Polish borders, which was expressed in the signed declarations on good-neighborly relations [Szymański 2014]. For Polish borders with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania, whose line could be potentially problematic due to historical burdens, the stabilization of the common borderline<sup>2</sup> was guaranteed not only by treaties, but also by geopolitical choices made in these states. These states, who directed their international activities towards the participation in NATO and EU structures, just like Poland did, fully accepted the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and border inviolability, inscribed into the treaty foundations of the European integration process.

However, the security of Polish borders depended mainly on the relationships with its two largest neighbors: the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation. It was an undoubted success that as

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<sup>1</sup> The priority to build cooperation in the Central European region was accomplished, among others, by creating several forms of international cooperation, such as the Visegrád Group, CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) and the Central European Initiative.

<sup>2</sup> Post-1990 agreements sealed by Poland with these countries: *Agreement on good neighborliness, solidarity and friendly cooperation concluded between the Republic of Poland and the Czech and Slovakia Federative Republic in Kraków on 6 October 1991 – in force from 4 May 1992*, Official Journal of Laws 1992, no. 59, item 296; *Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighborly Cooperation concluded between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania in Vilnius on 26 April 1994 – in force from 26 November 1994*, Official Journal 1995, no. 15, item 71.



early as in 1990, a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany was signed, confirming the common borderline on Oder and Neisse rivers. The treaty was supplemented with *Treaty on good neighborliness and friendly cooperation*<sup>3</sup> signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991, which emphasized, among others, the importance of Polish-German relationship for the European unity and initiated cultural cooperation between these two countries. In the following years, the dynamics of cooperation between Poland and Germany increased, notably in economy and regional cooperation, through the creation of institutionalized cross-border regions.

In 1992, Poland also signed a treaty with the Russian Federation<sup>4</sup>, in which both sides recognized their common border as inviolable and stated that they have no territorial claims towards each other nor would lodge such claims in the future. However, the actual scope of political relations with Russia did not proceed as smoothly as Polish-German relations due to the strongly rooted traditional imperialism of the country, which could not be conquered by the new authorities and which was reinforced by an increase in nationalist tendencies since the 1990s. These tendencies were expressed in the doctrine of the "near abroad", which was in fact a manifestation of Russia's lack of approval for the new borderlines. The doctrine consisted in Russia awarding itself special rights in relationships with countries created on the basis of ex-Soviet republics, which rose to independence and sovereignty. It meant *de facto* treating these countries as an area reserved to Russia's international activities. Russia had such an attitude towards three countries, directly bordering Poland: Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, which from the very beginning was a potential threat to the security and stability of Polish Eastern borders<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> *Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation concluded between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn on 17 June 1991 – in force from 16 January 1992*, Official Journal of Laws 1992, No. 14, item 56.

<sup>4</sup> *Treaty on Friendship and Good-Neighborly Cooperation concluded between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation in Moscow on 22 May 1992 – in force from 8 May 1993*, Official Journal of Laws 1993, No. 61, item 291.

<sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that since the very beginning, the Russian Federation, in its foreign policy, treated countries belonging to the so-called USSR external empire (which was the name for the zone of Russian influence in the communist Russian imperial doctrine), including Poland, in a special manner [Rościszewski 1997]. This meant perceiving Central European countries as Russia's inherent zone of influence and manifested through Russia's attempts at hindering the processes of integrating these countries with the Western structures (NATO and EU). Observing the current undertakings of the Russian authorities in what concerns Central and Eastern Europe, which has been part of the EU for over 10 years, it seems that Russia has not renounced the main assumptions of its geopolitical

While Lithuania, like other Baltic countries, managed to escape Russia's influence despite its attempts at destroying Lithuania's integrity using the large Russian minority, other Poland's neighbors, Belarus and Ukraine, did not. Belarus has been politically and economically dependent on Russia since 1995, which is sanctioned by the *Agreement on friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation*, signed that year, and the establishment of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in 1997. This dependency has been reinforced and extended in the subsequent years. As for border-related issues, a manifestation of the dependency is a virtually full openness of the Russian-Belarus border, which has no border traffic control (except for heavy goods vehicles) and in some places has not even been demarcated. This situation naturally entailed the necessity to increase control on Poland's borders with both these countries.

Russia's relationship with Ukraine is different than the one with Belarus and influences the security and inviolability of Poland's border with Ukraine. Ukraine first resisted Russian imperialism thanks to its strong sense of statehood and nationalism, creating its own independent and sovereign state. However, Russian economic pressure (mainly in terms of fossil fuel supply) gradually led to a disorganization of part of Ukraine's economy and, as a consequence, increasing political influence of pro-Russian groups in the country. When part of Ukrainian political elites and society replied by turning to the West, the Russian pressure increased until Russia seized Crimea in 2014 and conducted an armed intervention in the Eastern Ukraine. In the face of such a policy exerted by Russia, the activities of the Polish authorities concerning Ukraine since it gained independence have been directed at supporting the country's European aspirations, both by including it in NATO security structures and gradually integrating it with the European common market area.

Despite the complexity and variety of political relationships with the new neighboring countries, after 1989, on all Polish borders there was a turn towards liberalization of border crossing regulations. Above all, new Polish authorities, similarly to other countries in the region, eliminated cumbersome and restrictive regulations concerning obtaining a passport and purchasing foreign currencies. No-visa traffic was introduced between Central European countries and with the Baltic states and Ukraine. From the early 1990s, many European countries (including Germany, France, Italy,

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doctrine. It still does not cease in its attempts to destroy Europe's fragile unity and turn Central European countries against the old EU countries.

Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Finland) gradually removed the visa obligation for Polish citizens. An important expression of this opening of borders were agreements signed with Germany (1992), the Czech Republic (1995) and Slovakia (1996) concerning local border traffic, facilitating border crossing for people living in border regions. On the Eastern and North-Eastern borders, in 1993, more than a dozen simplified border crossing points were opened for the inhabitants of border areas.

These changes brought about a dynamic growth of border traffic. In 1991, individual traffic increased by 40% in comparison with 1990. In 1994, over 217 million people and over 65 million vehicles were checked at border crossing points [Dominiczak 1997]. The Western border had the most intensive border traffic, while the Southern border was the second most intensive. In the following years, the traffic on the Eastern border increased as well. In 1997, individual border traffic on the whole segment of the Eastern border (including the border with the Russian Federation) amounted to 29 million people, which meant an increase of 74.3% in comparison with 1991 [Straż Graniczna 1998].

A sudden increase in individual and freight border traffic uncovered the total lack of preparation of the border infrastructure to the new situation. Gigantic changes to the infrastructure and organization of control points became necessary. As a result, numerous old road and railway border crossing points were modified and a number of new ones were opened, while the border infrastructure was modernized and computerized. Thanks to that, on the Polish-Czech border, the distance between border crossing points was only 7 km, while on the Polish-German border it was ca. 12 km [Sobczyński 2008: 51]. In total, 259 border crossing points functioned in Poland in 2004, including 92 with the Czech Republic, 52 with Slovakia and 38 with Germany [based on *ibidem*: 49]. Huge changes have also been implemented on the Eastern border. In 1990, the whole border had only five border crossing points, including two road and three railway points. For example, on the longest section of the Eastern border – with Ukraine, where before 1989 there was only the crossing point in Medyka, new crossing points in Dorohusk (1990), Hrebenne (1991), Kroscienko and Zosin (1994) and in Korczowa (1998) were opened. Simultaneously, the number of crossing points on the border with Belarus, Russia and Lithuania increased, although the underdevelopment of border infrastructure on the Eastern border can still be felt.

In the 1990s, a process of total transformation of patrolling, controlling and managing Polish borders took place. In 1990, the Act on state

border protection<sup>6</sup> was passed, establishing new principles of its protection, border traffic control, detecting and prosecuting cross-border crime. Principles of dwelling and staying in the border area were liberalized, limiting the area to 15 km from the borderline. Border protection and traffic control were entrusted to the newly-organized Border Guard (based on the pre-war formation), changing its status from military to civil-military. A number of new border traffic regulations were issued, concerning also fighting and detecting cross-border crime. It is necessary to remember that along with the intensification of border traffic, the number and scale of this type of crime went up, including trafficking of goods. On Eastern and North-Eastern borders, a common practice became small-scale smuggling of excise goods, on which the inhabitants of border regions support themselves. At the same time, serious international crime developed, including smuggling goods on a large scale and immigrant trafficking, which treated Poland as a transit country.

### **Polish border and accession to the EU and the Schengen area**

Thorough changes of the character of Polish borders and their functions took place as part of the process of Poland's accession to the EU, which required an adaptation of Polish legislation to EU standards and solutions, including regulations concerning border protection and crossing control<sup>7</sup>. Acceding the EU required from Poland to adopt all institutional and legal solutions as well as principles and procedures of border control, regulated by the Schengen area law. On the one hand, thanks to that, Polish citizens gained the opportunity to travel freely around the entire Schengen area, but on the other hand, Poland became obliged to render its Eastern border impermeable.

Polish accession to the Schengen area did not occur automatically on 1 May 2004, but upon the decision of the Council, confirming the implementation of Schengen regulations and effective fulfilment by Polish services of all obligations resulting from these regulations. According to these procedures, Polish accession to the Schengen area (along with 8 other EU member states) took place on 21 December 2007, when control on Polish land and sea borders with other Schengen area states was lifted. On 30

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<sup>6</sup> *Act of 12 October 1990 on the Protection of State Frontier*, Official Journal of Laws 1990 No. 78, item 461.

<sup>7</sup> The date of 20 March 1997 can be treated as the starting point of this process, when the Polish government filed a memorandum to Brussels, expressing the willingness to adapt the level of security on its external frontiers to the one in force in the EU.

March 2008, unrestricted crossing became possible also on Polish air borders.

However, in order for it all to be possible as early as several years before Poland's formal accession to the EU, the process of transformations started, consisting in gradual diversification of functions and significance of particular sections of Polish borders. Existing borders with the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Federal Republic of Germany and Slovakia<sup>8</sup> were to soon become internal borders of the EU (and the Schengen area), while borders with Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine – external borders of the EU (and the Schengen area). The division into internal and external borders of the EU meant that these borders would serve completely different functions in the Schengen zone. Some of them had to be prepared for a complete removal of standard border control while others needed reinforced control at border crossing points and effective border protection between the crossing points. In general, on the borders with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania, focus was placed on simplifying border traffic (with formal preservation of control and protection of the borders until December 2007), while on the borders with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, the level of impermeability was increased so that they could serve all the control functions of external EU borders.

These processes included a gradual Europeanization of Polish legislation concerning border control and conditions for foreigners' entry into the territory of Poland [Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska 2014]. What was the most important here were the changes in regulations concerning state border protection<sup>9</sup>, border guard and foreigners<sup>10</sup> as well as the necessity to adapt Polish visa policy to the EU standards<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> First, preparing part of Polish frontiers to obtaining the status and function of internal borders of the EU and the Schengen area did not concern the frontiers with Slovakia and Lithuania, which were not in the group of countries starting EU accession negotiations in December 1997. The situation changed after 1999, when the EU during the Helsinki summit agreed to start negotiations with Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta.

<sup>9</sup> A thorough amendment to the act on state frontier protection took place in June 2007 and was connected to the need to organize frontier crossing principles and frontier control and prepare them to adopting the *Schengen Borders Code*.

<sup>10</sup> Key changes consisting in transposing community rules regulating movement of persons through the frontiers were implemented under *Act of 13 June 2003 on Foreigners*. The act determined the principles and conditions for entering the territory of Poland, crossing, staying within and leaving the territory, procedures and competent authorities in this matter, in accordance with Schengen *acquis*. In 2003-2013, the act was amended numerous times due to the constant development of relevant EU legislation. On 12 December 2013, a completely new

As far as regulations on protecting the state border and the Border Guard were concerned, basic Schengen regulations were adopted, such as the division into tasks carried out at border crossing points and related to the protection of borders between crossing points, as well as the division into border control, border checks, border protection and second line control. A system of border control, developed within the Schengen area, was implemented. It deviated from control principles and practices used until then on Polish borders. The system divided types of control into permanent and random, detailed and simplified, dedicated to particular types of borders (external or internal) and to certain categories of foreigners<sup>12</sup>.

These changes were accompanied by the process of transforming the Border Guard, started in 2000 and going two-way: on the one hand, forces had to be appropriately allocated, taking into account the changes to the status of particular sections of Polish borders, and on the other hand internal organizational structures and formation management had to be modified. Allocation of BG personnel meant that the number of officers decreased on internal EU borders and increased on external EU borders<sup>13</sup>. On the East and North, forces and means to protect the borders physically and control border traffic were concentrated, while the South and West focused on operational and investigative work as well as random mobile control performed within the country [Pietraszczyk 2008: 65]. Another element of this process was the professionalization of the Border Guard, reinforcing the staff potential of the formation and conducting training to prepare the guards to performing new

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act on foreigners was adopted and came into force on 1 May 2014 See *Act of 12 December 2013 on Foreigners*, Official Journal of Laws 2013 item 1650.

<sup>11</sup> In this scope, key events were the introduction of visa obligation for citizens of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine on 1 October 2003 and the elimination of simplified frontier traffic with these countries. Experts voiced concerns that the change would have a negative influence not only on the functioning of frontier area inhabitants, who supported themselves on cross-frontier trade, but also, in the long term, on the relationships between Poland and its Eastern neighbors [Gromadzki 2001].

<sup>12</sup> In accordance with *Schengen borders code*, citizens of non-EU states have to undergo a thorough and unified check, regardless of whether they are obliged to possess a visa or not. Every check includes inspecting travel documents, establishing the objective and length of stay, determining whether the person has sufficient means of support, checking the SIS and state databases for threat concerns regarding the person. The only deviation from this procedure is the simplified check used for local border traffic. EU citizens, when entering or leaving the territory, undergo a "minimal check", meaning an inspection of travel documents in order to verify their identity.

<sup>13</sup> In 2009, it was stated that ultimately, BG infrastructure was to comprise 95 outposts, including 79 on the internal border [Straż Graniczna 2009].

tasks (detecting illegal immigration or combating terrorism, for instance) and fulfilling the standards of control used in the Schengen area (notably preventing bribery among guards). The end result of these modifications was a complete transformation of the BG (by 2015) into a modern, police-type border and immigration service<sup>14</sup>, taking into account the allocation of forces and means which correspond to the division into internal and external EU borders.

At the same time, a number of changes to border infrastructure was undertaken in order to adapt the Polish border to the functions it fulfilled in the Schengen system. On land borders with the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovakia, all obstacles restricting free movement across the border were eliminated. To this end, border infrastructure was removed or its purpose was changed (e.g. to use as training facilities). From January 2004 to 31 December 2008, 56 BG outposts on the internal EU border were excluded from the state border protection system. At the same time, the existing border infrastructure on the border with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine was gradually developed and modernized. In 2005, there were 12 functioning border crossing points (road and railway) on the border with Ukraine, 6 on the border with Russia (plus one only for simplified border traffic) and 13 on the border with Belarus (including one river crossing point) [Moraczewska 2008]. By 2015, two more road crossing points were created on the border with Ukraine. Moreover, border infrastructure on airports was modified as well, with the division of passenger traffic into within the Schengen area and beyond the Schengen area. However, mainly due to the large scale of border traffic on the whole Polish external EU border, the focus point was on activities which improved the flow of border traffic and at the same time increased the effectiveness of control checks, both at border crossing points and between them.

Despite numerous changes implemented as early as in the 1990s, subsequent modernization of equipment was necessary, including notably the purchase of modern equipment needed to perform completely new competences of the Border Guard (in connection with illegal stay and employment of foreigners, performing crime and risk analyses and combating terrorism). By the end of 2007, a special challenge was also the adaptation of Polish border service to the most modern information and communication solutions, including connecting all border outposts to the Schengen Information System II. The Border Guard, in order to perform its

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<sup>14</sup> In this matter, it was essential to transform BG into a leading immigration service, which would fully complement civil migration structures.

control tasks, had to have quick access to person and goods databases (including ones that are stolen, wanted and undesirable in the EU) and ensure the highest possible level of protection for this classified information. These changes visibly decreased the waiting time and the time needed to perform border checks on Eastern borders, and clearly improved the work of officers fighting cross-border crime.

The original fears that Poland's accession to the EU and the Schengen area, as well as the ensuing adoption of EU legislation in what concerns visa policy, border crossing regulations and control would have a negative impact on border traffic dynamism on new external EU borders have not come true. A significant, but short-lived decrease in border traffic was noted only after the introduction of visa obligation for Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian citizens in 2003, which was a result of Polish visa legislation being adapted to EU solutions. The largest decrease was noted on the border with Ukraine, but since 2004, traffic on this border has increased again. Data on border traffic show that in 2004, a total of 33 million individual border traffic checks was performed, which was only a 1.4% decrease in comparison to the previous year [according to Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska 2005: 32]. In the subsequent years, the intensity of border traffic stayed at a similar level, with fluctuations in both directions, depending on the changing detailed regulations concerning crossing of borders by persons and goods.

Polish authorities, in order to limit the possible negative consequences of Eastern border sealing in connection to it taking the role of external Schengen area border, took advantage of a certain flexibility of Schengen regulations and liberalized provisions concerning crossing of the borders by certain categories of persons. In this aspect, a key factor was the signing of agreements on local border traffic with neighboring countries regarding the inhabitants of border areas (areas up to 30 km from the border, and in special cases even up to 50 km). In 2009, such an agreement with Ukraine entered into force, and in 2012 – with Russia<sup>15</sup>. Pursuant to these agreements, citizens of both states, living in border areas, gained the possibility to cross the border multiple times due to social, cultural, family, economic reasons (except for commercial reasons) under simplified rules, i.e. without the need to possess a passport, a visa or a certain sum of cash

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<sup>15</sup> In July 2016, due to the organization of the NATO summit in Poland and the World Youth Days, Polish authorities made the decision to suspend the performance of agreements on local frontier traffic. After these events, local frontier traffic on the border with Ukraine was restored, but the decision to prolong the suspension of local frontier traffic on the frontier with the Kaliningrad Oblast was made for security reasons.



resources. Regarding the agreement with Ukraine, these regulations are of greater importance for its citizens than for the citizens of Poland, as Poles could already travel and stay there before up to 90 days without the need to possess a visa. It is worth emphasizing that local border traffic both with Ukraine and with Russia is more beneficial than simplified border traffic on the Eastern border before the accession of Poland to the EU [Parol 2014: 203].

Another event to simplify the crossing of the Polish border was the Act on the Card of the Pole entering into force in 2008. It allowed the citizens of ex-USSR states with Polish ancestry and admitting to being a Pole to obtain a long-term residence visa free of charge, which granted them the right to cross the border with Poland multiple times, as well as the right of residence, employment and education on the Polish territory. During the three and a half years that this act has been in force, over 75 thousand people applied for the Card of the Pole, out of whom 88% were citizens of Ukraine and Belarus [Wołłejko 2011: 156].

The research to date has shown that facilitating border crossing, especially by local border traffic, has had a positive influence on increasing border traffic and the expenses incurred by foreigners in the Polish border area [GUS 2015]. It has had important positive consequences for the economic functioning of Polish border areas, notably in the face of social fears concerning the possible negative impact on the life of border area communities due to the sealing of Eastern borders as Schengen borders.

Nonetheless, the implemented measures to facilitate the crossing of Eastern borders, which are now external EU borders, did not eliminate the huge disproportion in the functioning of particular sections of the Polish borders which has become a fact since 2009. The general division of Polish borders into internal and external EU borders introduces numerous differences between them. First of all, it is reflected by the scale of border traffic on these two types of borders. In 2014, the intensity of border traffic on Polish internal EU borders was 6 times larger than on the external borders [GUS 2014: 73]. It stems, first and foremost, from the lack of any restrictions in free movement of persons on the internal borders, while external EU borders have a number of restrictions to crossing them and obtaining a Schengen visa and the right of residence in the Schengen area for non-EU citizens. Secondly, the rules of patrolling and controlling these sections are different. On an external EU border, border controls are conducted systematically and in detail, and are additionally reinforced by control measures within visa or asylum procedures conducted on non-EU territories. On internal borders, however, it is forbidden to conduct activities

meeting the criteria of border controls, so they are replaced with police activities performed on the basis of the same principles within the whole Schengen area. Thirdly, while on the internal borders, the tangible, infrastructural functioning of the border is clearly fading, which is also influenced by numerous cross-border initiatives (such as common traffic routes or underlying infrastructure), on the external borders it is gaining momentum, and the borders become clearly defined in the physical space and play an important role in the activities and imagination of the inhabitants of border areas.

To sum up, Poland's accession to the EU and the Schengen area brought about a new status for particular sections of its borders: the status of internal or external EU and Schengen area borders. The sections of Polish borders which became internal EU borders and where fully free movement of persons was introduced lost their status as state borders in the practical sense, but maintain it in a symbolic and political sense. On parts of Eastern and Southern borders, which took over the function of external EU borders, the notion of state border is reinforced in the practical sense, but its symbolic and political aspect is redefined as they transform into community borders, i.e. a border of a *sui generis* territorially-organized political community [Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska 2014: 324]. Polish borders which obtained the status of external EU borders do not perform only functions vital for the protection and security of the state and its citizens, but have become Schengen area borders, assuming the common responsibility for the control and protection of the internal security of all member states. It also means that Poland must accept the fact that formal and legal decisions determining the principles and procedures of control and protection of the Polish border are made with the participation of all Schengen area member states. In other words, Poland's membership in the EU, besides numerous economic and social benefits resulting from the functioning of the Schengen area, brought about also certain restrictions to the free definition of state policy in the areas of border management, person movement control and protection of borders against cross-border crime.

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In conclusion, after structural and geopolitical transformations in the whole Central and Eastern Europe, the "new" Polish borders undoubtedly became places of intense border traffic and gradually increasing, both in

terms of its scale and intensity, cross-border cooperation<sup>16</sup>. As a consequence, the previous underdevelopment and peripheral character of border areas was gradually overcome and they gained new opportunities for economic, social and cultural growth. Polish borders in the 1990s had a relatively high level of openness, particularly with regard to minimal formal and legal requirements for border crossing. The main restrictions to border crossing were a result of an insufficient number of border crossing points and deficits in control practices, which led to growing queues at border crossing points. It is also worth emphasizing that after 1989, Poland returned to its role as a transit country both for international trade traffic routes and for movement of persons. Besides positive, pro-development tendencies which resulted from it, a relatively high degree of Polish borders' permeability was revealed and cross-border crime emerged, which was a new challenge for the border guard.

Since the end of the 1990s, Polish borders have undergone subsequent political, legal, institutional and operational changes as a result of an ongoing diversification of their function during the process of acceding to the EU. In particular, the organization and management of Polish borders has been transformed and adapted to the institutional and legal standards and solutions of the integrated external EU border administration system. Poland's accession to the EU, and then to the Schengen area, caused the part of the Polish borders which became internal EU borders to open fully to movement of persons and goods, while other parts of the borders, as external EU borders, became subject to EU's rigorous border regime (including the common visa code), the same in all member states. These thorough functional changes of the Polish borders were accompanied by a fundamental change to their status. Currently they are not only borders between countries, but also (internal or external) borders of a special political community. It means that the political nature of the community, its rights and the type of territoriality on which it is based determine the status and functions which Polish borders have had and will have in the future.

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<sup>16</sup> Cross-border cooperation developed dynamically notably on the border with Germany, where Euro-regions were created, enabling the financing of projects fostering this cooperation from EU funds. As part of these activities, infrastructural initiatives were performed, not only in the basic scope (roads, bridges, frontier crossing points, sewage treatment plants), but also in the form of building schools and even a university (European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder)).

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The ambition of the editors of this book was to prepare a set of articles concerning the selected aspects of the subject of dynamic changes taking place in Poland and the whole European Union. The papers present scientific interests of young researchers working at the Institute of Political Science at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. The work is divided into four topic areas: "Political processes", "Economy and society", "Culture" and "Poland on the international stage".

The first part includes two papers: "Internet and democracy. Development of digital citizenship in Poland" and "Coalition politics in Poland in the years 1991-2015 – in search of rules". The second part contains three articles: "Influence of economic crisis on the benefits resulting from the membership in the Economic and Monetary Union. Poland's perspective", "Poland – a land of prosperity?" and "Social work in politics and penitentiary rehabilitation in Poland and the selected EU states". The third part of the book is composed of two articles: "On the significance of Christianity for European integration and meta-political consequences of Polish accession" and "Spatial history-based politics? Remarks on relations between power and architecture in Poland after accession to the European Union". The last part includes four papers: "Poland: an ambitious pawn or a European partner? An outline of the evolution of Polish-German relations", "Polish development cooperation after the year 1989. Continuity or change?", "Place and role of Poland in the international security system in the light of parliamentary discussions on information provided by ministers of foreign affairs on tasks of foreign policy between 2006 and 2016" and "Post-1989 changes in the status and functions of Polish borders".

*Editors*

The reviewed work edited by Andrzej Rudowski and Mariusz Sulkowski entitled 'Poland in the European Union - perspectives of membership' is an attempt of approaching difficult and current problems and challenges of Poland in the perspective of its membership in the European Union. The wide view on the researched matters presented by the Authors specialising in the included areas constitutes the added value of the book.

*Part of the review by dr hab. Karina Marczuk*



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